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ABSTRACT
It is today commonly acknowledged that rape is a weapon of war. This consensus 
has been achieved in significant part through the efforts of feminist scholars and 
activists. Yet the consensus hides a multiplicity of ways in which weapons of war 
might function. This thesis uncovers and critically explores that variety.
First, it turns to questions of what makes a form of inquiry specifically feminist, 
the better to understand the foundations for claims about rape as a weapon of 
war. Having offered a critique of existing divisions of empiricist, standpoint and 
postmodern feminisms (and of the distinction between feminism and gender 
theory), the thesis proposes a view of feminism as critical explanation: as at once 
explanatory, political and ethical inquiry. These view is expanded on through a 
framework of modes of critical explanation: styles of reasoning that provide 
analytical wagers, narrative scripts and normative orientations for feminist 
inquiry.
Second, the thesis explores three such modes of critical explanation in relation to 
wartime sexual violence. It argues that the modes of instrumentality, unreason 
and mythology implicitly structure feminist claims about war rape. Each is 
examined in turn, with particular attention to how the forms of explanation 
mirror debates found in war studies and in social theory more generally. Each 
mode is clarified and expanded on, resulting in sets of propositions for each mode 
and in a clearer sense of where modes contradict each other and where they may 
combine.
Third, this meta-theoretical and theoretical framework is applied to the specific 
case of atrocity in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Working through 
several kinds of empirical material (studies of sexual violence, histories of conflict 
in the Great Lakes,  data on economic dimensions of violence and testimony from 
combatants and ex-combatants on the topic of sexual violence), the thesis shows 
how ‘the rape capital of the world’ is best understood in terms of themes derived 
from the modes of unreason and mythology. It explores retaliatory atrocity, 
extractive sexual violence and fragmented sexual aggression as three situated 
dynamics of violence. This part thus critiques a narrowly instrumentalist idea of 
wartime sexual violence as a strategy of profiteering, whilst also attending to how 
economic dimensions matter in the war complex as a whole.
The conclusion draws out consequences for further work,  especially in relation to 
a comparative project for the critical explanation of  wartime sexual violence.
I know you have reasons
A rational defence
Weapons and motives
Bloody fingerprints
But I can't help thinking
It's still all disease
Fugazi, 'Argument'1
1! From Fugazi 2001.
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Introduction
THE ATROCITY EXHIBITION
The center of the scene is occupied by a suffering body, a body reduced to a 
totally available object or, rather, a thing objectified by the reality of pain, 
on which violence is taking its time about doing its  work. Death may come 
at the end, but it is not the end in view. The dead body, no matter how 
mutilated, is only a residue of the scene of torture. The special form of the 
horrorism of which the torturer is the featured protagonist actually prefers 
to consummate itself on the living body, to prolong the suffering inscribed in 
the vulnus, bring the vulnerable one to the limit of bearability of pain and 
offense. As every torturer knows, the vulnerable is not the same as the 
killable. The latter stands poised between death and life, the former between 
the wound and healing care.
Adriana Cavarero, Horrorism 1
This thesis is about horrific acts – acts which can induce a sudden nausea – and our ways of 
accounting for them. Specifically, our ways of accounting for them as feminists. Which is to 
say: as people who claim that human social relations are currently saturated by gender; who 
identify a conjoined history of hierarchical orderings promoting the 'male' (however 
understood) and denigrating the 'female' (however understood); who hold that this state of 
affairs demands transformation; and who engage in some political work (variously 
interpreted) towards that end.2  Although my animating interest is in feminism so 
understood, what follows sometimes goes quite beyond that, into conceptual foundations 
and sometimes into theoretical side-streets. My attention is not only on what feminist theory 
is, but also what it can do, and consequently to the objects of a feminist curiosity,  which are 
many. What, after all, does it entail to talk of horror as a feminist, and what variety does the 
talk hide?
·  1·
1! Cavarero 2008:31–32.
2! I propose this as a suﬃcient minimal definition of feminism, one which very many self-declared feminists 
would share. There are other definitions, and strictly unifying principles are likely impossible. Here, as 
elsewhere, the language of a 'family resemblance' is helpful, but this articulation has the virtue of uniting 
diﬀering strands of feminism (which might disagree over terms like 'male', 'female', 'transformative', 
'hierarchically', 'political work' and so on) whilst separating them from gender theorists (who may not recognise 
the same degree of hierarchy nor accept the need for transformation), non-feminists (who do not agree that 
gender is a central dynamic of human aﬀairs or do not recognise the political claims of critical theorising) and 
anti-feminists (who may agree with the diagnosis but see in this a most welcome ordering). More on those 
positions later.
The principal variant of horror examined is that of war rape, which has always been of 
particular interest for feminism, and which will sometimes be referred to in what follows as 
wartime sexual violence, sexual brutality or sexualised aggression.3 Atrocities of other kinds 
will also be attended to, not least because it is often so hard to separate the 'sexual' from the 
not. The naming is difficult, and the reason lies in the ontology of violence itself (and maybe 
in the ontology of everything). As Elaine Scarry once showed, acts of torture and war have 
to convert violence into discursive sensibility: to appropriate physical suffering away from 
the body and render it as evidence of  sovereignty, authority, power.4
The act of theory is also a transubstantiation of the unspeakable into a regime of 
truth. A practice of naming and embalming in abstraction. For post-structuralists and 
others,  this has often indicated the violences of theory and of language itself. In the 
case of sexual violence, the traumatic dimension of theorising can be quite literal. 
Many studies approach the question of rape by trying to engage with women (and very 
occasionally with men) subjected to the most intimate of violations, and to build 
upwards from a fidelity to their suffering. A particular way of 'thinking from women's 
lives'. There is something almost reassuring about proceeding in this way: of grounding 
understanding in the truth value of direct experience. The difficulty,  as always, is that 
the events and the pain is very soon layered in discourse; the academic-activist 
accounting always already mediated in thought,  which is itself embodied,  relational, 
empathetic, held in common, and gesturing towards the wider field of knowing and 
doing. And there is always also the problem of interpellation: of how the researcher 
will be read and understood by others,  perhaps especially if he is a man writing about 
rape.
·  2·
3% Sexual violence refers to the range of violence that includes sexual torture and humiliation, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization and forced pregnancy (this definition follows that of Wood 
2009:133). Rape, which is defined as the forcible penetration of the anus or vagina with any body part or object 
or the penetration of any body part of the victim with a sexual organ, is perhaps the major example of sexual 
violence, but does not exhaust its many varieties. Importantly, sexual violence is only one part of a wider range 
of practices called gender violence. I take these definitions to be relatively unproblematic in the context of war 
and the feminist analysis of rape in war, but an overview of the relevant conceptual issues is provided by Reitan 
(2001) and in Bourke (2007)  A more complete list of forms of sexual violence that intersect with political 
violence is provided by Enloe (2000:109–110)
4! Scarry 1987.
This thesis  does not reveal a truth about wartime sexual violence. It seeks instead to 
open and examine the multiplicity of feminist accounts about rape in war. The most 
basic constitutive element of what is to be discussed – war rape – is itself in sore need 
of scrutiny. It is indeed instructive to observe just how different the history of peace 
rape has been (if we can tempt oxymorony with such a formulation). In spite of 
considerable progress, rape in the 'domestic' sphere remains mired in many familiar 
clichés, from victim-blaming and demonisations to divisions amongst 'progressives' and 
'radicals' over certain cherished male figures.5  By contrast, there are few who would 
today deny that rape is a phenomena of war. Louise du Toit suggests some reasons 
why: because consent is not an 'issue' in war rape; because rapes gain visibility through 
political expedience; because war rape is deliberate and systematic,  while ordinary rape 
is  isolated and random (a view we will have some grounds to challenge); because there 
is  relational, communal damage in war rape as a kind of genocidal hate crime; because 
rape is a form of communication among men and so has more weight in war; and 
because rape in distant war zones is ‘othered’ so as to appear exotic and problematic, 
thus fostering a view of peacetime rape as free of political significance.6  Of course, 
many scholars do not let the admission that war rape matters interfere with the conduct 
or content of their research, and it is  still not granted the policy resources of such rivals 
as terrorism or nuclear proliferation. But in the field of discourse at least, war rape is 
no longer hidden as it once was. Moreover, its acknowledgement now takes a common 
and instantly recognisable form. That of  rape as a weapon of  war. A curious visibility.
It is the interrogation of rape as a weapon of war that is the running theme of the 
thesis. An interrogation both of the language of that phrase in feminist accounts and 
what it means (we might say,  of the construction of rape as a weapon of war), but also of 
the practices of war/rape. An inquiry both into talk about war rape and into war rape 
·  3·
5! In the course of writing up this thesis a whole series of such stories took centre-stage, from the case of Julian 
Assange (in which one strategy of his defenders has been to pour scorn on the rape charges against him and to 
question whether the acts he admits to engaging in count as 'real rape' at all) to that of Todd Akin (the 
Republican Representative who suggested that women could not get pregnant from 'legitimate rape').
6! du Toit 2009:291–292.
itself.7  Does the formulation of 'rape as a weapon of war' merely assume that war itself is a 
weapon of something else, a tool, the 'Clausewitzian' cliché of politics by other means? Is it 
a reduction to the economic or the military? The answer developed here is that 'weapon of 
war' means many things, all of them feminist (some, perhaps, not quite so feminist). Each is 
a way of rendering rape political,  and of making it into the kind of object that cannot be 
either ignored or integrated within an otherwise patriarchal paradigm. The divisions that 
emerge are over just what is entailed in the political, over just what kinds of uses weapons 
can have,  and over how those weapons are apprehended in thought by the people who go 
about using them. 
This entails the bleeding together of a series of constitutive and causal questions. What is 
rape? What is war?  What kind of composite thing is war rape and how does it work? After 
all, just how important is the 'war' framing in which sexualised aggression is enacted? This 
thesis is  a critique (to deploy a much over-used term) not because it seeks to overturn or 
refute the feminist position (it indeed accepts it as an analytical baseline and as an 
indispensable political-analytical achievement), but because it works at it from within, 
revealing its contested margins, cautious of its affinity with certain other ways of 
conceptualising war, and attentive to the complexities of its simultaneously explanatory, 
political and ethical character. An empathetic questioning. And an attempt to hold on to 
troublesome concepts.8
The thesis is  built on three layers of reinterpretation – first of feminist inquiry in IR, 
then of modes of critical explanation for wartime sexual violence, and finally of the 
dynamics of war and rape in the Eastern DRC. It progresses in three parts, each 
dedicated to a different layer. 
·  4·
7! I will use the term inquiry over its rivals – theory, paradigm, hypothesis, method, epistemology, ontology – to 
be purposefully vague. These are all ways of framing in thought, but too often they suggest a formality of 
hypotheses, or a definitive edge, that they lack in practice. That, or they try and fix conceptual problems at a 
certain level (for example, ontological rather than epistemological). Unlike Patrick Jackson, I do not accept the 
desirability of speaking in terms of ‘science’. Like Jackson, I seek a term adequate to the diﬀering ways in 
which the world is thought. Inquiry, then, designates a form of thought marked by a certain consistency of 
form, a problem or phenomena which it addresses, and the possibility of critical discussion on both those 
fronts. It therefore includes within its remit normative thinking, as well as empirical claiming, conceptual 
categorisation, model making, theory testing, ideal typification, and so on. For the more restricted view of 
inquiry as science, see Jackson (2010).
8! This was the advice given to the room by Barry Hindess at ISA 2011 in Montreal: don't just take the things you 
like from a theorist. Hold on to what troubles you, critique and expand it.
Part One deals with the problem of war/rape (or,  rather, what I find problematic about 
it)  and with questions of knowing and method in feminist IR. It settles some questions 
and opens up others. Chapter 2 in particular seeks to move beyond one common 
framing of the feminist contribution – that of the empiricist/standpoint/postmodern 
triptych – and one false debate – that between feminist and gender studies. Chapter 3 
builds on this by trying to show that feminist analysis has always been explanatory and 
political and ethical. Moreover, that the explanatory dimension of feminism is 
inescapable, at least so long as inquiry into practices of sexual violence is proposed as 
one of its dimensions. Borrowing from some debates in the philosophy of social 
science, it advances the case for feminism as critical explanation, and sets out the 
framework of  modes of  critical explanation.
It is this framework that enables Part Two, which distinguishes three modes of critical 
explanation in feminist accounts of wartime sexual violence: modes of instrumentality 
(largely rationalist,  materialist and orientated towards military and economic 
reasoning),  unreason (principally concerned with fracturing, desire, trauma and the 
psychoanalytic), and mythology (the site of collectives, cultures, symbolism and 
behaviours of ritualism and habit). These styles of reasoning animate feminist inquiry, 
although they are usually only implicitly present, and each produces a complex picture 
of how rape happens. A close reading of each yields three sets of propositions which 
guide research into given cases of  wartime sexual violence. 9
Part Three takes this enlarged framework and seeks to use it to make sense of an 
apparently singular case: that of war rape in the DRC over the last decades. Rather 
than testing the modes one by one, as if they were theories, it examines different 
dimensions of conflict in the DRC. Having provided an overview of what we know 
about war rape there, and of the related dilemmas of interpretation, Chapters 8-10 
each fix a different aspect – respectively, regional histories of violence, the 'resource 
curse' thesis of some activists,  and the discourses of combatants themselves – as the site 
for a close examination. The result is not a clear endorsement of one mode over the 
·  5·
9 Some of the material presented in the first two Parts has appeared in a separately published journal article 
(Kirby 2012a).
other. Instead, a combination of associated logics emerges, and supports an argument 
for the relative disconnect of patterns of war (which often involve collective identities, 
and rely on access to economic goods attained through violence)  from those of war 
rape (which have a much more fractious character, only sometimes related to strong 
cultural senses, but more often emphasising themes of  need, frustration and revenge).
These moves – from meta-theory to theory to empirics – successively concentrate the 
thesis.10  As in all serious attempts at inquiry, the theoretical and meta-theoretical 
debates occasionally struggle for purchase amongst the dense detail of violent histories. 
One way to avoid this  is to reduce one part of the argument to the others, to decide the 
questions in advance through theoretical or empirical fiat. Viewed thus, what gaps do 
emerge are not signs of success so much as evidence of a fraught reckoning. Or, as 
Theodor Adorno once put it, “the splinter in your eye is the best magnifying-glass”.11
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10! This is, of course, a simplification. Part Two is both meta-theoretical and theoretical (and draws on empirical 
examples in setting out its case), while Part Three continues to draw on, and in turn informs, theoretical issues.
11! Adorno 2005:50.
Part One
lootpillageandrape
Rape...shocks. It shocks, but then it loses its distinctiveness. Typically,  when 
rape happens in the midst of war, no individual soldier-rapists are identified 
by the victims, by their senior commander, or by the media (if there). The 
women who suffer rape in wartime usually remain faceless as well. They 
merge with the pockmarked landscape; they are put on the list of war 
damage along with gutted houses and mangled rail lines. Rape evokes the 
nightmarishness of war,  but it becomes just an indistinguishable part of a 
poisonous wartime stew called 'lootpillageandrape'.
Cynthia Enloe, 'When Soldiers Rape'1
A Poisonous Wartime Stew
These words, with which Cynthia Enloe begins her influential discussion of war rape in 
Maneuvers, are followed by a caution against two related traps: first, that “women must be 
listened to, but with an awareness that their stories are likely to be complex” and second, 
that “exposing militarized rapes does not automatically serve the cause of demilitarizing 
women's  lives”.2  A warning, then, about both the complexity of feminist inquiry and the 
myriad intimacies of gender and war. It is with these two questions that Part One is 
concerned. Beginning with a survey of war/rape, it sets out the existing challenges and 
distinctions that mark feminist inquiry, before trying to understand what it is that that kind 
of inquiry consists of. Dealing with dominant paradigms and alternative views of 
explanation drawn from the philosophy of social science,  it proposes an understanding of 
feminist IR as at once explanatory,  political and ethical, and shows how this can translate 
into a framework of modes of critical explanation, to be applied to the substance of 
accounts of  wartime sexual violence in Part Two. 
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1! From Enloe 2000:108.
2! Enloe 2000:108, 109.
Chapter One
WHAT WAR/RAPE IS
When they start falling
Executions will commence
Sides will not matter now
Matter makes no sense
How did a difference become a disease?
Fugazi, 'Argument'1
'Weapon of  war' could be many explanations...I'm not sure of  any of  them.
UN official, Goma, Democratic Republic of  Congo, June 20102
Goma
Arriving in what the international humanitarian/media community has labelled 'the rape 
capital of the world' in June 2010, I was struck by a number of things, each of which could 
yield a thesis on global politics. The first was the humanitarian segregation of Goma. As the 
Eastern DRC has become subject to increasing international attention over the decades, so 
too has Goma. Although MONUC, the world's largest peacekeeping force, is formally head-
quartered in Kinshasa, many of its employees live and work here. So too do the UN agency 
and NGO workers who travel Goma's streets in clean 4x4s, inhabiting an air-conditioned 
intervention space as they bump along roads rendered nearly unrecognisable as such by 
neglect, conflict and the volcanic detritus of Mount Nyiragongo. Together these intervening 
subjects sustain the local hotel economy, keep the specialist supermarkets afloat, and 
patronise the high-quality local restaurants (occasionally mingling with war crimes 
indictees).3  Humanitarian business is conducted behind barbed wire, giving the whole place 
the feeling of two completely different forms of life rubbing uncomfortably against each 
other (Figures 1 and 2). I passed one Sunday afternoon playing tennis on a private court in a 
large and gated property on Lake Kivu, tranquil but for the happy sounds of playing 
children inside. It was owned by a European, the only licensed dealer of those much 
demanded 4x4s in the region.
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1! From Fugazi 2001.
2! Interview with UNHCR oﬃcial, Goma, 2 June 2010.
3! McClelland 2011.
Figure 1: The gate to the UNICEF compound, Goma, Eastern Democratic Republic of  Congo, June 2010
·  9·
Figure 2: UN Attack/Power Hero: A toy for sale at one of  Goma's more up-market stores, June 2010
The second was the contrast between Eastern Congo and Rwanda. Goma is  in reality 
territorially contiguous with Gisenyi, the major city on the Rwandan side, and the only 
impediment in moving from one to the other is the queue at the border. Both sit on the 
northern tip of Lake Kivu, and I had travelled to the Eastern DRC by driving through 
Rwanda from Kigali airport because it was easier than making my way from distant 
Kinshasa. But geography aside, Goma and Gisenyi could not be more different: the former 
dishevelled, the latter pristine. It was not unusual to see MONUC troops on their day off at 
the border, waiting to pass across the invisible line to a place where they could relax. Goma 
for work; Gisenyi for leisure. A reality at total odds with the persisting Western imaginary of 
Rwanda. One of the other homes that I visited was on the Gisenyi side, shared by a married 
international NGO official and a Congolese think tank chief. It was stunning, and the party 
was splendid. During conversation, I discovered that there were some legal disputes over the 
home, which had apparently previously belonged to a high-ranking genocidaire.
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The third impression, and the most relevant to the substance of this thesis,  was of the 
frustration, and the frequent despondency,  of those I interviewed.4 Few thought that much 
could be done about sexual violence, nor about violence generally (a point dealt with at 
greater length in Chapter 7). I had asked each what they made of the idea that rape was a 
tool of war in Congo, but few had given it much thought. None could draw on an 
organisational line which expressed the place of sexual violence in conflict theoretically. 
Each worked to some extent on programmes tackling sexual violence and were to varying 
extents themselves producers of representations of sexual violence (Figures 3 and 4). Yet most, 
especially the international agency respondents, stressed the degree to which day-to-day 
logistical issues took precedence over conceptual coherence. A substantial proportion of 
those I spoke to not only recognised this as a problem, but expressed a strong desire that 
things be otherwise,  and saw the lack of theoretical clarity over wartime sexual violence as 
something likely to undermine efforts to end it.
This conceptual messiness is not restricted to those intervening in the DRC. Rape may be 
used in war in a variety of ways, just as it may be deployed by authority figures, family 
members, partners or strangers in times of peace. Nor is the point to resolve conceptual 
difficulties so that the forces of 'policy relevance' can better achieve their ends. The trouble 
is, at least in part, with the idea that 'war rape' is any sense a stable and solid object. The 
issue, then, is how to think war rape. This chapter provides an initial survey of these 
problems, moving through existing feminist debates about the (in)visibility of rape, issues 
around analysis - including male rape - in feminist accounts, before moving on to an 
assessment of  how to apprehend both war and rape as co-implicated processes of  violence.
·  11·
4! The full list of interviewees is provided in the appendix. The results are expressed most clearly in International 
Alert 2010, the report for which the interviews were undertaken. Consequently, I deploy the interviews 
impressionistically throughout the thesis to concretise analysis, but not as definitive evidence.
Figure 3: Representing  Sexual Violence/Recycling  Rape Myths: A public awareness poster on rape produced 
by a Congolese NGO in Goma. The mother is warning  her daughter of the possible consequences of leaving 
the house dressed provocatively.5
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5! This was the message as clarified by Sage Mulinda of the NGO Alpha Ujuvi, Goma, 3 June 2010.
Figure 4: The Constant Danger of Rape: A child's view of sexual violence. The young  girl has been 
surprised by an attacker whilst collecting water, the jerry can of  which has fallen to the ground.6
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6! Part of a project by ActionAid to get children (all between the ages of 10 and 12) to express their view of 
violence against children through drawing. The best pictures are then collected for advocacy work and for 
collection into a book. Interview with Dr Muteho Kasongo, ActionAid Education Rights Coordinator, Goma, 2 
June 2010.
An Obscured Object
Sexual violence is marked by silence. Just as experiences and individuals judged properly 
'feminine' have been historically placed outside the political sphere in discourses on 
collective violence, rape and its brutal avatars have barely featured in legal judgements on 
correct behaviour in war.7  And while the 'peacetime' extent of rape has been obscured by 
the fears of victims and the public mythologies that sustain them, wartime sexual violence 
has been rendered mute by appropriation into the language of property rights, with women 
considered part of the rewards due to the victor, along with cattle and land.8 In both cases, 
sexual violence has been located within a private domain, a conceptual move which itself 
suggests the operations of power – the shifting public-private distinction which might be 
read as the primary mechanism for the organisation of  political authority.9
Silence has also been a central motif in feminist critiques of IR. An early diagnosis that 
women had been 'hidden' from international politics; curiosity about how the workings of 
gendered power are made invisible to analysis; and persistent charges that feminism is 
marginal within the academy10 – all speak to the historical obscurity of sexual violence as a 
topic of  scholarly concern:
Realists do not deny that women suffer in wartime and that they suffer in 
particular ways. Off the record (not in print, not at the podium) a realist 
may acknowledge the common use of rape as a weapon of war. But the 
realist will not go further. He or she will not accept that the construction 
and articulation of gender identity, or sexual identity or racial identity, 
might play an important part in the causation,  enactment and continuation 
of war. The actors who matter to the realist,  the people the realist thinks it is 
worth watching and listening to, are only that handful of people – usually 
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7! Although rape has been a crime of war in some military codes since the 14th century, and in modern standards 
like the 1907 Hague Regulations, charges were seldom brought and available sanctions almost never imposed, 
not even at the Nuremberg Tribunal. A prominent exception is the conviction of Japanese oﬃcers for the war 
crime of rape at the Tokyo Tribunals after World War II (see Meron 1993:425; Brownmiller 1975:61). On gender 
and the private/public divide and its relevance to politics see Elshtain 1995.
8! Bourke 2007; Brownmiller 1975:31–35.
9! See, for example, the discussion in Owens 2008:979.
10! Examples are multiple, but see Halliday 1998; Enloe 1996, 2001; D’Costa 2006; Sylvester 1994b; Tickner 1997.
male, usually members of the dominant ethnic group – with enough power 
to steer a state. They  are the causal factors. Everyone else is a mere 
consequence, or coincidence.11
War in the DRC is another context in which the notion of silence has featured strongly. 
Given the general absence of public discussion of, and scholarly attention to, the conflict, 
and (contested) estimates of some 863,000 to 2.83 million excess deaths from conflict-related 
causes there since 1998, it is not surprising that it is often described as a 'forgotten war', 
especially where advocacy and media coverage lag so far behind that devoted to Darfur or 
Iraq.12 
Today, such silences are openly challenged, if not broken. Within social science, the growth 
in work on gender and conflict suggests that the 'taboo' on these issues has finally dissipated. 
'Mainstream' IR journals publish articles not only on rape but also on more general issues of 
women's  (in)security.13  Not coincidentally, feminist IR has also attained a firm enough hold 
for itself in the discipline's self-image to be considered 'beyond marginality' by some.14  And 
in the DRC, vivid reports of sexual violence have made rape the most (internationally) 
recognised aspect of the conflict, which conforms in its own way to the historically imagined 
'truth' of the Congo as a metonym for chaos and brutality.15 In each case,  silence no longer 
seems to be the greatest problem.
Marysia Zalewski suggested once that feminist IR is the work of persistently asking two 
questions: 'what about women?' and 'what work is gender doing'?16 In the case of wartime 
sexual violence women are everywhere. At least, they appear to be everywhere. Because 
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11! Zalewski and Enloe 1995:295.
12! 5.4 million excess deaths is the more familiar figure and comes from International Rescue Committee 
estimates which were widely accepted for years. More recently, considerable doubt has been cast on those 
figures by the Human Security Research Project. I use the best estimates of the two sides as the low and high 
figures here (see International Rescue Committee 2008; Human Security Report Project 2011:123–131). On 
DRC as a 'forgotten war' and the comparison with other conflicts, see Oxfam UK 2000; Mamdani 2007.
13! Skjelsbæk 2001; Carpenter 2003b; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Hudson et al. 2008.
14! Squires and Weldes 2007.
15! See L. F. Jackson 2007. Journalistic dispatches  from the DRC have also emphasised that 'Silence = 
Rape' (Goodwin 2004) and agencies like UNICEF have used similar motifs (UNICEF 2008). For a brief 
account of recent depictions of the DRC, see Dunn 2001.
16! Zalewski 1995:341.
international political inquiry hid war rape from itself, the place of both women and gender 
in it once went unacknowledged. But in the wake of what we might call the feminist 
insurgency, gender too is everywhere. This does not simply 'solve' the problem, since women 
and gender are together made present in a particular way. Hence the need for attention to 
Zalewski's second question: to the work that gender is doing, both as narrative and as reality. 
What do we know about war rape? Who do we see in sexual violence? What assumptions 
underly ideas of perpetrators and perpetrated upon? And to what uses is such rape discourse 
put? 
A Hideous Ubiquity
The view of rape as a historically obscured object sits uncomfortably alongside the success 
since the mid-1990s in establishing sexual violence as a major concern of the security-
development nexus. We know now that rape is a weapon of war. Such is the refrain of 
practically all contemporary academic research, political advocacy and media reporting on 
wartime sexual violence. At the highest levels of global governance, it is  now acknowledged 
as a war crime and a constituent act of genocide to the extent that some talk of achieving 
the “international criminalization of rape”.17 US Secretaries of State speak publicly of rape 
as a “tactic of war” as they pledge to make its eradication a strand of foreign policy.18  Press 
accounts deal not only in the terminology of rape itself,  but also in sexual violation as a 
powerful metaphor for the full range of suffering attendant on contemporary collective 
violence.19 
Sexual violence strikes us as extreme. Like the mutilation of bodies or the language of racial 
supremacy,  it can promote outrage over inquiry.20  In an age where much is written on 
virtuality and violence, on dismemberment at a distance, war rape appears as the primal 
horror, as the original penetration on which all those accumulated metaphors of sexual 
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17! Engle 2005. See also Bergoﬀen 2009. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820, passed on 19 June 
2008, describes wartime sexual violence as “a tactic of war” and as “widespread and systematic”. Statements in 
support of the Resolution referred to sexual violence as “a weapon of war” no less than nine times (see United 
Nations Security Council 2008).
18! See Clinton 2009.
19! Examples abound but see Smith-Spark 2004; BBC 2006; le Carré 2010; Bleasdale 2009; Kristof 2010; 
Goodwin 2004.
20! Kalyvas 2006:24–26.
dominance rely.21 Its raw physicality exposes the Real;  it is the ultimate co-presence in war.22 
The representation of certain crimes as 'unimaginable' in their brutality, particularly in the 
popular imagination, risks reducing organised violence to these expressions, sacrificing any 
analysis of  interests and causes to a vague psycho-pathology of  war.
Yet academic investigation commits its own kind of error when it conceptualises sexual 
violence as unrelated to the character of  a war itself, as Véronique Nahoum-Grappe warns:
When the terms 'excesses', 'blunders', and 'errors' are used to describe 
certain violent incidents arising from political action, the term has to be 
understood as containing a dual injunction to ignore what has to be 
mentioned. The 'excesses' correspond to some extreme act which, however, 
adds nothing. The 'blunders' are minor 'slip-ups', as if someone had merely 
slipped or stumbled under the pressure of events – so that the meaning is 
already cleaned up by the choice of words. And the 'errors'  are an 
unfortunate mistake on the mathematical path to truth, as if they could be 
easily erased and then corrected at a stroke.23
Feminist scholars have long acknowledged that matters are more complicated. But there 
may yet be reasonable grounds for doubting the special character of sexual violence. If we 
reject simplistic journalistic accounts of extreme violence, should we not also try and 
discover the instrumental and rational sources of such behaviour?24 That kind of analysis 
might allow us to separate our moral outrage from our analysis, and even show us that 
'extreme' violence is strangely normal after all. There is substantial value in this view. But 
there are some prima facie reasons to doubt the 'normality' of sexual violence. Sexual violence 
does not occur everywhere to the same extent. Nor does it follow any simple association with 
governments or armed groups. It is  'extreme' not just because it violates (some) ideas about 
acceptable means in war but also because it is not attendant on other apparently extreme 
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21! On virtuality, distance and war see particularly Der Derian 1990; Bousquet 2009. On metaphors of the phallus 
in organised violence, see Cohn 1987.
22! 'Co-presence' is a play on the discussion of Baudrillard, technology and the decoy in Shapiro 2011.
23! Nahoum-Grappe 2002:555.
24! The infamous example of simplifying is Kaplan 1994. For a classic example of revealing the apparently mad as 
rational see Pape 2003.
behaviours. It seems to operate according to its own causes.
It is a standard feminist claim that sexual violence is not 'natural' in any biological sense.25 
Rape is “not a sexual act, it is a crime of power, a mark of fascism”; “not an aggressive 
manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation of aggression”.26 But to say that 
sexual violence is not a consequence of genetic coding is not to say that it is a simple result 
of rational action. As will become abundantly clear, 'weapon of war' can mean many things, 
and only some of them fit the idea of means-ends rationality, or what I will call 
instrumentality. Several recurrent features of wartime sexual violence indicate a kind of excess 
that sets it apart from other acts of violence and which consequently require analysis. First, 
there is the intimate character of rape just mentioned: as an act often involving the direct 
forcing of bodies into other bodies (and in some definitions requiring it).27 The body is often 
strangely erased in accounts of collective violence in IR, but here it is almost excessively 
clear: overwhelming in its corporeal proximity.28
Second, there are those acts of mutilation and 'extra insults' on the bodies of victims, 
violations carried out in addition to rape. Some US Marines in Vietnam inserted flares into the 
vaginas of North Vietnamese Army nurses after raping them, and many ex-servicemen 
reporting not only that they were encouraged to rape but shown how to drive objects into 
the female genital organs by their instructors.29  The stabbing of the victim's genitals after 
rape was also widespread in East Pakistan and many rapes were 'concluded' by the insertion 
of sticks into vaginas in the Japanese attack on Nanking.30 It is hard to see what humiliation, 
purpose or sexual satisfaction is achieved here not already produced by the rape itself. Nor is 
it clear why attacks like this are so often followed by mass murder, a practice so widespread 
that it apparently has its own heroic term in military jargon, where to rape and then kill 
your victim is to become a 'double veteran'.31
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25! Brownmiller 1975; Bourke 2007; Enloe 1998. While Brownmiller frequently speaks of rape as fundamentally 
and inherently associated with men (1975:12, 15), her actual use of evidence suggests much more variation.
26! Wilden 1985:39; Seifert 1994:55.
27! Recall from the introduction (footnote 3) that rape can involve penetration with an object.
28! On bodies and violence in IR, see particularly Muppidi 2012; Brighton 2004; Sylvester 2012.
29! Bourke 1999:188, 190.
30! Sharlach 2000:95; Brownmiller 1975:59.
31! Wilden 1985.
Third, there is the co-incidence of war rape with public atrocity, where sexual violence is 
enacted in a display before family or community members. At Nanking, fathers were forced 
to rape their own daughters at gunpoint. And in Darfur,  women were frequently raped in 
front of other village members who were forced to clap and cheer as militia members took 
turns.32  Again, such public performances are often followed by the murder of all those 
involved. It can be hard to ascertain just how common such incidents are, and what the 
display is intended to achieve. For whose satisfaction are such scenes enacted? 
Fourth, and relatedly, sexual violence often appears as a kind of performance. If the clichéd 
view of it as an act in peace is of furtive and hidden assaults, accomplished by known 
abusers or by opportunistic strangers, in war it is  often accompanied by explicit messages, as 
when janjaweed militia members shouted phrases indicating a sense of religious omnipotence 
during attacks involving sexual violence: “Slaves! Nubas! … We are your God! Your God is 
Omer al-Bashir”.33  This can lead to views of rape as something that “reveals the male 
psyche in its  boldest form, without the veneer of 'chivalry'  or civilization”.34  Alternatively,  it 
may stress social or emotional aspects: rape as “a form of social performance...highly 
ritualized” which can become “an integral part of youthful common sense and self-
respect”.35
Each feature foregrounds a dimension of rape too easily written off as irrelevant, suggests 
even an obscene enjoyment. This catalogue of horrors conforms vividly to Primo Levi's 
diagnosis of 'useless violence': “an end in itself, with the sole purpose of creating pain, 
occasionally having a purpose, yet always redundant,  always disproportionate to the purpose 
itself ”.36 These dimensions do not settle the problem of war rape in advance; cannot show 
that it is not instrumental,  but instead something else (the alternatives this thesis develops are 
that of unreason and mythology). Instead, they suggest that there is a problem with how we 
understand sexual violence as a form of extreme violence, a problem deserving of further 
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32! Brownmiller 1975:59; Human Rights Watch 2005b; Physicians for Human Rights 2006.
33! Cited in Amnesty International 2004:23. See also (Human Rights Watch 2005b:16.
34! Brownmiller 1975:33.
35! Bourke 2007:6; Bourgois 2003:343.
36! Levi 1987:83.
inquiry. Perhaps techniques of extreme brutality are chosen to instil fear across populations 
and just enough victims are left alive to speak of their experiences to others. And expressions 
of sexualised hate may be just that – expressions – having little to do with underlying causes 
and patterns of  who gets targeted for rape. 
The extreme features of sexual violence are not simply different patterns of atrocity within 
wars. They are also distributed unequally among wars, both in character and incidence,  and 
this diversity has not yet been satisfactorily explained.37  As is almost always recognised, 
problems of under-reporting and social taboo that have contributed to the historical silence 
around rape make comparative work difficult.38  Moreover, that scholars have only recently 
taken an interest in sexual violence in itself is  reflected by the fact that “war casualty 
figures...are not known to include 'raped women' and 'sodomized children'”.39
But existing studies of wartime sexual violence, however partial, do suggest sufficient 
variance to establish sexual violence as an area for study in its own right. Different wars are 
marked by different patterns of sexual violence – not only how many victims are raped,  but 
which kinds of people are considered appropriate targets and what kinds of sexual violence 
they are subjected to. This empirical evidence would seem to support constructivist thinking 
about social behaviour, especially given research on sexual violence outside war. One 
anthropological survey of 95 band and tribal societies found that 47% of them were 
relatively free of rape.40  The absence of any self-evident links between the intensity of war 
and the intensity of sexual violence is suggested by the sketch of selected wars in Table 1 
below.
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37! Wood 2006:308.
38! Brownmiller 1975:40; Lindsey 2002; Seifert 1994; Swiss and Giller 1993:613.
39! Sylvester 1994b:36. 
40!Sanday 1986:85.
War (Duration)	 Combat Deaths41	 Rape Level	 Perpetrators42
Nanking	 1,000,00043	 20,000-80,000	 Invading forces only.
(1937-1938)
El Salvador	 69,000	 Limited.	 Government forces only.
(1979-1992)   
Sri Lanka	 50,000	 Almost none.	 Some by Government.
(1983-2009)
Bosnia	 250,000	 10,000-60,000	 Majority by Serb forces.
(1992-1995)
Sierra Leone	 20,000	 Extensive.44	 Indiscriminate, but 
(1991-1996) 	 	 	 particularly RUF.
Rwanda (1994) 	 500,000	 250,000-500,000	 Majority by Hutu forces.
Table 1: Death and Rape in Selected Wars45
A Curious Visibility
But not all wars are marked by massive sexual violence. It seems from general reports and 
the testimonies of kidnapped women that Viet Cong forces raped little, if at all, despite their 
extensive use of other terroristic methods.46  Elisabeth Wood has explored the general 
absence of sexual violence in both Sri Lanka and El Salvador. In the former case, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been responsible for the forcible 
displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, as well as for attacks on Mosques during 
services and for a high number of suicide bombing operations. Yet there are no reports of 
the use of sexual violence by the LTTE except in a few instances of the sexual torture of 
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41! Data on wars (and their duration) and total combat deaths all from the Correlates of War Project (see Sarkees 
and Schafer 2000).
42! Data for total rapes and main perpetrators for Nanking, Sri Lanka, El Salvador and Sierra Leone from (Wood 
2006). Data for Bosnia and Rwanda from Sharlach 2000.
43! This figure is for the entirety of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1941). There are no separate combat death data 
for the battle of Nanking but it is widely reported as the major occurrence of rape during that war.
44!No total data available but Wood cites one survey of nearly 1,000 women estimating that 9% had suﬀered 
sexual violence. See Wood 2006:314–315.
45! This is not intended to be a comprehensive accounting, merely a suggestive view of variation on the basis of 
current figures.
46! Brownmiller 1975:90–92.
male prisoners.47  In the latter case, there was some use of sexual violence by government 
forces, although it was low in comparison to other contexts, but almost no reports of such 
acts by the Frente Farabundo Martí para Liberación Nacional (FMLN), either unofficially or 
through the post-war Truth Commission.48 These characteristics of sexual violence indicate 
that “rape is not just 'one atrocity among others', which results, like violent crime, from the 
character of combat”.49  Rather, there are dimensions of sexual violence which adhere to 
patterns but do so according to apparently different causes and drivers. Just as rape is not 
just one atrocity among others, it does not conform easily to one explanatory paradigm, to 
one logic. 
And yet, for all the difficulty in establishing precise numbers,  and for all the marginalisation 
of gender research in the academy, war rape is also curiously visible. This is sometimes the 
case on purely statistical grounds. It now seems clear, for example, that the number of rape 
victims of the Liberian war were seriously inflated – it had been common to claim that 75% 
of women were raped in the civil war, when the proportion is likely closer to 10-15%.50 On 
the other hand, there are also reasons to think that the scale of sexualised suffering has been 
under-estimated in the case of the Rwandan genocide, where a low calculation of 
pregnancies resulting from rape means that the common figure of 250-500,000 may be only 
half or a quarter of the true number.51  There are perils in inferring too much from human 
rights reports too, since in addition to the usual issues of reporting, selection and taboo, 
there are also questions of resources and advocacy and how those imperatives shape what 
facts are highlighted and how.52  These perverse incentives can apply to those who have 
survived wars too. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, for instance, 'accusation 
cooperatives' were founded for the purpose of selling denunciations of Interahamwe killers 
and rapists for profit.53
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47! Wood 2006:147–149.
48! Wood 2006:316–317, 2009:152.
49! Morris 1996:672–673.
50! See Cohen and Green 2012.
51! Palermo and Peterman 2011.
52! Wood 2009:133; Cohen and Green 2012.
53! Prunier 2009:3.
But issues of visibility go beyond accounting. As several important interventions have 
argued, making rape visible in particular ways can co-opt feminism. The 'discovery'  of rape 
was, as Susan Brownmiller observes, closely connected to the evolution of propaganda as a 
tool of war itself.54  The British used rape in Belgium in 1917 to cast German troops as 
uniquely repugnant and the Nazis later relied on similar acts by Soviet troops for their own 
mass literature on the tendencies of the 'Asiatic Mind'.55  The infamous 'Rape of Nanking' 
too was quickly turned to anti-Japanese purposes. Despite some feminist ideas of a 
conservative and rural Muslim Bosnia in which rape was a terrible familial burden, if there 
was a common element in the representations of rape in the Croatian and Serbian media it 
seems to have been that of women standing in for the collective body of the nation, a nation 
that either had to be defended or asserted.56 A whole collection of representational materials 
bear out this function (see Figures 5 and 6). Awareness of rape on its own, as Enloe warned, 
does not not necessarily de-militarise. And is not necessarily feminist.
In the aftermath of the Bosnian and Rwandan genocide-wars, feminists raised similar 
concerns about the uses of visibility. For Doris Buss,  one reason that activists were so 
successful in foregrounding gender crimes in both the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda was because they were tied to ideas of ethnic war.57 Because the 
Tribunals focused principally on this 'ethnic' dimension – on an understanding of rape as 
resulting from a specific mythology, to use the language of this thesis – they also turned rape 
into a mark of distinctly Serbian evil. In the Rwandan case,  rape similarly became a 
question of Tutsi (female) victims and Hutu (male) perpetrators, rendering invisible other 
gendered atrocities. On Karen Engle's account too, war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia 
turn on a division amongst feminists, with some seeking to retain attention to all sexual 
violence, whilst others wanted to focus on genocide, and not 'everyday' forms of rape. 
Rather than standing as a major achievement for gender justice, this approach merely 
rendered those raped, once again,  as 'womenandchildren'.58  In other words, the Tribunals 
and their feminist allies subsumed rape within race. 
·  23·
54! Brownmiller 1975:41.
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56! Žarkov 2007:114, 85–116.
57! Buss 2007.
58! Engle 2005:779–780.
Figure 5: Enlist!: 'Destroy This Mad Brute' (1917): H.R. Hopps' World War I Army recruitment 
poster depicting  Imperial Germany as a great ape with a stereotypically  German moustache, his helmet 
reading  'Militarism', one hand holding  a club labelled 'Kultur'; the other an ivory  pale woman, presumably 
taken to represent Western civilization, as he lands on the shores of America, a ruined Europe visible on the 
horizon.
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Figure 6: Back Up Our Battleskies!: 'Keep This Horror From Your Home (1940s): A World War II 
poster, seeking bond investments from the public with this depiction of  a rapacious Japanese invader.
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In the context of wars in which there are agendas to foregrounding a barbaric enemy, rape 
can therefore become “an all too visible and malleable justification for militarization”.59 And 
rape has also been useful in more apparently domestic struggles. The figure of the rapacious 
negro, for one, has been mobilised again and again to shore up white masculinist 
supremacism. In contrast to some views of Against Our Will as simplifying or essentialist, 
Brownmiller in fact demonstrated a considerable sensitivity to this issue when showing the 
ways in which rape has been projected outwards onto racial others.60 The politics of looking 
at rape is always loaded, especially as the terms of feminist discourse become more 
successful, and therefore more useful as tools for other ends.61
A Monstrous Masculine
If some forms of war rape can be too visible, others remain almost as invisible as ever. This 
is especially the case with male rape (meaning, usually, the rape of men). There is now some 
debate on the extent to which 'women' are the primary victims of sexual violence, 
particularly in contexts of 'gendercide' where perpetrators attempt to eradicate all the males 
of a given community.62  This is not because feminists deny that men suffer rape. Many do 
indeed stress both that men can be victims and that women can be perpetrators whilst 
maintaining that the balance is starkly unequal.63  But this point is also frequently made in 
passing without a major change in the form of inquiry undertaken.64  Although the leading 
assumption of female victims is often implicit, it occasionally manifests more obviously, as in 
a recent sexual violence campaigning site called, simply, Women Under Siege, despite their 
attention to boys and men suffering sexual violence in concrete mapping work.65 
For professionalised agents in Eastern DRC, the terminology is more neutral. During 
interviews, officials and NGO workers spoke continually of 'SGBV' – Sexual and Gender-
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60!See Brownmiller 1975:210–256. Remarkably, this text also stood until very recently as one of the few book-
length studies to advance a feminist treatment of war rape in any depth.
61! This is part of a more general critique of the co-option of feminism into projects of militarism, one expressed 
well in Eisenstein 2007. 
62! Jones 2000. See also Carpenter 2003b.
63! For a discussion of depictions of female violence see Sjoberg and Gentry 2007.
64! This point is made particularly strongly in Shepherd and Grey 2012 (see also Kirby 2012b).
65! See Women Under Siege n.d. The Syria Crowdmap (https://womenundersiegesyria.crowdmap.com/) includes 
metrics tracking male victims. 
Based Violence. But this did not translate into serious provisions of funding, or even into a 
clear sense of the scale of the problem (Chapter 7 includes a dedicated discussion on this 
point). Interviewees can sometimes assume that the rape of women is  all that anyone is 
interested in, and so leave out corresponding cases amongst men.66  This in spite of 
increasing attention in research on the DRC itself with the issue of male rape, and at least 
one serious statistical analysis illustrating the scale of  the problem.67
However, although the topic is relatively neglected, there is evidence of rape against men as 
a tool of war. In instances from the Crusades to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
violence in the contemporary DRC, men are recorded as having suffered rape, genital harm, 
enforced masturbation,  coerced nudity and similar shaming.68  Whether or not they were 
recognised and named as 'rape' by perpetrators and victims, such incidents have also found 
their way into the visual record (see Figures 7 and 8). Chris Dolan found that in the case of 
Uganda, sexual violence by men against men was understood as increasing the masculinity 
of the perpetrator by subtracting from that of the victim. Or,  as a doctor put it to him in 
Gulu: “[male rape] was used by the Government soldiers as a weapon. The anger goes very 
deep, the men cannot talk about it, it is the women who bring it up. Male rape is  a major 
cause of people's anger against the army”.69  In many ways, male victims suffer problems 
familiar to feminists, such as doctors who simply do not believe that men are a group at 
risk.70
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66! This anecdote was told to me by Chris Dolan while we were working on the interviews for International Alert 
2010. He had gone to interview a prominent human rights defender, had spent several hours in conversation, 
and was on his way to leave when he raised the issue of male rape. It quickly became clear that the activist did 
have stories of this kind of sexual violence, but had not shared them in the formal interview because they had 
not thought it was a subject that Dolan would be interested in.
67! That analysis is Johnson et al. 2010, and is subject to extensive discussion in Chapter 7.
68! Sivakumaran 2007. Sivakumaran makes note of cases of sexual violence in El Salvador and Sri Lanka, both of 
which this chapter has just discussed as cases of low rape in war. The examples provided are too scattered (or, 
as in the example of male torture rape below, possibly excluded from her categories) to cause a substantial 
revision of Wood's characterisation, but there is clearly an issue here with records of violence, and the 
conclusions drawn from them by scholars.
69! Cited in Dolan 2005:310.
70! Sivakumaran 2007:256.
Figure 7: The Sexually  Dismembered Enemy: The penile evisceration of the enemies by  the soldiers of 
Outina, as found in Theodoricus de Bry's America (1591), an illustrated text describing  the discovery  and 
subjugation of  'the new world'.71
Figure 8: Etching Male War Rape: A fragment from Joe Sacco's Safe Area Goražde (2000).72
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The invisibility of male rape is surely in part reflective of a fear that attending to it will 
dilute the feminist project. This is a view shared by those who would prefer not to speak in 
terms of a feminist IR at all,  seeking instead the purportedly neutral tones of 'gender 
theory' (a topic turned to in the next chapter). But acknowledging sexual violence against 
men is compatible with many (if not quite all)  versions of feminist inquiry. At least, this is so 
if we adopt a common feminist explanation for the efficacy of sexual violence. Understood 
as an act of humiliation, rape against women is spoken of as a way of shaming men, and 
therefore particularly effective in societies ridden with patriarchal norms.73  Similarly, male 
rape may be taken as a further form of emasculation, which is largely synonymous with 
transformation into the feminine.74  Closely related is the idea of rape as a coercive 
performance of homosexuality. For both perpetrators and victims, the 'taint' of 
homosexuality may be essential to the act: for the former because it conforms the un-
masculine nature of whoever is being raped (recall the common phrase “it's only gay if you 
take it”) and for the latter because it may prevent reporting (since “only gay men are raped”) 
(a point to some extent taken up in the discussion of mock sexual violence in fratriarchal 
initiation rituals in Chapter 6).75 
Feminists may also be in danger of neglecting male rape not because they haven't looked for 
it in war, or because they don't want to see it,  but because it may often take place in different 
circumstances from female rape. For example,  by far the highest estimates of male rape 
come not from combat situations or associated violences, but from the the sexual torture of 
men detained in prisons or war camps. Some 76% of male prisoners in El Salvador 
reported having been subjected to sexual torture during the 1980s (when the civil war was 
ongoing), and 80% of concentration camp detainees (from a sample of 6,000) said the same 
of their experiences in the Sarajevo Canton during the Bosnian war.76 And yet there is little 
question for most advocates of further attention to male rape that it will ever rival the scale 
of  female victimisation.77 
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73! This is perhaps the most common idea in feminist literature on war rape apart from the 'weapon of war' claim, 
but see, for example, the persuasive discussion in MacKenzie 2010.
74! Sivakumaran 2007:270–272.
75! See Sivakumaran 2005.
76! Stemple 2008:612–613.
77! See Sivakumaran 2007:260.
For the purposes of this thesis, male rape will be discussed where it offers a special case or 
problem for the forms of feminist inquiry under discussion, but will not be treated as an 
analytical object in its own right. Such a treatment is long overdue, especially within the 
social sciences. However, because the concern of what follows is  largely with how feminists 
have thus far conceptualised war rape, it will only be as part of that scrutiny that the 
gendering of rape perpetrators, and the connections and the disjunctures between 
perpetrators, enablers and refuseniks – and between men, masculinities, and gender orders – 
might become more fully apparent. It proceeds on the understanding that both men and 
women can be raped and that the construction of categories of 'male' and 'female' and 
'masculine' and 'feminine' are of great consequence in this process. Acceptance of the idea 
that the rape of women and girls is  much more common means that they will be mentioned 
more often. Men will become more visible where there is a specific question around the 
character or extent of  violence experienced by them.
What Kind Of  An Object Is 'War Rape'?
Wartime sexual violence is a practice, but so is accounting for wartime sexual violence. In 
other words, descriptions are not innocent. Making this kind of observation in IR is 
increasingly a way of invoking Michel Foucault to uncover submerged histories or produce 
genealogies of certain identities in global politics.78  This is in many ways an eminently 
feminist way to proceed. For example, calling into question standard categories of 
'pathology' and 'deviancy' around sexual violence shows how deeply infused they are with 
pervading social norms.79 After all, homosexuality, fetishism and transvestism were formally 
defined as 'disorders' at a time when rape itself was not.80  Discourses of psychiatry, 
criminology and sexology have surely shaped the narratives produced of rape and its 
causes.81  By the same token, the framing of rape, its very visibility, is wrapped up in the 
networks of  feminist advocacy and the openings allowed by global politics.82
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78! See, for example, Bartelson 1995; Der Derian 2009; Vucetic 2011; Evans 2010; Howell 2010; Shilliam 2011.
79! Cameron and Frazer 1987:7–8.
80!Lalumière et al. 2005:106; Groth 1979:2–4.
81! Cameron and Frazer 1987:21–22.
82! Enloe 1994.
The forms in which sexual violence has been patterned and thought across time are thus at 
stake. 'Rape' has at points been an impossible object (taken as axiomatically inconceivable 
within marriage or as the result of consensual orgasm if pregnancy resulted).83  Feminist 
thought and activism has made it not only socially real but political. This is not only a 
question of making private experience public,  although this is  surely part of what happened. 
It is also a matter of constituting it, of bequeathing a form of knowing sexual violence by 
virtue of having assembled it in a particular way: as a symbol of patriarchal domination. 
Certainly, other ways of knowing rape – as property invasion,  as demonic possession, as a 
right of domesticity, as metaphysical punishment – are possible. The contest over forms of 
knowledge is hardly settled, but the politicisation of sexual violence has successfully 
produced a kind of object. One, for example, adoptable as a standard of civilization on the 
global scene.
The caution for feminists faced with this relative malleability is partly that talk of murdering 
sex beasts (whether as heroic masculine or as medical deviant) detracts from the social 
character of rape and sexual murder and misses the place of such acts on a continuum of 
gendered violence including much putatively normal behaviour.84 That is,  that it constrains 
analytical vision. But more than this, accounts of sex and death can also have the quality 
that most interested Foucault, and which Ian Hacking terms the looping  effect of human kinds.85 
Human kinds because it matters to people how they are labelled, described and studied, and 
looping  because the labelling changes the kind. It is not just an act of naming, since 
apprehending the name given to it changes the kind, requiring new knowledge, leading in 
turn to new behaviour: “The greater the moral connotations of a human kind, the greater 
the potential for the looping effect”.86  Crucially, this makes human kinds causal and the 
effect is principally found in those kinds marked as deviant or abnormal (kinds like 'child 
abuser', 'suicide', 'murder' and, we might add, 'rapist').87
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83! The former claim comes from Sir Matthew Hale's 1736 judgement that rights to bodily pleasure were 
surrendered in the marriage contract, a contract that the wife could not thereafter retract; the latter is 
traceable to Onesipherous W. Bartley's 1815 A Treaties on Forensic Medicine or Medical Jurisprudence, which argued 
that conception “must depend on the exciting passion that predominates”. See Bourke 2007:307–308, 53.
84! Cameron and Frazer 1987. See also Kelly 1988:74–137.
85! Addressed most closely in Hacking 1995, but see also Hacking 1999.
86! Hacking 1995:370.
87! Hacking 1995:364.
Carol Harrington has traced the discursive strategies employed in bringing sexual violence 
into the political arena, and so illustrates a looping kind in relation to sexual violence. 
Having adopted a strategy for combatting sexual violence based on the success of 
abolitionist campaigns, feminist strategies of politicisation cast the issue of rape in terms of 
bodily violation and individual freedom, both of which played on existing discourses of 
female innocence.88  In the context of the Cold War and the utility of consciousness-raising 
through testimonies of suffering, sexual violence became heavily associated with 
psychological trauma and susceptible to techniques of quantification such that, when human 
rights discourse became intwined with the rhetoric of interventionism over the former 
Yugoslavia, the visibility of sexual violence entailed a view of “the post-conflict zone as a site 
of  mental health emergency”, one particularly conducive to the new military humanism.89 
What such an account foregrounds is the co-constitution of sexual violence and accounts of 
sexual violence. Strategies to eradicate sexual violence changed the way it was perceived, but 
not in a way that could escape more general discourses of legitimate (medical) knowledge. A 
politicisation negotiated in webs of interacting kinds.90  Following Harrington, such 
constructions make a difference because they change the ways in which both victims and 
perpetrators of rape perceive themselves (and so act), and because they exclude and obscure 
forms of challenging patriarchy that involve collective political subjects and the agency of 
those who have experienced rape and abuse.91  Alongside the critiques levelled by Karen 
Engle and Doris Buss, this requires of a feminist account that it be particularly sensitive to 
the power of narratives and to the constitutive role of theorising, matters taken up more 
forcefully in Chapter 3.
·  32·
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them on one side” (Hacking 1995:355).
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Surfacing War Rape92
There have been few attempts to characterise difference within feminist accounts of war 
rape. Those that exist have usually offered a brief set of forms that rape can take, without 
much further discussion of theoretical issues raised by this variety. So Cynthia Enloe lists 
eleven kinds of sexual violence, several of which could have a similar explanation.93 Patricia 
Rozée, by contrast, organised her cross-cultural survey of rape by identifying a number of 
differing forms of rape that meaningfully distinguish between a variety of gender orders: 
marital rape; exchange rape; punitive rape; theft rape; ceremonial rape; and status rape.94 
These are all forms of condoned rape,  which is to say that there are moral codes, forms of 
legitimation and punishments attendant on them found in peacetime.95  The variation is 
instructive, both for undermining assumptions that rape is something that is everywhere the 
same, and for developing a parallel to accounts of variation in war rape. For example, of 
those societies where rape was significantly present, some 70% had a coherent conception of 
'exchange rape', where coercive sex constituted a part of bargaining relations,  as when 
sexual access to female family members is offered as a gesture of goodwill or as a stake in 
games. By contrast, only 14% of the same societies legitimated 'punitive rape': as a 
punishment for inappropriate gender behaviour or for errors committed by husbands.96 
Anticipating the argument to come, we can say that these are all forms of mythological rape, 
in that they are bound by norms of  community and culture.
But perhaps the most prominent distinction between forms of war rape in feminist IR, and 
one which explicitly differentiates between forms of feminist argument, is that of Inger 
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93! The list runs as follows: 1) rape by male soldier of a women he thinks of as a foreigner; 2) rape by a male soldier 
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groups; 6) rape by men of one group of men from an 'enemy' group to humiliate them by making them 'mere 
women'; 7) rapes of women by male soldiers as part of a system of morale building rewards authorised by senior 
oﬃcers; 8) rapes of women taking refuge in camps by men taking refuge in the same camps or be men assigned 
to protect those women; 9) rapes of women by prostitution procurers to prepare them for service in brothels; 
10) rapes of women in wartime by men of same community acting out of misogyny licensed and nurtured by 
militarised atmosphere; and 11) rapes of women who publicly oppose militarisation by men of their community 
who support it. See Enloe 2000:109–110.
94! See the summative table at Rozée 1993:507.
95! Rozée also considers 'nonnormative rape', i.e. rape without a socially defined status.
96! Rozée 1993:507–508.
Skjelsbæk. Skjelsbæk suggests three conceptualisations of the relationship between sexual 
violence and war: essentialist, focusing on all women as victims in the assertion of militaristic 
masculinity; structuralist, focusing on targeted women as victims in attacks on particular 
groups; and social constructionist, focusing on targeted men and women with women victimised 
in order to 'masculinise' perpetrators and 'feminise' men.97  On this account, the differences 
are not only in empirical attention, but in underlying epistemologies.98 In this the differences 
are said to map on to more general distinctions amongst feminists (distinctions to be 
examined in Chapter 2), and such differences certainly exist. 
Some feminists,  Skjelsbæk included, are more inclined towards particularist accounts of war 
rape which attend to constructions of masculinity rather than emphases of continuity in war 
rape over time. But the conflation of empirical foci and epistemology also means that case-
specific conclusions are confused with philosophical commitments. After all, that feminists 
find 'structure' in cases of genocidal rape need not mean that they deny a constructivist 
account of identity and knowledge. It entails only that they think those who perpetrated the 
rapes had a structural and community-orientated understanding of their actions. The 
apparent dispute between an account of wartime sexual violence in which all women are 
targeted and one in which men and women are targeted may tell us much more about 
contingent historical factors (different wars and differing contexts may display different 
patterns of rape) or analytical distinctions (between acts that are essential to a strategy and 
those that are peripheral to it)  than they do about the philosophical foundations of research. 
As the coming chapters will make clearer, philosophical foundations orientate research and 
explicate the 'link-up' between worlds and knowledge of them, but do not themselves 
generate substantive theories. It is not philosophically schizophrenic to say, for example, that 
war rape in Bosnia was community-orientated whilst similar forms of violence in Iraq are 
more fragmented and sexual violence in the Second World War targeted women in general. 
Such a claim of diversity in violence may suffer from conceptual deficiencies, but the claim 
itself is possible whilst still being 'constructivist'  about knowledge, or 'essentialist' about the 
ontology of  gender.
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Repertoires Of  Violence
Where feminists  have examined war in their analyses, this has usually been as the larger 
context for rape and gender norms, rather than as a particular field in itself. Several 
accounts link rape in war to areas of the social usually thought to sit outside of war, such as 
the media, or to political phenomena like nationalism.99 Yet there are no studies which relate 
the ways of explaining sexual violence to ways of explaining war, and behaviour in war, 
generally. The causes of this neglect may have to do with the historical development of 
feminist theory, which has focused mainly on dismantling a series of myths about rape in 
'peacetime'.100  Work on wartime sexual violence, which already largely subscribes to the 
general claims of feminism as to what rape is, has concentrated on showing that rape is not 
about sex but about power. It has paid much less attention to the different ways of thinking 
about power and its  effects. In short, there is a literature on gender and war, but not much of 
one on gender in war. 
Linking sexual violence explicitly to the study of war does not suggest that the former should 
become a sub-field of the latter. Rather it argues against any tendency for feminist 
scholarship to be assigned to the private sphere, to be domesticated.101  Moreover, it 
recognises that the neglect between thinking about sexual violence and thinking about war is 
two-way. Despite increased institutional and academic attention to gender, the major works 
on violence in war have little, if anything, to say about sexual violence. For example, many 
articles that specifically address extreme violence in war either ignore sexual violence altogether 
or mention it as an example in a catalogue of other crimes.102 One recent book on violence 
in civil war, which concentrates on 'intimate' violence,  seems to contain only two vague 
references to rape.103 Even those who have produced rich work on both social behaviour in 
war and sexual violence in war have tended not to link their research projects.104
·  35·
99! See Žarkov 2007; Elshtain 1991; Peterson 1998.
100 See the discussions in Bourke 2007; Mardorossian 2002; Reitan 2001.
101! Youngs 2008:691.
102 In the former category see Azam and Hoeﬄer 2002; Downes 2006; Kalyvas 1999; Kaufman 2006; in the latter 
McDougall 2005:126.
103! Kalyvas 2006:20, 108.
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Critical security scholars,  who have forged a space for themselves in the discipline analogous 
to that of feminists, have done so by tending to focus on practices usually considered outside 
of war: issues such as the construction of enemies, the intersection of foreign policy 
discourses of violence, the language of sovereignty and the codification of war memory in 
film.105 Many of these interventions have been invaluable, and have cast critical light on core 
concepts and figures of war.106 But the distinction between 'war'  and 'security' has begun to 
harden to the extent that attempts to be critical about the former can lead to accusations of 
returning to a hegemonic IR.107  Other strands – postcolonial,  constructivist, and so on – 
have all taken some interest in the question of war, with varying success, but have 
simultaneously tended to ignore gender.108 Paradoxically enough, the field may have become 
so caught between policy-orientated projects of military sociology and critical approaches to 
the not-quite-war, that it may have found itself  without any actual discipline of  war.109
By considering practices and explanations of war alongside those of rape in war, this thesis 
will seek to advance the understanding of gender in war. It follows from the variation in war 
rape, and from the different forms it takes when it is found, that the two dynamics are in a 
complex relation. Attending principally to rape risks making war not much more than the 
empty background – the opportunity structure – for elements internal to sexual violence. 
And looking only at war makes rape just another tactic, effacing both its  own special 
character and the splayed tissues weaving into broader gender hierarchies. Reductions of 
this kind, which simply push together the varieties of violence, can lead to some apparently 
contradictory claims about war rape,  such as that it is both the 'engine of war'  and simply an 
intensification of the gender relations that exist in 'peacetime'.110  Isn't war rape all those 
things, and more? Perhaps, but merely combining claims together with no sense of contrast 
or contradiction repeats the error of “lootpillageandrape”. Atrocity becomes 
undifferentiated, homogenous. Unquestionably hideous, but with no sense of why this kind 
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of aggression, manifested this way, in this place, against this person. The point is instead to 
reveal the connections between war and rape in their variety and their specificity.
This is the task of examining repertoires of violence, those subsets of Charles Tilly's  repertoires 
of contention: “a set of practices that a group routinely engages in as it makes claims on 
other political or social actors. A particular group may include in its repertoire any or all of 
the following: kidnapping,  assassinations, massacres, torture, sexual violence, forced 
displacement, and so on”.111  Repertoires are clusters of violent practices applied in similar 
situations with similar kinds of people subjected to violence.112 They are consistent, without 
an implication that they are either consciously-chosen or habitual. But they are also subject 
to historical and social variation, and it is partly this variation that poses a problem for 
inquiry. Repertoires offer a non-deterministic way of naming patterns without embarking on 
the assumption that the violence we are looking at is simply madness.113
How are we to account for this variation? It is frequently stressed that sexual violence can 
have many motives.114 There is  no reason why rape cannot serve multiple ends in practice, 
no particular requirement of parsimony that would single out tactics, ritual or sexuality as 
the cause of sexual violence in war (or, at least not as the only one for all times and places). 
There exist manifold proofs for each theorem, anecdotes and data-sets for each style of 
atrocity. And yet wartime sexual violence is “too widespread,  too frequent and seemingly too 
calculated and effective [to] not to be part of a larger political scheme and hence a weapon 
of war”.115 But the political has many forms and weapons can serve many purposes. Primo 
Levi,  who provided that concise identification of 'useless violence',  once recounted the 
message given to him by a concentration camp guard: “there is no why here”.116 This thesis 
suggests instead that there are many whys, if no ethical explanations. It seeks not necessarily 
to adjudicate between them, but to examine their foundations and implications,  and to put 
them to the test against the actual practices of  war and of  sexual violence.
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Chapter Two
WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT 
WHEN WE TALK ABOUT GENDER?
The epistemological problem for feminism is to explain an apparently 
paradoxical situation. Feminism is a political movement for social change. 
But many claims, clearly motivated by feminist concerns, made by 
researchers and theorists in the social sciences, in biology, and in the social 
studies of the natural sciences appear more plausible - more likely to be 
confirmed by evidence - than the beliefs they would replace. How can such 
politicized research be increasing the objectivity of inquiry? On what 
grounds should these feminist claims be justified?
Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism1
Conclusion: neither science nor the methodology of research programmes 
provides arguments against anarchism. Neither Lakatos nor anybody else 
has shown that science is better than witchcraft and that science proceeds in 
a rational way. Taste, not argument, guides our choice of science; taste,  not 
argument, makes us carry out certain moves within science (which does not 
mean that decisions on the basis of taste are not surrounded by and entirely 
covered by arguments,  just as a tasty piece of meat may be surrounded and 
entirely covered by flies). There is no reason to be depressed by this result. 
Science, after all, is our creature, not our sovereign; ergo, it should be the 
slave of  our whims, and not the tyrant of  our wishes.
Paul Feyerabend, ‘Theses on Anarchism’2
The Tyrant Of  Our Wishes
The feminist insurgency in International Relations, from its earliest manifestations to the 
present, has fused questions of representation and emancipation with those of knowledge 
and method. Not satisfied with 'making women visible' within the discipline's already 
established parameters, feminists have also forced a revisiting of ontology, epistemology  and 
methodology.3 These interventions have generated both anxiety and enthusiasm, and might 
today still be characterised in terms of a misunderstanding.4 A familiar kind of impasse has 
emerged in their wake. On the one hand, there is a continuing commitment to feminism as 
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problematising exclusions, combating silences, and exploring the shift,  blur and return of 
identities in our disciplinary field.5  Alongside other self-consciously critical lineages, a 
feminist space, albeit narrow, has thus been secured in terms of syllabi, publications and 
careers.6 On the other hand, elements of the initial feminist programme have been taken on 
and adapted within more mainstream parts of the discipline, but in a way that distances 
themselves from the category of ‘feminism’ and its  implications. So constructivists might 
now use beliefs about sex and gender in their explanations of decision making,  or the 
experiences of female labourers may contribute to an analysis of the everyday in 
international political economy, without the resulting works being thought of as distinctly 
politicised in the way feminism is often taken to be.
The reception of feminist ideas in IR has been framed almost exclusively by two related sets 
of distinctions. Firstly between empiricist,  standpoint and postmodern positions within feminism 
itself, and secondly between gender and feminism. Invariably used to classify legitimate and 
illegitimate disciplinary identities, these distinctions have also worked alongside broader 
binaries (quantitative/qualitative, explaining/understanding, positivist/post-positivist, 
empirical/theoretical and conservative/radical, amongst others) to define appropriate ways 
of being  feminist in IR for advocates and skeptics alike. For some, the repetition of narratives 
of marginality has reinforced a tendency to see research in terms of identity rather than 
content, and arguably also led to an excessive focus on what separates feminists from non-
feminists.7  It is against this background that ‘gender’ has lately taken on a somewhat 
separate life from ‘feminism’, often because it is seen as more amenable to the mainstream 
standards of the discipline and by some as better suited to an account of masculinities.8 The 
impact of these meta-theoretical questions on feminist inquiry into war and sexual violence 
has been substantial. The identities bequeathed by the empiricist/standpoint/postmodern 
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triptych and by the gender/feminism binary offer immediate guidance on method, politics 
and audience. Sedimented into cognitive shortcuts,  they thus threaten to constitute the very 
camp structure they purport to describe.9
Because feminist IR has so frequently been defined in terms of its approach to knowledge, 
attempted contributions to that project must position themselves accordingly. If feminism is 
more than 'add gender and stir' (more, in other words, than incorporating a new variable 
within existing models without troubling their foundational assumptions),  then a feminist 
inquiry into wartime sexual violence cannot but incorporate the discussion of method, 
epistemology and ontology. Usually this is  done in passing, providing the reader with a 
general orientation (critical, post-structuralist,  occasionally 'policy-orientated'). We have seen 
that Inger Skjelsbæk, one of the few feminist IR scholars to attend to the different possible 
ways of conceptualising wartime sexual violence, herself adapted a form of the empiricist/
standpoint/postmodern triptych. That detail is rare, but foundational (and anti-
foundational) positions are commonly deployed as part and parcel of a given feminist 
theoretical account of  war rape.10
But revisiting the history of these debates within IR over the form of feminist knowing will 
reveal that they are not as instructive as often supposed. This chapter first returns to the two 
frames which have so persistently set the terms of debate about feminism in IR. In both 
cases the separations - between empiricist, standpoint and postmodern feminisms and 
between feminism and gender - are shown to be less stark than is commonly supposed. 
Having in part shown why these familiar camps are more open to each other than we might 
think, I turn to more recent disciplinary debates about the foundations, methods and the 
philosophy of social science, debates which are in many ways the successors to the fraught 
discussions of feminism’s means and ends in IR. This sets the stage for the examination of 
feminist critical examination in the next chapter.
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Denying The Possibility Of  Social Science11
It was Robert Keohane’s initial engagement with feminist IR that popularised the 
empiricist/standpoint/postmodern distinction. Drawing on Sandra Harding’s original 
definition, read through Christine Sylvester, Keohane both adopted and circumscribed the 
possibilities of a feminist contribution.12  In brief, he characterised feminist empiricism as 
“observ[ing] that states and the interstate system have been fundamentally gendered 
structures of domination and interaction”, feminist standpoint as offering perspectival critiques 
from the periphery that “contain valid insights into the complex realities of world politics” 
and feminist postmodernism as difficult to pin down but essentially a resistance to singular 
narratives.13  Seeing feminism as a potential ally for liberal institutionalism against neo-
realism, Keohane sought a standpoint engagement with mainstream IR theory, warning 
against “happily accept[ing] the existence of multiple incommensurable epistemologies” in a 
way that might lead “ultimately to a sort of nihilism” and to “intellectual and moral 
disaster”.14  In this vision of theoretical aggregation newly accumulated facts about the 
relative positions of men and women (including perspectives from 'the margins') which 
illuminated 'core' problems were to be welcomed, even as the destabilising effects of a 
certain kind of  theory were to be kept at bay.
While at one level drawing on and finding worth in feminism, this assessment also located 
any contribution firmly on the plane of inter-state relations, traditionally conceived - the 
content of sovereignty, institutions,  economics and war - and validated by a particular view 
of scientific adequacy based on Imre Lakatos’s criteria of ‘new facts’ and ‘continuous 
growth’ in knowledge.15  The subsequent reaction within feminist IR took the form of both 
stiff resistance and cautious engagement. On the one hand, there was strong criticism of 
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Keohane’s dismissal of postmodernism and of his separation out of good feminists from 
bad.16  On the other hand, the terms set by Keohane remain operative, and continue to 
frame interventions on the character and value of feminist IR. They have continued to 
shape the conversation such that papers on gender and feminism in IR continue to deploy 
the empiricist-standpoint-postmodern series as a framing device.17
The effect of the distinction was to anchor the early diagnosis of feminism in IR, separating 
out its varieties and appearing to expose fundamental differences between them. Those 
committed to standard research procedures but interested in the varied experiences of men 
and women could identify with feminist empiricism. Scholars who engaged the world 
through normative and political projects of transformation could find in standpoint 
feminism an epistemological licence for the autobiographical and the personal as legitimate 
knowledge forms. And those wishing to undo prominent academic categories – categories 
like ‘truth’ and ‘experience’ - could find allies in deconstruction amongst feminist 
postmodernists. The split mapped neatly onto more general subject positions: positivist, 
critical and poststructural as well as quantitative, qualitative and conceptual. Gender 
rendered respectively as fact, perspective and illusion.
In the case of feminist accounts of war, the triptych has found influence in a number of 
ways. For one, the terms are common in introductions to the feminist/IR intersection.18  In 
one of the earliest feminist interventions on security,  J. Ann Tickner framed the contribution 
in terms of contrasting liberal, radical and postmodern variants.19  These terms track the 
empiricist/standpoint/postmodern distinction closely, since liberal feminists are usually 
thought of as wanting formal equality on the same grounds (analogously to the empiricist 
desire for normal science done properly),  radicals as advancing a new politics from identities 
of difference (in the same way that standpoint produces a successor science through its 
situated knowledges),  and postmodernists as destabilising and fracturing politics and 
knowledge.20  Skjelsbæk's division of essentialist, structuralist and social constructionist 
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approaches to sexual violence has also had a similar impact.
In more recent dialogues, both Keohane and J. Ann Tickner have continued to speak in 
terms of the tripartite division, but the conversation has also tilted in telling ways. Against 
his original identification with standpoint,  Tickner now identifies in Keohane a feminist 
empiricism in a particularly restricted sense, neglecting feminist politics in favour of mere 
data about women.21  Keohane’s own more recent views again identify feminist potentiality 
and limit in uneasy measure, this time suggesting both that the binaries of critical/problem-
solving, hermeneutic/positivist and social constructivist/covering law should be seen as part 
of a continuum of science but also that feminists can only be accepted when they formulate 
testable hypotheses, and that this could easily take the form of variables within a 
neopositivist model.22  A strange confluence thus emerges, since Tickner, in a similar vein, 
both rejects the idea of ‘gender as variable’ but also offers largely empirical examples from 
feminist security analysis, herself subscribing to the ideal of “testable, generalizeable claims 
about the gendering of  the discipline of  international relations”.23 
The primary statements on the relation between gender, feminism and the nature of inquiry 
thus weave disparate and apparently contradictory strands, at times seemingly separated by 
antagonistic world-views, at others to speak only in a different language about the same 
procedures and ends.24  To unpick these knots, it is worth looking again at the origins of the 
feminist triptych. Sandra Harding’s motivating interest was in the critique of science offered 
by feminists and others investigating scientific legitimacy as a social project and product. It 
was the stark separation between unimpeachable scientific method and extra-scientific 
prejudice which needed destabilising, but not, as the general impression would have it, in the 
service of  some mere anti-science.
Most crucially, the distinction between empiricist, standpoint and postmodern was from the 
beginning understood as unstable and laced with tensions. At the most basic of levels, the 
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triptych is not intended as a menu of self-contained scholarly trajectories. For example,  on 
Harding’s account, feminist empiricism is partly self-refuting, since it simultaneously seeks to 
hold on to the old methodological rules (but put them to better use) and acknowledges that a 
particular group (historically subordinated women) are more likely to be able to reveal the 
relevant facts than their colleagues. In other words, the procedures of scientific inquiry cease 
to be neutral and unrelated to the identity of the inquirer at the same time that the apparent 
quality of the corpus of objective knowledge increases. Hence the paradox of “empirical 
inadequacies in empiricist epistemologies”.25  A pure position of empiricist feminism was 
thus rendered impossible for Harding since it spilled eventually into standpoint-style 
understandings of who is best placed to offer certain truths. A less biased factual truth 
intermingled with, and in important respects dependent on, a truth of  perspective.
Feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism are thus contiguous, with the latter picking up 
and developing the core dimensions of the former by further stressing a) the social identity 
of the observer; b)  biases in hegemonic scientific norms; and c) politics as something which 
can - in pushing for emancipatory agendas - increase the objectivity of science.26  What 
Harding actually foregrounds is a kind of militant empiricism: the paradoxical way in which 
the critical attitude undermines the mythologies of criticality and enlightenment themselves, 
against “the defensive belief that science itself should not be examined in the same ways 
science proposes to examine everything else in the world around us”.27  And so this critique 
deploys the grammar of science against its own abstractions, as when standpoint feminists 
argue that “the social world in effect provides a kind of laboratory for ‘experiments’  that can 
enable one to observe and explain patterns in the relations between social power and the 
production of  knowledge claims”.28
Standpoint in its  most general manifestation is not, then,  a replacement of careful objectivity 
with the subjectivity of identity politics, a position that would itself reflect a naive 
empiricism of experience. Even in the case of participatory research alongside informants, 
the particular role of the theorist as the generator of definitions and distinctions remains, 
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with the ‘standpoint’ of those involved becoming less the substantive content of the work 
and more “a critical check on the adequacy of their constructs”.29 Subject positions are not 
taken as innocent but instead require critical interpretation.30  Tickner’s phraseology for 
what makes research feminist - namely ‘starting thought from women’s lives’ - often means 
starting thought from other women’s lives, and so is not a kind of permission slip for 
substituting one’s own views as the equivalent of careful analysis.31  Standpoint is thus more 
than revaluing marginalised perspectives. It is also the practice of  re-evaluating them.32
The postmodernist critique of standpoint works from the fracturing of actual identities, 
which are always multiple and situated in ways that proliferate difference and intersected 
experiences upon closer examination. Yet, as with empiricist and standpoint feminisms, 
continuities are also obvious in the cultivation of an oppositional consciousness that 
destabilises dominant views, and which maintains an intensely political sense of what 
inquiry is  for.33  All three moments similarly share an interest and cognisance of how 
experience is mediated and turned into larger categories and identities.34  For standpoint-
orientated theorists,  this is to say that the subjects included in analysis are already recognised 
as multiple, heterogenous and contradictory.35  Hence the possibility of standpoint as a 
postmodern strategy,  mirrored in IR feminist discussions of what we mean by ‘women’ and 
‘men’.36
This is not to say that gender as fact, perspective and illusion are synonymous for feminist 
critics, nor that frequently-cited divisions amongst feminists have no purchase. Tensions 
indeed persist between reformist epistemologies (those ‘successor sciences’ which carry out 
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standard procedures better) and counter-epistemologies (which seek to replace androcentric 
procedures with new ones37) but for Harding the overlap of empiricist, standpoint and 
postmodern moments is to be embraced:
...I propose that we think of feminist epistemologies as still transitional 
mediations upon the substance of feminist claims and practices...we should 
expect, and perhaps even cherish, such ambivalences and contradictions.38
This emphasis on the multi-perspectival quality of a feminism adequate to its  own task 
remains a major theme of Harding’s work.39  A similar view is taken by Donna Haraway, 
who characterises the relationship between deconstructive and reconstructive (or radical 
constructivist and critical empiricist) feminisms as a ‘necessary multiple desire’: 
my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simultaneously  an account of 
radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing 
subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ 
for making meanings, and a non-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts 
of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide 
projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning 
in suffering, and limited happiness.40
Read through this history, the compulsion to choose between kinds of feminism is rendered 
somewhat artificial. The transposition of the empiricist-standpoint-feminist triptych into IR 
has consequently lost both some content and some context: content in posing the choice within 
the familiar frame of competing paradigms, rather than moments of a more unified project, 
and context because Harding’s primary target was not the self-understanding of social 
science, its physics envy notwithstanding. Feminist critics of science have instead been more 
interested in its uses and purposes (as a tool for control, as increasing inequality in capitalist 
societies, as unable to respond to pressing social questions requiring political action rather 
than general laws), than about the internal procedures of the activity itself. ‘Science’ stood 
here as a restricted category to be opened out so that it could mean more than what happens 
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in the lab.41
Indeed, to interpret the feminist critique of science as an attempt to unseat a method per se is 
to miss the point, since it is precisely the distinction between pristine inside and messy 
outside which is  being troubled. The issue at stake in the original distinction was not 
whether knowledge was possible or not, but whether the idea that knowledge leads 
necessarily to social progress is the residue of Enlightenment truth or political power. Since 
the history and politics of science shows that there is no ‘pure’ inquiry, feminist philosophy 
of science explored “the suspicion that science is both more and less than any possible definition 
of scientific method”, suggesting instead that some values may indeed increase the reliability 
of research, giving rise to a reformulated account of objectivity.42  Contra fears of apocalyptic 
relativism, there have indeed been quite extensive discussions among feminist philosophers 
of the possibilities and limits of reliable knowledge, discussions drawing on a richer and 
wider account of  epistemology and ontology that most accounts in IR allow for.43 
Impervious To Nuance Or Paradox44 
Similar questions of epistemology and identity haunt the other major operative distinction 
between feminists from non-feminists in the discipline. Where earlier debates set the choice 
between kinds of feminism, ‘gender’ has come to be formulated as an explicit alternative to 
feminist analysis. As a category and variable, it has proved easier to adapt and to fit to 
existing research projects, and less contentious in its political ramifications. Although 
frequently coupled in complementary fashion - ‘feminist and gender theory’45  - a distinct 
line of argument seeks to set aside feminism, the better to mainstream gender. The 
proposition, in other words, that all feminism genders theory, but that not all gender theory 
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is feminist. For war rape,  the consequent view is that feminism in some sense obscures 
analysis, and that the methodological commitments of gender theory (generally 
constructivist,  more hesitant in political identification, examining the suffering of men as 
well as women) will provide a more comprehensive view of how violence works in practice, 
and will also be more palatable to those who see in feminism the submission of an 
intellectual project to a political one.
Indeed, this second framing distinction has been particularly noteworthy in the analysis of 
sexed and gendered violences. So, for Adam Jones,  feminism requires a singular attention to 
the suffering of women, thus marginalising the ways in which men are exploited as men in 
international politics, and so evinces “in its way, a new logocentrism”.46  On this account a 
reworking of feminist theory becomes necessary,  one that to some extent allows for a 
normative project, but better ‘balances’ contemporary realities of gender.47  Charli 
Carpenter, whilst preserving a space for legitimate feminist IR, nevertheless recommends 
that non-feminists “recognize and appropriate gender as an analytical instrument”, 
separating out normative commitments to allow for a ‘gender constructivism’ more suited to 
causal analysis and to gendered issues that affect men and children.48
Addressing equivalent issues of disciplinary identity to those highlighted by Keohane, Jones 
and Carpenter thus also provide reasons for shifting to apparently improved standards of 
inquiry.49  These views have been convincingly challenged, particularly for their (mis)reading 
of feminists and characterisation of them in one-dimensional terms to imply that all,  or even 
most, are essentialist and maternalist advocates of a naive pax femina.50 Most importantly,  the 
substantive empirical work that flows from the gender/feminism distinction, in which Jones 
and Carpenter track and map the distinct forms of harm that are visited on men in war, is 
easily read as compatible with feminism.51  The apparent trouble lies in not recognising that 
feminists, especially in their early disciplinary manoeuvres, were not seeking to provide 
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complete accounts of war, but to uncover the gendered dimensions of war that had been thus 
far absent from the discipline. That men - and especially male combatants - suffer in war has 
never been a marginal claim, and is in itself no surprise for war studies, even if further 
research may illuminate new examples of male subjection. Indeed, the attempt to 
foreground how war affected women in a discipline that had traditionally stuck to the high 
politics of statesmen is exemplary of Harding’s view of the intimacy between standpoint 
and science: putatively biased and politically-motivated work on gendered violence has in 
fact enriched and extended the true picture of  war.52 
As with standard uses of the empiricist/standpoint/postmodern triptych, the gender/
feminism distinction tends to reinforce the view that feminism is either against,  or incapable 
of, explanations that do not begin from a given identity. If ‘women’ are the only relevant 
category, and their hardship in any given situation beyond question, how can there be 
anything but a circular,  internal conversation masquerading as research? For Jones, the 
critique seems to be that feminism cannot be objective - that its prior political commitment 
to the emancipation of women and epistemological commitment to women’s perspectives is 
what constrains it. Others more sympathetically see a great variety in feminism, and so focus 
on gender as a way of narrowing their research question.53  Carpenter’s point, for example, 
is directed more closely at the reception of ideas in the academy. Although she does hold 
that there are lacunae in feminism, and shares with Jones the sense that men and 
masculinities are one such gap, her concern is more that ideas of gender are made 
sufficiently amenable to “engage the mainstream”.54 
The arguments of feminist philosophers of science are again instructive. As well as seeing 
empiricist, standpoint and postmodern feminisms as in a complementary tension, Sandra 
Harding also stressed explanation as what the method of looking at science from the 
perspective of  women was for:
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The leading feminist theorists do not try to substitute one set of gender 
loyalties for the other - ‘women-centered’ for ‘men-centered’ hypotheses. 
They try instead, to arrive at hypotheses that are free of gender loyalties. It 
is true that first we often have to formulate a ‘woman-centered’ hypothesis 
in order even to comprehend a gender-free one. But the goal of feminist 
knowledge-seeking is to achieve theories that accurately represent women’s 
activities as fully social, and social relations between the genders as a real - 
an explanatorily important - component in human history. There is nothing 
‘subjective’ about such a project, unless one thinks only visions distorted by 
gendered desires could imagine women to be fully social and gender 
relations to be real explanatory variables. From the perspective of feminist 
theory and research,  it is traditional thought that is  subjective in its 
distortion by androcentrism - a claim that feminists are willing to defend on 
traditional objectivist grounds.55
This should not be taken to suggest that feminists are agreed on the role of objectivity and 
explanation, or on the exact balance between the imperatives to rethink men and women 
and masculinities and femininities. Certainly, there are many ways in which the debate 
around feminist epistemology has left Harding behind.56  Moreover, as Carver, Cochran and 
Squires stressed at the time, one prominent tactic of IR critics has been to actively represent 
contested questions within feminism as monolithic doctrines to serve their narrative.57 But the 
relationship between political positionality and explanation developed here is crucial. For 
many, the standpoint criteria sketched above indicate the need for ‘strong objectivity’, that 
way of combining the facts revealed by partial perspective with a reflexivity requiring that 
“the subject of knowledge be placed on the same critical,  causal plane as the objects of 
knowledge”.58 Far from marking a step away from the ideals of sound knowledge articulated 
by Keohane and others, this move is demanded because conventional objectivity is “not 
rigorous or objectifying enough”.59
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So standpoint is not a singular method, and is not a synonym for the subjective. It is more 
akin to a crisis, or perpetual wound, over which feminists worry. It is this which makes so 
many IR responses to feminist epistemology infuriating,  since they take as definitive in 
feminism precisely what it finds so problematic. Subjectivism haunts contemporary 
feminism.60 Although feminists are generally concerned with positionality, this can just as well 
mean that they problematise it to the point where it can do little analytically. Thus 
'experience' can be as much a constraint on feminism as that which constitutes it.61  Sylvia 
Walby, for example, sees science as a complex and internally divided practice, and one in 
which deep and critical feminist engagement has been able to force new awareness of the 
scale of gendered violence and the extent of wage gaps,  but without leading to a successor 
science model.62 On this account,  since science mirrors neither nature nor culture, criticisms 
of dominance legitimised in scientistic language cannot easily invalidate the social practices 
associated with science. Rather than this meaning simply that we should adopt science 
rather than non-science (or anti-science),  it instead suggests that knowledge is produced in 
networks which communicate via shared standards across a science/non-science divide.63
Nor do feminists who see value neutrality as unsustainable require that ‘objectivity’ is 
therefore abandoned. The constitutive goals  of a politicised practice still require subsidiary 
standards, openly known, against which progress towards gender justice is assessed.64 Rather 
than meaning that there must be some bedrock Truth, this is again founded on communities 
and networks of participants: “[a]ll that is required is that there be an intersubjectively 
accessible way of identifying the state of affairs which is given in evidence and that there 
should be agreement about this description in any theoretical dispute”.65 
So as varied as feminist perspectives on objectivity and method may be, they are nevertheless 
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closer to each other, and more engaged in a serious debate over the possibilities of inquiry, 
than the caricatures of IR critics would suggest.66  For example, Harding repeats that the 
point is not to replace objectivist science with subjectivist standpoint, but to introduce some 
kinds of ethics and politics (those distinguished as ‘pro-democratic’) and then only as part of 
evaluation, “not as criteria sufficient in themselves”.67  Consider the congruence between 
these sentiments and those of  a prominent feminist postmodernist in IR:
Feminist theorising offers...the possibility of less biased, less partial 
understandings of the world, the possibility of greater justice in theory and 
practice, the possibility that we discover, through the binoculars of gender 
research, that our very categories of identity and attachment are habits 
rather than realities.68
There is indeed much within feminism to satisfy requirements of evidence, theoretical 
consistency and responsiveness to counter-argument. Questions of theoretical 
commensurability, contexts of discovery and justification, and protocols for validity remain, 
as do issues of how analysis links to ethics and politics. But these are not the special province 
of  feminism, but belong to the problem-fever of  inquiry itself.
The feminism/gender distinction is further troubled by the apparent equivalency of its 
terms. ‘Gender’ as not only something that we can opt for instead of ‘feminism’, but also in 
important respects its  opposite: neutral where feminism is  politicised, balanced where 
feminism is perspectival, open where feminism is closed, and universal where feminism is 
particular. Here, too, attempts within contemporary IR to delineate disciplinary identity 
have tended to ossify categories the better to produce an array of choices. Carpenter, for 
example,  suggests a need for ‘gender’ rather than ‘feminism’ so that we can analytically 
separate and clarify the difference between biological sex and cultural gender, apparently 
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66! It is also worth noting here that turns towards reflexivity in the analysis of global politics intersect strongly, 
but not always, with feminist concerns. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such reflexive moments reveal the position of 
the researcher (and so like Harding reject a traditional scientific epistemology) but often do not proplematise 
or extend the relation of that position to knowledge as a whole (so do not go nearly as far as Harding on the 
character of strong objectivity). See, for a reasonable range of engagements, Conway 2008; Higate and 
Cameron 2006; Eagleton-Pierce 2011.
67! Harding 2001:512.
68! Sylvester 1994a:316.
unaware that this is already a long-running conversation within feminism, and that the sex/
gender distinction was itself an early feminist innovation.69  To use Harding’s terms, 
advocates for gender theory contra feminism basically propose an empiricist agenda which 
they set against a standpoint/postmodern combination (which they call ‘feminism’), taking 
as possible a straight-forward encounter with the realities of gendering unencumbered by 
political distortions. 
The Apartheid of  Paradigms70 
Neither the empiricist/standpoint/postmodern triptych nor the gender/feminism distinction 
provide sufficient grounds for understanding the methodological-epistemological status of 
feminist IR. Within the disciplinary camp war, they have been taken up too readily as secure 
positions from which to proceed, and as legitimising given modes and methods of inquiry 
(always implying that some other way of inquiring is de-legitimised). The consequence for 
concrete study (including into war and sexual violence) has been both to make feminist/non-
feminist the main analytical fault-line and to reduce discussions within feminism to some 
version of the tripartite contest (if not empiricist/standpoint/postmodern then essentialist/
constructivist/postmodern or liberal/radical/postmodern).
And yet the more expansive debate over the contribution of the philosophy of social science 
to the study of global politics is of only meagre assistance. To be sure, the last years have 
witnessed a burgeoning interest in questions of philosophical foundations and anti-
foundations. A series of interventions have challenged the taken-for-granted IR version of 
‘explanation’ that has traditionally elided variegated concepts of cause, data selection, 
testing, fact/value distinctions and methods into an often monolithic, and also confused, 
version of ‘science’. Hidemi Suganami, for example, has convincingly argued that the usual 
separation between formally explanatory theory and the more narrative approach 
emblematic of history is a false one, and that both are a way of ‘rendering intelligible’.71 
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69! Carpenter 2002:163–164.
70! Wight 1996:292. A useful metaphor not only for the shock value, but also because IR's camp structure 
reproduces the idea that diﬀerent forms of inquiry are 'separate but equal', whilst in practicing denigrating 
some to the advantage of others.
71! Suganami 2008; Lawson 2012.
Ways of distinguishing normative and explanatory stories are similarly complicated, 
especially when accounting for the reasons individuals hold for bringing about certain 
events, which is often what is at stake in social science discussions.72
Working in a slightly different register, Milja Kurki has revealed the ‘inadvertent 
Humeanism’ of many IR scholars who dismiss questions of causal explanation because of a 
narrow conception of what that entails (observable phenomena, linked by regularity-
deterministic efficient causes), and who – despite their disavowals – also sometimes 
reproduce those very kinds of explanation in their own research.73 Along with work by Colin 
Wight, Jonathan Joseph and others often aligned with critical realism, this reconceptualising 
of explanation and cause has suggested a range of possible ways in which scholarly practice 
might ‘explain’  without having to satisfy the kind of shifting restrictions outlined by Keohane 
in his diagnosis of  feminism.74
For Patrick Jackson, the kinds of disciplining moves associated with the rhetoric of ‘science’ 
- of which the positions taken by Keohane, Jones, Carpenter and even Tickner are all 
varying examples - blind us to the necessarily pluralist character of inquiry. Proposing a 
more expansive definition of science - systematic reasoning open to criticism and 
improvement that produces worldly knowledge - Jackson outlines four methodologies as 
appropriate ideal types for the disciplinary field: a)  neopositivism (mind-world dualist and 
phenomenalist); b) critical realism (mind-world dualist and transfactualist); c) analyticism 
(mind-world monist and phenomenalist); and d) reflexivity (mind-world monist and 
transfactualist).75  Seeking to progress beyond a war over single sources of scientific authority 
or one-size-fits-all ontological and epistemological warrants, this model gives each approach 
its due, such that debate takes places in relation to the procedures appropriate to each 
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72! Suganami 2011. The question of the connection between causal and moral stories is a significant theme of the 
next chapter.
73! Kurki 2008.
74! See for example Wight 2007; Joseph 2007; Kurki 2007; Chernoﬀ 2007. In each case, there is much that could 
be said about the possible understanding of feminism. However, I focus below principally on Patrick Jackson’s 
pluralist account of inquiry in IR, partly for reasons of space, and partly because it oﬀers the broader 
discussion of how we may locate diﬀerent philosophical approaches.
75! Jackson 2010. Mind-world dualism is the idea of the knower as importantly separate from the world. Mind-
world monism is the view of the knower as part of the world in a way that changes the possibilities of knowing 
itself. Phenomenalism holds that knowledge is always significantly restricted to experience, existence, and the 
position of the knower. Transfactualism instead proposes that experiences can be generalised in a more 
substantive way, even if the position of the knower remains important. 
different methodology. It is the responsibility of scholars to make these commitments 
explicit, not to conform to a master narrative of  legitimacy.
Yet even here, feminism is subsumed too easily into an unwieldy opposition to explanation, 
instead of being seen as capable of including it. Acknowledging that feminist concerns have 
been too easily co-opted by neopositivists76,  Jackson foregrounds feminists as reflexivists, the 
prime exemplars of locating the researcher within structures of power, and of contributing 
to emancipatory agendas by uncovering these locations. But this inclusion comes with a 
caveat. IR's intellectual margins have been too quick to border their spaces through a 
rejection of  method itself:
[D]issidents...have spent considerably more time criticizing the 
methodological approaches that they do not adopt than they have spent 
articulating an alternative methodology. Not that such scholars have not 
produced intriguing insights; it is simply unclear precisely how they have 
done so... None of this is to say that reflexivists should have to demonstrate 
that their work makes the kind of difference that can be easily slotted into a 
neopositivist hypothesis  about systematic connections between variables 
across cases; rather,  it is  to say that reflexivists have to articulate their own set 
of methodological standards and then pursue them as consistently and 
rigorously as neopositivists (and critical realists and analyticists) pursue 
theirs.77
Feminists, like other methodological refuseniks,  posed not as engaging in alter-method, but as 
proponents of non-method. Although the point is somewhat overstated, this framework at 
least moves matters beyond the knotted conflict of the empiricist/standpoint/postmodern 
triptych and the gender/feminism dichotomy.78  But it also threatens to seal feminism (and 
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78! See, for example, the contributions to Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006. Most of the essays reflect the history of 
IR feminism as characterised above, tending to reject positivist methods, stressing the need to unsettle 
hegemonic assumptions, and providing a narrative of the power relations of a given research experience. In 
this sense, they may be taken to confirm Jackson's point. Nevertheless, explicit discussion of methodology does 
take place.
other criticalities) into the reflexive loop alone. The incommensurability implied in Jackson's 
pluralist framework not only protects the methodologies from each other, but also appears to 
prevent them from entertaining either challenge or hybridity.79 
In Jackson’s hands feminism thus reduces to something resembling standpoint alone. 
Although there is a recognition here that this goes beyond individual experience to broader 
claims about marginalised groups (the transfactualism that allows feminism to claim 
'worldliness'), this placement also misses those aspects of feminism which have a more 
strongly phenomenalist character - as in attention to specificity and the unsettling of 
categories like ‘woman’. So methodologies bisect the distinctions within feminism. Feminist 
empiricism might be said to belong to the phenomenalists, but also to the critical realists in 
its attention to an obscured reality; standpoint to the reflexivists but potentially also to the 
analyticists and to the critical realists; and postmodernism predominantly to the camps of 
monism.80  Because in Jackson’s framework a social constructivist ontology moves quickly 
into Weberian ideal typification, these latent possibilities go unnoticed. 
Consider the example of a feminist inquiry into sex-trafficking. A set of standpoint or 
reflexivist conceptual questions would doubtless play a major role, incorporating the 
experiences and self-understandings of participants,  in this example likely trafficked women. 
Such a project may also substantially unsettle the image of ‘the trafficked woman’ itself, by 
addressing the variety of trafficking experiences, by challenging the beliefs of trafficked 
persons or by unpacking the conceptual categories that stabilise 'sex-trafficked women' as a 
singular object of inquiry in the first place. Yet only some parts of feminist work should be 
expected to attend to these issues exclusively. Further sets of questions may well arise 
(around financial flows in trafficking economies, around the reasons for failure by 
governments,  around prevalent attitudes towards trafficked persons in society at large, and 
so on) in which the subject position of researcher and researched may contribute little. 
Indeed, the motivations for trafficking would seem central to many feminist accounts, but 
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80!Kurki, for one, sees feminism as compatible with critical realist claims. Wight further argues that critical and 
scientific realisms can, and have, accommodated reflexivism within their programme, such that there is no 
conflict between the two. See Kurki 2008:219–230; Wight 2013.
may bear only tangentially on a located reflexivity.81  Moreover, the practice 'sex-trafficking' 
does not stand alone. It is imbedded in, and implies an account of, fields like 'economy' and 
'state', ideas like 'person', 'sex' or 'money' and legal-normative distinctions like 'legal/illegal', 
'free/unfree', 'consent/coercion'. 
In both the programme offered by Jackson and in the divisions over the status of feminism, 
the implication appears to be that preferred philosophical orientations cover all of these 
areas: that they go all the way  down. In these terms it is  not possible to be a critical realist 
about the currency used in trafficking and a reflexivist about the meaning of trafficking for 
those who participate in it and an analyticist about the role of ideal types in theory-
construction. If we cast philosophical questions either in terms of multiple 
incommensurable methodologies or as the search for a single foundation to proper inquiry, 
we cannot accommodate these different registers. Amongst diverse epistemological warrants 
and differing social ontologies, we are thus compelled to exclusive decision unless we 
conclude that the original questions are in some way misconceived. 
The Promiscuity Of  Gender 
One answer would be to see a world composed of multiple objects and processes, with 
different philosophical-methodological assumptions appropriate to each one, an idea that 
can also be applied to 'real' science.82  This has not generally been the path taken by 
advocates, who pose the choice as one between different programmes.83 Nor is it the answer 
offered by Jackson, since the irreducible pluralism he proposes means that research agendas 
only make sense within methodologies, and not across them. Consider instead the possibility 
of gender as a field of ontological and epistemological promiscuity. Not just that gender can 
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81! 'Reflexivity' may be reframed so that inquiry into men's motivations for traﬃcking may form part of a 
standpoint approach, even where the researcher is not a man, is not a traﬃcker, and is not otherwise 'inside' 
the practice of traﬃcking, but this would seem rather to dilute the specificity of a standpoint beyond standard 
usage.
82! Cartwright 2004.
83! Colin Wight, by contrast, argues that by virtue of rejecting a singular scientific method, scientific realists 
understand that “it must be the case that diﬀering phenomena will require diﬀering modes of investigation 
and perhaps diﬀerent modes of explanation”. See Wight 2006:19. As well as fostering opportunities for 
theoretical hybridity, this also points to a counter-solution to that oﬀered by Jackson in which philosophical 
positions are not arranged side by side as incommensurable options, but are capable of being embedded within 
each other, such that certain programmes can contain others, but not vice-versa. This intriguing possibility is 
eschewed here in favour of a more concentrated focus on feminist IR as currently understood.
be studied from many perspectives – which is true for all of the subject-objects of social 
inquiry – but that any concrete examination of gender combines different perspectives, and 
that this is desirably  so (indeed,  strictly necessary under certain iterations). That the possible 
ways of  accounting for gender co-exist in an overlapping geometry.84
Recalling again the moves between empiricist, standpoint and postmodern epistemologies, 
the point is more than that Harding offers a richer view of feminist epistemology than her 
IR interpreters suggest. It is also that many IR feminists already  practice Harraway's 
'necessary multiple desire'. Although it is common for scholars to present themselves as one 
or other of the relevantly separate feminist identities, most combine conventional empirical 
detail (challenging a dominant interpretation); a situated critique (the view of particular 
women or the reflexive positioning of the author); and a deconstruction of what has come 
before (to extend the empiricist-standpoint claims or to enable new thought and future 
action). 
Moreover, this multiple desire becomes constitutive if we recognise feminist theorising as 
always both an attempt to reveal gender orders as currently constituted, and to show (create, 
even) the conditions of possibility for going beyond them. A way of thinking and unthinking 
gender. Seen differently, this could also mean that there is a confusion in our ways of talking 
about feminism, a mixing together of ideas of situatedness, politics and social ontology. 
Feminism thus appears to operate as both a very general method of study (asking certain 
questions about gender and women, as Zalewski put it),  one nearly synonymous with the 
phenomena studied (gender),  and as a deeper set of philosophical-methodological 
dispositions. 
This is a dilemma not only for characterisations of feminism by those somewhat outside it 
(such as Keohane and Jackson)85, but also a question of exclusions within feminism itself. 
Mary Caprioli's charge, that “conventional IR feminists appear to discriminate against 
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85! 'Outside' only in the sense that their preferred programmes (an institutionalism borrowing occasionally from 
standpoint and an analyticism, respectively) are diﬀerentiated from feminism on their own terms, not in the 
sense that they are anti- or non-feminist in political disposition.
quantitative research”, serves as one example.86  Rather than accepting, in the manner of 
Adam Jones, that a proper scientific study of women means doing gender (and not 
feminism), Caprioli instead wants to maintain and celebrate the political dimensions of 
inquiry. Although she seeks to rebrand a ‘quantitative’ emancipatory project as 
‘neofeminism’ she also clearly sees the inter-disciplinary divide that has developed as 
“artificial”.87 
What, after all, are we saying if we claim that more gender equal societies are less prone to 
collective violence;  or that those with gender conservative attitudes (emphasising differences 
between men and women)  are more prone to sexual violence?88 It is not enough to classify 
these attempts as minority feminist pursuits (and therefore irrelevant) without replaying the 
same games of disciplinary power in a new direction.89  We are clearly close to ‘proper 
science’ in one of the senses used by Keohane: hypotheses that hold across different cases, 
supportable and challengeable by evidence, with plausible mechanisms by which the effects 
make themselves felt. Indeed, a clear conjunction appears possible between Tickner’s view of 
feminism as “both less biased and more universal than conventional research” and Caprioli’s 
claim that “[f]eminist theory is rife with testable hypotheses that can only strengthen feminist 
IR scholarship”.90  Whether this is enough for gender to be a clear-cut variable in a 
neopositivist model is  up for dispute: this  kind of explanation can just as easily be critical 
realist or analyticist in orientation. Reflexivists,  too, often gesture at the possibility of such 
claims (recall Kurki on ‘inadvertent Humeanism’). To say that similar events happen in 
different places for a similar constellation of reasons is not automatically to be a 
neopositivist, although this is often how the term is used in IR.91 
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86! Caprioli 2004:257.
87! Caprioli 2004:266. I place 'quantitative' in quotes here because Caprioli’s project goes far beyond quantitative 
data, and is instead about establishing relationships between empirical observations in a conventionally 
‘rigorous’ sense. That broadly neopositivist assumptions reduce to simple quantitative methods in this account 
is itself reflective of the slippage in terms characteristic of the interventions already surveyed. Indeed, the 
distinction deployed by Caprioli between the research work itself (carried out according to conventional 
strictures) and its purpose (a radical feminist critique of global politics) is more reminiscent of Weber than IR's 
neopositivists.
88! See, for example, Caprioli et al. 2009; Hudson et al. 2008.
89! See the dismissal in Sylvester 2013.
90!Tickner 2005:4; Caprioli 2004:257.
91! This point is subject to further discussion in the next chapter.
There are ontological and epistemological questions at stake in all research, but much 
disagreement arises also at the levels of substantive theory (particular explanations for 
phenomenon citing particular actors and processes) and of politics (the framing of the 
research - who it is for, what it seeks to accomplish)  regardless of its foundations. Indeed, for 
the political dimensions of a theory to be problematic, there is usually implicitly a view that 
its meta-theoretical and substantive grounds are fairly secure and accurate, which is what 
allows it to be instrumentalised for destructive ends in the first place. 
One way to look at this tension is to distinguish between the depth and seriousness of a 
problem. The misunderstandings that have so thoroughly plagued feminist theory and IR 
(and the two are frequently posed in this way, as if always already external to each other92) 
are indeed serious in their content and consequences, but their philosophical roots may not 
go very deep. It is logically possible for there to be historical patterns of inquiry so vile and 
oppressive in their forms, their purposes and their effects that we wish to banish them 
forever without this meaning that we require a new picture of ontology and epistemology. A 
‘merely’ methodological requirement to include marginalised voices in research may have 
wide-ranging and transformative effects without actually requiring a foundational revision of 
social ontology. By the same measure,  research can remain confined to the analytical level of 
the state, even if  the ontological basis of  the social has been completely reconstituted.
Apparently stringent differences may then be revealed as functions of our vernacular (whether 
we speak of variables or not, even if the same point can be articulated in multiple ways), 
register (the pitch and tone of our projects,  how open they seem to transformation and 
critique, how they summon and interpellate fellow travellers) and purpose (the uses those 
projects are to be put to in the world). Two projects with identical methodological 
groundings may find themselves directly opposed, and vociferously so, on this  model, 
without it threatening ontological stability. Indeed, this political grammar of our work is 
strangely neglected given the discipline’s purported objects of study.93  Knowledge is 
produced, or critical intellectual work carried out, in communities which are the locus where 
identities and affiliations circulate, and where there are consequences to the views we 
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IR theorists, or even of constructivists, realists, liberals and others who are feminists in their political practice.
93!  Which is not to say that these issues have not been addressed. See in particular Kurki 2009, 2011.
attribute to ourselves and others. The disciplinary identities associated with the distinctions 
between feminist and non-feminist thus take on a renewed salience, not because the 
common distinctions made between them are accurate, but because their rhetorical 
separation has effects in itself.
A Tasty Piece Of  Meat, Surrounded By & Entirely Covered By Flies
The question, then, is at least as much one of disciplinary identities as of philosophical 
disputes. But the attempt to stabilise a certain feminist history and identity is bigger than IR. 
As Clare Hemmings has so aptly shown, many feminists have themselves constructed a just-
so story of different waves (empiricist, standpoint,  postmodern, but especially essentialist, 
difference, postmodern), each replaced by a more sophisticated and politically astute variant, 
constantly legitimising the present state of theory.94 This narratology of feminist theory – an 
exposition of its political grammar – uncovers how shifts in feminist theory are euphemistically 
temporalised. For example: 
“The past few years” remains obscure,  the phrase's function less to explore 
the past than to reassure its reader that the present is a time of proliferation. 
So accepted is  this view that neither the past nor its  transitional phase need 
citation or discussion: once the business of reiterating the credentials of the 
present is out of the way, we can move to more controversial 
considerations.95
The credentials of the present. The task of providing the necessary legitimation for inquiry, even 
whilst resisting the discourses of legitimacy: a historicism held in place by citation and 
affect.96  Given the dual character of feminism as explanatory and normative-political, the 
injunction to “think from women’s lives” can also be read as primarily political, rather than 
an epistemological straight-jacket. Making any kind of distinction between the political and 
the 'merely' explanatory is risky, although here it signifies only the difference between 
emancipatory action (intended to overcome certain barriers and oppressions) and 
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conceptual reflection (which may be directed by political imperatives, and laden with 
political issues, without therefore being the same thing as emancipatory action). In a sense 
this political requirement, raised by Tickner as the unifying link between the variety of 
feminist projects, is  both minimal and transformative, since acknowledging situated 
privileges and marginalities does change research, often in a way that reconfigures our idea 
of what it is to be a scholar, but does not straightforwardly commit us to a singular, pre-
prepared ontological-epistemological-methodological package.
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Chapter Three
FEMINISM AS CRITICAL EXPLANATION
Method is not...a more or less successful set of procedures for reporting on a 
given reality. Rather it is performative. It helps to produce the realities. It 
does not do so freely and at whim. There is a hinterland of realities, of 
manifest absences and Otherness,  resonances and patterns of one kind or 
another, already being enacted, and it cannot ignore these. At the same 
time, however, it is also creative. It re-works and re-bundles these and as it 
does so re-crafts realities and creates new versions of the world. It makes 
new signals and new resonances, new manifestations and new concealments, 
and it does so continuously. 
John Law, After Method 1
The Problem-Fever Of  The Body Of  Political Science2
Another way to comprehend feminism, the way pursued in the remainder of this thesis,  is as 
a particular convergence of explanation, ethics and politics. This understanding repeats 
ideas about feminism already encountered – that it is internally differentiated; that it is part 
politics and at least part science (depending on definition) but not reducible to either; and 
that it shares features with other forms of critical or emancipatory thought and praxis. In 
setting out how feminist IR has this character, and in showing how it links to the idea that 
there are different feminist modes of critical explanation for sexual violence, the 
demarcation lines predominant in contemporary IR discussions of feminism are largely 
eschewed. This is  not meant as a rejection of, nor as an opposition to, the validity of those 
questions. It merely takes the matter of  feminism and gender, and looks at them askew.
Responding to philosophical quandaries – of which the feminist standpoint and gender/
feminism debates are but two examples – critical IR theorists have overwhelmingly attended 
to a set of epistemological questions framed in terms of discourse, perspective, consensus, 
community, truth and anti-truth.3 What can be made of the 'inter' in inter-subjective reality 
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3! See variously Linklater 1992; Neufeld 1995; Milliken 1999; Campbell 1998a; Wight 1999; Campbell 1999; 
Hutchings 2005; Hansen 2006; Robinson 2011.
has, for example, been one major dividing line within critical perspectives.4  This has 
displaced the closely-related, but also somewhat different, idea of explanation. Although the 
idea of explanation rubs up against that of truth, and requires a sense of confirmation 
through dialogue, it has only recently been resuscitated as a topic amongst critical theorists, 
and even then usually only those of a critical realist stripe. But what is usually thought of as 
explanation in IR (positivist understandings of determinist covering laws drawn from 
observable and strict regularities)5 is but one understanding of cause; causes in turn being 
only a part of what falls under explanation; and explanation being a component,  but not the 
only one, in general ideas of  truth.6
This situation is partly discipline-specific, traceable at least to the point when explanation 
was separated from understanding in IR's philosophical imaginary. In the hands of Hollis 
and Smith, explanation is that kind of social science story that looks in from outside, 
formulating laws and marking structure, rather than attending to meaning, contingency, 
agency and belief. Despite their caution that it is only ever half the story,  explanation is still 
generally presented as a separate and closed kind of activity.7 Much the same could be said 
about the distinction between 'critical' and 'problem-solving' theory. Just as Hollis and Smith 
desired to distinguish two stories whilst still allowing them to operate together,  so too Robert 
Cox argued that whilst critical theory was the more desirable of paths, it nevertheless 
contained elements of problem-solving theory within it.8  It could thus be both descriptive 
and political, even if  these elements were in some state of  tension.9
But like associated divisions, such as that between rationalists and reflexivists, the contrast 
between explanation and understanding has become one of the easiest dichotomies for 
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4! See, for example, Fluck 2012.
5! These conditions follow the Humean conception of cause outlined and critiqued in Kurki 2008.
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example, aesthetic, moral or logical kinds of truth.
7! Hollis and Smith 1990.
8! Cox 1981. For an important statement of the relationship between knowledge and ideology critique in critical 
theory, see Geuss 1981.
9! Hoﬀman 1987. See also Whitworth 1989.
locating methodological-theoretical commitments.10  In practice,  explanatory theory seldom 
proceeds in the way imagined.11 But suspicion of explanation is also a resistance to attempts 
to limit the possibilities of feminist politics on the grounds of putatively scientific claims 
about social realities. Classically, Judith Butler:
There is no ontology of gender on which we might construct a politics, for 
gender ontologies always operate within established political contexts as 
normative injunctions, determining what qualifies as intelligible sex, 
invoking and consolidating the reproductive constraints on sexuality, setting 
the prescriptive requirements whereby sexed or gendered bodies come into 
cultural intelligibility. Ontology is,  thus, not a foundation,  but a normative 
injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political discourse 
as its necessary ground.12
A rejection, then, of explanation understood as the revelation of an ontological truth of 
women's  actual – and necessary – place in the social order. Not only explanation, but all 
craving for theoretical and political generality, can thus be thrown into dispute:
Barely concealed in the category of women debates is the unspoken wish 
that feminist theory can, and ought to,  give an exhaustive account of 
gender relations and provide a kind of 'super-idealized guidance' on how to 
change them. We might think of this wish as a desire for solace, a desire 
that would be satisfied by, and thus incessantly searches out, the perfect 
theory.13
Yet politics persists  – desirably so – in spite of much feminist caution over its sometimes tidy 
categories. So too should explanation, not least because of the inadvertent reliance on 
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10! Keohane 1988. 'Reflexivism' has in many ways merged into 'constructivism' since the 1990s. These distinctions 
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11! See in particular the fascinating discussion in Humphreys 2011
12! Butler 2006:203.
13! Zerilli 2005:35.
explanatory truth in accounts which claim to eschew it. However circumscribed, explanatory 
claims in the sense unravelled below are no more detachable from feminist politics than 
political and ethical considerations are from attempts to name and plot a neutralised 
'gender'.14
This chapter is an attempt to show how such explanation works,  and how it can be 
examined in turn. It is not in itself about substantive kinds of explanation – rationalist, 
economic, constructivist,  Realist, and so on – nor about given focuses of study – war,  norms, 
diplomacy, state action – but about what explanation is,  and what it can be, within a 
substantive kind of explanation – that of gender-feminist theory.15  Moreover, explanation 
not as some over-arching or under-lying guarantee of validity, but variously as a multiple term, 
allowing for wide variation in form; as articulated alongside politics and ethics in critical feminism; 
and as an actually existing practice within feminist IR (if  an ambiguous and disavowed one).
Incommensurability Makes The World Safe For Critical Theory 16
Resistance to explanation comes, in part, from the view that feminists are concerned with 
the broadly interpretive dimensions of global politics: the ways in which meanings are fixed, 
the rules of language and ideology through which gender makes itself known and felt,  the 
discursive associations which align ‘woman’ with ‘nation’,  and so on. As a result, feminist 
work is taken to be thickly descriptive rather than explanatory, or more generously 
constitutive rather than causal. Causal questions are about ‘why’ and ‘how’ while 
constitutive ones ask ‘how-possible’ or ‘what’.17  The assumption is that ‘causal’ is 
synonymous with ‘explanatory’, but, following Alexander Wendt, constitutive questions are 
also explanatory. ‘What’ questions reveal the capacities and structure of social kinds, and so 
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14! Bernard Williams puts the point well: “It is remarkable how complacent some 'deconstructive' histories are 
about the status of the history that they deploy themselves. A further turn is to be found in some 'unmasking' 
accounts of natural science, which aim to show that its pretensions to deliver truth are unfounded, because of 
social forces that control its activities. Unlike the case of history, these do not use truths of the same kind. 
They apply the social sciences, and typically depend on the remarkable assumption that the sociology of 
knowledge is in a better position to deliver truth about science that science is to deliver truth about the 
world”. See Williams 2002:2–3.
15! I push the two terms together here to underline their common explanatory ground – social relations 
understood by reference to gender – rather than to overlook some of the distinctions in their assumptions 
about hierarchy/diﬀerence or the preferences about politics.
16! Wight 1996:298.
17! Wendt 1998:104–108.
are inferential. This is explanation by  concept.18  ‘How-possible’ questions go beyond 
classification to give a ‘morphological’ account of the internal and social characteristics of a 
social kind, which is to say the properties of an entity (what is it that makes something a 
state?)  and the relational characteristics that define it in a field (what social structure sets 
states in ‘the international’?).19
So to speak of the differential social placement of humans assigned ‘male’ and ‘female’ is 
already to give a constitutive explanation of gender power. There is then no reason not to 
think of gender and feminist theory as including this capacity for explanation. Indeed, one 
of their major contributions is to provide constitutive explanations of gender that are 
superior to those offered by other forms of inquiry. The persistent internal arguments of 
feminism – such as the idea that feminism discovered the multiplicity of 'woman' whilst in 
search of a stable feminist subject – indeed require that explanation in this sense is a major 
element of feminist theorising: the 'discovery'  cannot be wished away by virtue of its possible 
political inconvenience.20
But we can go further. Feminist and gender theory also offer causal explanations. Wendt 
distinguishes causal questions of the form ‘does X cause Y?’ as assuming: 1)  the 
independence of X and Y; 2) that X precedes Y in time; and 3)  that but for X, Y would not 
have occurred.21  Terms such as ‘independence’ can generate considerable dispute, but need 
only mean that two phenomena are not identical (for example that ‘misogyny’ and ‘rape’ are 
different in the banal sense that they do not necessarily  entail each other). The independence 
of two elements within an explanation does not commit one to the idea of mind-world 
dualism, or to a total split between fact and value, or to covering laws. Similarly, dispute may 
arise as to regularity of the X-Y connection, but explanations ranging from particularist 
historical to covering law will include some kind of counterfactual, implicit or not, in their 
explanations.22 
·  67·
18! Wendt 1998:110.
19! Wendt 1998:111–113.
20! On these tensions between feminism as a paradoxical praxis and the status of “women's studies” as an 
academic discipline see Wiegman 2002; de Lauretis 1990; Brown 2005.
21! Wendt 1998:105.
22! Conceding the existence of counterfactuals does not entail that we embrace social laws, since we may regularly 
use counterfactuals in explanatory reasoning without being able to tie them down with the appropriate 
specificity to parallel formal laws in the hard sciences.
In this sense, common feminist claims, such as that patriarchal attitudes in society increase 
the likelihood of rape, are clearly causal forms of explanation. A pre-existing situation (social 
attitudes defined as ‘patriarchal’) gives rise to an event (rape),  albeit in a general and perhaps 
probabilistic way. At the level of the individual,  this requires only that perpetrators held 
patriarchal views before they raped, and can be combined with a constitutive perspective 
which acknowledges that ‘rape’ and ‘patriarchy’ are of course linked phenomena with 
contested histories, the meaning of which is retroactively set by the practice of theorising 
about them ('linked' not meaning that they are the same thing). We may even provide a 
simple model in which decreases in one independent variable (patriarchal attitudes) is 
predicted to lead to some corresponding decrease in a dependent one (the incidence of 
rape). 
To speak of patriarchy, misogyny and sexism as processes shaping wartime sexual violence is 
thus to engage in 'common sensical' causal description. As Kurki expresses it,  feminism 
indeed “depends on making some causal claims about the nature of patriarchal societies and 
global structures”.23  Again,  the ‘political’  dimension of feminism (seeking to dismantle 
patriarchy) to some extent requires that the causal sequence (the explanatory inference)  be 
valid. Dispute may quickly arise as to measurement and to the character and contingency of 
this link, but this only challenges the scope of causal explanation, not its existence. Because 
feminists tend not to be positivists, and since non-positivists are sceptical of formal 
modelling with large collections of abstracted data, inquiry is  unlikely to be operationalised 
in terms of variables, and attention will often turn to historical specificity and political 
theoretical interpretation. But beneath the genealogy, the model lurks:
A moral philosophy...characteristically presupposes a sociology. For every 
moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial conceptual 
analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons,  motives, 
intentions and actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some claim 
that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real world.24
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24! MacIntyre 2007:23.
By incorporating both constitutive and causal questions, feminist IR can accomplish 
different kinds of explanation. In addition (assuming again a general disposition against fully 
positivist inquiry) differing specific models of explanation link together ontological and 
epistemological assumptions with preferred methodological styles.25 
We have already briefly encountered Hidemi's Suganami's combining of explanation and 
understanding as the process of historical sense-making and reason-giving, as well as claims 
by critical realists about the deep causal structure of the social. There are other models of 
explanation, but consider just two highlighted by Jason Glynos and David Howarth. In the 
case of contextualised self-interpretations, a hermeneutic method explains via normatively-
informed descriptions: making sense of social events from within, and combining that thick 
description with critique.26  By contrast, causal mechanisms in the sense proposed by Jon Elster 
allow for the retrospective identification of certain patterns. We do not predict in advance 
how social relations will work out (there is too much contingency for that), but we can trace 
commonalities  after the event: so if C1, C2, C3, then sometimes X (where Cn represents 
different possible causal mechanisms and X the relevant outcome). We might then identify 
causal mechanisms as feminists simply by substituting 'hierarchical gender relations' or 
'patriarchal history' or 'misogynistic norms' for C1, C2,  and C3 and say then that sometimes 
this leads to gender-based violence in the relevant situations.27
At a more mundane, but no less challenging level, there is simply a wide variety in possible 
explanations dependent on what questions are posed. As Alan Garfinkel put it,  explanations do 
not merely aim at particular objects, but at something “more like a state of affairs together 
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25! Patrick Jackson, amongst others, argues that there is no necessary link between philosophical foundations and 
substantive theories. One can, for example, apply large n-quantitative datasets to constructivist questions. But 
this does not mean that there is not a close connection between methodologies and methods, since some 
approaches to inquiry only really make sense within that methodological framing. A reflexivist may be able to 
apply the kinds of methods usually associated with neopositivists, but given their suspicion of generalisations 
and the rejection of laws, the return on eﬀort would seem rather minimal. Hence the vague phrase 
'methodological styles'. In any case, in practice ontologies, epistemologies and methods are put to work as part 
of a more-or-less joint package. See Jackson 2010:205–206.
26! Glynos and Howarth 2007:49–82.
27! Glynos and Howarth 2007:83–102. Ultimately, Glynos and Howarth reject both options, seeing contextualised 
self-interpretations as too specific to generate a useful purchase, and causal mechanisms as exhibiting a 
'residual positivism' by measuring themselves in comparison to the ideal of laws, but both suggest ways of 
explaining that are compatible with feminist suspicions of social science.
with a definite space of alternatives to it”, alternatives rooted in what stands as problematic.28 
Feminist accounts of war rape, following this logic,  introduced a new contrast space in their 
questions. They made it possible to ask “given war, why rape?” or “why is there wartime 
sexual violence,  given any of the possible alternatives to it during war?”.29  This alone does 
not require a change in kinds of explanation (which remains causal in this example) or even 
one of the model of explanation (explanations before and after feminist interventions may be 
of a historical, or a critical realist, or a positivist, kind). Embedding explanation within 
political and ethical sensibilities (or constituting the social itself in political and ethical terms) 
may then not so much change the validity  of claims (whether a given statistical representation 
of opinion is accurate) so much as shift and problematise their status (results accurate to what 
ends, for whom, to the exception of  what else, and assuming what about the future).
Because ultimately all explanations depend on other prior explanations and assumptions,  we 
operate with a sense of “limited negation”, of what can reasonably count in the set of 
alternatives.30  These can be challenged in turn but usually are not for the purposes of 
substantive theorising.31 One way of translating this into our existent disciplinary language is 
to say that critical theorising (including feminism) entertains a wider set of contrast spaces 
than problem-solving ones. This applies to causal and constitutive questions, but also to 
normatively-directed inquiry. So instead of just asking “how can the United Kingdom be 
made safe from the terrorism of Al Qaeda”, critical theorists might ask “how do practices of 
'making-safe' operate” (a different causal question), or “what is it to think of a 'state',  a 
condition called 'security' and a distinct political violence called 'terrorism'” (a different 
constitutive question), or “what power does it serve to frame the question in this way” (a 
normatively-informed question). 
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28! Garfinkel 1981:21, emphasis in original. In Garfinkel's example, an imprisoned thief and a priest are both 
dealing with the question “why rob banks?”, an apparently simple kind of question, but one which reveals their 
diﬀerent purposes. For the priest, the space of alternatives includes an honest life and not robbing anything. 
But for the thief, major alternatives include, for example, robbing grocery stores or gas stations. Which is why 
he answers the question “why rob banks?” with “because that's where the money is”.
29! The structure of these questions follows the general formula given by Garfinkel 1981:29.
30! Garfinkel 1981:30.
31! In this they come very close to the idea of an analytical wager, to be discussed in greater depth below.
Renegade Knowledge32
Multiplicity in explanation is both frustrating and banal. We do not know what to make of 
all the possible questions that could be asked, and of the many possible explanatory answers 
that could be given to them. But it is ultimately unsurprising that there should be such 
variety, and that it persists. Yet we proceed as if this situation is to be overcome, somehow. In 
the case of feminism, self-consciousness about ethical and political dimensions of inquiry 
add to the problem-fever. One way to resolve the apparent conflict is to formally separate 
the explanatory, the ethical and the political,  such that they inform each other without 
seeping across a separating boundary. In such a model, scholars can quite consciously move 
from 'science' to 'politics' and engage in the later without renouncing a special claim to the 
former.33  But although some aspects of explanation, ethics and politics are conceptually 
distinct,  there is always a risk that in foregrounding explanation, ethics and politics become 
subsidiary categories,  activities to be pursued after the underlying issues have been settled by 
explanation.
But values infect our construction of an explanatory contrast space. Because explanations 
are instances of practical reasoning, orientated towards something that strikes us as 
problematic, they exclude and suppose much. But the grounds for this exclusion are not 
easily settled by the objective structure of the situation, but instead rely upon the 
accumulated history, interests and values of the inquirer. Explanation that can render 
practicable advice (that can enable us to actually understand anything in its specificity) 
requires exclusion. This is how even 'laws' come to have values, since explanations that adopt 
a smaller contrast space implicitly make value judgements by taking non-necessary elements 
of the social field as if they were necessary in the formation of a given, practicable, 
explanation. This is especially so because of the contestability of very many core concepts in 
social theory.34  Assuming the laws of physics as given in the explanation of how someone 
was tortured to death is not equivalent to assuming the legitimacy of the state in the same 
example. Ian Hacking puts it wonderfully: 
·  71·
32! Wiegman 2002:18.
33! For a particularly interesting example, including a useful discussion of the role of value for Weberian 
scholarship, see Jackson and Kaufman 2007.
34! Classically, MacIntyre 1973.
It is the shibboleth of science that is value-neutral. Throughout the history 
of the social sciences there has been a strident insistence on the distinction 
between fact and value. That is a give-away, for the natural sciences have 
seldom had to insist upon this  distinction. On the contrary,  elderly natural 
scientists regularly regret that there are not more values to be found in the 
natural sciences.35
Hence the novelty,  at once explanatory, political and ethical, of making questions about war 
rape possible.36  Yet for some, feminism is primarily political,  rather than primarily 
epistemological, which means that it cannot be reduced to the validity of a set of knowledge 
claims,  even though some feminist debates have proceeded in that way. As a practice of 
freedom, it is concerned with the potentiality for world-making, for politics as unboundable 
and precarious action.37  This is so,  but does not detach feminist politics from feminist 
explanation. It means only that because feminism is concerned with creative and 
emancipatory futures, its  explanations are often retroactive, tracing the forms and 
constraints of gender orders to the present. Explanation that is contingent,  genealogical, 
historical,  reconstructive, and so on, rather than an anti-explanation. To respond to 
feminism's politics by jettisoning feminist epistemology indeed only reproduces the sharp 
division between the two, but now from the other side: knowledge claims reduced to the 
validity of political claims. It is to adopt the rhetorical style of the enthymeme: implying a 
premise in the formation of argument,  without setting it out explicitly.38  The normative and 
activist politics at stake are usually very clear, so clear that they sometimes threaten to 
overwhelm the question of what particular account is being given of sexual violence as a 
phenomenon. The ‘concealed’ or ‘implied’ premise is not a political one, but one regarding 
the proper conception of  social action in analytical terms. 
·  72·
35! Hacking 1995:366.
36! Garfinkel 1981:147–151.
37! Zerilli 2005:38–39.
38! Pearce 2003:154.
To reintroduce explanation to discussions of feminism is not an attempt to banish the 
vertigo induced by scepticism about truth (in Linda Zerilli's  channelling of Wittgenstein).39 
Post-positivisms in general seek to preserve that vertigo. Nor, given the character of 
explanation already set out, is the assumption that talking about explanation will enable a 
new certainty: a definitive diagnosis of the real causes of sexual violence across all cases. 
Rather, the claim is that explanations (of varying degrees of contingency) are already  present. 
Even the most throw-away comment on the link between patriarchy and rape is riddled with 
muted explanatory content. The task is to reveal that content, and to explore clearly how it 
matters: for discourses of gender power; for the structuring divisions between war and 
peace, military and economy, male and female, violence and desire, and more; and for the 
concrete political actions undertaken now – often in the name of  feminism – to end rape. 
The ambiguity is in how the explanatory elements connect to the ethical and political 
elements. Do they strongly restrict possible futures, broadly contour them, or admit of the 
possibility of a radical break? These are better grasped as questions of imagination rather 
than of adequate concepts, and within the social sphere there may be no definitive limit on 
freedom so understood.40  Yet even this strong view mingles with the explanatory: a 
conception of the possible based on an assessment of what it is.41  In relation to rape as a 
weapon of war we might here adopt Louise du Toit’s phrasing (channelling Cornelius 
Castoriadis)  and say that feminist accounts of rape are accounts of dominant meanings and 
acts within an instituted social imaginary which they attempt to disrupt in the name of a new 
practice or instituting  social imaginary.42  Conceived of in this way, feminist analysis is 
constituted by its explanatory-ethical-political tensions,  advancing both an account of 
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41! At the risk of belabouring the point, this explanatory dimension is visible immediately in the separation of the 
'social sphere' from any other (presumably natural). It is this looping back of politics into explanation which 
enables a separation of the future claim “women can earn as much as men” from the future claim “humans can 
fly into space unaided”. Even the admission that there is some diﬀerence in probability between the two would 
seem to restrict the conception of freedom (and of feminism) on Zerilli's terms, but identifying the 
comparison as ridiculous requires us to distinguish “fly into space” as a diﬀerent kind of action, bounded by 
diﬀerent rules and causes, than “earn as much”.
42! du Toit 2009.
current conditions and a ethico-political critique of  them.43
It might be said that the ambiguity over explanatory referents and politically-charged claims 
is precisely what the early positivists wanted to eradicate by fixing relations in strict and 
exclusive form. The difference lies ultimately in a radically different view of social ontology. 
Because critical theorists consistently identify in the world the possibility for change (in 
particular the possibility for change that can be understood as emancipatory), they cannot 
rely on as many structural presuppositions as other social scientists. Whether in constitutive 
or causal registers,  this problematising, this calling-into-question, underlines the non-necessary 
character of social relations for critical theorists. Like Butler, they identify an openness in the 
social field that mitigates against any strong fixing of properties,  both because of the 
complexity of  what is studied and because of  the positionality of  the one doing the studying. 
Method Always Works Not Simply By Detecting But 
Also By Amplifying A Reality 44 
At the substantive level of critical explanations for wartime sexual violence, clarification is 
thus needed in terms of kinds of questions,  models of explanation and the relevant contrast 
space of specific problems posed. For my purposes, the question is not 'why is there war 
rape?'. This thesis involves no comparison of cases of extreme rape with those of low or no 
rape.45 The orientating question is closer to 'what is war rape?' and 'how is war rape?'. In this 
it combines constitutive questions (what are the available concepts and axioms and where 
are their limits? Where are the boundaries of 'war' and 'rape'?  What are 'war' and 'rape'? 
How is gender in rape?)  and causal ones (what led to these atrocities, here? What variable 
grasp do our theories provide?  What assumptions must be abandoned in the face of 
evidence?). In practice, existent feminist and gender theory implicitly deploys a range of 
explanatory models (sometimes indeterminately), but the broad outlines of most feminist 
inquiry is subsumable within the idea of  modes of  critical explanation.
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organisation and contestation in world-making, and the latter is a process of reflecting and discussing the 
status of the ought. 
44!Law 2004:116.
45! This is the current project of Elisabeth Jean Wood. See Wood 2006, 2009.
Like other ways of talking about the world (perspectives, paradigms, ideal types,  logics, 
discourses or conducts of inquiry), modes frame and name causal or constitutive relations 
and mark them as involving a pattern of process or outcome, a way of distinguishing 
explanations which gives rise to claims about the underlying reasons for behaviours, events 
and social phenomena. If explanation is one purpose and sub-set of the larger enterprise 
called 'theory',  modes are packages of explanations united by common themes and 
assumptions, differentiated from other modes by the distinctive way in which they assemble 
and cohere accounts of the social world. In this  sense modes are close to styles of reasoning: 
“the grammar of assumptions and concepts that informs a particular approach to the social 
world: a way of formulating problems, addressing them, and then evaluating the answers 
that have been produced”.46
In defining critical explanation, Glynos and Howarth propose a view of logics (in general) 
but then specify three thicker logics of explanation (social, political and fantasmatic) which 
they see as generally operative in human affairs.47 By contrast,  the idea of modes of critical 
explanation does not settle differences in feminist accounts of war rape by reference to the 
philosophy of social science, but establishes an interpretive framework for understanding 
them in their variety. The explanatory-ethical-political character of feminism, and the 
intersection of these dimensions with epistemological debates on the one hand and with 
shifting and complex gender objects of inquiry on the other, mean that feminist modes are 
not best understood as merely competing theories (still less 'hypotheses'). When modes 
assemble, they negotiate the retroductive relationship:
[Assemblage practices] both receive and they transmit. Picking up on a faint 
pattern, they make it stronger. They condense and manifest a version of 
reality, but as they condense it they re-enact it,  they re-confirm it. Method 
always works not simply  by detecting  but also by amplifying a reality. The absent 
hinterlands of the real are re-crafted – and then they are there,  patterned 
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47! Glynos and Howarth 2007:157–161.
and patterning, resonating for the next enactment of  the real.48 
Feminist modes of critical explanation are thus particular ways of understanding social 
phenomena that depend on conditions that are distinctly feminist in character. Different 
feminist modes will supplement these conditions with further layers of analytical, political 
and normative content. A feminist mode of accounting for wartime sexual violence is, then, 
a distinct form of feminist critical explanation applied to the phenomena of war rape, 
transferring or developing further arguments from the perspective of a particular grammar 
of assumptions or style of reasoning. The claim that there are multiple feminist modes in the 
study of wartime sexual violence attempts to show how these forms of critical explanation 
are differentiated from each other and how their respective assumptions give rise to 
particular kinds of  stories about rape in war.
	
Different epistemological traditions demand different standards of fit between these two 
kinds of activity, but all approaches which seek to clarify, explicate, understand, explain or 
diagnose wartime sexual violence will deploy implicit or explicit criteria for what makes a set 
of claims persuasive. Modes are ways of assembling the social world in theory, of sorting 
through the mess of evidence and experience by foregrounding certain realities while 
ignoring or suppressing others.49 Identifying and naming modes is thus an interpretive and 
ideal-typifying act. Modes are arrived at by extrapolating from themes and patterns found in 
our articulations of  research and our analytical claims. 
Modes And Models
Modes of critical explanations are composed of a number of elements, which cohere 
together as composite forms to provide the substance of a critical explanation. 
Conceptualising how we study wartime sexual violence (or other phenomena) in this way 
better reflects the processes involved than a neat division of different feminist epistemologies 
or ontologies. Again, this is not to say that epistemology and ontology as usually understood 
are irrelevant. But we can discover something important about the modes taken by feminist 
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2004. And, for a somewhat more simplified application of similar ideas to IR, Büger and Gadinger 2007.
49! See Glynos and Howarth 2007:133–137; Law 2004; Hacking 2004:1–26, 99–114.
accounts of war rape by looking at them through the lens of modes and their elements, and 
we may be better able to understand their contributions and lacunae by doing so.
Patrick Jackson identifies philosophical wagers as crucial to forms of inquiry: “Wagers 
constitute worlds, in that they quite literally set the stage for the kinds of empirical and 
theoretical puzzles and challenges that a scholar takes to be meaningful and important”.50 
At a minimum, wagers specify: 1) the researcher; 2) the world to be researched; and 3) the 
character of their relationship.51  Instead of philosophical ones,  we can speak of analytical 
wagers, which are the commitments within modes to certain claims or assumptions. Like 
philosophical presumptions in general, they reflect basic beliefs about the make-up of the 
world – making them claims of social ontology – and thus reflect the commitments scholars 
bring to inquiry. They may be explicit or implicit,  meta-theoretical or substantive, but are in 
whatever case the basic axioms at the (imagined) modal core. Rationality may be one such 
wager for the mode that we will come to identify as instrumentality. This is not to reject 
Law's observation that there is something arbitrary about assemblages,  and therefore no 
reason why they should be considered internally consistent, since analytical wagers may be 
problematic or fatally flawed. Their use may vary wildly in scholarly practice or even 
recognised as contested terrain. Nevertheless, it is through analytical wagers that an 
approach is  given coherence.52  Feminist scholarship in its broadest sense is based on the 
wager of gender, and could not function in the absence of it as a category (although of 
course feminism is more than the claim that gender matters). Others do not recognise gender 
as a significant dimension of the social world, or hold that it is too unstable a category to be 
of use, or say that there is no point in looking at gender as a variable because it is natural. 
Feminists disagree, and a particular take on the wager of gender (one with emancipatory 
intent) is the core commitment distinguishing them from non-feminist scholars. The 
analytical wager of gender may be specified many different ways, but its inclusion in our 
conceptual and explanatory vocabulary generates certain forms of  explanation.53 
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As well as considering analytical wagers, the coming chapters will also focus on the narrative 
scripts of each mode. If analytical wagers frame what might concern us at the level of 
historical ontology, scripts populate the stories we tell about sexual violence. Between them, 
wagers and scripts yield a “catalog of objects, processes, and factors that a given line of 
scientific research expects to exist or has evidence of the existence of: ontology as bestiary, so 
to speak”.54  Narrative scripts are both the set of scholarly commitments enacted in the 
process of elaborating a mode (as in the idea of oneself as 'doing' anthropology) and, more 
importantly for this analysis,  the stories told about objects of inquiry (as in the idea that 
someone chooses to rape to advance progress towards a particular aim).55  On the basis of 
partial evidence, and a minimal conception of events as they happened,  narrating as making 
sense is a process of filling in. Filling in connective tissue, if you will, to give the sporadic and 
divergent scraps of the archive their meaning. Which is not the same as claiming that 
narratives are inventions.56 
Narrative scripts convert wagers into a plot located in space and time, peopled by a 
determinate cast of actors. It is through narrative scripts that the narratives of utility-
maximisers,  symbolic exchangers or irrational compulsions are written. So if gender frames 
an explanation, and if 'military' designates a crucial component of the social, then narrative 
scripts will provide stories about how and why people join and stay loyal to the military, and 
how that lived experience leads to the actions which a particular account is  interested in. 
This most literal dimension of social science as a kind of story-telling draws on imagination, 
empathy and chronology to flesh out the abstractions of wagers in a communicable human 
drama.
	
Finally, normative orientations are the ideas of responsibility, blame and possible political action 
implicated in the wagers and scripts that characterise a particular mode. Where wagers and 
scripts construct agents as motivated by ends or moved by imperatives, orientations add the 
quality of judgement, often by seeking explanation in terms of right and just conduct.57 
They might indicate which institutions or practices we may appeal to as solutions to wartime 
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56! This point draws on Williams 2002:241–269, which is also the source for the terminology of 'filling in'.
57! See Suganami 2011.
sexual violence, or they might challenge whether we can even apply such normative 
categories to a social situation of such complexity at all. As the normative content of modes, 
orientations are particularly important to the political aspects of theorising and are directed 
towards imperatives of action,  whether in terms of consciousness-raising,  global campaigns, 
state action or military and cultural reform. In the case of an individual involved in the 
military as a site for the operation of gender, normative orientations will render judgement, 
for example by attributing blame not to individual soldiers but to an institution or society 
guilty of  inculcating gendered norms in those individuals.
We can, and frequently do,  contest some elements by reference to others. For example, we 
might say that a particular set of assumptions about agents in IR leads to an overly narrow 
focus on individuals as evil.58 This is a way of saying that an analytical wager (individualism) 
has given rise to a focus on isolated actors (the ontological bestiary) and thus to a narrative 
script (atrocities are committed at the behest of individuals) which bequeaths us an 
impoverished normative orientation and restricted view of politically-meaningful subjects 
(combating atrocity means prosecuting evil individuals in international tribunals). An 
alternate set of wagers and scripts will lead us to challenge international law as an adequate 
forum for prevention and deterrence and draw our attention back to the underlying claims 
implicated by given modes of  explanation.
Modes constrain the range of ways in which we might 'fill in' the elements,  but do not 
determine them. More than one mode may see international legal institutions as the 
appropriate ethical-political space for challenging wartime sexual violence. More than one 
mode may make claims across elements based on an understanding of action as 
individualistic. Taking gender as an analytical wager and the military as a site of its power 
does not require that a particular story about soldiers be told, only that there is a space, even a 
pressure, set by the analytical wagers for some story about how the category of gender in the 
military is experienced over time. A different narrative gap would exist if our account 
focused on a culture or civilisation instead of an institution. We would then have to tell 
stories about particular peoples and societies,  rather than about particular people in 
particular organisational contexts.
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The Ratification Of  Evil59
The implied sinews binding wagers and scripts to normative orientations can knot in ways 
that deserve some discussion. Conceptions of responsibility – for protection, for impunity, 
for rape itself – are increasingly appealed to in action against atrocity, especially given the 
focus on legal instruments of global politics in the last decades. For a number of feminist 
activists, success has come in the shape of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325, which in 2000 acknowledged and mandated action against the gendered violences of 
war.60  Building on feminist arguments developed in earlier war crimes tribunals,  legal 
responsibility for rape thus became more clearly visible both in UN policy and in the cases 
brought by the nascent International Criminal Court (ICC).61 Preventing impunity for direct 
perpetrators and military commanders continues to be a major theme in NGO activism on 
issues of peace and gender, and at least some activists initially confident that important 
provisions around prior sexual conduct and expert testimony in the Rome Statute would 
mean that international law would not be as selective, nor serve the interests of power as 
egregiously, as it had in the past.62
But,  as we have seen, moral and legal judgements can also have unwelcome global political 
consequences. The actual pattern of war rape cases pursued by the ICC, for instance, 
indicates attention to only some sexual violence in some places,  and so perpetuates colonial 
tropes of African barbarism.63  And, although the lines of influence are by no means 
straightforward, questions around the politics of the 'responsibility to protect'  can become 
muted in academic-activist accounts of how to make it work.64  But paradoxes can arise not 
only in operationalising responsibility judgements, but in the connection between causal and 
moral judgements within modes themselves.65 Feminist theory tends overwhelmingly towards 
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a structural accounts of rape – accounts which variously emphasise historical legacies of 
gender hierarchy, society-wide misogynistic attitudes, patriarchy as a system, sexism as 
learned and frequently-reinforced behaviour, and so on. At least one significant attempt to 
understand men's collective responsibility for rape thus sees “rape [as] deeply embedded in a 
wider culture of male socialization” and holds that although “[r]ape is normally committed by 
individual men...[it] is not best understood in individualistic terms”.66
However, moral judgements about rapists also frequently focus on the need to end impunity, 
the role of courts and laws in prosecutions, and the 'law and order'  procedures which allow 
rape to continue. But if men are the products of patriarchy (and masculine gender orders 
more generally) which constrain their freedoms and sense of self through what amounts to a 
gender indoctrination, appeals to their choice and responsibility with respect to rape and 
other gendered behaviours become rather complicated. So, although responsibility 
attributions are often presented as self-evident, there is no way for them not to entail a 
constructed and imagined agent, often one that conforms to individualist and rationalist 
criteria.67 It is not hard to see how an analytical wager (for example, that rape is importantly 
social) might rub up against a contradictory, or at least paradoxical, political-normative 
injunction (that individual perpetrators must be the ones legally punishable for rape). 
Resolving the tension may suggest that patriarchy is responsible for rape but that men in 
patriarchy are not. Structural accounts of rape illuminate the social sources of violent 
misogyny, and so guard against reductions of rape to individual pathology or lust, but 
therefore demand a more sophisticated account of who to hold responsible for rape in the 
wake of  feminist analysis, or risk eradicating the question of  guilt altogether.
As Alasdair MacIntyre expressed clearly more than a decade ago, ideas of moral agency and 
responsibility are undermined when we think about the effects of social structure on action. 
Occupying certain social roles requires a fidelity to their rules and standards and when a 
particular moral exclusion is  written into those roles – as in MacIntyre's example of a prison 
train driver in Nazi Germany or in ours of a war rapist in conditions of extreme patriarchy 
– fulfilling them becomes synonymous with not being aware of the effects of our actions, and 
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not being able to predict that certain wrongs will result.68 The usual preconditions for moral 
agency (and therefore moral responsibility) “can be satisfied only within social orders in 
which there exist milieus, spheres of activity, which sustain the relevant kind of 
understanding of the self, the relevant kind of critical discourse and reflection, and the 
relevant kind of  accountability” required to challenge harmful social roles.69
In other words, the more patriarchal the context,  and the less space for challenging 
patriarchal attitudes and behaviours within it, the less morally responsible actors are for their 
behaviour within their assigned social roles. It is precisely in the most brutal social structures 
of war rape, then, where the moral responsibility of individuals will have the least traction. 
Part of the legacy in IR of separating out the normative from the explanatory, of confining 
feminism to understanding/reflexivity,  is that these questions are relatively muted. 
Connections and contradictions are thus elided. An insistence on the explanatory-political-
ethical character of feminist inquiry, and of the criticality of modes of explanation, redirects 
attention to this shared space. 
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Interlude
PROGRESSIVE / RESEARCH / PROGRAMMES
Having traversed several – but far from all – debates in the philosophy of social science, 
feminist IR now appears less antithetical to explanation than commonly supposed by 
advocates and critics alike. Not because it can merely be folded into dominant paradigms 
(the famous “add women and stir”) but because it has always carried in it its own forms of 
explanation, forms which are usefully specified in terms of modes of critical explanation. 
Explanation in this expansive sense is simply a way of showing why this and not that. The 
differentiation between forms of explanation lies in how they show, what they take to be a 
sufficient why,  and how they draw the boundaries of the this and the that. Different feminists will 
cash out these explanations differently. The triad of wager, script and orientation does not 
require explanation in the same way, or for the same reasons. It is a way of showing how 
feminist critical explanation works, not of specifying what its content must be in advance. 
Again, this is not an exercise in prescribing what feminist IR should do (to meet the standards 
of some external authority), nor of saying that critical explanation is the only valid form of 
explaining, but an elaboration of a framework for analysing what feminist inquiries into war 
rape very often already do. The coming chapters will show how this is accomplished, and also 
indicate why the variation in the explanations proposed by various feminist perspectives are of 
such consequence.
Another consequence of the view elaborated here is an inversion of Robert Keohane's 
problematique. Rather than feminism failing by the standard of progressive research 
programmes (or of failing except in a limited empiricist/standpoint variant),  it is revealed as 
always having been progressive, research and a programme on its own terms.1  'Progressive' 
in being politically emancipatory and knowledge-generating; in 'research' of the inner and 
outer (exploring both the situatedness of the self and the transfactual quality of gender 
orders); and as a 'programme' of praxis as well as accumulation, direction and purpose in 
inquiry. Or, to return to Sandra Harding:
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I am not proposing that humankind would benefit from renouncing 
attempts to describe, explain, and understand the regularities, underlying 
causal tendencies, and meanings of the natural and social worlds just 
because the sciences we have are androcentric. I am seeking an end to 
androcentrism, not to systematic inquiry. But an end to androcentrism will 
require far-reaching transformations in the cultural meanings and practices 
of  that inquiry.2
Part One has established the challenges for a feminist account of wartime sexual violence, 
deconstructed some common framings for how such an account should proceed, and 
reconstructed and elaborated a sense of feminism as critical explanation. War rape has been 
subjected to considerable feminist scrutiny, and yet remains somewhat under-theorised. 
Chapter 1 suggested reasons for focusing on war rape without losing sight of the need to 
theorise war, and addressed the stakes in relation to male rape, the constitutive act of 
naming rape,  the political uses to which feminist accounts of rape might be put (often 
against their will) and the variation of the violences of war and rape across situations. 
Despite much rich work on these matters, the available distinctions amongst feminist 
approaches too closely track a particular narrative of feminist theory. That narrative – of 
waves of empiricist, standpoint and postmodern theorising – has been influential in IR 
alongside a distinction between feminism and gender theory, but both tend to a reification of 
moments of inquiry into ghettoised disciplinary identities. One consequence of this has been 
a rejection of 'explanation'  even as feminists in fact regularly practice critical variants of 
explanation. Moving from some standard distinctions to the idea of modes of critical 
explanation reveals new commonalities and differences, and without losing sight of the 
distinctive character of feminism as at once explanatory, political and ethical. The wager is 
that this framework will cut feminist knowledge about war rape in a new way, and that this 
will prove intellectually (and perhaps politically) productive. Filling in this framework, and 
dealing with the complexities it throws up, is the task of  Part Two.
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Part Two
The Cunning of Reasons
We cannot grasp what connection such circumstances have with the actual 
fact of slaughter and violence... To us, their descendants, who are not 
historians and are not carried away by the process of research, and can 
therefore regard the event with unclouded common sense, an incalculable 
number of causes present themselves. The deeper we delve in search of 
these causes the more of them we find; and each separate cause or whole 
series of causes appears to us equally valid in itself and equally false by its 
insignificance compared to the magnitude of events, and by its impotence – 
apart from the co-operation of all the other coincident causes – to occasion 
the event.
Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace1
So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to 
find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do.
Benjamin Franklin2
Telling Stories About Sexual Violence
The coming chapters turn to the content of feminist modes of critical explanation. 
Progressing through accounts of sexual violence, war studies (critical or otherwise),  and 
debates within feminist and social theory,  they attempt both a conceptual typology and a 
progressive argument. The typology is that of instrumentality, mythology  and unreason (a chapter 
on each) and the argument connecting them concerns crucial questions about the nature of 
rationality, the divide between the psychological and the social, and the functions of identity 
and belief. So the chapters are: a)  diagnostic, in identifying feminist modes and showing their 
logic in existent accounts of wartime sexual violence; b) expansive, in connecting these themes 
and theses to wider controversies and forms of explanation in social theory and the study of 
war generally; c) clarificatory,  in distinguishing different versions of these theses and showing 
what binds and separates particular accounts; d) critical, in identifying major points of 
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tension or difficulty which may undermine or lead to the revision of the modes or their 
logic;  and e) hypothesising, by setting out plausible ways in which we may identify the 
dynamics of  a particular mode in concrete cases of  rape at war.
These chapters think war around the locus of sexual violence,  pulling out from specific 
brutalities to the patterning of collective violence, and then to the character of human 
action. Feminist modes explicitly address such issues as the harm done by wartime sexual 
violence; the importance of recognising it as a political phenomena; the gendered tropes and 
justifications that exist around rape in context; the empirical evidence for certain forms of 
brutality and wrongdoing (rape camps, mutilation, specific groups of perpetrators and 
victims and/or a lack of intervention by local or international agencies); the depiction of 
events in the media; and the need for local and international collaboration to end rape. But 
they usually only implicitly address questions around the appropriate grounds for certain 
kinds of explanation; the possible debates and disputes over ideas of agency or cause; the 
relation of feminist explanations to social theory; and the impact of these issues on 
interventions designed to prevent or end sexual violence.3  These are the questions opened 
up by an investigation of  particular modes of  critical explanation.
Each mode carries its own analytical style in its elements, articulated through a focus on 
particular empirical regularities and a corresponding characterisation of instances of sexual 
violence (see the typology offered in Table 2 below). All have a plausibility when dealing 
with particular examples. However, the shifting nature of both the modes and of the 
phenomena under analysis resists any easy preference for one mode over others or reduction 
of them to three separate and wholly incommensurate hypotheses of sexual violence. The 
modes are coherent but not in the sense of being directly competing paradigms. They are 
partly overlapping, and ambiguous at the margins, but also apparently contradictory on a 
range of key analytical problems. As we will see, these slippages turn out to be very 
important.
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	 Instrumentality 	 Unreason 	 Mythology 
Analytical	 Rationality	 Affect	 Symbolism
Wagers	 Materialism	 Psychology	 Identity
	 Individualism 	 Sexuality	 Collectivism	
Narrative Scripts	 Calculating	 Angry	 Habitual
	 Soldier-Strategist	 Soldier-Sadist	 Soldier-Ritualist
Narrative Script	 Geopolitical Commander	 Sexual Predator	 Sexual Exterminationist
Stereotypes	 Obedient Footsoldier	 Frustrated Power-Seeker	 Communal Enforcer
	 Class Warrior	 Brother-in-Arms	 Gendered Member
	 Economic Survivor	 Disorientated Victim	 Liminal Subject
Normative 	 Self-Interest	 Trauma	 Beliefs
Orientations	 (Dis)Incentives	 Therapy	 Education
Logic	 Consequences 	 Drive	 Appropriateness
Victim/Women as...	 Object	 Abject	 Subject
Primary Thematic	 Material	 Expressive	 Symbolic
Foci	 Scarcity	 Trauma	 Difference
	 Greed	 Desire	 Inter-Subjectivity
	 Accumulation	 The Unconscious	 Meaning
Examples of  Relevant 	 Military Units	 Individual Soldiers 	 Militarised Discourse
Relevant Actors	 Political Elite	 The Family Unit	 Cultural Institutions
	 Businessmen	 Opportunists	 National Communities
Table 2: Feminist Modes of  Critical Explanation for Wartime Sexual Violence
Where instrumentality trades in incentives, interests, dispossession and accumulation, 
unreason speaks of desire, bonding,  esteem and sexuality and mythology conjures symbols, 
imaginaries and collective identities. These are not only different registers, but also differing 
ways of conceiving of power and the channels through which it manifests in the social, 
whether as political economy, libidinal economy or symbolic economy. Crudely put, 
patriarchy is made solid for instrumentality through the material benefits accrued to men by 
the subordination of women; for unreason through the persistence of a gender aggression 
either closely approximating sexual difference or unconsciously repeated in the processes of 
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psychic cohesion; and for mythology through the perpetuation in cultural and social systems 
of  norms and rituals of  behaviour. 
The victims of rape thus appear as instrumentalised objects (used and discarded in the pursuit 
of other ends);  the abject bodies of unreason (defiled as sources of deep and disgust for 
rapists) or mythologised subjects (others with an imagined group identity antagonistically 
opposed to that of the perpetrators). The views of violence implied are for instrumentality 
an act judiciously applied, necessary, protective, rational; for unreason frustrated, expressive, 
unpredictable, directed at psychic (rather than real) threats; for mythology an act of 
community, symbolic, boundary-making, generative, legitimated and differentiated. In each 
mode, the actors are emplotted in different ways according to the underlying analytical 
wagers. So instrumentality's focus on rationality, materiality and economy gives rise to the 
calculating soldier-strategist, who can take the stereotypical form of a geopolitical 
commander, an obedient footsoldier, a class warrior or an economic survivor. Unreason's 
attention to affect, sexuality and trauma produces the angry soldier-sadist,  rendered 
variously as a sexual predator, a frustrated power-seeker, a brother-in-arms or a disorientated 
victim. And mythology, with its wagers of symbolism, identity and collectivity,  narrates a 
habitual soldier-ritualist, whether as a sexual exterminationist, a communal enforcer,  a 
gendered member, or a liminal subject.
As intimated in previous chapters, these differences in feminist accounts of war rape do not 
directly correspond to debates between positivists and constructivists or between qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to data. Nor do they merely map onto feminist empiricist, 
standpoint feminist or feminist postmodernist strands of theory. Again, it is not that such 
questions are unimportant, merely that the contrasts between instrumentality, unreason and 
mythology operate at another level. Instead, we should look to the kinds of research questions 
asked, the ways in which the answers are variably constructed and the emancipatory  political 
commitments built into them. There are manifest and latent stories about what feminist 
analysis does, just as there are manifest and latent stories about how feminism takes on and 
transforms categories inherited from elsewhere.4 Further, as Mary Caprioli argues, there is  a 
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real risk of feminism being seen — by both proponents and detractors alike — through the 
Popperian ‘Myth of the Framework’, where it is assumed that real differences in approaches 
are projected ‘all the way down’, such that there can be no commonality or communication 
with paradigmatic others. These chapters are a step towards such an opening.5
How Modes Matter
As we have seen, claims made by different feminist modes have typically been united under 
the proposition that rape is a weapon of war. This phraseology, although politically potent, 
covers for significant ambiguity in the understanding of what a weapon is and how it can be 
deployed. When considered in terms of instrumentality, unreason and mythology, the 
tensions between different possible explanations are distributed in a new way. In some cases 
the modes are straightforwardly contradictory and thus force a choice between political 
options. So it has been argued both that rape happens because the militaries in question are 
extremely hierarchical organisations in which troops obey specific orders to rape 
(instrumentality) and that sexual violence is opportunistic, occurring because the militaries in 
question are insufficiently  hierarchical, leading troops to ignore orders and carry out their own 
wishes (unreason). In the latter example, efforts to strengthen and train militaries in conflict 
zones will decrease rape. In the former, such efforts will only increase the effectiveness of the 
masculinised war machine.6  And viewing the military as a site of mythology may require 
neither increases nor decreases in levels of hierarchy but instead point to the necessity of 
shifts in institutional culture. More generally, military solutions might decrease sexual 
violence or increase it, depending on the underlying assumptions of  the mode in question. 
More commonly, different modes of critical explanation will not crystallise as distinct policy 
options. Rather, understanding sexual violence in terms of one or other form of critical 
explanation will shape the priorities and forms of political intervention adopted. This is 
Engle’s point when she criticises some feminist activism for contributing to an understanding 
of war rape in terms of ethnicity and sex in a way that diverts attention from wider patterns 
of gender oppression. But, although distinct,  instrumentality,  unreason and mythology are 
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not straight-forwardly incompatible. Modes meet at common borders: instrumentality and 
unreason share an interest in questions of desire, (ir)rationality, interiority and control; 
unreason and mythology both require an analysis of the psychosocial divide and the 
complex relations of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity; and mythology and instrumentality 
both recognise the functional and collective aspects of violence. These overlaps are at least 
partly a consequence of the kind of ‘rational reconstruction’ necessary to set out the three 
modes as doing unacknowledged work in feminist explanations.7 Moving between the ideal-
types of the modes and the specific, detailed accounts of how particular feminists have 
constructed their work highlights those areas in which elements bind together and those in 
which overlaps are more complicated. 
But the resultant ambiguity is  not simply that of an intellectual menu from which aspects 
can be chosen at whim, since the kinds of amalgamated modes of critical explanation that 
result differ in politically and analytically consequential ways. The overlapping yet coherent 
character of modes means that specific examples of rape in war can be made amenable to 
more than one mode of critical explanation. This poses a problem common to theory, 
scientific or otherwise,  of how to determine which pattern of reasoning provides the most 
plausible account of sexualised aggression in conflict. This is the problem of the gap 
between modes of inquiry and forms of action, between discourses of explanation and the 
behaviours to which they refer, however closely they may be linked in the process of 
interpretation. Evaluating feminist accounts of wartime sexual violence will thus require 
further stages of contention and articulation. But this is no more challenging in the case of 
rape than it is when we discuss the character of the nation-state or the role of democracy in 
global politics. As in other subfields of IR, determining how things happen and why evades 
any easy resolution. 
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Chapter Four
INSTRUMENTALITY AND THE CALCULATING
SOLDIER-STRATEGIST
[W]hile the concept of utility in economics is the foundation that makes 
possible a rational, calculable world, the utility itself stands for desire, an 
incalculable and irrational force that can overtake and disrupt the most 
carefully calculated actions. An element of irrationality, of something not 
quite human, inhabits the rational, human core of  the economic.
Timothy Mitchell, Rule Of  Experts 1
The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron.
Amartya K. Sen, 'Rational Fools'2
Kissi
In May 1998, soldiers of the Rebel United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone brought a group of 
captured women to the town of Kissi.3 They had been caught along with civilian men some 
time before. All had been mutilated with a razor-blade – the letters 'RUF' carved into their 
backs – but the men were released. The women, by contrast, were forced to carry rice for 
the soldiers. On arrival in Kissi,  they were distributed as 'wives'. In the experience of one 
victim what followed was 15 months of slavery in which she was required to perform 
domestic work (cooking, cleaning, washing) in the settlement, and to submit to daily rape. 
She was kept in a home of sorts, assigned to a man who made palm wine for the RUF. More 
civilians would occasionally be brought to the town following each RUF raid. Other 
abductions and rapes in the Kono area followed a similar pattern, sometime accompanied 
by forced sex between captives, mutilation of genitals and the firing of guns into vaginas. 
Those captives who could not manage the work assigned them were shot to prevent them 
from passing intelligence to the RUF's enemies.4
But what did it mean to be a 'wife' in this context? A witness in the trial of Charles Taylor 
explained:
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The women who I knew that they brought were women whom the men will 
see and somebody who was a man, or a combatant,  would say,  “I'm taking 
this away, she is  my wife”. He will bring her...she will stay with him where he 
was staying... He will bring her to the base and turn her into his wife. Like 
they would sleep together, the woman would work for him just like a women 
would work for her husband in the home... If you were captured at a front line, like 
it happened to us, they were not going to ask you if you love them, or do not 
love them. The person who captures you and brings you, you will stay with 
that person.5 
So-called 'bush wives' were a mark of the Sierra Leone war and the majority of those 
abducted and designated as such by RUF appear to have been raped.6  Moreover, as the 
testimony just quoted indicates, the creation of RUF rebel villages reflected the sociological 
structure of 'peacetime' arrangements: a pseudo-family structure with commanders at the 
head of a number of 'bush wives',  subordinate males and occasionally elderly residents. The 
forms of labour assigned to women also followed the patriarchal imperatives of 
reproduction: fetching water and firewood, cleaning, and preparing food.7 
Traditional roles like the 'mamy queen', who would look after young girls and prepare them 
for marriage, were also replicated within the camp structure. These arrangements were 
stable, to the extent that hierarchies among bush wives also emerged, with the favoured 
wives of powerful commanders themselves taking on responsibilities for distributing arms 
and ammunition and holding power over other wives and children within the camps.8 
'Wives' in the camps were spared sexual abuse (at least from men who weren't their 
'husband') and often had several 'unmarried' girls working for them in a domestic capacity. 
Those without 'husbands', however, were vulnerable to continuous abuse and rape. And so it 
has been suggested that women's productive labour was the “principal reason” for abduction 
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in the first place, since it was required by the RUF to sustain the war system.9 
The Sierra Leone example is of rapes that were systematic and planned for a particular 
purpose. They were not random acts, but were of a piece with the logistics of the RUF war 
effort. Rapists maintained tight control and put the abducted and brutalised to work. This 
happened not only at Kissi,  but throughout the war zone: an iterated system of labour, 
established by sexualised aggression, and an apparently compelling instance of 
instrumentality. That is the subject of this  chapter, which will examine instrumentality as a 
mode of critical explanation for feminist IR, as dependent on certain ideas of rationality 
and interest, and as involving shifting conceptions of  materialism. 
Rape Is Cheaper Than Bullets
Instrumentality signifies self-conscious means-ends reasoning at its purest. Broadly speaking, 
its analytical wagers are materialist, individualist and rationalist; its ontological politics that 
of scarcity, greed and accumulation; its narrative scripts those of the calculating soldier-
strategist who self-consciously chooses to rape,  and its normative orientation that of an agent 
unconstrained by ethical boundaries, one thus susceptible only to direct disincentive. For 
instrumentality, rape is a weapon of war because it is in the direct interests of perpetrators 
to use it for other ends. Or, as Amnesty International put it in a recent campaign, 'Rape is 
Cheaper Than Bullets'.
The view of sexual violence as instrument is strongest in accounts which foreground the 
material benefits of rape. Given reigning ideas of rape as a private sexual act it is perhaps 
not surprising that much feminist research has stressed how it facilitates material 
appropriation through terror. Doing so establishes the analytical and political connections 
between violent sexual politics and the processes of military strategy, economic interest and 
political domination more conventionally placed within the field of high politics. A great 
deal of feminist work has thus taken an instrumentalist approach in the sense of identifying 
sexual violence as central, rather than tangential, in the practice of war, as having a 
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functional or intentional component.10  War rape so defined is a rational technique and a 
calculated tool: “Torturers are trained – in military doctrine, chain of command, social 
psychology, and anatomies”.11
Figure 9: Sex as Instrument: Amnesty International's poster for a campaign to end violence against women, 
'Rape Is Cheaper Than Bullets' (2009)12
Empirical support for the material benefits thesis is drawn from the kinds of plans that 
embody a certain idea of masculine ruthlessness. In Liberia, reports of massive rape appear 
to have been sufficient to instil fear throughout local populations, while others have 
suggested that rape may even be a “shrewder military tactic” than others since it is  hard to 
prove and seldom prosecuted in war crimes tribunals.13  Military documents set out the uses 
of sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and observed that “[Muslim] morale, desire for 
battle, and will could be crushed more easily by raping women, especially minors and even 
children”.14 Certainly, the cheapness of wartime sexual violence for an economic strategy of 
resource accumulation in the DRC is central for feminist campaigners like Eve Ensler, who 
has commented that “rape is a very cheap method of warfare. You don't have to buy scud 
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missile or hand grenades”.15  The centrality of military objectives and economic goods 
brings these claims close to ideas of 'greed' as the fuel for civil war, with rape the weapon of 
choice in the struggle for diamonds or coltan.
The Object
Rape is a weapon of war in the instrumentalist mode for the simple reason that it is the most 
effective tool for the aims pursued. Accordingly, instrumentalism can accommodate a 
number of possible ends which rape serves. What it maintains is the idea of a conscious and 
goal-directed strategy. In practice,  this almost always means an economic end. This may 
amount to a claim that individual soldiers rape for money or goods and so fit the kind of 
model common in rational choice economics. But, as this chapter will seek to show, 
instrumentality is also conducive to thinking in terms of the class basis of sexual violence, 
with men acting in more collective economic interests to extract wealth, or maintain unequal 
economic relationships, over particular groups of women understood as a productive 
resource. Rape thus becomes a weapon for the maintenance of a particular kind of material 
power, with other dimensions being secondary, if  visible at all.
The figure that embodies instrumentalist logic is the calculating soldier-strategist. When we 
narrate instrumentally,  we think of the combatant as responsive to the demands placed on 
him, as purposeful, as confident and capable, as in many ways embodying the ideal of the 
soldier as an agent in war,  if now turned to repellant ends. This idea of calculation can 
unfold in several ways according to the level at which he soldier operates and according to 
what ends he is calculating his way towards. In purely military terms, our imagined soldier is 
interested in besting an enemy, and sees in the population an opportunity to hasten his 
victory. Perhaps an area needs to be cleared or materials seized. Alternatively, civilians may 
be providing the enemy with support (food, shelter, information) and brutalisation may be 
the quickest way to discourage them.
Depending on the strategic environment and the tactics available, our soldier will then 
decide on action. The important point is that his decision is contingent, that it is a response 
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to a changing situation in which he must win or die, and in which rape is one tool at his 
disposal. It obeys, in the standard formulation, the logic of consequences. This is as much a 
question of restraint as it is of violence: at times our soldier will choose not to rape. This 
military version of the soldier-strategist comes in two stereotypical forms: the geopolitical 
commander and the obedient footsoldier. The geopolitical commander takes a wide view, weighing 
the situation of war and the opportunities for progress. He may not rape himself at all, but 
decides when atrocities of all kinds are required. The obedient footsoldier is  on the other 
side of the military hierarchy,  and receives the order to rape. In an instrumentalist vision, he 
treats this as no different from the command to lay siege or to dig trenches. There is an 
order, and he and his comrades must enforce it. Sometimes this obedience is secured by the 
threat of force, sometimes simply by the smooth functioning of the military machine. In 
either case, the obedient footsoldier rapes because he is instructed to, not because it 
expresses his true desire. 
But instrumentality's economic dimension yields two other stereotypes: that of the class 
warrior and the economic survivor. Like the geopolitical commander,  the class warrior is 
interested in the balance of power. He too is at war, but battle is not his only concern. 
Instead, he fights to maintain and extent a division that approximates that of class: some 
produce so that others may consume. Communities are selected for rape not only because of 
the requirements of force doctrine, but also so that profits may be realised. The 
accumulation may be instant, as in loot and pillage, and rape the way to enable it. Or, as in 
the Sierra Leone example, it may be part of a more sustained system of exploitation. For the 
economic survivor, money is also at stake, but rape is contemplated more because of the 
sense of a desperate need than for great wealth. After gruelling months fighting the enemy, 
he may find himself starving, or with no prospect for substantial pay. Coming upon a village, 
the opportunity presents itself to attack and loot,  and sexual violence appears as the quickest 
and cheapest way to secure the goods. In all cases, victims of rape are the detritus in projects 
aimed at other ends, just so many objects to be made use of.
Patriarchal social orders are the background condition necessary for these acts: they are 
what tend to make the men the soldiers, and which render women vulnerable to treatment 
as objects. But the calculating soldier-strategist does not rape because he is a misogynist, at 
·  96·
least no more so than any other man. He does so because he has considered the 
consequences and decided that this is  the necessary, or the optimal, act. With a different 
balance of incentives (if he may be prosecuted, if he considered attacks on civilians may be 
counter-productive, if there was more profit to be made in enslaving other men) he would 
act differently.
Talking about rape in instrumentalist terms “has certain ontological and epistemological 
effects…[and] limits the types of questions that are asked about sexual violence”.16  It 
establishes certain understandings of how social action is carried out, of who the relevant 
sides are in a situation of war and/or genocide, and who gets to count as an audible or 
legible witness.17  For example, structuring explanation around the aim to acquire material 
benefits would seem to involve a certain view of exteriority in that it is particular situations 
which create incentives, which in turn shape behaviour. An interior space remains,  but this 
scripts the subject as an instant analyst,  a mechanism for interpreting the data of the world, 
rather than the source of affective charge. The accompanying materialist social ontology 
posits actors driven by imperatives of accumulation and so invokes an ethical imaginary of 
males as rational beings who may respond more credibly to military force, the threat of 
prosecution or institutional constraints than to education about the experience of rape and 
its long-term effects on survivors.
The Machiavelli Theorem
The logic of instrumentality, as characterised here, bears a striking resemblance to ways of 
explaining violence in civil war that bear no apparent relationship to the feminist project. In 
the post-Cold War period, accounts of the causes and character of collective violence 
turned their attention to economic dimensions. Rather than viewing conflicts, and the 
strategies used in them, as the product of great power politics, irrational chaos or merely 
disruptions to peaceful economic growth, a spate of scholarship and policy identified a 
rationality at play: “War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of 
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creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection”.18  Subsequent debates, 
usually summarised as a contest between 'greed' explanations and 'grievance' explanations, 
generated a range of propositions and critiques that clarify and perhaps undermine an 
instrumentalist logic of  wartime sexual violence.19
The turn towards economic aspects was never uniform. Its most politically successful version 
built on models of behaviour and methods common to the economic mainstream.20  The 
fundamental claim was that the incidence of civil war was driven by primary commodity 
resources targeted by rebel groups.21  The link was established through proxy indicators and 
regression analysis, with little attention to micro-theoretical foundations beyond a 
commitment “to infer motivation from patterns of observed behaviour”.22 Despite the focus 
on quantitative evidence, this particular line of thought is commonly traced to the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics and the positing of rational, strictly self-interested 
and materialistic individuals aiming at maximising own-income.23  In line with a greater 
focus on the role of crime and profiteering in 'new wars', this suggested the modelling of 
behaviour in war as a form of market behaviour,  as 'muscular economics': “conflict 
interactions,  like all economic interactions, involve equations of optimisation on the decision-
making level and of  equilibrium on the society-wide level”.24
Most succinctly, this was put as the 'Machiavelli Theorem': “no one will ever pass up an 
opportunity to gain a one-sided advantage by exploiting another party”.25  Others have used 
similar assumptions to look more specifically at civilian victimisation in war. In particular, 
formal models of war exploring the dynamics of violence frequently postulate the 
acquisition of economic goods as the ultimate aim and correspondingly assume clear and 
efficient instrumental rationality on the parts of actors.26 Take, for example, Stathis Kalyvas' 
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instrumentalist narrative of  brutality in late-1990s Algeria:
Because their access to army-held villages and towns (and hence their ability 
to inflict punishment) is declining, insurgents will seek compensation through 
brutality: they will want to signal that although death at their hands might be 
less certain than death at the hands of the army, it will definitely be more 
brutal: more painful (through the use of knives and axes),  more 
comprehensive (including entire families), transgressive of taboos (mutilation 
of  dead bodies), etc.27 
Such approaches are clearly sex/gender-blind in that their characters are abstracted from 
actual social conditions.28  While reference may be made to rape as one tactic of 
brutalisation, there is no real attention to gender as a dynamic that may impact on 
predictions or specifics. This is not, however, to say that feminist and economically 
instrumentalist approaches to brutality are fundamentally different at an explanatory level. 
Given a different 'scientific ontology' of actors (militarised men instead of rebels  and women 
instead of the state) the causal narrative appears striking similar. These emplotments 
establish rape as a tool or weapon in a narrow sense: a way of signalling intention and 
transmitting information from a distinct group of attackers to a defined group of recipients 
to be influenced. Wartime sexual violence also comes to count as instrumentally rational in a 
particularly economic sense,  in that the objectives of groups using rape are frequently 
conceived of in terms of material (financial)  benefits,  with political control a stage towards 
that end.
This neo-classical strand of the 'greed' thesis has not gone uncontested. As well as challenges 
from anthropological and psychological perspectives (to be examined in the coming 
chapters), there have been attempts to maintain a focus on economic dimensions of violence 
without a reliance on either the language of 'greedy' rebels or the contested assumptions of 
economic theory. Economic benefits were still seen to arise from opportunities  for a range of 
activities during war, namely: pillage; protection money; trade; labour exploitation; land; 
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stealing aid supplies; and benefits for the military.29  Rather than theorising violence as a 
choice made by individuals in the face of free-rider dilemmas or self-interested calculations, 
we may instead turn to an examination of processes that benefit particular groups and 
sections of society. Doing so retains a focus on accumulation and exploitation, but in a more 
collective register linked to, for example, the historical development of capitalism or a 
peculiar 'sell-game' agreed by two sides cooperating  in a war.30  Against the individualist focus 
of  neo-classical economic studies, this introduces a collectivist, even class, lens to analysis.
For some, even where economic ends have been posited as one among many, purposiveness 
remains central to the conception of violence offered: “violence is intended to shape the 
behavior of a targeted audience by altering the expected value of particular actions. Put 
otherwise, violence performs a communicative function with a clear deterrent dimension”.31 This is 
a way of excluding the non-instrumental by force of definition alone: once all violence is 
conceptualised as a rational-chosen means to an end, any other possibility – affective, 
expressive, symbolic, irrational, transgressive – becomes invisible.32  For others, the talk of 
'greed' or economic objectives as the cause of war is over-simplistic and ignores the 
entanglement of the economic with the political and the social. Instead of speaking of 
motives or covering law generalisations about the causes of civil war, this view proposes a 
focus on specificity and on the variable functions of behaviour in war.33  We can understand 
war economies as functional and material and as crystallising interests, even if there are not 
two clear sides, or one group of men ‘doing’ sexual violence while a different group suffers 
it: “No matter who shoots whom, certain power elites make a profit”.34 The issue for an instrumentalist 
account is  thus to show that this is somehow a greater profit than would be the case without 
war and specifically without sexual violence. 
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The critique of  neo-classical approaches has been well summarised by Chris Cramer:
There is no discussion of where the 'players' come from other than as the 
product of relevant economistic calculation... Typically,  they are driven by 
the urge (this seems to be the only occasion where compulsion is relevant,  all 
else being decided in the realm of choice) to maximise power or windfalls 
from victory (or just from conflict itself).35 
Instrumentalist feminist accounts are not susceptible to the first element of this critique (since 
the players are identified as the enforcers of a particular historical socio-political system of 
patriarchy) but do remain open to the second charge, which is  to say that having specified an 
end or goal desired by men in war (productive and reproductive labour or access to 
resources) the process of choosing sexual violence as a weapon is rendered clear and 
uncomplicated. Where neo-classical theories of war postulate an originary accumulative 
drive grounded in universal self-interest,  instrumentalist feminist accounts identify 
patriarchal self-interest as the source of exploitative behaviour. But in both cases a general 
individual or social property is manifested in clear preferences pursued by purposeful 
strategic actors. This reduction of war to economics by other means has in one sense 
progressed analysis beyond simplistic attributions of 'cultural' causes of violence, but can just 
as easily be used to lament the collapse of  moral orders and pose a rational barbarian rapist:
It is this economic rationale that makes warfare in much of Africa not only 
endemic but also inhumane, because it is disproportionately aimed against 
civilians… Looked at in this light we can conclude that war is inhumane in 
much of Africa precisely because it is so 'rational'. Inhumanity serves a 
purpose.36 
·  101·
35! Cramer 2002:1847
36! Coker 2001:124.
The Soldier-Rapist As Social Moron
Challenges to this understanding of purposive social action arise not only from counter-
arguments within civil war studies, but also from social theory in general terms. The 
'rationality postulate' has come under various kinds of attack. Rational agents tend to be 
characterised as possessed of 1) fully-ordered preferences; 2) perfect information; and 3) 
accurate information processing.37 Moreover, their interests are conventionally taken (as with 
Hirschleifer on conflict economics) to be wholly self-interested.38 Since these assumptions are 
often deployed for heuristic purposes, it is useful to distinguish between the strong rationality 
hypothesis, which holds that these assumptions do in fact account for observed behaviour, and 
the weak rationality  principle,  which suggests instead that rationality is a general, and sometimes 
purposively vague, approach to understanding behaviour.39 
In the case of the strong rationality hypothesis, it is now widely accepted as empirically false, 
which is to say that individuals do not respond in the expected ways even in laboratory 
conditions.40  The weak rationality principle is more successful, but is also strangely empty. 
Deprived of claims that utility must be economic, that actors are necessarily self-interested, 
that preferences are always distinct and well-ordered, or even that whatever is desired is 
'maximised' rather than merely 'satisfied', 'rationality'  then comes to stand as an “almost 
empty principle” in the sense that actors simply follow their particular idea of 
'appropriateness' within a 'situational logic'.41 Hence:
The rationality principle is not in need of any defence. It cannot be disputed. For 
every conceivable action, including the most bizarre, there are purposes and 
beliefs (also very bizarre) conceivable that make it consistent.42
To avoid unsustainable claims about internal mental states, economic theory adopted the 
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concept of 'revealed preference',  in which the unknown utility of actors was understood by 
reference to their acts. If people sought to purchase certain goods, or to acquire them 
through violence,  then this indicated a preference for them. But this repeats the problem, 
since behaviour is explained by preference, and preference by behaviour.43
In actual conflict situations, these issues are exacerbated. One particular ambiguity in 
instrumentalist accounts is in this understanding of war rape as an act that produces a 
desired outcome, which is central to the “effectiveness of rape as a weapon of war”.44 Rape is 
spoken of not only as a thing that is chosen, but that is also consistently successful. This 
combines two ideas: a) that attackers have a particular end beyond the rape itself in mind 
(sexual violence is a means to another end); and b) that this appraisal is generally realistic 
(rapists do in some sense actually benefit from the consequences of their actions). 
Instrumentalist logics thus open themselves to criticism on both conceptual and empirical 
grounds. 
Conceptually, the assumption of purposively directed action risks circularity. It begs the 
question of how we know that rape was directed at a particular goal. That the particular 
goal came about is  insufficient, since this simultaneously explains the outcome on the basis 
of a preference on the part of the actor and 'proves' the preferences of the actor because a 
certain outcome resulted. Similarly, instrumentalist approaches are also tempted to reduce 
the social to a set of individual decisions, making acts appear as the rationally constructed 
decisions of the cunning male(s), rather than the complex product of multiple processes and 
trajectories. Empirically, evidence of command directives seems rare,  and in general leaves 
an incomplete picture. Does it show that generals give orders which are followed and which 
benefit all men involved in the military exercise (who act according to self-interest); that 
commands are obeyed, but benefit those at the top at the expense of those who (perhaps 
unwillingly) carry out their instructions; or that elites seek to shape and control processes of 
sexual violence, but without success (since the complications of war frustrate their efforts)? 
The risk for instrumentalist feminist accounts is that they perpetuate a thin conception of 
power and reproduce assumptions of economistic or utilitarian desire as swallowing other 
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aspects of the social. A general diagnosis of complex gender constructions and 
identifications which in practice reduces to the assumption of  calculating man machines.45 
Patriarchal Dividends
And so to the internal political economy of masculinity itself. Feminists,  in studies of peace 
no less than in war, have correctly identified the pervasive and systematic benefits of 
attributions of manhood, of a status providing a “gilt-edged platinum card for life” in Terrell 
Carver's memorable formulation.46 As seen in Chapter 2, it is now in fact very common for 
feminist work to stress multiplicity and difference within male experiences,  although there is 
still to some extent a flattening of the category of man.47  This can certainly occur when it 
comes to attributing responsibility to men in general for benefitting from rape.48  But the 
question of just which men benefit,  how they benefit, and to what extent becomes particularly 
salient for an instrumentalist account of  war rape.
Conceptualising masculinity in terms of relations of hegemony and subordination and 
marginalisation and authorisation, R. W. Connell famously proposed that men receive a 
dividend as participants in patriarchy, and that this takes the form of status, command and 
material assets.49 On this account gender inequality on the scale observable in contemporary 
societies is “hard to imagine without violence”, which is taken to have an important 
enforcement role both in terms of maintaining men's power over women through acts like 
rape and in setting patterns among men.50 Extending this reasoning to the practice of war, it 
is plausible to see rape (whether at similar or heightened levels relative to 'peacetime' roles) 
as an instrument of this enforcement, protecting or extending the patriarchal dividend. 
Soldiers in this sense become the frontline troops for the collective of men, just as domestic 
violence, street-level intimidation and rape fulfil the same functions outside of the war 
system.
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There are, however, arguments around the relationship between violence and the benefits 
received by men which pose problems for an instrumentalist feminist account of war rape. 
Following an instrumentalist interpretation, the hegemonic masculinity thesis can be read as 
a claim that “male violence is the brutal core of a politico-cultural strategy  that is deployed to 
sustain an illegitimate position of dominance”.51  But if there is a 'patriarchal dividend' 
accessible to all men, despite internal differences, then: 
it must be possible for lower-class men to cash them in for some of the real 
privileges and benefits enjoyed by those men who – alongside many women 
and 'subordinated masculinities'  – inhabit the higher class or occupational 
echelons. If profitable exchange is infrequent rather than routine, then, in 
the case of  violence, the personal is quite possibly not very political.52
We might also expect that active believers in masculine ideals receive greater benefits than 
others. Yet it has been claimed that violence is more common among lower classes marked 
by crude, aggressive masculine norms while the means of cultural production are controlled 
by a pseudo-pacified elite. So to demonstrate a connection between the patriarchal dividend 
and violence as an act of privilege, Connell's three patriarchal groups “must be shown to 
have common interests”.53  But if studies of all kinds repeatedly show a connection between 
violence and socio-economic marginality, might we not conclude that men's interests  have 
never been united under a common patriarchal flag but that subordinate masculinities are 
exploited by elite ones?54 If these distributed masculinities are not part of the same project, 
then assuming an instrumental decision by those men who carry out violence but who will not 
themselves benefit from the results of  that violence, becomes unsustainable.55
The answer may depend on how we view violence and class. For Connell, this critique 
focuses on stereotypically 'lower class' violence between men (in bars,  at football matches and 
on the streets of deprived neighbourhoods), rather than on the more widespread practices of 
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domestic violence and rape.56  Moreover, the hegemonic masculinity thesis itself 
acknowledges that class positions can lead to men 'losing out' on the patriarchal dividend.57 
This rejoinder is supported by evidence that men from 'lower' classes (understood in income 
terms) are no more likely to be rapists,  although higher arrest and conviction rates can 
project a misleading statistical picture. But low-income women are more likely to experience 
sexual violence,  suggesting that there might be an economic relationship in terms of 
predation, with attackers correctly identifying that victims will not have resources to 
respond.58  In terms of an account of wartime sexual violence, this transfers the locale of 
causation. Instead of holding that men rape because they are poor we might say that they 
rape particular women because they are unable to resist. But this moves the explanation 
away from instrumentality, since it ceases to be clear what economic or material benefit is to 
be gained from those with the least to offer.
Whatever answer is given to these questions by particular empirical studies,  a fundamental 
conceptual problem remains. Even if we accept Connell's account, a more fine-grained 
analysis of the process by which men benefit from patriarchy seems necessary. How is it that 
men 'cash out' the benefits of patriarchy? And what is the relationship between the role of 
enforcer and the freedom to enjoy the fruits of violence?  As with the debate within civil war 
studies, the relationship between individualist and collectivist assumptions becomes 
important. If we narrate war rape as the consequence of soldiers seeking goods for 
themselves (as, say, economic survivors in war), we may expect a certain pattern, 
characterised by a failure or gap in command structures allowing for relatively autonomous 
accumulation through violence.59  On the other hand, if soldiers are working on behalf of 
interests which they struggle to access, as the obedient footsoldiers for class warriors or 
geopolitical commanders,  this would suggest that some other way of forcing their obedience 
is necessary. Perhaps they are themselves subjected to violence as a marginalised masculinity. 
Or perhaps a more 'positive' identity is nurtured to encourage participation in a joint 
patriarchal project.
·  106·
56! Connell 2002:200.
57! Connell 2005:116.
58! Phipps 2009:669–671. In terms of the three modes, this contrasts with the idea that someone may be attacked 
because they are a high-status representative of the nation (mythology), or merely because they are an easy 
target in an opportunistic attack (unreason).
59! For a version of this kind of thesis (or a 'principal-agent' issue), see Butler, Gluch, and N. J. Mitchell 2007.
Rape Factories
While these parallels with issues in civil war studies and social theory trouble smooth 
narratives of strategic instrumentality by marauding soldiers, they only partially address 
another central wager of instrumentalist logics: that of materialism. The salience of 
individualist and collectivist perspectives arises again here, although the role of narrow 
'rationality'  recedes into a more functionalist analysis of patriarchy as a system. The parallels 
with debates in civil war studies and in social theory both clarify and challenge the implicit 
assumptions of purposive behaviour in the instrumentalist feminist mode. The question of 
materiality and redistribution in feminist theory itself likewise both refines and undermines 
by setting the materialism of patriarchy (and hence of sexual violence as a tool to achieve or 
protect material benefits) as a problem, rather than a self-evident assumption. 
Although now rather displaced by 'post-socialist' politics and the success of discourse-based 
theories of gender, materialist and socialist feminists devoted considerable theoretical 
resources to elaborating an understanding of patriarchy that can serve as an elaboration on 
the logic of instrumentality. For Nancy Hartsock, Marx's two levels of social life (exchange 
and production) required a feminist supplement in the form of reproduction.60  Writing against 
contract and exchange theories and their view of communities in instrumental terms as 
markets for interests, she also critiqued existing Marxist analysis for its blindness to non-
wage labour.61  The possibility for a distinctly feminist standpoint in these historical 
materialist terms arises from the sexual division of labour and this standpoint is informed by 
the experience of material life and material relations of domination, understood in terms of 
relations of  production and reproduction.62
A materialist feminism offers an expansive conceptions of women's work and labour as 
“variable practices that are constitutive of ever-changing forms of existence and modes of 
subjectivity”, which is to say that labour produces subjectivity to the degree that we can 
speak of an ontology  of labouring practices and labour as an 'immanent ontological dynamic' 
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in history.63  The role of women as a collective with a particular relationship to exploitation 
and gender hierarchy (and a particular insight into it) is hence analogous to workers as a 
collective with a particular relationship to economic hierarchy (and their particular insight 
into it).64 
Indeed, the perspective of women is “more thoroughgoing than that available to the 
worker” in the sense that stereotypical male labourers are only involved in one 'circuit of 
capital'  while women are caught up in four since: 1)  women can possess labour power like 
men; but 2) women are more involved in the production of use values directly consumed 
rather than first exchanged; and 3)  women are the major producers of labour power itself. 
Their labour produces labour power (through caring,  cooking and child-bearing). Finally, 4) 
women are also themselves commodities exchanged for pleasure and money in patriarchy, 
thus reproducing androcentric sexuality and power.65  This is one way in which the intense 
overlap between 'objective' forms of exploitation (lower wages, different work, profits from 
female labour) can be seen as of a piece with 'subjective' forms of aggression (domestic 
violence, physical harassment,  rape).66  A gender-class-instrumentalist vision of war 
identifying reasons for the particularly victimised status of women in situations which are 
not just violent, but also economies. 
Of particular relevance to instrumentality as a mode of critical explanation is the role of 
materialism in such an account not just as a characterisation of social relations at a 
particular point, but as a means for “explaining  the relations and factors that structure 
women's  lives” which can take us “toward a theory of the extraction and appropriation of 
women's  activity and women themselves”.67  This is not to say that say that a materialist 
account in Hartsock's terms only recognises economic dimensions of the social. Ideas of 
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virility,  potency and sexuality (eros)  play a role in power itself, just as the character of desire 
forces a more direct conflict of the ruling gender with the ruled than need be the case in the 
sphere of rational production.68 It is, however, the relations of women to men as classes, with 
the former's labour extracted and exploited by the latter, which does the analytical work and 
sets the ontological politics in such an account.
Rosemary Hennessy also adopts a materialist feminist, although here discourse itself also 
counts as materialist. Moving away from an understanding of that wager in narrowly 
economic terms, discursive materialism retains an “interest in Marxism as a problematic 
which explains social relations causally”, whether through a focus on crisis or the category of 
capitalism.69 A view of gender violence as instrumental to a class relation need not subsume 
feminism into Marxism. That requires that we hold that the class relationship in question is 
one established under capitalism, or under some distinct mode of production. If, instead,  we 
hold that a gendered division of labour, with men (however defined) benefiting at the 
expense of women (however defined),  which is to say that they appropriate and dispose of 
value created by women’s work, then we are speaking of gender as a class relationship. We 
might say that Marxist class analysis is interested in women’s relationship to a particular 
economic system, while feminist class analysis is  interested in women’s relationship to men.70 
Such a perspective both recognises the multiple character of oppression and promotes a 
particular account of its emergence, since ideology, mythology and discourses remain of 
analytical interest, but not as themselves primary causal forces.71 
For materialist feminism then, exploitation depends on extracting value produced by one 
class for another, and gender enters as a class distinction. Sexual violence thus becomes a 
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Although these terms (labour, capital, exploitation) are not explicitly justified on their own terms, they are the 
implicit structuring analytical wagers.
tool for the process of securing productive and reproductive assets in the context of war. 
The 'bush wife' system of Sierra Leone being a compelling example. Such an account aligns 
with a more general analysis similarly seeing systematic rape as a strategy for seizing 
women's  assets, primarily productive and reproductive labour and only secondarily personal 
possessions or access to land.72  As well as proving empirical support for a logic of 
instrumentality, these elements of a materialist feminism also indicate what a more complex 
account of the economic functions of wartime sexual violence may look like, although we 
will come to see that some of these same events are readable in terms of ritual and 
pornographic indoctrination not so amenable to calculation or accumulation. For example, 
the role of forced marriage and the 'wife'  designation has so far been neglected, and stands 
as a remainder somewhat at odds with a direct interest in captive labour insofar as they 
indicate a desire or need for symbolic legitimation.
Noting the absence of a relational analysis of different economies in the study of war, V. 
Spike Peterson has proposed a three-part typology of reproductive, productive and virtual 
economies.73 Working from this framing sets three kinds of economy relevant to a gendered 
understanding of war. Coping  economies are those centred on sustaining family and social 
life. The experience of the 'bush wives' of Sierra Leone fit most closely to this context in 
replicating a kind of domesticity in the midst of collective violence. This sphere is the most 
stereotypically 'feminised'. Combat economies are generally 'masculinised' and sustain fighting 
itself through direct supply, for example in capturing primary commodity resources. Criminal 
economies are the province of profit-seeking and are more indirect in their effects, perhaps 
by providing black market goods or transporting 'conflict minerals'  to international 
markets.74 
All three economies may be related to war rape in an instrumentalist account. Rape 
followed by sexual slavery and general servitude to armed groups is a product of coping 
economies. Rape to induce fear and therefore clear areas for the seizure of valuable 
resources which then sustain armed groups is a product of combat economies. Rape as a 
tool for the kidnap of women later traded as commodities (for example in sex trafficking) is a 
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product of criminal economies.75  All three economies direct attention to the uses of labour 
controlled through violence, and therefore suggest the materialist purposes to which sexual 
violence can be put, whatever model of  intentionality we opt for.
The Figure Of  The Psychopath
These are some of the conceptual ambiguities within instrumentality, ways of posing it 
economically, militarily, as obedience, as agency, with gender as a class and rape as 
exploitation, and as sensitive to the functions and benefits of violence. The dangers are of 
evacuating any concept of personhood thicker than that of a cog in a patriarchal machine, 
and the problem is how to cash out the specially gendered profits of violence. Returning to 
the question of rationality, there is  also a zone in which instrumentality becomes less clear, 
and where it bleeds into the categories of unreason. Not an issue of the specifics of means-
ends calculations, but of  the boundary between rationality and madness.
 
There is a revealing moment in Breaking the Conflict Trap,  perhaps the World Bank document 
most associated with 'greed' theses of war, one nominally committed to a rationalist and 
economic account of civil war, in which a footnote mentions that 3% of any given 
population can be classified as psychopathic and that this in itself is enough to recruit the 
foundations of an army and to explain why people fight.76  In clinical assessment measures, 
psychopaths are distinguished by their short tempers and strong feelings of anger and desire 
for retribution for perceived wrongs, characteristics clearly identifiable with trends in 
unreason. But they are also manipulative, lacking in guilt and motivated by self-interest, 
features that would seem to better suit the calculating soldier-strategist.77 They come close to 
Sen's view of purely economic man as a social moron: one with only a single preference set, 
orientated only towards themselves.78 
The two sides of the psychopath – anger and self-interest – appear in contradiction because 
we are so used to the association of rationality with cool calculation. Yet, as Timothy 
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Mitchell comments, the 'utility' of economics disavows but requires desire. Consequences 
matter where agents want something. Saying that they want power or money or survival 
defers the question: if they want those things consistently and intensely and plan their lives 
around ways of acquiring them, they are not just rational, but driven. And the concept of the 
drive ultimately tempts us with ideas of passion, hunger, and sex. The soldier-strategist, 
adjudicating on the field of battle, finds that his mask has slipped a bit, and that his pleasure 
is showing through. The minute we stop abstracting the rapist,  it becomes much harder to 
think of him as someone who 'just'  chooses to rape, as if selecting the cheapest product in a 
store. That kind of method is madness. The pervasiveness of violent accumulation and 
violation in war is suggestive of it as a space of insanity, where psychopathy becomes the 
norm, a familiar enough trope. War is hell. 
The psychopath thus stands for the existentialist connection between sex and death. When it 
comes to modes of critical explanation for sexual violence, the analytical claim of rationality 
is thrown into some disarray. It is  possible to see all instances of rape as uses of a tool 
applied to different ends (money, culture, lust). But as well as subduing a whole set of 
contexts and circumstances under one term, this also undoes the major contribution of 
'weapon of war' claims in the first place. If the instrumentality of rape can apply to any 
chain of events and any  motive or utility, there is no reason not to return to the prior idea of 
it as 'just something men do',  as unrelated to war aims at all, or as peacetime desires writ 
large. There must be some additional content to the instrumentalist diagnosis, both to 
specify what perpetrators are being 'strategic', 'systematic' or 'rational' about and to make 
these claims feminist, rather than just generically rationalist. 
If the aims are domination in a specifically gendered form, or the expression of a gendered 
desire, then where does this content come from? It is common to give an answer in terms of 
the social construction of identity, of the pervasiveness of certain gender norms, but 
introducing these elements of symbolic structure, belief and ideology takes us back to the 
problem of rationality, which is that if it is structured by these standards (or a bounded 
rationality), then forms of violence may not be so freely chosen or calculated toward military 
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or economic gains at all.79  The imagined soldier-strategist thus might on one side become 
the gendered member acting in accordance with a militarised social structure that specifies 
his legitimate and illegitimate action and on the other the practitioner not of a carefully 
judged violence but of  the covered-over imperatives of  lust and anger that drive him.
Instrumentalist Propositions
Beneath the instrumentalist account of wartime sexual violence – the one that most 
obviously substantiates 'rape as a weapon of war' thesis – we have encountered a series of 
complexities. One result has been to clarify the different possible strands of the 
instrumentalist mode. Far from implying merely an individualist and economistic 
understanding of agency in war (a charge that sticks more to 'greed'-based approaches in 
war studies), the tradition in feminist and social theory concerned with materialism, power 
and exploitation is rich and suggestive. It draws our attention to issues of class and 
distribution, to the intersection of economics of war and those of peace,  and to an attendant 
range of analogies of war-labour, killing-fucking machines and combat as the brutal 
securing of a political economy. But tracing out the possible forms of the calculating soldier-
strategist has also left a conceptual remainder. We are left with fundamental conceptual 
issues around the nature of rationality (and its  circularity), the benefits of violence within 
masculinity, and the borders of  the rational and the irrational. 
However, we are able to advance some broad propositions which, if not quite firmly testable 
hypotheses, at least indicate what kind of observations and events might support the claims 
of the instrumentalist mode. They are intended to both accommodate the range of 
instrumentalist inflections surveyed and to provide a distinct basis for instrumentalism, 
thereby allowing for comparison, contrast and possible co-explanation with the logics of 
unreason and mythology surveyed in the coming chapters.
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Proposition 1
Following the narrowest of assumptions about rationality, we might conclude that wartime 
sexual violence follows an instrumentalist logic if we find clear evidence of orders, either in 
written form or evidence given by troops (for example in international tribunals), that 
armies, militias or groups were instructed to rape for an identifiable purpose. This latter element is 
important since a mere discussion of rape or the prevalence of discourse around will not 
show instrumentality. To identify the work of a geopolitical commander or class warrior 
requires that we discern a chain of command, or at least an atmosphere of impunity which 
is more than permissive, but actually encourages violence. We are searching, in other words, 
for orders for the obedient footsoldier to follow. To ask for such evidence of instrumentality 
demands a significant amount of proof, and one unlikely to be furnished within the contexts 
of uncertainty and inadequate information characteristic of war. As with more general 
discussions of economic rationality, one solution is to read intentionality and instrumentality 
through the evidence of material of functional benefits for particular actors, which opens up 
a range of  materialist propositions. 
Proposition 2
If we find that rape is generally accompanied by kidnapping and sexual slavery for 
‘domestic’  work or other kinds of labour within a war economy, then this would support an 
account based on the invisible role of ‘reproductive’ and ‘non-wage’ labour in sustaining the 
war machine. The class warrior and the obedient footsoldier are primarily implicated here. 
Moreover, it may suggest the relevance of gendered notions of appropriate and 
inappropriate labour to sustaining that system and leading to the perception by soldiers that 
this was an appropriate tactic to secure female labour.
Proposition 3
If we find that rape is generally accompanied by theft or appropriation of particular 
resources, then this would also support an argument about the gendered exploitation of 
female labour,  although here it would not be a sustainable exploitation in the form suggested 
by Proposition 2, but merely a forceable appropriation of labour value already created by 
gendered economies. Following the theoretical discussion above, a tendency towards this 
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kind of accumulation rather than a more regularised pattern of exploitation may yet invoke 
instrumentalism, but in a more restricted capacity as the short-term seizure of assets to 
facilitate certain aims which may have little to do with labour or economics in a 
fundamental sense (likely invoking the economic survivor more than any other stereotyped 
soldier-rapist).
Proposition 4
If we find that rape accompanies acts which fall within the sites of war economies (more so 
than in situations not so linked to war economies), then this would support an argument 
about its role as materially-beneficial and instrumentally-rational aid to processes of 
international profiteering. Here the actors involved may not be benefiting a domestic 
constituency or even their immediate military superiors, but instead lubricating a 
transnational flow of material resources. This is again the sphere of the class warrior, 
although now in a more global sphere of exchange. Since all economies are to some extent 
linked to globalised others,  the mere existence of transnational flows cannot justify a 
conclusion that an instrumentalist logic is victorious over its  competitors. More attention is 
required to a comparison of existent flows with those characteristic of non-war and non-
rape situations. In addition, an empirical investigation of these issues will need to examine 
the closeness of the link between rape and transnational economic flows. That a civil war is 
marked by both cannot establish their connection at an explanatory level.
These four propositions are not mutually exclusive, and may well be combined with 
evidence supporting others in any concrete case. Whether their prevalence is clear enough to 
support a specifically instrumentalist reading, and whether an instrumentalist reading can be 
sustained as distinct in theoretical terms, will become clearer once we have considered the 
wagers, scripts and orientations of  unreason and mythology.
·  115·
Chapter Five
UNREASON AND THE ANGRY SOLDIER-SADIST
Sometimes it seems that we're merely Constructions made out of yarn, 
paper and wood with threads rising from our toes and fingertips. We 
pretend to talk and act as though we were alive but actually we don't have 
any choice in the matter. Some secret power directs us.
Evan S. Connell, The Diary Of  A Rapist  1
War is not only the Great Educator, it is the Great Revealer. Its marches 
and bivouacs,  its battles, its commonplaces and surprises, its trials and its 
triumphs, are a singular school of experience. The various impacts upon 
man's psychological anatomy produce strange results. They seem like the 
blows of some Invisible Sculptor, producing out of commonplace material a 
hero and it may be a demi-god. The opening orchestra of shot and shell 
braces up the mind of the soldier and attunes it up to receive new 
sensitiveness. The bullets play strange dirges on the strings of life before 
they break them, and each dirge has its theme, some song of spiritual 
things. His gaze is towards the sky line and he sees strange things, a whole 
battery of  lights each of  which is in its way a revelation.
Forbes Phillips and R. Thurston Hopkins, War and the Weird  2
[I]f  it's violence not sex why didn't he just hit her?
Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Sexuality, Pornography and Method'3
My Lai
On 16 March 1968, US soldiers from Charlie Company descended on the village of My Lai 
in South Vietnam. It was to become the scene for perhaps the most infamous war crime in 
the second half of the 20th century. More than 500 people were killed,  all unarmed, all 
without provocation, on the orders of Lieutenant William Calley, who in turn claimed to be 
following orders to “kill everything in the village”.4  Whatever the truth of that Calley – 
described by one of his subordinates as “a kid trying to play war” - oversaw the rounding-
up, the execution, and the desecration of bodies, elderly villagers and young children among 
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them.5 Some men wept, and could not complete the slaughter. Others refused to cooperate 
at all.6  One soldier may have shot himself in the foot to avoid participating. Another, the 
helicopter pilot Hugh Thomson, was the only person to actively resist, threatening to shoot 
on other American soldiers if  they participated.
Amidst the slaughter, some twenty women and girls were raped, according to army 
investigators. Some were as young as 11 and 12, and they were generally raped and then 
shot.7 Some had had their genitals cut open.8 A photographer came on soldiers attempting a 
rape of a 15 year-old girl,  one declaring “let's see what she's made of ” and enjoying the 
desperate attempts of an older lady to fight them off.9  If there were orders to commit 
atrocity,  there were not to commit rape, and Calley was eventually charged and convicted of 
murder, not sexual violence. Attempts to make sense of the killings have stressed the 
combination of fear, frustration (at the recent death of a commander) and racism.10  The 
scene deteriorated quickly into confusion, or as one participant put it, “this wasn't no 
organized deal”.11  Nevertheless, there were reports of joyful shouting and laughter: “The 
boys enjoyed it. When someone laughs and jokes about what they're doing they have to be 
enjoying it”.12 As a G.I. involved in the massacre explained:
We were all psyched up, and as a result when we got there the shooting 
started, almost as a chain reaction. The majority of us had expected to meet VC 
combat troops, but this did not turn out to be so. First we saw a few men 
running...and the next thing I knew we were shooting at everything. 
Everybody was just firing. After they got in the village, I guess you could say 
that the men were out of  control.13
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Figure 10: 'My Lai : We Lie : They Die', a 1970 satirical poster by Jeff Kram. The text reads: “We as 
R.O.T.C. cadets know that tomorrow's business, governmental, and professional activities need top men who 
have the ability, will, and opportunity to prepare for positions of responsibility, and leadership. R.O.T.C. 
cadets are those superior men. Our motto and solemn oath: My Lai We Lie They  Die. Support our program: 
as you can see, we have a lot to offer” and is signed 'Committee for the Promotion of  Selective Youth In Asia'.
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Figure 11: 'The Confessions of  Lt. Calley', cover of  Esquire: The Magazine for Men, November 1970
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My Lai may have been extreme, but it was not unique. Indeed, on the same day US troops 
had massacred 90 people at My Khe, just a mile away, but it never got the same attention, 
perhaps because there were no photos.14  It became a hallmark for critique of military 
masculinity, and for the crass affinity of the phallus and the cannon (see Figure 10). But it 
also revealed a thick deposit of complicity and justification in American society – in one poll 
79% of respondents disapproved of Calley's life sentence – and produced its own nauseating 
reactions, as in the November 1970 Esquire cover showing Calley smiling amongst 
Vietnamese children (Figure 11).15 
Attempts to write My Lai off as exceptional were, of course, strategies of denial. Yet the 
characteristics of atrocities of the My Lai kind do set them somewhat apart from the sexual 
slaveries of Sierra Leone. For one, there is little sense of a plan that either originates higher 
up the command chain than Calley or his immediate superior, nor of one which 
serendipitously coincides with those of other commanders operating nearby. Moreover, the 
war time of My Lai is condensed. A day is a long time to engage in sexualised slaughter, but 
it is not the kind of disciplined violence needed to maintain a terrorised labour force, to run 
a concentration camp, or to elucidate an army-wide plan. 
In other words, it is marked more by unreason than by instrumentality. This chapter 
explores that mode through themes of pleasure, emotion and excess in both studies of war 
and in the less explicitly feminist literature on 'peacetime' sexual violence and sexual abuse. 
Particular attention is then paid to psychoanalytical feminism and to the analytical wager of 
sexuality, showing how sexed bodies remain relevant even after essentialist conceptions of 
gender identity have been jettisoned. 
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The Satisfactions Of  Conquest, Like A Boot In The Face
Unreason signifies that which lies outside the realm of the self-conscious sovereign individual 
and his coherently-plotted, goal-directed action. It can imply irrationality in the sense of 
actions that do not benefit, or even harm, an actor, but it is not chaotic or random. 
Unreason posits causes and patterns for sexual violence, but finds them in a complex space 
of subjectivity and sexuality. It suggests the dimensions of behaviour that escape self-
reflection and which defy incentives. Sexual violence in these accounts takes the form of a 
drive or a bond, biological or social psychological. Where instrumentality focuses on the 
space of conscious individual reasoning and mythology on the production of group 
processes and rituals, unreason seeks understanding via the convoluted shifts of our 
frequently repressed or obscured desires. It expresses the logic of drive, rather than of 
consequences or appropriateness. Wartime sexual violence emerges, then, not from interest or 
obligation but from the doubled impetus of  pleasure/disgust.
Unreason's analytical wagers are those of emotional and expressive being and of variegated 
and contested internal mental states. This gives rise to a focus on themes of trauma, affect 
and the (perhaps collective) unconscious. The relevant actors thus become not so much 
institutions or organisations as individuals and informal groups led to certain acts by a 
confluence of events and internal urges. Its narrative scripts revolve around a psyche opaque 
to itself. Consequently war rapists often appear to unreason as confused,  frustrated or angry. 
Unreason’s normative orientation addresses the conditions that perpetuate such 
psychological states. At the limit, this  implies that rape cannot be changed by policy but 
must be accepted as a kind of persistent eruption. This can include essential accounts of 
male desire which come close to non-feminist explanations for rape, although, as we shall 
see, most accounts from unreason establish a more subtle interpretation of psychology and 
its link to biology and corporeality. For unreason, rape is a weapon of war because it is the 
result of desire and fear faced by perpetrators in brutalising situations of affect and trauma. 
Wartime sexual violence is here politicised in the sense of combating a divide between 
apparently ‘private’ desires (such as lust)  and ‘public’ events (the systematic destruction 
wrought by war) and in seeing emotions as causes and consequences of  political processes.
Unreason is purest in work which stresses the expressive role of sexual violence. This is rape 
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as an over-flowing of frustration. Among its motifs is the idea of sexual abuse as an act of 
group cohesion among men.16  It notes the frequent presence of alcohol in rape as well as 
racist abuse, all “typically conducted in a hands-on orgy of bloodletting”.17  Related 
justifications based on the logic of inevitable expressive unreason ('this is just what soldiers 
do')  have been critiqued by Susan Brownmiller but have also been implicated in her much-
quoted view that rape is “one of the satisfactions of conquest, like a boot in the face”.18 The 
most brutal and shocking acts associated with wartime sexual violence – the severing of 
body parts,  mutilation and 'extra insults' in addition to rape – seem to fit with the mode of 
unreason, especially where they are accompanied by evidence of pleasurable release for 
perpetrators.19 These details evoke rape as carnivalesque 'laboratories in total domination'.20 
Unreason assembles narratives of celebratory and transgressive violence, psychopathology, 
perverse homo-sociality and the kind of criminal opportunism that can find no justification 
in a financial reward. It is a force of  undoing, not only for perpetrators but for their victims:
[T]he raping of a girl (or a boy, for that matter)  in the presence of her father, 
forced to witness the affair – is bound to set in motion the vicious cycle of 
guilt: the father – the representative of authority, of the big Other – is 
exposed in his utter impotence, which makes him guilty in his own eyes as 
well as in those of his daughter; the daughter is  guilty for causing her 
father's humiliation; and so on. The rape thus entails, besides the girl's 
physical and psychic suffering, the disintegration of the entire familial socio-
symbolic network.21
Unreason also resonates particularly with common views of rape in 'peacetime' contexts. 
Although there is an overlap with mythological explanations in the sense that such behaviour 
is supported by cultural beliefs and rape myths, unreason promotes a narrative script of the 
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rapist as a certain type of individual, one empowered to sexual violence by elements of their 
personality,  including entitlement, violence, control and anger.22  The sexed body and 
affective states are centre-stage, as are the emotional transitions which escape the calculating 
logic of instrumentality, for example in diagnosing violence as the result of grief mobilised 
as rage.23  Although the mode of unreason need not imply any trans-historical sexual 
essence, it does invoke a particular view of rape as related to sex and sexuality, as in the 
claim that “[r]apists possess a subconscious knowledge about human vulnerability acquired 
through the centrality of  our sexuality to our personhood”.24 
This may be a directed heterosexuality (lust as an efficient cause) or a more amorphous 
homosociality (the production of masculine sexuality through processes of male bonding). In 
the case of unreason, sexual violence can be a tool,  and a weapon in and of war, without it 
serving instrumentalist ends: 
When a victorious army rapes, the sheer intoxication of the triumph is only part 
of the act. After the fact,  the rape may be viewed as part of a recognizable 
pattern of national terror and subjugation. I say 'after the fact'  because the 
original impulse to rape does not need a sophisticated political motivation 
beyond a general disregard for the bodily integrity of women. But rape in 
warfare has a military effect as well as an impulse. And the effect is 
indubitably one of  intimidation and demoralization for the victims' side.25 
So sexual violence remains political, collective and fundamentally linked to war as a 
practice, but the apparently instrumental benefits are now rendered not as causes,  but as 
consequences and afterthoughts. Rape is still about power, but now in a sense which includes 
the dimension of  sexuality and its attendant taboos in a much clearer way.
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The Abject
In contrast to the exteriority of instrumentality, unreason relies on a fractured interiority. 
Unreason contains both the joys of war (war as game; war as the profession of the 
psychopath; war as festival) and behaviour in war as trauma or psychological coercion (drugs 
as an enforced lubricant to sexual violence; kidnapped and brutalised children; the fearful 
lashing out of men with guns). Consequently, its normative orientation becomes similarly 
fractured between an outright condemnation and palpable disgust at the pleasure taken by 
protagonists  in sexual violence on the one hand, and a pitying recognition of trauma on the 
other, directing us to move away from a model in which the actors themselves feature so 
prominently to one which asks questions about how any human being could become so 
damaged as to enact these fantasies on the bodies of  others.
Unreason's figure is the angry soldier-sadist. Where the soldier-strategist responds to 
pressures from outside (economic or military),  the soldier-sadist is driven by pressures from 
within. These may have been forces which led him to join an armed group, or which 
emerged in response to experiences of combat itself. Writings from soldiers turned scholars 
show that decisions to enter and participate in militaries may have little to do with a 
conscious plan to attain either money or status. Instead they appear as shaped by limited 
options, family histories, ambiguous feelings towards military culture, significant changes in 
mind and body as part of the militarising process, and feelings of loss after leaving.26  The 
soldier-sadist is not a lunatic,  but has adapted to the conditions of war, or sought them out. 
He responds emotionally as well as rationally. There is no reason to think that this makes 
him a bad soldier: his ability to actualise a certain rage may even keep him alive. 
Professional soldiers feel as well as calculate. But the role of affect and trauma is most 
pronounced in the situation of the child soldier. Kidnapped in often bloody circumstances, it 
is not unusual to hear of children forced to kill their own families or neighbours, to be forced 
to be heavily drugged before combat,  and to be initiated into their new military family 
through brutalisation. The connection between brutalised children and the brutalising 
soldiers they go on to become is an unsettling one, and accounts do not linger long on the 
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transition from innocence to monstrosity. Yet the numbers are not insignificant (sources from 
the early 2000s mention 300,000 child soldiers worldwide).27  What does it mean to operate 
only with a rationalist view of war, and not to think about the trauma, suffering, confusion, 
anger and pain attendant on these experiences? Together with aspects of mythology, this 
kind of figure raises clear questions of liminality and soldier-making unbroached in 
narrations of  the soldier-rapist as already full formed.
Unreason yields four stereotypes from the figure of the soldier-sadist. In the most lustful 
iteration there is the sexual predator, who takes the opportunities provided by war to fulfil his 
desires (the designation of his desire as sexual is complex, as we shall see). Although sex is 
taken by force,  the attitude of the sexual predator is both menacing and playful, as when 
soldiers at My Lai joked “let's see what she's made of ”. For the stereotype of the frustrated 
power-seeker, by contrast, the apparently sexual element of rape is less  important. His interest 
is in demonstrating domination, and in receiving emotional rewards in the process. Rape in 
war gives him a power he otherwise lacks, and those he rapes provide the fleshy material for 
his anger. Where examinations of My Lai stress the failure of Charlie Company to find and 
engage the actual enemy in the run-up to the massacre, they identify the same kind of 
dynamic: there was no question of tactical necessity or material benefit, and no real 
ideological programme (although there was a lot of ideological buttressing). Instead the 
civilians who were there stood in for the punishment – for the 'real' combat – that the 
soldiers had been deprived of  inflicting on the Viet Cong.
Affect is not only a matter of lust and anger. It is also a way of binding men together, of 
uniting them by virtue of that which they collectively destroy. Hence the stereotype of the 
brother-in-arms,  he who commits atrocity as a way of being included. Creating community in 
this way requires that other men know, and participate, and later validate the actions jointly 
committed. The continuities with mythology are important here,  since the bonding of 
soldier-sadists together parallels in a more contingent moment the bonding and the combat 
motivation of the military at large. An event like gang rape, seen thusly, is not just useful for 
overpowering the victim, but because it brings men together in complicity. Finally,  the 
disorientated victim stands as the most traumatised of the stereotypes of unreason. He is much 
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less in control that the predator or the power-seeker, and is past the reassurance of the 
group. As the victim-who-victimises, he is also re-enacting a trauma, but receives less 
confidence from it than does the power-seeker. He is more likely to feel disgust and shame 
towards himself, and not to be able to say why he acted as he did. Some soldiers prosecuted 
for rape appear in this mode, perhaps because they are trying to show remorse, perhaps 
because they no longer operate in a culture which sanctions sexual violence. For all forms of 
the soldier-sadist, those subjected to rape are unsettling presences, things of horror to be 
expelled and extinguished: victims as abject.
The space of unreason is that of fracture, which tends to mean that rapes occur not so much 
because they are structured by situations or ideologies, but because the opportunity for them 
arises. Where both instrumentality and mythology contain some conception of restraint, 
unreason foregrounds its absence. It can therefore suggest the play of impunity and freedom 
to carry out what was always desired. But to say that rapes occur when the opportunity for 
them arises is only to push the question back. Opportunity, by definition, allows for many 
courses of action. For opportunity to result in a particular kind of violence suggests that 
there is  a pre-existing desire for that action, which has in other situations been restrained. 
'Impunity' will not cause a soldier to rape,  it will only make him feel that he can get away 
with a rape if he wishes to perpetrate one. And it is by no means obvious that soldiers, or 
men in general, consistently want to perpetrate rape.28 So there is also in unreason a sense of 
the randomness,  or the arbitrariness, of rape. Not because it is natural or acceptable, but 
because it cannot be plotted according to military plans or social incentives.
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they were confident they would not be discovered). 1/3 of the respondents said they would rape in the 
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‘only’ 12% for low sex stereotypers. The implications are significant for any study of wartime sexual violence, 
although there is much more to be said about contexts and causes. See Check and Malamuth 1983.
The Excess Of  Violence
Although thinking in terms of 'rational violence' or the greed thesis has been a major trend 
in conflict research over the last decades,  there have also been a number of critiques of 
those positions which have explored the role of unreason. David Keen, although initially 
associated with a kind of functionally instrumental account of civil war violence, has more 
recently explored the experiences of individuals and how they challenge these narratives. 
The force of shame and humiliation seems deeply linked to the traumatic experiences of 
combatants who, in contexts of extreme violence like that of Sierra Leone, attempted a 
reversal of  the 'loss of  face' they had suffered by passing on the humiliation to others.29 
The instrumentalist narrative script of soldiers as calm and clear-headed accumulators 
neglects the manifold ways in which they themselves suffered through recruitment, whether 
in kidnap at a young age and/or in being forced to kill loved ones.30  On this account 
civilians were not attacked so much because of anything they had but because they could 
serve as a canvas on which the anxieties of war could be played out. This is the two-sided 
character of soldiering frequently addressed by unreason – the ways in which the trauma 
and difficulty of becoming a warrior ('professionalised' or otherwise) transforms into a 
pleasure taken in the new identity and in killing itself.31 
This dimension is brought into sharp relief by Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton, who seek 
the ontology of war and locate it in the transformative effects of fighting, which is given the 
status of an unstable event and not as a behaviour that can be adequately instrumentalised, 
in spite of attempts to do so.32  Not war as an expression of the social order, as mythology 
may suggest to us, but as a terrible undoing of  such certainties:
Always in excess of the strategic or juridical duration of fighting, war stands 
beyond the discrete ontology that fighting evidences to take on an elemental 
function within ‘‘peace.’’ Orders of peace thus consist in significant measure 
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of veiled traces and effects of fighting—an order of battle traduced through 
civic transformation, but an order of  battle nonetheless.33
There is a particular status given to uncertainty in war in such a vision, an uncertainty that 
always escapes the intentions of policy makers who seek to harness its destructive power for 
other ends. Whether this is a character of all war, or just wars which fundamentally upset a 
pre-existing symbolic structure is unclear (if it ever could be settled), but the European 
experiences of World War I present at least one stage in which such a crisis was manifested 
for the soldiers who fought it:
[W]ar experience is nothing if not a transgression of categories. In 
providing bridges across the boundaries between the visible and the 
invisible, the known and unknown, the human and the inhuman, war 
offered numerous occasions for the shattering of distinctions that were 
central to orderly thought, communicable experience, and normal human 
relations. Much of the bewilderment, stupefaction,  or sense of growing 
strangeness to which combatants testified can be attributed to those realities 
of war that broke down what Mary Douglas calls “our cherished 
classifications”.34
The force of the boundary crossing suggested by such an ontology is exacerbated when acts 
of violence are accompanied by the consumption of drugs and the release of tensions. The 
dynamics of such events invoke a particular excessive pleasure, as in cases of genocide where 
“momentary participation in legitimised killing takes place in heightened emotional 
conditions,  akin to sustained orgasm, which recall the sexual licence of the festival (and 
which in turn are recalled by the mass rapes that occurred during the Bosnian war and the 
ferocious mutilations that characterised the Rwandan genocide)”.35
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In examining the continuum from massacres to genocide, Jacques Semelin gives particular 
prominence to the imaginative space of killing and the importance for political leaders to 
tap into the desires of their subordinates. Projecting outwards onto an enemy in a clear 
dichotomy in which the other must be eradicated feeds on the 'paranoid-schizoid' position of 
Kleinian psychoanalysis,  a disposition towards others which is said to account for the 
intensity with which representations of the foreign intruder are saturated with negative 
feelings.36  Along with the mechanisms of differentiating between a putative purity on the 
one side and a disgusting filth on the other (with different parties to conflict imagined as 
corresponding to the two poles),  these psychological processes form the foundations in which 
acts of  extreme brutality in war build.37
Although directing attention to a range of expressions and experiences otherwise neglected 
in instrumentalist studies of war, these resonances raise questions of their own. Most 
crucially, what is the precise relationship of internal psychic dynamics to social processes? 
Recalling the difficulties of accounting for variation in the extent and character of rape, how 
does unreason address differences in rape across context? And,  at a more specifically 
conceptual level, just how is sexuality relayed to power? 
An Unspeakable Delight38
The question of the connection of sex to sexuality and eroticism, and of how the experience 
of pleasure is then related to rape, has dominated discussion between feminists and others in 
the context of 'peacetime' sexual violence. For some, rape is best explained by an 
'adaptationist'  view (rape is the legacy of an evolutionary reproductive strategy).39  Although 
this broad explanation is opposed to the overwhelming majority of feminist accounts, the 
detail of rapist characteristics concurs in significant ways with the narrative scripts of 
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criminologist Lombroso cites the 1873 case of Vincent Verzeni, guilty of mutilation and murder, who explained: 
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39! Lalumière et al. 2005:29–30.
unreason.40  Specifically, rapists are considered in this literature to be impulsive, callous, 
irresponsible,  manipulative, violence, promiscuous,  lacking in remorse and to display 
'shallow affect' (meaning a difficulty in relating emotionally to others rather than a lack of 
emotion). These 'anti-social' traits are taken to be strongly correlated with both hyper-
masculinity and 'Machiavellian' attitudes to social interaction.41  It is hard to avoid the 
overlap with the figure of  the psychopath that we have already encountered.
Other psychological research has clarified the association of eroticism with rape and thus 
undermined a simple appeal to reproductive desire as a driver of rape. In many ways 
supporting feminist arguments about patriarchal power,  this work has specified that “[r]ape 
is a pseudosexual act, complex and multidetermined, but addressing issues of hostility 
(anger)  and control (power)  more than passion (sexuality)”.42  Intended to counteract myths 
of rape as the result of sexual need, such studies have stressed both that rapists are often 
married and sexually active and that the act of rape is often a failure in narrowly sexual 
terms.43  Studies of convicted rapists  shows on the basis of self-reporting that around a third 
of offenders experienced sexual dysfunction (failure to achieve erection, premature or 
delayed ejaculation) during the rapes themselves and that this was secondary impotence 
(meaning that they could and had successfully achieved erections in other situations).44 
Extensive histories of abuse in the personal histories of convicted rapists also suggest a link 
to psychological trauma rather than lust interpreted as an uncomplicated sexual desire.45
A drastic gap thus appears between a view of rape as sexual and a view of it as some other 
dimension of power masquerading  as  sex. Put otherwise, rape has the character of the sexual 
but is not sex. Or, as Cahill puts it, we can say that the rapist has sex with his victim, but not 
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45! Groth 1979:99–100.
vice-versa.46  But despite claims regarding the non-sexual nature of rape in some 
psychological studies, the relationship between sex and rape is rather complicated. In 
Groth's typology, sexuality is implicated in different ways in the three basic patterns: 1)  anger 
rape,  in which sexuality is a hostile act; 2) power rape, where sexuality is an expression of 
conquest; and 3) sadistic rape, where anger and power are eroticised together.47
Anger rapes are characterised by extreme physical brutality, involving much more force than 
is required merely to over-power the victim, with additional humiliation and brutalisation 
often added to the act (urinating on the victim, for example). Perpetrators of this kind often 
do not report sexual arousal but rather achieve their satisfaction through the discharge of 
anger. Finally,  assaults are often identifiably responses to particular triggers or precipitating 
stress in the lives of  perpetrators.48
In the case of power rape, physical violence is less prominent, and the goal is sexual 
possession as a way for compensating for underlying feelings of inadequacy. As with the 
anger rapist, perpetrators are often dissatisfied with the experience,  finding that it does not 
live up to their fantasies, and so go in search of further victims – their activity often takes on 
a repetitive and escalating pattern. Power rapists experience many forms of sexuality as 
threatening, but it is important for them to believe that the victim is experiencing pleasure 
and finds the rapist suitably virile. Rapists of this sort have been known to offer dinner and 
drinks following an assault and to engage in inquisitive sexual questioning before rape.49
Sadistic rape involves extreme physical violence and eroticised elements, brought together in 
a particular, often ritualised,  symbolic form that gives the perpetrators a feeling of 
omnipotence. The body of the victim is often a special site for violence (victims may not 
survive the attack)  and seems to stand in for a wider agenda or group of others to be 
destroyed, such as prostitutes or allegedly promiscuous women. Since arousal for sadistic 
rapists is a function of aggression, attacks often escalate in their levels of brutality, and are 
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always fully premeditated.50
These studies give a mixed picture of the role of sex and eroticism in 'peacetime' rape. Their 
distribution indicates that power rapes are most common (55%), then anger rapes (40%), 
with sadistic rapes relatively rare (5%).51 The character of the anger and sadistic rapes bears 
striking resemblance to reports of brutality associated with wartime sexual violence, 
especially in terms of 'extra insults', mutilation and further degrading treatment. The 
features for all kinds of rape resonate strongly with the figures of the power-seeker (and to a 
lesser extent sexual predator) more than with disorientated victims or brothers-in-arms 
(types which seem more clearly linked to contexts of war). In all cases, rape appears neither 
as a tool chosen towards some material end nor as an act of explicit cultural identity, but as 
the product of intense feelings of frustration, anger and revenge. That attempted 
penetration – the distorted stand-in for sex – is the mode for these feelings seems significant, 
although the ways in which eroticisation take place remains obscured (more on which 
below). 
In a more psychoanalytical register, themes of unreason parallel investigations into the 
anatomy of human destructiveness.52  As is often acknowledged by feminist interpreters of 
this tradition, Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents had already begun to bring together a 
theory of psyche and of society.53  In his work on group psychology, identification came to 
play a central role in explaining the apparent combination of egalitarianism and obedience 
to a father-like figure in the church and the army, from which we can speculate on how the 
state maintains authority through the psychic capacity of human beings to internalise 
coercion and compulsion.54  When the notion of the 'death drive' was introduced to 
psychoanalysis in the 1920s, it was specifically in response to Freud's observation that 
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spectrum of rape behaviour. For example, Groth reports that victims of anger rapes are more likely to be 
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Similarly, it is plausible that the extreme character of sadistic rapes more often leads to convictions, suggesting 
that they may be over-represented even in a sample of convicted rapists.
52! The term is from Fromm 1997.
53! Freud 2002; Chodorow 2002:236.
54! Freud 2004; Balibar 2007.
soldiers kept returning psychically to scenes of trauma.55 This identification with groups and 
leaders and the compulsion to a kind of sadism could be seen as the formative foundations 
for the force of unreason. Moreover, the early development of children as seen by 
psychoanalysis suggests a deep link beyond the formation of material interests or 
socialisation within a community,  as the beating fantasies of children mark an unsettling 
parallel with the brutality of  acts of  rape:
Among these imagos are some that represent the elective vectors of 
aggressive intentions,  which they provide with an efficacity that might be 
called magical. These are the images of castration, mutilation, 
dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the 
body.56
And from this lineage, filtered through feminist critique, emerges something like a theory of 
war itself  as unreason:
We project on to the alien, or other, the destructiveness we fear in the most 
intimate relations or parts of ourself. Instead of trying to repair it at home, 
we send it abroad. War makes the other accountable for a horror we can 
then wipe out with impunity, precisely because we have located it so firmly 
in the other's place. This saves us the effort of ambivalence, the hard work 
of recognizing that we love where we hate, that, in our hearts and minds at 
least, we kill those to whom we are most closely and intimately attached.57
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The Desire To Possess Her Is A Wound58
But in one sense, unreason seems an unlikely category as a distinct feminist way of 
interpreting wartime sexual violence. As we saw in Chapter 1, the looping effects of 
psychological discourses of deviancy have been a consistent target for feminists and 
Foucauldians alike, and there is a corresponding risk of replicating ideas of 'madness' in war 
which obscure the social, political and economic background to acts of rape. All this means 
that working through feminist approaches to affect and sexuality requires some care. But, 
although perhaps the least distinctively feminist of the modes,  the categories that adhere to 
unreason (the body, the psyche, sex, sexuality and sexual difference, pleasure, and so on) 
have taken on a particular resonance with several strands of feminist thought: in the 
rethinking of the relation between sex and violence, in the return to role of psychological 
development in creating (violent) gender identities, in the unsettling example of the abject, 
and in the role of  affective bonding in creating a community of  men.
In justifying the view that rape is not a sexually-motivated crime, Groth mentions that many 
offenders were already in consenting sexual relationships and that in no case was the rape 
their first sexual experience.59  This was taken to show that rape is not motivated by sexual 
desire. But others use the same data (here rendered as the promiscuity of the archetypal 
rapist) to suggest that sex (or 'high mating effort') is a major reason for rape.60 In both cases, 
definitions of 'sex' are being used which reduce it to a regular need normally dissipated by 
conventional relationships or to a reproductive drive. Both sever sexuality substantially from 
an understanding of power, and even emotion, and so conceptually under-specify the ways 
in which acts of violence can be sexual or erotic in some dimension. In particular, the idea of 
rape as an 'expressive vehicle' for feelings of power and anger remains open to Catharine 
MacKinnon's challenge: “if  it's violence not sex why didn't he just hit her?”.61 
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The view that rape is about power rather than sex is a commonplace among feminists. A 
frequent conversational intervention in discussions of lust and sexuality, it marks the 
important break from naturalising justifications of masculine needs and the attractiveness of 
(and therefore blame supposedly appropriate to) victims of sexualised assault. But power and 
sex, and sex and violence, cannot be so easily separable in conceptual terms, let alone in the 
mess of actual case histories. As the discussion of Groth and others show, the border 
between 'sex as violence'  and 'violence as sex' can be a difficult one to maintain. As Ann 
Cahill argues,  this is the binary that has for too long defined feminist discussions of rape. On 
the one hand, a view of rape as a form of violence (associated with Susan Brownmiller) and 
on the other, a view of rape as a form of sex (associated with Catharine MacKinnon). These 
two reductionist positions are set up in an opposition which in the former case obscures 
gender and in the latter pathologises sex itself.62
To consider rape as 'sex-neutral' (as an act of violence which happens more to women but is 
not in itself sexual)  misses that it is in the character of rape to have a sexually-differentiating 
social function, which is to say that rape and the threat of rape is sexing  on both individual 
and collective levels, embodying and sedimenting sexual identities.63  On this account rape 
should be conceived of as an embodied experience: “Rape is an assault on a person's 
embodied sexuality using eroticized weapons,  whether or not they are body parts”.64 
Sexuality is  thus restored to rape without narrating an evolutionary 'battle of the sexes'. The 
body is the site for the inscription of gender, and bodily experiences of desire, pleasure and 
suffering are therefore as 'real' as anything else,  but this reflects not genetic determinism but 
the materiality of the body as the locus of power, so that the process of embodiment over time 
sediments and makes concrete gendered identities.65
In similar terms, what Cameron and Frazer term the 'lust to kill' is a fuzzy category intended 
to capture the ways in which violence and killing is eroticised but without being reducible to 
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mere sexual desire.66  They draw attention to perpetrators' fixation on genitalia and sexual 
objects in 'womenslaughters' that did not involve rape and to the self-reports of sexual 
pleasure and excitement from men involved in these acts. Starting from the problem of why 
there are no female lust-murders of this kind, they argue that many forms of murder and 
assault that do not involve penetration deserve the title of 'sexual murder' because of the 
centrality of an eroticised imaginative space and identity to the acts and their meaning, a 
pattern that recalls the character of sadistic rape explored by Groth. Sexual murder is not 
explainable merely in terms of misogyny but instead follows from a more specific masculine 
identity based on transcendence and the freeing of the self in an existentialist register. This 
gives rise to an understanding of sexuality heavily orientated towards motifs of performance, 
penetration and conquest.67
The Pattern For Every Form Of Domination
Viewed in terms of psychoanalytical dynamics of projection, wartime violence in general 
takes on a strange ambiguity. Against the conscious control implied by instrumentality and 
the enactment of social norms implied by mythology, unreason unbalances the relationship 
between fantasy and reality in the minds of martial protagonists.68  For Jessica Benjamin, it is 
through the 'twisting' of the fundamental psychological dynamics that fantasies can become 
enacted realities of domination.69  As Winnicott put it, fantasies of violence are ways of 
developing a sense of self and other: “Destruction, in other words, is  an effort to 
differentiate”.70  Thus violent behaviour can be read as the failure to limit such boundary-
making exercises to early development or to the realm of the imagination. Since the body 
plays such an important role in the emergence of a discrete self and an acceptance of the 
denial or deferral of immediate physical needs and wants, it takes on a special meaning for 
eroticised violence: “...the violation of the body is a transgression of the boundary between 
life and death, even as it breaks through our discontinuity from the other”.71 Recalling Freud 
and Lacan on the destructive behaviours of children, erotic domination can thus be thought 
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of  as “a basic differentiating tendency that has undergone a transformation”.72 
As with a trope of transcendence in sexual murder, these 'private' dynamics take on a social 
aspect because they become persistently associated with socially-defined roles: “The 
difficulty lies in the fact that the power of the liberator-father is used to defend against the engulfing 
mother”.73  The oedipal model, socially sustained, does not produce mothers as subjects with 
which children can identify as they are expected to with fathers, but instead posits mothers 
as belonging  to fathers, even as they are expected to fulfil the role of nurturer.74  A ‘paranoid-
schizoid’ functioning may then develop in which there is persecutory anxiety and therefore a 
pressure to attack or ‘retaliate’ first.75
This 'psychic splitting' is productive of gender difference itself, turning bonds of love into forms 
of violence in “the pattern for every form of domination”.76  This is the 'hallmark of 
masculine power' and is the mechanism by which internal subjectivity and sexuality is 
repeatedly formed in a way that links male identity to violence and violation, although the 
locus of this identification is social rather than natural in the sense that it is not given by 
genetic heritage but by lessons learned in the contexts of family life. This regressive 
character may account for what Chodorow identifies as “something peculiar” in the 
psychodynamics of extreme violence: rape, killing and torture are direct and physically 
aggressive, not exchanges “inside the head”: 
[P]erhaps more importantly, the consciously articulated cultural ideologies 
that tend to justify such behaviour seem directly, and without much 
symbolic transformation or elaboration, to express exactly what 
psychoanalysts describe as the individual unconscious motivations and 
internal constructions that lead to aggression.77
·  137·
72! Benjamin 1990:68.
73! Benjamin 1990:133, emphasis in original.
74! Benjamin 1990:162–165. See also Balbus 2002.
75! Chodorow 2002:241. This point in particular bears examination in relation to psychoanalytically-inspired views 
of extreme violence and genocide as in Semelin 2007.
76! Benjamin 1990:218.
77! Chodorow 2002:244.
In the case of rape, this leads to a view that perpetrators, at least in the kinds of empirical 
cases focused on by unreason, act in accordance with heavily internalised and emotionally 
invested ideas about good and bad objects, ideas which may have their origins in a 
generalised socio-symbolic order (the world of father figures that is patriarchy), but not in 
the sense of being mandated or explicitly legitimated by institutions and discrete collectives. 
The earliest experience of attachment and bonding is thus played out on the social stage. 
Where the process of recognition breaks down, it develops into a power struggle where the 
child uses aggression in place of a healthier dynamic of reciprocal assertion.78 The threat to 
identity that results from war and conflict produces a violent reaction. As Nancy Chodorow 
explains it:
Paranoid-schizoid gender, based projectively on split off images of 
repudiated women and feminized or boylike men, fuses with paranoid-
schizoid splitting of good self and hated bad object. The enemies are 
constructed as part objects without subjectivity; at the same time, destroying 
their subjectivity helps provide the sadistic pleasure of violence. This rigid, 
projective splitting and expulsion, both of bad objects and bad aspects of 
gender identity at the same time, seem to involve a disintegrative flooding of 
self-object boundaries and drives, so that the projected object and 
threatened aggression not only return in paranoid fantasy but also 
overwhelm the subject and lose their linkage to organized fantasy. When 
social wholes fracture, and identity, via conscious and unconscious concepts 
of peoplehood, nation, or ethnos, is threatened, for men, especially, gender 
identity seems to fracture along similar lines. This reinforces the threat to 
selfhood and leads to reactive, hate-filled violence.79
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Abjection Is Above All Ambiguity
It is a commonplace that enemies in war are dehumanised. In the case of extreme violence, 
however, there is both a way in which enemies are thought to feel and suffer, “so that there is 
an identificatory joy in torture or rape”, and a sense in which they are thought to have no 
feelings at all,  but are just objects to be expelled or destroyed.80  This ambiguity unites the 
expressions of unreason thus far surveyed and foregrounds the doubled character of 
pleasure and disgust at work in this way of  understanding social behaviour. 
The abject is precisely that which cannot be encountered in the “detached and 
autonomous” register symptomatic of instrumentality.81 As with the corporeality designated 
as so essential to the understanding of rape as embodied practice in Cahill's analysis, in the 
psychoanalytical interpretation of mutilation, and in the data of homosociality, abjection is 
closely related to corporeality. Fluids and flows mark the “fragile container” of skin 
separating inside and outside.82  It is  corporeal waste in particular which represents “the 
objective frailty of symbolic order” and so becomes a focus of abjection.83  Excrement and 
menstrual blood have an especially polluting connotation, which may account for the focus 
of sexualised brutality on the vagina and anus.84 The feminine itself as thus unsurprisingly a 
site of abjection, not in terms of 'essence' but as “an 'other' without a name, which 
subjective experience confronts when it does not stop at the appearance of  its identity”.85
Crucially, the thing being expelled in abjection, the thing found horrific,  is psychoanalytic in 
the sense that it is not external, but a rejection and expulsion of something within us.86  In 
other words, we are faced once again with a split and fractured internal state for perpetrators 
which drives their behaviour. On this account, rapists do not act clearly against a well 
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defined enemy, since “[a]bjection is above all ambiguity”.87  Pleasure is taken in expelling 
these disgusting elements (these bad objects),  a process especially applicable to rape in times 
of war because of the transgression of barriers.88  The acts of eradication embodied in 
violation and sexual murder take on the character of jouissance: “a time of oblivion and 
thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts forth”, sacred in their 
intensity, but not limited within the confines of formal doctrine or institutional purpose.89 
On the contrary, the breaking of  prohibitions is essential to the pleasure of  abjection.90
This is a view of excess, of something troubling and somehow heterogeneous, which for 
George Bataille meant the spectre of fascism as a distinctly anti-instrumentalist force. In 
Bataille's terms,  the realm of economics and calculation is that of homogeneity, while the 
unconscious and attendant categories such as the sacred and the taboo, are part of the 
heterogeneous character of life that cannot be captured by science. Heterogeneous objects 
thus provoke reactions of disgust and attraction, elements are charged and are characterised 
by violence, excess, delirium and madness.91  This poses abjection as completely opposed to 
the rationales of  instrumentality:
The vision of the ab-ject is, by definition, the sign of an impossible ob-ject, 
a boundary and a limit. A fantasy, if you wish, but one that brings to the 
well-known Freudian primal fantasies, his Urfantasien, a drive overload of 
hatred or death, which prevents images from crystalizing as images of 
desire and/or nightmares and causes them to break out into sensation 
(suffering) and denial (horror), into a blasting of sight and sound (fire, 
uproar). Apocalyptic vision could thus be the shattering or the impossibility 
not only of narrative but also of Urfantasien under the pressure of a drive 
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unleashed by a doubtless very 'primal' narcissistic wound”.92
Homosociality And Fratriarchy 
The devaluation of women in the development of masculine sexual identity is accompanied 
by a potent, if also ambiguous and threatening, space for other men: the arena of 
homosociality. Take Catharine MacKinnon's well-known argument that the saturation of 
Yugoslavia with pornography before the outbreak of war meant that “a whole population of 
men [was] primed to dehumanize women and to enjoy inflicting assault sexually”.93 This is a 
script of almost automated mimesis, in which watching pornography produces rapists 
through a psychic infection, passed on celluloid and video tape.94 MacKinnon is particularly 
interested in the way that pornography changes desire itself, a process that appears to take place 
outside of the conscious realm of men. Relying on psychological studies, MacKinnon argues 
that men exposed to violent pornography come to enjoy it,  even if they initially found it 
distasteful. Hence, “[m]ale sexuality is apparently activated by violence against women and 
expresses itself in violence against women to a significant extent”.95 Although other works by 
MacKinnon cast sexuality in less apparently natural terms, the idea here of an unbidden 
process of eroticisation which marks male sexual identity in particular resonates strongly 
with the view from unreason that there is something very deeply personal about the act of 
rape for perpetrators. In the case of Bosnian rapes, the mimetic urge to reproduce the acts 
and film them – so that they  can be consumed by other men – reminds us that these private desires 
rely also on a public theatre, and on the doubled placement of the imagined self as both 
actor and watcher, subjecting acts to a masculine gaze.
Recent work on 'hazing'  and rituals of group membership suggests a similar analysis. As part 
of the process of inducting new members, soldiers frequently undertake activities with 
heavily sexual, and often homoerotic, content, such as drinking alcohol that has run down 
the buttocks of other soldiers, dancing together naked around a fire,  and displaying genitalia 
in acts of vulnerability and celebration. Importantly, such acts are far from forced, and are 
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conducted with all the evidence of pleasure and release by the participants.96  Rather, such 
acts and the border-making they represent seem to steer a careful symbolic line between the 
homoerotic and the homosexual and so form some bond of trust and unity of men together 
in a fratriarchy – a band of warrior brothers. Through these acts hierarchies are established, 
but they also seem to provide a sense of freedom and becoming which recalls the 
existentialist tone of views on sexual murder as transcendence and reports of group 
participation and pleasure in public acts of  rape.
For Klaus Theweleit, the bonding of men together in hostility towards women was the 
central problem in understanding the ways in which proto-Fascist Freikorps soldiers 
expressed themselves in fictions and in reality in inter-war Germany. Drawing on a range of 
novels and memoirs, Theweleit's puzzle was that although the men exhibited all the signs of 
misogyny familiar from our discussion, and although they engaged extensively in fantasising 
about and acting out the murders of women, they do not seem to have chosen rape as a 
vector for this gendered aggression. Despite clear arousal from certain images of women 
and of their destruction, including explicit discussion of great emotional satisfaction and 
also regularly focused on eroticised parts of the female body (the mouth, the buttocks and 
the genitals), the desire mutated into one to kill.97 
The distinctive character of this homosociality lies in the relation and combination of an 
association of hated women with a particular class threat and in a deep fear of boundary 
transgression. The love of the men in these scenarios are not directed at women as symbolic 
stand-ins but at uniforms, other men in hierarchical role placements (as fellows,  leaders or 
subordinates), weapons, animals, killing,  particular places (usually local) and the idea of the 
fatherland while female sexuality was associated with vulgar, unfeeling women and then with 
the barbarous mass of the proletariat, and hence communism.98  The women attacked, and 
the politics they represented, embodied a destruction of older orders and a blurring of 
barriers of identity. They invoked floods – of the lower classes, of autonomous sexuality, and 
of  bodily fluids. 
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In all three cases, gendered violence is associated closely with the boundary-making needed 
to bring men together and to separate them clearly from women and from the feminine. In 
all cases, this reflects not a conscious desire to achieve certain ends, and does not require 
merely that the men conform to established identities, but reveals a process of becoming and 
expression, asserting affective selves against threatening sexual others.
And Every Smile That Marks A Lie, Passed In Code As Real Desire99
As Jacqueline Rose observes, sociological accounts of gender have tended to hold that 
norms are internalised successfully,  whereas for the psychoanalytical tradition it is always a 
question of the failure of identity.100  This is the crux of the distinction between accounts 
founded on mythology and their counterparts in unreason, but also highlights the potential 
overlap between these two modes of understanding wartime sexual violence. Attachment 
and object-relations traditions in psychoanalysis have largely superseded a narrowly internal 
and family-based model of early psychology with a more social frame emphasising the active 
engagement of children in a world of adults.101 Its critical variants reach more ambitiously 
for the directly political aspects of 'private space' and the consequences for social theorising 
about violence and oppression.102
So unreason and mythology blur in the psycho-social space where culture (broadly 
understood) fills in the objects of identification, and psyche contributes the attachment to 
those objects, and desire with which the social works.103  Disorientated victims struggle to 
make sense, as do the liminal subjects of mythology. And the brothers-in-arms, united in 
their moment of conjoined brutalism coalesce as gendered members. Ann Cahill stresses 
both the intersubjective character of embodiment and the collective social effects of fear of 
rape.104  For Benjamin, the intra-psychic and the inter-subjective are two complementary 
ways of understanding our psyches, unified by the common element of recognition as a 
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reflexive and essentially human response to interactions with others.105  Homosociality both 
requires and troubles group norms and rules. And for Kristeva, abjection can even be seen 
as 'productive of culture',  just as the sacred is a 'two-sided formation',  one side “defensive 
and socializing” in border creation, the other full of “fear and indifferentiation” in border 
undoing.106  More strongly,  abjection requires a social setting.107 However, abjection does not 
enforce or follow rules,  but takes that symbolic order of law and rules (the domain of 
mythology) and “turns them aside, misleads, corrupts;  uses them, takes advantage of them, 
the better to deny them”, which is why for Kristeva the abject is closely related to perversion, 
which returns us again to overtures of  sexuality.108
It is not that instrumentality and mythology ignore emotional investments altogether, 
anymore than unreason denies the possibility of goal-directed behaviour. Rather it is a 
question of the space given to the domain of affect. An instrumental reading will allow that 
the fruits of brutality are enjoyed, that they give attackers pleasure or, more prosaically, some 
comfort or satisfaction. But this emotion will not penetrate into the realm of immediate 
causes,  or of the constitutive form of rape as an act. At best, affect emerges as a kind of 
vague background or baseline, allowing for a modicum of group cohesion so that the real 
business of collaborative extraction through violence can proceed. Reflecting a familiar 
debate around the respective contributions of agency and structure,  sadism can be shown as 
an expression of the latter in a typically Foucauldian epochal identification of mythological 
discourse109:
Sadism is not a name finally given to a practice as old as Eros; it is a massive 
cultural fact which appeared precisely at the end of the eighteenth century, 
and which constitutes one of the greatest conversions of Western 
imagination: unreason transformed into delirium of the heart, madness of 
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desire, the insane dialogue of love and death in the limitless presumption of 
appetite.110 
To define rape-conducive attitudes as anti-social is not to say that they are a-social. 
Existentialist accounts are thus connected to social conditions as the background against 
which acts are taken to be rebellions.111  For unreason, the pressures of drives and their ilk 
may be social in origin or formation, but they are nevertheless experienced as individual and 
follow a distribution which suggests marked individual difference, a kind of statistical 
deviance. Rape may be an act that enforces a group right, but it has specialist implementers 
and there is no reason to assume that rape behaviour is a defining feature of all men. Even 
the most terrifying psychological statistics still suggest that most men don't rape. This 
disjunction between the variation in individual propensities and a visible social character to 
the processes repeats the problem of the patriarchal dividend already encountered: who is it 
who acts for the collective?
Speaking of the psychoanalysis of murderers, Jacqueline Rose touches on the fundamentally 
unsettling effect: “the more you identify the aberrational and extravagant in the most 
fundamental workings of the mind, the harder it becomes to use those categories to secure a 
social classification – to secure the social itself ”.112 Put otherwise,  the identification of male 
fantasies linked to sexuality and expressed in times of trauma through rape and sexual 
violence threatens to extinguish the idea of a 'normal' condition in which men don't rape or 
in which rape is sufficiently constrained for the label of 'peace' to seem to apply. This is a 
precarious line, since the political commitments of feminism require an attention to just 
these dimensions, the socio-cultural props for gendered violence, but must still be capable of 
differentiating enablers from perpetrators, and for accounting for variations of form and 
content.
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The Propositions Of  Unreason
Following these parallels and resonances, we are closer to specifying the content of a logic of 
unreason in relation to wartime sexual violence. Unreason is not reducible to the essentialist 
or the sexual, but instead explores the fields of desire and affect that undergird the social. 
They direct us to attachment, identification and enjoyment, and show how pleasure sits 
paradoxically alongside horror in war. War itself viewed not as a space like that of politics or 
economics, but as a space of undoing, trauma and transgression. Given the repeated 
centrality of ambiguity to the motifs of unreason, there are likely to be contradictory 
elements in the different propositions and in particular a more subjective and interpretive 
dimension to parsing data than may be the case for the more measurable dimensions of 
instrumentality. 
Proposition 1
If accounts that privilege deviance, psychopathy or the social marginality of rape 
perpetrators are correct,  we should expect to find that identified rapists conform to similar 
psychological 'profiles' and/or express themselves in ways which parallel accounts of rape 
given by 'peacetime' perpetrators. In particular, this would suggest that detailed accounts of 
rape by both victims and perpetrators will report high levels of sexual dysfunction in the 
form of 'failure' to satisfactorily complete sexual acts, and a pattern of behaviours and 
attitudes familiar from the 'peacetime' psychological literature. Following the patterns 
suggested by the analysis of anger, power and sadistic rapes, consistently high levels of 
additional brutality and/or expressions of sexual conquest would seem to support a thesis 
from unreason.
Proposition 2
The character of rape as an act of psychological pleasure/disgust suggests that it is not the 
direct product of an institutional setting. We would therefore expect that rape is not confined 
to military operatives, but is found to be carried out by a range of actors, including civilians, 
in a range of scenarios. If we find that rape is distributed in this way, and is not as focused in 
the theatre of war as other accounts might suggest, this will tend to support an argument 
from unreason.
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Proposition 3
If rape is one part of an expressive landscape that brings together men in groups, we would 
expect to find evidence of homosociality and bonding in relation to acts of sexual violence. 
This may take the form of a distinct proportion of group rapes or of a group association in 
relation to rapes, such as the production of rape pornography for the consumption of other 
men. However, care will have to be taken to address the persistence of these groupings after 
the acts, since the coming together of men to participate in rape without longer-term 
bonding may indicate an instrumentalist dimension (making it easier to achieve other ends), 
a looser and more chaotic sense of unreason (as in the characteristics of the anger rapist),  or 
the micro-level coherence of  socio-cultural structures (as in mythology).
Proposition 4
Given the particular weight of abjection for unreason, reports of contradictory expressions 
of pleasure and disgust associated with rape are likely to indicate the play of unreason. In 
particular,  perpetrators may exhibit both great pleasure and great shame in their actions. If 
reports from victims suggest a quasi-ritualised character of rapes or a particular obsession 
on the part of perpetrators with bodily parts made meaningful in abjective terms (the places 
of flows and barriers between inside and outside), this will also tend to support the analytical 
wagers and narrative scripts of  unreason.
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Chapter Six
MYTHOLOGY AND THE HABITUAL 
SOLDER-RITUALIST
The ritual reminds the brothers of their sexual dominance of women and 
at the same time it gives each a heterosexual stamp. The sexual activities 
have the flavour of a bathhouse orgy, with the difference that multiple 
sexual activity is directed towards a single female victim rather than turned 
within the group. However, by sharing the same sexual object, the brothers 
are having sex with each other as well.
Peggy Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape 1
It was a society onto itself, demanding total commitment to its doctrine and 
values,  rather like one of those quasi-religious military orders of ancient 
times, the Teutonic Knights or the Theban Band.
 Officer candidate's observation on the culture 
of  the training camp (US army, c. 1960)2 
Foča
Like My Lai, but unlike Kissi, Foča is infamous. Since before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia opened a case directly focusing on war rape it has been 
a byword for the atrocities committed against civilians in the Bosnian War. Serb forces 
established rape camps – in hotels, schools, old town halls – where they imprisoned victims 
for long periods.3 Although the exact camps were quickly moved upon discovery and were 
largely secluded from the Red Cross at the time, the systematic use of rape was known of by 
local authorities and allowed to flourish.4  As in the Sierra Leone example, victims at Foča 
were kept together, within the control of their captors, and often forced to perform domestic 
chores.5
But at Foča,  people were targeted as Muslims in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Once the 
·  148·
1! Sanday 2007:124–125.
2! Cited in Cameron 1994:52.
3! Stiglmayer 1994.
4! Stiglmayer 1994:85–86.
5! See, for example, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 2001:paras 
63, 68.
Serb forces gained control of the area and had congregated the Muslim population, the men 
and boys were separated from women, girls and the elderly. The boys and men were killed; 
the women, girls and elderly sent to rape camps (Figure 12).6  Military action and focused 
assaults  on their homes and bodies had reduced the Muslim in Foča population from its 
1991 population of over 20,000 to only about 10 people at the close of the war.7  Women 
and girls kept in a hall would be selected, often daily, for gang rape by soldiers and civilians, 
some of whom had previously been their neighbours. As became grimly clear, pregnancies, 
rather than simply rapes, became the major weapon of  a genocide in progress.8
One victim, who was also force to eat pork and drink alcohol, was also told during her rape 
“You should have already left this town. We'll make you have Serbian babies who will be 
Christians”.9  Another women subjected to gang rape recollected: “They told us we were 
going to give birth to Serbian children and they would do everything they could so we 
wouldn't even dare think of coming back again”.10  Another was shouted at while she was 
forced to clean: “Fuck your Turkish mother... Death to all Turkish sperm”.11  A survivor of 
rape at a camp in Sokolac described the taunts of  her Serb guards:
They told us how much they'd like to see us raise their kids, they sang 
rhymes with words like, “A mother raises a baby, he's half a Muslim, half a 
Serb”...[They said] “Look what your Muslims are doing, they're fighting 
against us and killing our people. We have to get revenge, and we can't let 
any Muslim get away”.12 
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Figure 12: Representing Foča: Panels from Joe Sacco's Safe Area Goražde (2000)13
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What was the character of the Foča camps?  Certainly they constituted part of a systematic 
attempt to wipe out a community, one either ordered or encouraged by senior Serb 
politicians and commanders and some have seen in the patterns of camps a clear correlation 
with military requirements.14  And soldiers surely benefitted in some way from the labour 
they extracted. But gender in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also layered intensely with ideas of 
ethnicity, and women had themselves become ethno-markers, set apart in 'sexual 
geographies of ethnicity'.15  The character of beliefs about rape, impregnation and genetic 
heritage hardly seem within the scope of rational self-interest, but are also too sustained and 
ideology-laden to reflect opportunistic expressions of anger and lust (although anger and lust 
there was). Structured by communal imaginaries, this was the site for sperm as a biological 
weapon.16  These are the motifs of mythology. Following the outline of mythology as a 
feminist mode, attention turns to anthropological insights into rape in all-male groups, to 
symbolic logics of war fighting, to complexities within military initiation rituals, and finally 
to how group identities may be turned to instrumentalist purposes.
Programmed By Culture
In some senses, mythology is a mediating term between instrumentality and unreason, 
curtailing profit maximisation within socio-cultural bounds and providing a symbolic 
framework for drives. But it is also much wider, embracing discourses,  collective belief 
systems and ideologies. It includes not only doctrines and religion,  but the background 
assumptions that are constructed through human communities, even of “rape as an identity-
producing practice”.17  This is the view of sexual violence as shaped by cultural idioms, 
embodied in a habitus of masculinity or the expression of long-standing schemas of the body 
and of  gender.18 Not the logic of  consequences, or of  drive, but of  appropriateness.
Mythology's analytical wagers are those of collective identity and the primacy of human 
communities. Thematically it concentrates on socially meaningful difference and 
subjectivities grounded in the imperatives and limits of a community or a particular 
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institution,  which then become the relevant objects and actors. Narrative scripts here frame 
rapists not as self-interested or as acting out personal desires, but as performers of socio-
cultural ritual. Ethical and political options are thus shaped to suggest solutions in terms of 
changes made to the communities or institutions in question, for example through political 
campaigns contesting collective misogynistic beliefs or transformations in the forms of 
recruitment and training undergone by soldiers. For mythology, rape is a weapon of war 
because it is selected as appropriate behaviour by a social group which sets the self-
understandings of perpetrators. Wartime sexual violence is a continuation of political power 
in a more dispersed and collective sense, designating some as legitimate and others as 
illegitimate depending on their circulation within the rules and norms of the group. Rape is 
an extension and manifestation of  the political unconscious.19
Mythology embodies that feminist concern well articulated by Simone de Beauvoir when 
she argued that the 'othering' of women was not only about economic interest but also 
'ontological and moral pretensions': 
Once the subject seeks to assert himself, the Other,  who limits and denies 
him, is none the less a necessity to him: he attains himself only through the 
reality which he is not, which is something other than himself.20 
For Andrea Dworkin, the word 'mythology' itself was central to any dissection of patriarchy: 
“We are programmed by the culture as surely as rats are programmed to make the arduous 
way through the scientist's maze, and that programming operates at every level of choice 
and action”.21 
The view of wartime sexual violence as a symbolic reflection of masculinist mythology is 
strongest in those accounts that stress the ways in which women are treated as signs 
exchanged among men. Just as there is a persistent patriarchal view of women as 'beautiful 
souls', sexualised aggression can be related not so much to the particular material rewards of 
the act as to the imaginary role of certain women as representatives of a nation to be 
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destroyed or a community to be punished, and of rape as a violation that only counts as a 
violation in some collective sense because of patriarchal norms of family and custom.22 
Ruth Seifert, for one, accepts institutional explanations of sexual violence but also 
introduces culture both as that which rape aims at destroying and as the 'background' to 
rape orgies, a set of ideas which generate their content. On this account, women may be 
raped “because they are the objects of a fundamental hatred that characterizes the cultural 
unconscious and is actualized in times of crisis”, bodies on which a particular intersubjectivity 
acts itself  out in carnivalesque form.23
	
Just as women can function as symbols within a war system, so too can sexual violence serve 
to reproduce systems of patriarchy. As a way of acting that reflects the socially symbolic 
place of women, rape's fundamental function in this trend of explanation is perpetuate a 
system of collective being beyond the bounds of mere interest or desire. The mythological 
mode is, then, distinguished from a material benefits explanation by the role of ideology, 
which suggests that individuals and communities are targeted not for their resources but 
because of their identities, even if such attacks can result in political or material advantage for 
perpetrators. A similarly strong way of thinking about wartime sexual violence in 
mythological terms links it explicitly to culture,  where brutalisation mirrors culturally specific 
tropes, such as impalement and crucifixion in Bosnia or the systematic cutting of tendons 
and violation of  bodily 'flows' in Rwanda.24
Mythology need not condemn whole cultures in a way that buttresses retrograde ideas of 
patriarchal others or inherently misogynistic civilisational constellations. It may just as well 
refer to specific institutional contexts and the particular practices hegemonic there.25  For 
example,  in the mid-1990s Madeline Morris examined what she termed the ‘rape 
differential’ (the gap between civilian and military crime rates) between the actions of 
American soldiers in times of peace and in times of war. While she found that rates of 
military violent crimes were lower than civilian ones in peacetime, the propensity of soldiers 
to rape in wartime leapt to 260% of the civilian rate (the comparative rate of other crimes 
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remained lower than that of civilians).26  Morris  rejected the idea that all-male groups were 
automatically implicated in higher rape rates and further argued that higher rape rates in 
wartime conferred no strategic benefit in military terms, preferring instead to see the higher 
levels of rape as a consequence of the particular masculinist practices characteristic of the 
US military.27  In other words, she decoded military rape as the product not of 
instrumentality or unreason, but of mythology. The institutional culture, not resource 
pressures or suppressed lust, inculcated a set of beliefs  that led to heightened levels of 
wartime sexual violence.28
The Subject
In the mode of mythology, rape is again a weapon and a tool, but not one that belongs to 
individuals or which is used for accumulation or to release sexual frustration. Instead, it is a 
tool for a particular community. It obeys the internal requirements and limits set by a 
particular socio-symbolic order. Resources matter in sustaining and reproducing a group, 
but that does not mean that all acts in war are orientated towards that end or even that 
violence should be understood as an accumulatory strategy in any setting. Indeed, following 
the norms of a group may be counter-productive in terms of material well-being, and may 
involve restrictions on pleasure as well as the licence to carry out particular socially-sanctioned 
acts. Rape is a tool of power again, but now in a more variable sense, requiring attention to 
the legitimacy of  certain actors in context and to shared ideas of  appropriateness and taboo.
In identifying context-specific systems of belief and practice, mythology moves to a set of 
analytical wagers based on the community (whether political, social or institutional)  and the 
particular acts it legitimates. Consequently,  explanation does not rely either on the external 
situation or the personal traumas of rapists but on the collective and its rules. Mythology's 
narrative scripts thus focus on symbolic authority, whether in terms of a kind of demand 
made on actors to enact certain tropes or because it identifies an external community to be 
destroyed via the example if its feminine embodiments. It thus suggests not a soldier-
strategist or a soldier-sadist, but a soldier-ritualist. As before, this figure comes in a number 
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of  stereotypical variants.
Closest to the geopolitical commander and class warrior of instrumentality we find the sexual 
exterminationist. The kind of ideologue who might otherwise write racist tracts, in times of 
war he is able to implement an internally-coherent, if wholly horrific, plan for cleansing. In 
this scenario – as in the case of Foča – the enemy is attributed a definitive lineage, and the 
gender order poses men and women within that vision in a vivid contrast, one usually 
projecting the patriarchal-heterosexist family onto the screen of the nation/state. Thus 
women become the mothers of a whole race, and the men the fathers and battle-aged sons. 
To dominate the father, violate the mother. This does not mean that only women are victims 
of the exterminationist. Men, too, suffer gender-specific death, and sexual mutilation too.29 
But the imaginative place of the womb tends to be potent in such ideologies, and so is the 
prime target for symbolic and real desecration.
Like the exterminationist, the communal enforcer sees himself as representative of a people. But 
where the exterminationist has a crafted, and quite explicit, cosmology for his violence, the 
enforcer is  a rule-follower. If the instrumentalist works according to his own conscious needs, 
and the sadist of unreason according to urges to transgress, the enforcer of mythology is a 
rule-follower, enacting the habits of a community. He rapes because women and girls have 
been denigrated in the daily norms of community life, and because everybody else is doing 
it. The act is ritualised,  and so likely garlanded with justifications and rationales, but this  is 
less a question of  true belief  as going through the learned steps of  appropriate manhood.
For the gendered member (the pun is intended) the pressures are less intense. He is 
institutionalised into a (usually military) group, and his initiation schools him in certain 
behaviours. As we will see, these are often rituals that encourage and celebrate the 
denigration of the feminine, and which teach men to dominate, but which do so for ends 
other than ethnic cleansing or gender war. Ends like 'combat efficiency' or 'group cohesion' 
or 'esprit de corps'. He corresponds to the soldiers in Morris' account of the rape 
differential: not so much instructed in hatred of enemy women as learning the game of 
manhood and war, and so acquiring the aggressive dispositions that go along with it. 
·  156·
29! As is well stressed for the case of Bosnia in Carpenter 2003b.
For the last stereotype, that of the liminal subject, the success of inculcation – whether into a 
military, a culture, or a genocidal identity – is  very much at stake. Precariously related to the 
brother-in-arms, he experiences the group both in terms of its meaningfulness and its 
threatened collapse: collapse in the face of war or his own trauma. He rapes, unsure about 
what the group requires of him. The group, indeed, may be the source of the trauma itself. 
For all aspects of the soldier-ritualist,  where instrumentality poses the victims of rape as 
mere objects, and unreason sees them as a horrifying abject, mythology recognises in them a 
subject: the bearer of another code or symbol of another order to be encountered and 
dominated.
The Silencing Of  The Feminine
Developed along feminist lines to counter assumptions of historically constant and 'natural' 
propensities to sexual violence,  early attempts to synthesis ethnographic evidence found that 
rape in up to 59% of societies for which information was available could be classified as 
either absent or rare.30  Within these examples, the character of rape varied too, with some 
societies legitimising it in certain ceremonial periods, or allowing it as a distinct practice of 
war in others.31  Additional anthropological studies suggest that rape is not a invariant 
feature of violent encounters between polities: both male and female North American 
colonists commented with surprise that captured women were not raped by the native 
'Indian' tribes.32  'Rape-free'  societies appear to be separated from 'rape-prone' ones by the 
degree of sexual equality and beliefs regarding the complementarity of the sexes.33 The 'all-
male group', when given a mythologised status, thus emerges as “invariably” associated with 
the degradation of  women.34 
And in some cases, the notion of  rape seems to make no sense at all:
Among the Guajiro of South America, rape is considered a heinous crime. 
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It took years before some of my informants admitted to me that rape 
occurred. Discussion about violence against and abuse of women indicated 
that our definitions – theirs and mine – differed. One woman told me that 
she had been raped during her puberty ritual while being inside the 
seclusion hut. It is,  however, unthinkable by Guajiro standards that a rape 
could occur under such circumstances. As I kept asking her to explain this 
to me the woman described how a young man had been looking at her 
through the walls of her hut. Clearly, this was a grave breach of privacy. But 
it would not be called rape in many places.35 
Such measures of rape presence and absence are open to contestation, and questions persist 
as to the reliability of testimony, problems of conceptual translation, and the validity of 
inter-societal comparisons of  gendered violence. 
But anthropological perspectives on rape have also been applied to distinctly 'modern' 
settings. Peggy Reeves Sanday's landmark Fraternity  Gang  Rape in particular offers a close 
reading of local mythologies and their role in sexual violence. Following a 1983 case of 
fraternity rape at the University of Pennsylvania, where she was a faculty member, Sanday 
began an investigation of the male culture of the American frathouse. Although careful in 
specifying that not all were rape prone, Sanday characterises all-male fraternities in 
particulars as specific rule-bound spaces separate from wider campus standards, and indeed 
often inverting them.36  In this setting, women are treated primarily as symbols amongst the 
men, used to show their virility,  their power, or their ability to withstand attachment and 
feeling. As a female student who had dated a fraternity brother explained to Sanday, one 
common house ritual involved assembling in a circle and dancing to music before repeatedly 
miming sexual acts – often meaning homosexual intercourse – in front of  the others.37 
For Sanday, the juxtaposition in the fraternity community between homoeroticism and 
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homophobia reveals the 'logic' of  gang rape:
[T]he answer seems to lie in homophobia. One can suggest that in the act 
of 'pulling train' the polymorphous sexuality of homophobic men is given a 
strictly heterosexual form...In group sex,  homoerotic desire is 
simultaneously indulged, degraded,  and extruded from the group. The fact 
that the woman involved is often unconscious highlights her status as a 
surrogate victim in a drama where the main agents are males interacting 
with one another... The expulsion and degradation of the victim both 
brings a momentary end to urges that would divide the men and presents a 
social statement of  phallic heterosexual dominance.38 
Mythologised male communities act to bind men together (in homosociality or fratriarchy) 
but only through a displacement and denial that affirms brotherhood at the expense of 
women. As one of  the brothers themselves explained:
I also think that [oral sex] is important in frat culture because it is a fantasy 
which can be easily applied to men and women. In other words, there is 
more homoerotic potential in sharing a fantasy about a woman performing 
a blowjob than about having heterosexual intercourse, because the blowjob 
given by a woman can stand for a blowjob given by a brother, whereas 
intercourse is  more specifically heterosexual... [Humorous] references to 
blowjobs express and manipulate a variety of themes, including sexual 
dominance, violence, and degradation, as well as a certain amount of real 
affection and attraction (at least between the males) while also sharing the 
enjoyment of the shared humor and irony of the references within a 
normally heterosexual (in practice) environment.39 
Objectifying discourse was unsurprisingly common in the fraternity.40 The most articulate of 
Sanday's male informants, a fraternity member, explained that 'gang bangs' were the result 
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both of men's insecurities and pressure to impress and of women's sexually subordinate 
status: “Sex, he continued, is a way for men to dominate women. A gang bang is an 
assertion of dominance because the woman is objectified and dominated socially in a gang 
bang”.41 Women here are the symbolic offerings in a communal, homosocial ritual,  even in 
the defensive account provided by those involved. Frat brothers offered their own moral 
coding of acts, in which 'rape' was given a negative valence but restricted only to brute force, 
whilst everything else, including drugging, pressure and the clear threat of force in group 
situations, was labelled 'seduction'.42  Although commonly from wealthy backgrounds, and 
attending a prestigious university in a time of peace, fraternity brothers commonly described 
sexuality in terms of a 'war' between 'armed camps' in which the objective was to take as 
much as possible from the enemy.43 
Brothers are initiated into this code, into the mythology of the fraternity, via acts of 
considerable violence and degradation. Abuse in the process of 'pledging'  creates them 
anew, shedding old identities in favour of a properly masculine role within the new 'family' 
of the fraternity. Reading initiations anthropologically, Sanday draws attention to the 
manipulation of conscious states and identities through symbolism to enable a restructuring 
of self.44  The transition of boys to men in the fraternity can thus be read as homologous 
with other rituals of manhood and of severing dependency from mothers and others. In the 
rituals, would-be-brothers are forced to engage in dirty and degrading practices which are 
reinforced again and again as 'feminine'  so that they may be cleansed and emerge properly 
'masculine'.45 
Consider two tales of initiation given to Sanday by participants. In the first,  pledges would 
arrive at the fraternity seeking membership. There they would be “hosed with red, sticky 
liquid...made to wear diapers...[and] then physically and verbally abused”.46 Senior brothers 
would call them 'girls', 'pussies', 'pampered' and 'pansies' before forcing them to clean the 
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house. As they cleaned brothers made still more mess:
Next they were told to remove their diapers and expose their genitals. Those 
who tried to cover themselves with their hands were made to do more push-
ups. Their diapers were then replaced, and makeup and perfume were 
applied to the pledges, resulting in more laughter and embarrassment... The 
pledges were given glasses of milk and jars of baby food to drink and 
eat...and then buckets of feces mixed with water were thrown onto them. 
Some proceeded to vomit.47 
Pledges who did not vomit were forced to drink hydrogen peroxide-laced milk. Pledges were 
then forced to clean the vomit and faeces. Bound and gagged, they were taken to a basement 
and subjected to mock castration and execution as tests of their trust in the older brothers. 
Finally, there were told that they had passed the pledge test and were now 'new men' and 
'new brothers' in a 'new life'.48  As in the case of unreason, this account is saturated with 
transgression and affect, but the institutionalised nature of the ritual pulls the participants 
back, granting them a new membership and identity: inclusion in a community for which 
they are now expected to act.
In the second account, pledges were met by brothers who appeared to be covered in blood 
who called them “scum, wimps, fairies, shitheads, worthless, die”.49  Forced to run from 
phone box to phone box in promise of a call, they pledges returned to the house, where they 
had to crawl amongst brothers who kicked and spat on them. Made to strip, their genitals 
were mocked and then basted in a burning balm. Paddle-whipped, they were forced to drink 
a vomit-inducing concoction and then subjected to both mock-castration and mock-faeces 
eating.50 As Sanday summaries: 
The ritual inducts pledges into the brotherhood by first producing and then 
resolving anxiety about masculinity. The ritual produces anxiety by 
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representing the feminine to the pledge as both dirty and as part of his 
subjectivity. The ritual then resolves the anxiety by cleansing the pledge of 
his supposed feminine identification and promising him a lifelong position 
in a purified male social order.51 
The connection between such a masculine identity and rape then seems vividly obvious. 
What Sanday calls the 'mythologies' of the polluting woman and the engulfing mother are 
expelled through ritualised brutality.52  The fraternity takes on the role of the father and 
promises some level of control over anxiety, ambiguity and infantile fantasy.53  Since this 
security and identity depends so strongly on the silencing of the feminine, women easily 
become the outlets for sublimated homoerotic desire and group bonding through violence. 
This much is reinforced by studies suggesting that fraternities where brothers more regularly 
denigrate the feminine and strongly emphasise gender differences are more dangerous for 
women.54 
What thus emerges from a close reading of Fraternity  Gang  Rape is a clear sense of the 
denigration of feminine in all-male environments; the precarious and meaning-laden 
frontier between homophobia and homoeroticism in male bonding;  and the ritualised 
practices of entry and membership distinctive of the fraternity as a form of communal 
belonging. The model of the fraternity is connected to wartime sexual violence in two ways: 
first,  by a suggestion of scaling, in which whole nations or societies act according to similar 
codes; and second, in a militarised register,  where combat units and army training camps 
reproduce the rituals of membership and ideas of appropriate gender found amongst the 
fraternity brothers.
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Political Violence Is Itself  Ritualistic
In the study of war, mythologies have sometimes been introduced as alternatives to strategic 
and economic theories of violence, generally in terms of broad ideas of 'culture', 'race'  or 
'ethnicity'. For example, in opposing rationalist theories, Stuart Kaufman instead suggests 
that symbolic politics best explains ethnic violence, which follows the pattern set by a group's 
'myth-symbol complex', directing emotional responses and opening historical enmities to 
elite manipulation.55  These pre-existing fears,  under the right conditions, drive leaders to 
engage in ethnic cleansing and genocide, even when this would not make sense on the 
grounds of material or political self-interest.56  This question – of the productivity of 
extreme violence – is crucial, since instrumentalist arguments require that actors are indeed 
seeking the most efficient method, even if clashing incentives ultimately lead to 'sub-optimal' 
outcomes.
In the case of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts, attention has been drawn to the 
role of Poro secret societies and the ways in which rituals of witchcraft were believed by 
combatants to protect them, for example in creating bullet proof vests out of ordinary 
shirts.57  Cult-like societies conducting initiation rituals stress the passage from boyhood to 
manhood through pain and place a premium on metaphorical and actual sacrifice,  as in the 
eating of organs and of flesh.58  Far from only affecting the least educated combatants, there 
is strong evidence that rituals of cannibalism and blood drinking were practiced by the 
highest commanders.59  This is not enough to say that violence is caused by rituals,  and both 
conflicts involved extraction, looting and trade on a large scale,  but it does reveal important 
dynamics in the performance and character of violence. Hence overlaps with the bonding 
dynamics of unreason's brothers-in-arms, experiencing solidarity as “the group believes 
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because it acts together”.60  So the undeniably materialist character of war economies (they 
are networks for the circulation of goods, after all) need not require an instrumentalist 
characterisation: 
They fashion economic possibilities, they broker political power, and, 
importantly, they constitute cultures, for these networks of power and 
exchange are governed by rules of exchange, codes of conduct, hierarchies of 
deference and power – in short, they are governed by social principles,  not 
merely the law of  the jungle.61
Killing itself may be ritualised in specific ways, but all war can be viewed in the same light, 
as a collective performance and reshaping.62  Anthropological accounts of war thus offer a 
further conception of mythology than simply a contrasting causal mechanism to rational 
choice in a given case. Rather than distinguishing 'ethnic' war as a special type, or 'new wars' 
as a paradigm of especially ideological contestation, they theorise all violence as symbolic 
practice.63  Conventional social scientific wisdom that 'primitive' war was more brutal and 
more culturally-determined is  undone by an examination of the historical record (it is 
'modern' violence that is extreme) and of current practice ('our'  war making is also 
symbolic).64 Taking the view that “political violence is itself ritualistic”, some have sought to 
extend a Durkheimian framework of the sacred/profane distinction to show how acts of war 
are made meaningful.65  Yet understanding violence as 'coded' in a cultural sense does not 
mean seeing it as the mere product of a pre-existing order. Rituals of war are less fixed than 
those of religious ceremony, and the practitioners less anointed by a set relation to the 
sacred.66 In wartime discursive formations, then, the ambiguity of  'culture' is heightened.67
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Since anthropologists may not have integrated the conduct of war (especially the forms of 
extreme violence that concern this thesis) in a sufficiently theoretical way, readings of myth 
at war tend to apply to the wider social level.68 Philip Smith's reading of the Falklands war, 
for example, focuses not on the experience of soldiers themselves, but on how the 
government and its constituencies were able to frame, initiate and consolidate the meaning 
of war. Although this involved active propagandising on their part (and therefore an 
instrumentalist dimension), social meanings are “relatively autonomous” and to some extent 
pre-existing. Seen through this framework, British commitment to a distant war against a 
capable military foe for vanishingly little in the way of material benefit was made possible by 
a series of symbolic associations. Under the category of the sacred were aligned such closely 
linked notions as 'British', 'moral',  'democracy', 'free', 'liberators', 'law-abiding', 'law-
enforcing', 'rational'  and 'strategic',  whilst under the profane were linked 'Argentinian', 
'immoral', 'dictatorship', 'unfree', 'aggressors,  'law-breaking', 'criminals', 'irrational' and 
'emotive'.69  Importantly, this was in the face of events and evidence which reversed and 
undid these links, meaning that they had to be renewed in an ongoing process of cultural 
coding. In this  way they were able to constitute the war itself and transform into a morality 
tale.70 
In a gendered register, the association of ideas of the nation with those of the symbolic 
female are a common way in which mythologies may lead to extreme and systematic sexual 
violence. Both eugenicist and Malthusian variants of nationalist discourse create a special 
role for women as the biological substratum of their political projects.71  Far from existing as 
a separate kind of violence,  as might be suggested by debates in civil war studies over 'ethnic' 
war, racialised identities depend on constructions of masculinity and femininity,  and thus 
have a direct impact on the forms taken by gendered violence. In the same way that 
Sanday's fraternity informants expressed dichotomous and stark understandings of gender 
difference, so media representations in a time of nationalist crisis oscillate between 
depictions of the Mother and the Whore.72 Yet these discourses are again not set. In the case 
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of post-war Yugoslavia, motherhood had to be variously put to use as victimisation, as 
militancy and as justification for violence.73  The result for representing sexual violence was 
that “the raped female body is always ethnic”.74
These frameworks account for the impact of mythologies at a social level. The discursive 
homology between terms (such as 'mother', 'nation' and 'home')  places really-existing persons 
within a symbolic order that indicates their appropriate fate. As in Sanday's account, the 
community establishes the logic of appropriateness, and symbolic otherings of the feminine 
set the scene for its eradication, casting “bodies as instruments in the nationalist cause”.75 
This is the consequence of belief and identity,  not of rational self-interest. And yet such 
perspectives may also miss the micro-political details of extreme violence. Like the class-
based and strategic versions of instrumentality, they may fail in accounting for the specific 
experiences and ambiguities faced by combatants and perpetrators.
A Peculiar Kind of  Social Structure76
A more detailed look at war as a practice reveals the specificity of violent acts, and shows 
how they spread and combine in concrete situations. Within the frame of mythology, this 
means identifying conditions of restraint (taboo even) and of permission,  and noticing 
where they blur and shift. So, in one example, the particular ritualised combat practice of 
scalping diffused from the native 'other'  into the practices of colonialists themselves.77  This 
was despite the fact that formal cultural codings forebode such acts. The deviancy of acts 
used by the enemy other can thus both confirm belief systems through disavowal,  but also 
become incorporated in practice through emulation. This complexity of war as practice is 
easily missed by assumptions that social beliefs align cleanly with acts in battle. As Simon 
Harrison suggests in relation to British practices of skull collecting in the Victorian age, 
there was no question of trophy-taking being civilised behaviour. Instead, soldiers themselves 
distinguished between wars against other civilised peoples and against savages:
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The difference...between a civilized and a savage combatant is that a savage 
is only able to fight savage wars, while a civilized soldier can choose to wage 
either type of war. To put this differently, the civilized soldier imagined that 
within himself a second, savage,  soldier was encompassed and subsumed. 
This encapsulated savage could be released in appropriate contexts, above 
all when fighting other savages.78 
Against a monolithic image of the loyal cultural combatant there thus emerges a more 
negotiated passage through ritual and codes. Romanticised and horrified constructions of 
cultural others give way to hybridity.79  Hybridised conducts of extreme violence themselves 
mix together mythologies, and can function as crossing points between the 'primitive' and 
the 'modern'. Harrison, for one, argues that skull collecting was not merely an adoption of 
what was understood as 'primitive' warfare, but allowed officers to both engage in a certain 
nostalgia (the display of severed heads had only ended in England a century before) and to 
pose themselves as appropriately modern in collecting scientific specimens (for example by 
tasking military surgeons to collect important heads after battle).80 
As Patrick Porter stresses, the reality of military conduct is one of continual borrowing and 
improvisation regardless of explicit ideology.81 Moreover, as comparative work on Orientalist 
discourses of the 'warlord' in imperial encounters suggests,  constructions are malleable and 
shift emphasis (from the bravery to the cowardice of enemies, from ingenuity to feckless 
parasitism) as the strategic situation requires.82  This raises issues which may threaten the 
mythological perspective. To what extent is mythology a cover, a story that combatants tell 
themselves regardless of the actual determinants of their action, and to what extent is it an 
actual generative force? As cover, mythology retains an importance,  but is the reactive 
deployment of tropes in the face of the disintegration of certainties and value systems 
wrought by war. This is precisely the anarchy of meaning which resonates with conceptions 
of  unreason. 
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On the other hand, mythology as generative force need not imply a simple enforcement of 
monolithic cultural norms. Instead, conceptions of appropriateness may bind and guard 
participants in the face of panic, providing the schemata needed to respond without 
thought. There need be nothing essentialist about such a view, especially if we regard norms 
as malleable and as the object of elite manipulations. Lee Ann Fujii pursues this point with 
reference to the Rwandan genocide. Seeing ethnic myth as more historically malleable and 
ambiguous than Kaufman suggests, she nevertheless identifies an active process by which 
'norm entrepreneurs' spread genocide-supportive attitudes on the back of existing tropes. 
Their attempt to mould history to lethal ends worked because of our dependency on 
simplified schemas in times of crisis.83 Perpetrators responded to cues not as rational actors, 
but as subjects offered “a vision of the world that would drown out all others, a hegemonic 
tale that would reign supreme”, supported by the rehearsal of killing and the collective 
effects of  targeted media.84
So combatants can be the agents of a hybridised war practice and can find themselves as 
enforcers of norms moulded for them. But they can also turn to mythology in response to 
traumas of combat and identity. For Eric Leed, the structure of war experience was that of 
'making strange'.85 Focusing on European participants in the First World War, Leed rejected 
the 'cultural patterning'  model that suggested that troops acted in accord with the already-
existing values of the society for which they fought.86 Instead, war was a space for the creation 
of identities. The rituals and symbol systems of the warrior therefore frequently focus on 
liminality: 
They are merged with sacred figures or animal categories, becoming like 
gods or beasts,  often taking on the raiment and habits of animals – feathers, 
wolf skins, bear skirts,  and so forth. In combat their change of state has 
been conventionally represented as a drastic alteration of temperature, 
intoxication or lust. Upon his return to society, the man who has killed is 
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often considered to be dangerous, polluted or stained until he has 
undergone a ritual cooling and cleansing.87
Even the most banal of militarised rituals – such as taking 'two steps forward' from line – 
perform in ceremonial form the sense of a separation before war.88  Both training and war 
itself normalise the bizarre for the initiate and abstract them from their previous life world 
into a new social setting.89  In contrast to ideas of war-making as defined method that could 
be taught, the 'knowledge' of combat is instead better seen as something written on the body, 
“a part of  the individual's very potency”.90 This spurs Leed to a telling comparison:
The best analogy to the knowledge acquired in war is perhaps to sexual 
knowledge, a knowledge that transforms the character and condition of the 
knower from that of an innocent to that of a bearer and administrator of a 
potent wisdom.91 
Initiation and combat thus tread a line between making strange and making anew: “As long 
as training and propaganda are successful, the soldier operates within a moral and ethical 
structure and his acts can be experienced as confirmations of his identifications, his identity”.92 
Yet World War I was of interest to Leed precisely because it failed in inducting its subjects 
into their social roles: instead, a generation experience disorientation and dislocation in the 
face of a mechanisation and a totality of violence that they had not anticipated.93 Although 
bourgeois volunteers had hoped to encounter authentic community, they instead underwent 
a 'militarized proleterianisation', in which war exposed the gap between them and their 
comrades in battle.94  The labyrinth of the trenches was suffocating, and nationalists were 
able to redefine their experiences as communal national bonding only after the fact.95 
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90!Leed 1979:74.
91! Leed 1979:74.
92! Leed 1979:105, emphasis added.
93! Leed 1979:73.
94! Leed 1979:94.
95! Leed 1979:80, 86.
Mythologies of war have a power both in initiation and in moments of trauma. Yet this is 
not only a question of legitimising and mandating certain kinds of violence, but also of 
restricting,  even forbidding others. Far from meaning a surrender to lust,  communal rules 
thus bind and channelled aggression in a particular way.96 For instrumentality and unreason, 
anything is in principle permitted, either because actors will adapt their actions to the 
economic and military demands of the situation, or because desire and aggression escape 
combatant's control. For mythology, even in the face of opportunity and trauma, the 
schemas offered by codes of culture, nation and military identity constrain and shape what 
can be done and to whom. Whether in success or failure, mythologies articulate combatant 
experiences.97  If we retain the view of sexual violence as having a particular form in war, a 
particular connection to collective violence manifested in and around combat, then we 
would do well to attend to what mythologies articulate about permitted and forbidden 
violations. 
Symbolic Penetrations
Recall Madeline Morris' diagnosis of the 'rape differential' as the product of military 
culture. Since the difference between soldiers' propensities to rape in war and to commit 
other crimes was so large, and since the patterns of rape seemed to serve no explicit military 
purpose,  Morris turned instead to the habits and rules learned by troops, and expressed on 
occasion in the open, for example on t-shirts bearing the legend 'Women Are Property'.98 
Read alongside anthropological investigations of all-male groups and the silencing of the 
feminine, this would appear to account for a significant amount of the observed brutality. 
Men together designate what is masculine as that which destroys the feminine, and the real 
embodiments of that mythologised gender difference pay the price. We may even begin to 
sketch a general theory of war rape: the combination of certain practices of induction and 
training (a variety of mythology) alongside group-bonded eruptions of extreme violence in 
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96! Consider here Philip Smith on the restriction of violence in the Falklands war: “Although Britain was a nuclear 
power and Argentina was not, nuclear threats were not made. Not only would such threats have brought about 
international condemnation – they would also have constituted a semiotic absurdity” (Smith 1991:120, emphasis 
added).
97! Leed 1979:116. Indeed, this is the reason that Leed considered 'mythology' a much more appropriate term than 
'fantasy', which implied some escape from reality, rather than a framework for interpreting it (Ibid., 118).
98! Cited in Morris 1996:717.
the combat zone (the mythology-bordering moments of  unreason).
But this analysis also raises further questions. Most importantly,  in understanding the 
connection between a fraternity and military, is the issue of function and purpose. Is rape 
the side product of these homosocial cultures, or what they are designed to do? Viewed 
mythologically, military existence requires a ritualised induction and the production of a 
new self. The themes of penetration, female degradation and dominance identified in many 
of the accounts surveyed here suggest a collective mentality which incubates rape-prone 
attitudes. Yet the purpose of the rituals (or, rather,  their function)  is to produce warriors, not 
rapists. Rape may not be 'accidental'. After all, it is supported and encouraged by a military 
masculine identity. Yet it can also be viewed as something that militaries do regardless of 
their conscious objectives, as the ugly surplus of inculcated beliefs and habits. In other 
words, where instrumentality would suggest a focused and self-conscious choice of rape as a 
tool, and where unreason reveals a localised act driven by desire and aggression, mythology 
opens to us a bounded, although often ambiguous, set of practices, of which the rape of 
external victims is only one facet.
Moreover, where some mythological themes suggest a relatively straight-forward posing of 
the feminine in negative terms, and a consequent denigration of women resulting in 
violence, Aaron Belkin identifies a more complex relation. In becoming military men, there 
is a need not only to disavow femininity, but also to become intimate with the 'unmasculine' 
and the 'queer'.99  Rather than identifying a direct alignment of the masculine with the 
military, or seeing gender norms as accidental in their intersection with the military, there is 
instead a constitutive tension between the masculine and the unmasculine.100 Basic training 
relies on a traumatic ambiguity, continually casting initiates as masculine and unmasculine, 
so that no soldier could ever be sure that they were sufficiently on the 'right side' of the 
line.101 As one Marine put it: “The opposite of feminine? No. To me, what is masculine? I 
don't know. [pause] And I've worked so hard at being it”.102
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(see Higate 2012).
102 Quoted in Belkin 2012:38.
Alongside more familiar forms of indoctrination such as discipline-as-surveillance and 
discipline-as-punishment, Belkin introduces the idea of discipline-as-collapse.103 Importantly, 
given Sanday's discussion of degradation, boundary crossing and bodily flows,  he also 
uncovers a submerged history of  military initiation:
I discovered that in the latter decades of the twentieth century, male 
American service members penetrated each other's bodies 'all of the time'. 
They forced broom handles, fingers and penises into each other's anuses. 
They stuck pins into flesh and bones. They vomited into one another's 
mouths and forced rotten food down each other's throats. They inserted 
tubes into each other's anal cavities and then pumped grease through the 
tubes. And parallel to these literal penetrations, they subjected each other to 
constant, symbolic penetrations as well. Penetrating and being penetrated 
have been central to what it means to be a warrior in the U.S. armed 
forces.104
Historically, such rites of passage have tellingly covered not only only initiates but also 
victims. The torture inflicted on colonials captured by indigenous North American warriors 
itself also manifests the patterns of sadistic ceremony, although the consequences in this case 
could be fatal: “it seems to be a symbolic birth canal, through which the captive is reborn as 
a member of a new society”.105  Captives deemed not ready for this new existence would 
then be subjected to 'the long torture ritual', in which they were burnt with hot irons, 
sometimes fed their own cut body parts, forced to sing a personalised death song, and then 
scalped before having their heart torn out.106
In the last chapter, the abjection of rape victims was located within patterns of unreason. 
But the abjection experienced by recruits themselves in their training – a training which 
both degrades and transforms – are rehabilitated in the making of military men and 
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recoded as normativity, as an internal other to struggle with and overcome.107 Although he 
does not investigate the rape of 'enemies' and others, Belkin does provide an account of 
male-on-male rape within the US military. Soldierly discourse about these rapes reproduces 
the constitutive ambiguity identified in training. To be the 'bottom',  or the man violated 
(often by a group of comrades in arms),  is in these accounts both to be submissive and to be 
the 'real man', just as attacks and forced sex are understood as sources of both pleasure and 
pain.108
For the study of sexual violence, this raises a number of issues. If soldiers can rape each 
other without framing it as victimhood, may their perpetration of sexual violence against 
external others also have a different character to what is commonly assumed? Moreover, if a 
military masculine identity contains warring elements of the masculine and the 
unmasculine, should we read the expressive function of rape in a different light? In surveying 
unreason, we saw that sexual violence could be the expression of frustration and trauma, 
and Belkin's reading of discipline-as-collapse suggests a similar liminal aggression. That 
fearful coincidence of order and chaos, rationality and psychopathy, purity and danger, to 
which the mythological frame seeks to give form, but which threatens continually to escape 
the bounds of  the intelligible.109
Mythology, Instrumentalised
So mythology shares a boundary with unreason, one not unlike the boundary between the 
hyper-rationality of instrumentality and the psychopathy of unreason surveyed in Chapter 
4.110  But mythology may also be subjected to instrumentality. Reflexivity and rationality 
allow for codes to be turned to purposes that may lie outside them. In prominent cases of 
systematic war rape, as in Bosnia or Rwanda, this may indeed account for the combined 
character of brutality that appears both ideological (in its  focus on ethnicity, organicism and 
conspiratorial others) and rational (in its planning, execution and beneficiaries). Kaufman, 
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occurrence of wartime sexual violence. For Belkin and others, the subject of research is the Western military 
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110! See also the analysis provided in Cavalletto 2007.
Fujii,  Smith and Leed all also suggest a link between rationality and mythology, pointing to 
elites as manipulators of  symbolic order.111 But the transformation is a precarious one. 
The intersection of instrumentalities and rationalities of war and its underlying images and 
myths were the prime concern of Craig Cameron in American Samurai,  a study of the First 
Marine Division between 1941 and 1951.112 On this account, it was the myths that enabled 
the destruction wrought by US forces in the Pacific War.113  As with reports of initiation 
already examined, the institution of the Marine Corps fostered emotional separation from 
the peacetime world and degraded external others.114 Moreover, in the context of wartime 
mobilisation, with many inexperienced young men entering the Corps, hazing and 
harassment became more brutal, the better to mould soldiers.115 Men were denigrated in the 
now familiar ways, with ceremonial entry into the mythologised status of  the Marine Corps:
The exaggeratedly all-male atmosphere of recruit training was part of what 
Theweleit labels the 'crucial transformation'  of eros. As psychogenic fantasy, 
this transformation created an antagonistic view across a gender line not 
unlike the race line that separated Americans from Japanese. The 
transformation of eros fostered the objectification of women...Women also 
became objects of danger and disgrace in classes on sex hygiene...Once 
begun this indoctrination continues until either the man received his 
discharge from the Marine Corps and returned to civilian life or he suffered 
serious injury or sickness that at least temporarily stripped him of his self-
sufficiency and isolated him from the male group.116
More than standing for nation, women also came to stand in for nature in the mythologies of 
the Pacific War, and it was nature that was dangerous and which needed to be penetrated for 
·  174·
111!  For example, Smith 1991:127–128.
112!Cameron 1994:2.
113!Cameron 1994:5.
114!Cameron 1994:49.
115!Cameron 1994:59.
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victory.117 As the war progressed, so the character of combat changed, and mythologies with 
it. Moving from the more closely fought and 'thrilling' Peleliu to the dominance of Okinawa, 
Marines adopted a mentality of 'processing' to code the strategic 'necessity'  and realities of 
new situations.118  For commanders, these tropes had to be put to work and properly 
stimulated to make men fight. Mythologies of the Marine Corps were consciously 
promulgated before and after the war to encourage recruitment. Beyond this, the experience 
of combatants – their expectations of race and gender, the frustrations of war, the reality of 
an enemy that did not conform to their assumptions – was continually filtered through a 
sense of  communal self  that had to be managed into strategic and rational pathways.
The problem is familiar,  if this time on the border between the geopolitical commander or 
class warrior and the exterminationist. Seeing mythology as something that can be turned to 
instrumental purposes requires that the instrumentalist not only stands sufficiently 'outside' 
the belief system to recognise it and see its potential, but also that the content of the beliefs 
are themselves malleable to any ends. In many accounts, this manipulation is presented as if 
it self-evident: an entirely cynical exercise on the parts of elites to get what they want. As 
Kaufmann stresses, this perspective is inadequate where decisions backfire on the leaders 
and communities in question. But the issue is more fundamental: in spite of the ambiguity 
and hybridity of codes of war, there seems no a priori way to determine whether belief is 
true or false. An accomplished manipulator will pass, and a true believer may profit from 
war in spite of himself. The risk again is of naturalising a rationalist account, such that every 
outcome is retrospectively read as if it occurred because somebody wanted it so, and was 
able to put the pieces in place. Apart from jettisoning contingency and struggle,  it also 
suggests a one-dimensional view of power,  and so sets to one side the very discourses and 
constructions of  gender order that feminists have done so much to highlight.
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Mythological Propositions
It remains to specify the content of a mythological perspective on wartime sexual violence. 
Although united by a focus on how communities are made, mythological perspectives may 
differ on a variety of more fine-grained issues: what the scale of the community is; what the 
relation is between its  'peacetime' norms and its 'wartimes'  one; how soldiers conduct war in 
an ongoing symbolic exchange with an imagined enemy as well as a real one; whether the 
initiation of warriors produces clear enforcers of misogynistic power or more ambiguous, 
even fragile, combinations of aggression and restraint;  whether soldiers together bond 
through rape or whether it signals their disintegration; and how commanders and others 
seeking power are able to transform and manipulate mythologies to their own ends.
Proposition 1
The prevalence of ritualised behaviours within given institutional and social contexts suggest 
that a mythological explanation may be validated by evidence of particular forms of rape 
and accompanying practices which are explicitly linked to an overarching symbolic 
significance or resonance with the group in question. The task will be to show that those 
really are group-specific practices and to fill in the content of the group mythology that 
leads to rape.
Proposition 2
Accounts of military masculinity have stressed that rape can occur in these contexts as a 
kind of group identity or bonding without there being instrumentalist benefits directly 
flowing from them. This coincides with explanations of group pleasure found in unreason, 
but the stress here is more clearly on the creation and reinforcement of a fratriarchal identity 
over time, rather than enjoyment shared within a given rape incident. Following the 
discussion of ritual, it would also be expected that such behaviour in a mythological context 
has a formal or repetitive pattern, for example in the regular use of particular induction 
rites. 
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Proposition 3
Mythology might also be indicated by the distribution of acts suggesting particular 
confinement to a given group in cultural rather than institutional terms, as in the idea that 
certain practices of gendered violence have traditional roots in political or ethnic 
communities and are therefore reproduced according to a logic of socialisation and habit 
rather than as a result of conscious planning or emotional confusion. Again, this would 
suggest that such acts are clearly spoken of in terms of permitted and forbidden acts, taboos 
and the like. In a wider register, this could include ideologies of hetero-nationalism which 
combine apparently 'personal' sexuality with collectivised identity, as when perpetrators 
stress different community loyalties during rape.
Proposition 4
Rape might conform to mythological expectations as part of process of ethnic cleansing or 
genocide. The debate around the rationality and functionality of mass murder continues, 
but it is plausible to see these processes as dependent on the formation of a considerable 
sense of group identity over-riding either individual interests or individual passions, instead 
harnessing affect to a joint project of extermination based on complex but powerful 
ideologies of fear, hate and social pollution. This is  the collective side of unreason's focus on 
the abject, and is differentiated from it by the clearly collective and organised character of 
rape aiming at some greater mythological purpose.
Proposition 5
Finally, a mythological perspective on group identity may be combined with an 
instrumentalist account where there is evidence both of more general codes of behaviour 
and combat and of conscious manipulation of these codes for given purposes. This indicates 
a more complex picture of allegiance, indoctrination and behaviour in war, but may also 
reveal how mythologies of violence were always already available as the material through 
which a more narrow rationality could work.
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Interlude
THE MADNESS IN METHODS
This thesis began with a sense that there was something more to be said about what it means 
to provide a feminist account of wartime sexual violence, something not yet captured in the 
major interventions made against androcentric, 'problem-solving' and high political theory. 
The work undertaken in Part Two to unpack instrumentality, unreason and mythology as 
distinct modes has both advanced and complicated that agenda. 
Advanced because in place of the singular statement that rape is a weapon of war, we now 
have a sense of the various ways in which it can be so,  and of the somewhat hidden variety 
of ideas of war and weapons at play. Instead of proposing a feminist theory of war rape,  the 
task of Part Two was to develop and explore latent (and sometimes not so latent)  feminist 
claims,  and especially to consider them alongside debates within war studies and social 
theory. The result is 13 relatively distinct propositions, bound by differing underlying 
analytical wagers and narrative scripts, and normatively orientated in different ways towards 
the possibility of  change.
Complicated because the process of moving beyond simplistic ideas of motive and cause ('rape 
is cheaper than bullets', 'rape is the desire for sex/violence',  'rape is caused by culture')  has 
shown both that each mode contains a degree of variety within it and also that ambiguities 
of interpretation and evidence in each case indicate a zone where different modes blend, 
whether because hyper-rationality blurs into psychopathy, because apparently 'private' 
desires turn out to be made of social and cultural stuff, or because structures of meaning 
can be manipulated towards instrumental ends. Importantly, these have been primarily 
addressed as problems of explanation, which is to say problems of accounting for why 
certain forms of atrocity are manifested (rather than other forms or no forms at all) within a 
contrast space of expectation. In each case there is ethics and politics too, although they 
discussed in more muted terms in the name of reclaiming a certain sense of the explanatory 
in feminism.
The explanations elaborated in Part Two reflect the initial concern with variation and 
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complexity within rape itself, as well as Cynthia Enloe's caution against collapsing sexual 
violence into an inchoate mass of horror. Why was rape so connected to slavery and labour 
in Sierra Leone? Why did US troops at My Lai experience their own sexualised brutality in 
terms of confusion, trauma and affect? And why were the violations of the Bosnian war so 
soaked in discourses of ethnic supremacy? Across cases, to what extent does rape reflect 
economic imperatives understood clearly by political and military elites? How should we 
relate the frustrations and aggressions of 'peacetime' rapists to the frustrations and 
aggressions of embattled soldiers? And if we see occurrences of rape as themselves reflecting 
a wider socio-cultural order, at what level of community are rape-supportive beliefs 
inculcated, and do they serve distinct purposes for those communities at all?
It may be objected that such problems are the product of the framework itself: that a spectre 
of explanatory failure haunts feminist inquiry, but that it is a spectre of my own imagining.1 
Does it matter at all that, when arranged in a certain way, particular strands of feminist 
thought appear to be in tension with each other, or conform ambiguously to non-feminist 
debates about war? There are several ways to answer that challenge. First, as I have tried to 
show (and as many have indicated before), this kind of ambiguity is a problem for all inquiry. 
It is a commonplace today to say that facts are not found and do not speak for themselves, 
which means that there is always a conceptual framework doing hidden analytical work. 
Strictly speaking then, all problems are the result of a set of conceptual assumptions, and all 
attempts to address what we find problematic will embroil us in further sets of  concepts. 
Second, although the way I have developed the distinction between instrumentality, 
unreason and mythology is new to the literature on war rape, they are not categories without 
antecedents. In some ways they gesture to whole disciplinary traditions: to economics 
(instrumentality), psychology (unreason)  and anthropology (mythology). The analogy is not 
perfect (for example, anthropologists also consider economic and material factors) but the 
styles of reasoning are not my creation, even if my rendering of them has not been wholly 
convincing. 
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Third, at least some of these propositions are regularly said to be the key to understanding 
wartime sexual violence. In recent years this has been the case especially for instrumentalist 
propositions, principally the idea that rape is consciously chosen as a strategy by 
commanders who give direct orders (instrumentalist proposition 1) and that the aim of that 
strategy is the direct seizure of material resources, usually through terrorising local 
populations (instrumentalist proposition 3). We will see very clearly in the case of some 
advocacy related to the DRC that these ideas reduce a whole range of social conflicts to 
private profiteering. In other quarters, rape is thought of as primarily a question of quite 
specific cultural norms (rather than widely distributed ones mingled with frustrations or of 
consciously-chosen tactics of accumulation). So it is said that some communities are more 
rape prone than others because of historically-ingrained misogyny (mythological proposition 
3).
When put this way (whether by feminists or not), some propositions come into occasionally 
stark contradiction with others,  as the introduction to Part Two intimated. Unreason's 
second proposition (that rape is widely distributed and fragmented across different 
institutions) is, for example, in conflict with instrumentalist proposition 1 (that rape is the 
result of orders passed down hierarchically within a single organisation) and mythological 
propositions 1 and 3 (that practices of rape are confined to particular institutional cultures 
or particular social groups). So in any given case,  one or other mode will offer the most 
purchase, and this will be specifiable at a more fine-grained level, even if there is ambiguity 
about how to interpret evidence. Part of the purpose of the last three chapters has been to 
enable such a focus, to show the presence not just of, say, instrumentality, but of class 
extraction, or military injunction, or whatever. And in any general case, the distribution of 
atrocity can in principle be examined to determine which mode best fits the reported 
experiences of  sexual violence.2
Moreover, this work has not been intended as an exercise in highlighting failure. I take it as 
given that honest and attentive inquiry is difficult, and that clarifying the conceptual and 
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political stakes of that inquiry, and relating them to a given problem in the world (such as an 
ongoing crisis of gender security or a historical case of war rape), is  complex. The 
complication is no sleight on feminism. Where difficulties arise (as in the definition of 
rationality or in how to conceptualise the psycho-social divide) these are often problems that 
have long troubled social theorists, and which themselves stand in need of sustained 
attention. At the risk of repetition, the point is not that feminist IR must learn from these 
external projects, like some hitherto inattentive schoolchild, but that it shares a set of problems 
with them, a commonality of conceptual struggles that can be obscured when the most salient 
question is that of  feminism or anti-feminism.
As Chapters 2 and 3 suggested, appreciating the explanatory dimension of feminism 
orientates inquiry towards concrete cases,  just as its  moral and political dimensions 
presuppose such an account. The more seriously we take the 'critical' element here – 
understood in terms of the non-necessary character of social relations and the multiplicity 
of logics within the social world – the more necessary it becomes to turn towards situated 
instances of sexual violence. Conceptual analysis of the kind undertaken in Part Two opens 
up a range of theoretical insight, but will not determine a singular answer applicable across 
all examples. Part Three thus elaborates one cluster of war rape – that of the Eastern DRC 
in the last decades – within that general framework of explanations. As a case, it both 
provides empirical material on the overlapping dimensions of conflict and sexual violence 
and offers a perspective from which modal claims may be rejected or modified. It is 
illustrative in the sense of substantiating some otherwise abstracted ideas of motive, cause 
and structure,  but not because it merely proves what has already been posited theoretically. 
Events, whether past or unfolding, also resist concepts, and throw their own bloody mess 
back in the face of  the inquirer.
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Part Three
A History of Bad Men
Tell me how will we know they can't hear us coming?
It's easy for me, I got a head start running away
Keep up or your disease spread quick
So how did you learn to be sick, so cunning?
It's easy to sing but you just keep on humming along
Did you hear that? I got a real bad feeling
Don't make a sound: they're not dead, just sleeping
The Melvins, 'A History Of  Bad Men'1
Periodising Atrocity
Eastern Congo is still at war. Despite a formal conclusion to hostilities in 2003, a decade 
long peacekeeping mission by MONUC/MONUSCO, and a recent rapprochement 
between Kinshasa and Kigali,  violence still plagues the Kivus and its environs.2  The 
populations of these territories indeed still prefer to name their condition as that of war.3 
The 'post-conflict' label so often applied by the international community may indeed itself 
be a factor in perpetuating the violence.4  A number of armed groups, including major 
perpetrators of rape like the Mai Mai and CNDP remained proactively involved in conflict 
throughout the decade, as did FARDC and MONUC forces seeking to disrupt the deeply 
embedded troops of the FDLR (see the chronology on pg. 194 for more details). During the 
writing up of this thesis, a new rebellion was sparked in the Kivus, this time apparently 
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2! MONUC (the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) initially deployed 
in November 1999 as a ceasefire observing mission, but had its mandate expanded to more than 5,000 troops 
in 2000 and then to over 22,000 'uniformed personnel' in July 2007, making it the largest UN peacekeeping 
mission in the world (the UNAMID Darfur deployment is larger, but is a joint operation with the African 
Union). In July 2010 it was renamed MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo). 
3! International Alert 2010; Autesserre 2010:192; Vinck et al. 2008:24.
4! Séverine Autesserre lists it as one of the elements of 'peacebuilding culture' which has failed to properly grasp 
the character of violence in the DRC. See Autesserre 2010:28.
involving former CNDP elements under the command of Bosco Ntaganda.5 It has recently 
become clear that this insurgency by the M23 group has the backing of  Rwanda.6
Although one research strategy would be to approach the material chronologically and to 
explore each conflict separately,  the overlaps of armed groups and violent processes since at 
least 1994 prevents any easy periodisation of sexual violence. The following chapters 
therefore treat the period since the Rwandan genocide as one of general conflict in Eastern 
DRC, and make distinctions in terms of particular groups and strategies in that context.7 
Consequently, while they draw on material from the First and Second Congo Wars 
(1996-1997 and 1998-2002), the focus is predominantly on the last decade, which is the 
period in which we can distinguish several general features, including the persistence of 'war 
without war' in eastern DRC; the major deployment of MONUC and other international 
agencies;  the relative shift to understandings of the Congo war as 'civil' rather than 
'regional'  (a complicated diagnosis, as we shall see);  and the major increase in international 
attention to the issue of  wartime sexual violence in the DRC.
The approach adopted is necessarily shifting: between periods of war, between locations of 
violence, and between actors. Where particular atrocities are explored in depth, the 
intended effect is to provide an episodic detailing of the wider questions posed. This is a 
function both of the complexity of events themselves, but also of the relative uselessness of 
conventional boundaries. For example, many putatively 'rebel' fighters are also now officially 
FARDC fighters (and the same may even have once been Rwandan army fighters). 
Repertoires of violence and exploitation may remain very similar regardless of whether an 
individual or unit was 'CNDP' or already 'FARDC' at the time of an incident, especially 
given the continuation of parallel command structures (a phenomenon illustrated by the 
M23 rebellion). Similarly, generic ethnic labels are often bad guides to identity and subject 
location without further detail and several countries continue to be involved to some degree 
in violence in Eastern DRC despite peace agreements specifying otherwise.
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The coming chapters attempt to account for sexual violence and its relation to war in 
Eastern Congo. But it is worth first stressing what is not at stake in them. Congo is not the 
test case for a general theory of war rape, and conclusions drawn from it are not expected to 
map neatly – if at all – onto other conflicts. An assessment that wartime sexual violence in 
the Great Lakes is fundamentally driven by instrumentality, for example, will in some sense 
validate insights drawn from that mode, but will not mean that unreason and mythology do 
not also have analytical purchase,  or that there are not cases where they may prove equally 
insightful. Instead, the question is how general logics of war rape play out in this case. What 
concatenations of instrumentality, unreason and mythology can be discerned, put into effect 
by which actors,  and with what consequences for our understanding of this  case? The 
underlying orientation is one of scepticism towards the possibility of direct comparisons 
between cases. Instead, ideal typical frameworks such as that developed in Part Two, serve as 
guides in understanding the detail of varying  and complex situations, rather than as unified 
theories: “the surface of  history affords, therefore, no certain principles of  decision”8
There is a danger that this will reinforce an impression of Congo as a place of special 
barbarity,  especially where questions of identity, genocide and resource extraction are 
concerned. As previous chapters have hopefully made clear, this is  not my belief. After all, 
European histories of blood identity and racial transgression are hardly inconsequential.9 
The issues arising are not so much 'African' – although the colonial legacy does set ethnicity 
and race in a certain general way – as specifically related to the Eastern Congolese scene.10 
A single case was chosen because theoretical work suggested a need to pick apart literatures 
and look in an altered way at existing situations; and DRC was chosen as that case because 
of the relative scarcity of academic material on rape there (compared to the extent of 
feminist work on Bosnia, Rwanda or Darfur) and because the complexities of violence in the 
region posed an analytical challenge for modes of  critical explanation.
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8! This was James Mill's reprimand against the covering law generalisations of Thomas Macauley, as related in 
MacIntyre 1971:270.
9! See Jackson 2007:482; Dunn 2009.
10! I address these colonial dimensions only in their contemporary impact. For longer views, see Ascherson 1999; 
Dunn 2003.
The Argument
The contours of the coming argument are complex. Unavoidably so, since they must both 
convey the range of factors in the successive wars of Eastern DRC (wars regularly discussed 
as an 'alphabet soup' of armed groups and allegiances) and develop an analysis of the 
relationship (and in some ways surprising disjuncture) between war and rape. As the 
chapters progress they explore forms of the following arguments about rape in Eastern 
DRC: that it is now principally carried out by civilians; that it is overwhelmingly carried out 
by rebel groups (rather than the FARDC); that it is the result of practices imported with the 
Rwandan genocide; that it is an expression of ethnic hatred; that it results from conflicts 
over land in the Kivus; that it is directed by the geopolitical aims of Rwanda, Uganda and 
other powers; and that it is a tool used in the extraction of natural resources. Each of these 
hypotheses is found somewhat wanting, although insights from several prove indispensable to 
a fuller understanding.
The four chapters build a case for seeing war and rape in the Eastern DRC as awkwardly 
articulated. Not because rape is not a part of the system of war, but because it does not 
appear to fit within common instrumentalist explanations. Moreover, there is an analytical 
gap between the dynamics of war and the dynamics of sexual violence. War is characterised 
by a number of  features, principally:
• forms of proxy warfare conducted in Eastern DRC according to the dictates of 
regional geopolitics. Many armed groups over the decades have to a significant extent 
been sponsored by other countries, and these strategies are closely related to the 
extraction of mineral wealth from the region, especially during the Second Congo 
War, but continuing to today;
• militia formation within the Kivus and Eastern DRC in response to a constellation of 
issues including pressures on land, ethnic clashes,  attempts to maintain autonomy 
from the central government of the DRC and from communal fears of 
marginalisation and annihilation;
• enrichment strategies undertaken by armed groups for the personal gain of 
commanding individuals,  for the profit of sponsoring nations and to enable the 
continued funding of political movements and their armed wings, including in line 
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with the dynamics of  fear and identity just described;
• the frequent shifting of allegiances between armed groups, apparently explainable 
primarily by reference to changes in the immediate political and military situation. 
Because of the complexity of economic,  identitarian and traumatic dimensions of 
violence (or of instrumentality, mythology and unreason), interpretation of these 
shifts is challenging.
On the other hand, sexual violence is characterised by a number of features, most 
importantly:
• a relatively stable form of sexual violence, with the majority of attacks taking the 
form of gang rapes and a significant minority involving additional brutality and/or 
periods of  sexual slavery;
• highly inconclusive and sometimes contradictory evidence about the identity of the 
major perpetrators of sexual violence. In general, rape appears to be carried out by 
small groups, usually seeking to hide their affiliations, with a degree of pre-planning 
but rarely orientated towards the subsequent seizure of  specific goods;
• some evidence of increasing civilian involvement,  but within an overall context where 
armed groups of  uncertain identity are the majority perpetrators;
• an apparently wide distribution of sexual violence across different groups and 
targeting different communities,  without strong evidence that rape is being waged 
against a given community in spite of evidence that much of the violence in general 
is related to inter-communal conflict;
• strikingly little evidence of military and political commanders ordering their soldiers 
to perpetrate sexual violence to achieve strategic economic or military ends. Indeed, 
some testimonial evidence instead suggests that certain armed groups consider rape 
to be forbidden, and punishable, even if  they nevertheless engage in it;
• a common factor of 'revenge' in atrocities, raising significant problems for modes of 
critical explanation in determining whether these are driven by conscious calculation, 
symbolic mimesis, or extreme frustration in a situation of  prolonged conflict;
• strong themes of stress, frustration, anger and lust in perpetrator and combatant 
discourse, with some specific groups (the Mai Mai in particular)  showing evidence of 
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a more specifically mythological understanding of rape, and an attendant cosmology 
of identity and violence. These are pockets of mythological intensity that co-exist 
with more diffuse and less explicitly ideological forms of  military culture.
As we will see, in some cases the connection between the dynamics of war and of rape 
appears clear. But in most cases problems of interpretation and evidence arise which 
together amount to a view that sexual violence cannot be reduced to the war context, and 
that the influence of the general situation of conflict and militarisation in the region has 
highly complex, and sometimes even paradoxical, effects in terms of rape. There is 
instrumentalism at work, but it seems either not to result in sexual violence (compared to 
situations where instrumentality does not seem to be in play) or is connected to it only in a 
partial and tangential way: what we might term an ad hoc instrumentalism. Despite the claims 
of some activists, the chapters find no compelling evidence of a hierarchically-organised 
campaign of rape on a scale that could account for the levels of sexualised aggression 
recorded in the Eastern Congo. 
Approached through a series of layers, the situation can then be stated as follows. At the 
level of politics,  the historical link between land and identity is repeatedly exploited to foster 
power in certain areas. A political-economic motive (the system of patronage)  combines with 
a somewhat under-stated genuine crisis of identity (histories of persecution,  genocide and 
variable oppression before, during and after colonialism). The result is a shifting 
arrangement in which political groupings (and their military wings) rise,  fall and collaborate 
to maintain status and security. These ends are contested and sometimes contradictory, as 
leaders exploit their own communities at the same time as they speak of common destiny. 
The pattern of politics so described can only be understood historically,  but are also subject 
to medium- and short-term shifts, depending on pressures from above (the involvement of 
regional powers, the Rwanda-DRC rapprochement) and from below (land pressures, 
migration and displacement, economic conditions).
At the level of the war, this dynamic – essentially one of instrumentalised mythology and 
historical political economy – is  both heightened and combined with a more direct set of 
economic expropriations, both for personal accumulation and for the funding of military 
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campaigns. However, these various military components cannot be understood as merely 
‘greed’ based, nor as the local implementation of a global system in a functionalist sense 
(although there are, of course, global connections). Instead,  militarised accumulation is 
again a combination of identitarian and economic aspects. Even if we assume that 
commanders are cynical in their statements, participants in violence and their supporters 
clearly understand war in mythological and political-economic terms as being about the 
relative positions and defence of communities and their resources. Together, politics and war 
reflect the constellation of land, ethnicity and community that makes up a multifaceted 
Great Lakes conflict system.11
Finally, at the level of wartime sexual violence, there is considerable fragmentation. On the 
one hand, it is very clear that rape is overwhelmingly carried out by armed groups. 
However, with some exceptions, it is neither strongly linked to ethnic mythology nor to 
direct accumulation. Instead, the character of sexual violence is best understood as the 
nexus between military masculinities, feelings of anger and frustration amongst combatants 
and the dynamics of the revenge attack (dynamics which exceed a narrowly military-
strategic consideration). Within this there is some scope for instrumental need arguments, as 
looting is common, yet the association between arbitrary taxation, forced labour and natural 
resources and sexual violence specifically is not as strong as often assumed. In fact,  there is 
evidence of economic exploitation dependent on a combination of violence and protection 
(armed groups as protection rackets) without sexual violence being a major element.
Three general forms of violence thus emerge from Part Three. First, a form of mythological 
(and ambiguously instrumental) violence founded on motifs of violation, taboo transgression 
and revenge in the form of the retaliatory  atrocity. Second, a more limited instrumentalist 
violence deployed as part of resource extraction strategies, and co-existing in war economies 
with parallel structures of taxation, relying partially on rape as part of a package with other 
forms of violence to coerce civilians into cooperation: an extractive sexual violence. Third, rape 
as the consequence of feelings of acute frustration and need experienced by combatants in 
war, but not heavily related to the ethnic identities of  the victims: a fragmented sexual aggression. 
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In propositional terms, the evidence provided in the coming chapters indicates significant 
evidence of group bonding in relation to rape (unreason proposition 3)  as well as 
contradictory expressions of pleasure and disgust on the part of perpetrators (unreason 
proposition 4). The spread of sexual violence across armed groups does not suggest that only 
some engage in it, although the ritualised form of Mai Mai rape does indicate some place 
for this kind of military culture argument (mythological proposition 1). There also appears 
to be a ritualised form taken by revenge attacks (mythological proposition 2), although this 
may sometimes be explainable in terms of intended signals to enemies (instrumentalist 
proposition 1). Violence in general is often linked, by some measure, to economic need and 
greed, and rape can play a role in this (instrumentalist proposition 3), although this does not 
appear to occur often enough to account for the scale of rape. In other words, while 
elements suggested by all three modes of critical explanation can be found in the case of the 
DRC, it is significantly weighted towards propositions on the border between unreason and 
mythology and to the more fractured micro-level of violent repertoires: to the distributed 
actions of  soldiers and small groups rather than to the plotted strategies of  commanders.
The chapters proceed via a shifting focus,  moving from rape to war and then back again. 
Chapter 7 sets out the evidence on war rape in the DRC, surveying studies of violence and 
its forms, attributions of responsibility to particular armed groups and suggests why any 
theory of rape in the Congo Wars may have to be 'un-unified'. Chapter 8 steps back from 
the example of war rape to explore wider conflict dynamics. In particular it looks at the 
legacy of the Rwandan genocide and civil war on Eastern Congo, investigates the case for 
land conflict as a source of sexual violence, and addresses the major theme of retaliatory 
atrocity before considering regional geopolitical dimensions of war. Chapter 9 picks up on 
this theme but focuses in on the argument that rape is a tool of resource extraction in the 
Kivus. Providing a detailed analysis both of general patterns of militarised resource 
extraction and of specific cases, it concludes that while resources are a major dimension in 
the conflict system, they cannot explain levels of sexual violence. Finally, Chapter 10 turns to 
the discourses deployed by combatants and perpetrators themselves in accounting for war 
rape. It finds little evidence of hierarchical commands to rape, instead developing a view of 
combatants self-understandings principally derived from the intersection of unreason and 
mythology. 
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Map 1: The DRC, showing Provinces and International Borders
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ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, TERMINOLOGY
ANR	 	 	 L'Agence Nationale de Renseignements
	 	 	 Civil intelligence services of  the DRC Government
Banyamasisi	 The name given to Banyarwanda (usually Hutu) living around Masisi in 
	 	 	 North Kivu.
Banyamulenge	 The name given to Banyarwanda (usually Tutsi) living in South Kivu, 
	 	 	 developed to 	stress location ('Mulenge' is a place) rather than origins in 
	 	 	 Rwanda.
Banyamulenge 	 Name sometimes given to the First Congo War, based on idea that it 
War	 	 	 was caused by Tutsis and that Banyamulenge living in Congo are 
	 	 	 essentially Rwandan Tutsis.
Banyarutshuru	 The name given to Banyarwanda (usually Hutu) living around Rutshuru 
	 	 	 in North Kivu.
Banyarwanda Literally “those ancestrally belonging to Rwanda”. The blanket term 
   for Hutu and Tutsi living in Eastern DRC.
AFDL	 	 Alliance of  Democratic Forces for the Liberation of  Congo-Zaire
	 	 	 Group formed under Rwanda impetus in 1996 which aided in the 
	 	 	 RPF's 	victory in Rwanda and were then backed by Rwanda in the First 
	 	 	 Congo War. Led by Laurent-Desire Kabila.
CNDP  Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
	 	 	 Armed group active in Eastern DRC after 2006, often associated with 
	 	 	 Tutsi ethnic groups, formally becoming a political group in 2009. 
	 	 	 Created by Laurent Nkunda and originally mobilising some	 	
	 	 	 4,000-	5,000 combatants. More recently led by Bosco Ntaganda, 
	 	 	 indicted by the ICC but now a general in the FARDC. Formally 
	 	 	 transformed into a political party in February 2009 after some 5,800 of  
	 	 	 the 7,000 CNDP fighters were integrated into the FARDC. 
DRC	 	 	 Democratic Republic of  Congo
	 	 	 The name given to the territory formally known as Zaire after the 
	 	 	 overthrow of  Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997.
FAC   Forces Armées Congolaises
	 	 	 The formal name for the official DRC army before 2003. Many 
	 	 	 soldiers who served in the FAC continued on in their roles in the 
	 	 	 reconstructed FARDC.
FAR 	 	 	 Rwandan Armed Forces
FARDC  Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du Congo
	 	 	 The official DRC army, reconstructed substantially after the formal 
	 	 	 end of  the Second Congo war in 2003, now incorporating elements of  
	 	 	 former rebel factions through a process known as 'brassage'.
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FDD   Forces de Défense de la Démocratie
	 	 	 Armed group active in the Burundi civil war.
FDLR	 	 Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
	 	 	 Rebel group active in Eastern DRC, initially comprising Hutu 
	 	 	 combatants fleeing aftermath of  1994 Rwandan genocide. The prime 
	 	 	 target of  post-2003 efforts to secure Eastern DRC for the government.
FNL   Forces Nationales de Libération
	 	 	 Rebel group active in the Burundi civil war on behalf  of  Hutus.
FPLC  Forces Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo
	 	 	 Armed wing of  the UPC, led by Bosco Ntaganda.
Interahamwe	 Generic term for rebels in Eastern DRC, usually taken to designate 
	 	 	 FDLR. Sometime used specifically to mean Hutu militia during the 
	 	 	 Rwandan genocide.
Kinyarwanda	 A dialect of  the Rwanda-Rundi language and an umbrella term 
	 	 	 sometimes given to Rwandaphone communities in Eastern DRC.
LRA	 	 	 Lord's Resistance Army
	 	 	 An armed group founded in 1987 and led by Joseph Kony, active in 
	 	 	 Northern Uganda and across Sudan and the Central African Republic, 
	 	 	 but also active in the North East of  DRC, particularly around Orientale 
	 	 	 Province.
M23	 	 	 A rebel movement emerging in Eastern DRC in April 2012, likely 
	 	 	 under the leadership of  Bosco Ntaganda. It largely consists of  former 
	 	 	 CNDP soldiers seemingly encouraged to mutiny in response to new 
	 	 	 pressures for the arrest of  Ntaganda or because of  moves by the DRC 
	 	 	 government against CNDP parallel command structures inside the 
	 	 	 FARDC. Evidence has recently emerged that the rebellion is backed by 
	 	 	 Rwanda.
Mai-Mai	 	 Sometimes rendered as 'Mayi-Mayi', meaning 'Water-Water', the name 
	 	 	 given to local militias from the Kivus formed in 1997-1998 in resistance 
	 	 	 to the 'foreign' rebel and other forces active in DRC. There are many 
	 	 	 Mai Mai groups with different compositions, but the term tends to 
	 	 	 denote particularly brutal methods.
MONUC	 	 United Nations Organisation Mission in Congo
	 	 	 UN mission in DRC, established in 1999.
MONUSCO	 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
	 	 	 Republic of  Congo
	 	 	 The UN mission in DRC, renamed from MONUC in July 2010.
PARECO  Coalition des Résistants Patriots Congolais
	 	 	 Mix of  North Kivu tribal militia including a significant Hutu faction, 
	 	 	 collaborating with FLDR against CNDP from 2007.
PNC	 	 	 Congolese National Police
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Rasta	 	 Criminalised militia made up of  ex-Mai Mai and FARDC deserters 
	 	 	 alongside local criminals, originally founded by Commander Koffi, an 
	 	 	 FDLR deserter. Notorious for brutality and widely considered to be 
	 	 	 interested only in profit.
RCD   Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
	 	 	 The Congolese Rally for Democracy, a rebel group based in Eastern 
	 	 	 DRC during the second Congo War, splitting into several factions and 
	 	 	 becoming a political party after 2003.
RCD-Goma Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma
	 	 	 The faction splitting from the RCD with the support of  Rwanda and 
	 	 	 constituting the 'militarist core' of  Banyamulenge Tutsi, former 
	 	 	 Mobutists and elements of  FAC.
RCD-ML  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération
	 	 	 Also known as RCD-Kisangani, the faction split from the RCD in May 
	 	 	 1999 under the leadership of  Wamba Dia Wamba with the support of  
	 	 	 Uganda
RPA	 	 	 Rwandan Patriotic Army
	 	 	 The armed wing of  the RPF, becoming the official Rwandan army in 
	 	 	 1994 after the defeat of  the Hutu power regime.
RPF	 	 	 Rwandan Patriotic Front
	 	 	 Political movement created by Rwandan exiles in Uganda in 1987, 
	 	 	 involved in an insurgency against Habyarimana's rule in Rwanda since 
	 	 	 1990 and constituting the main element of  Rwanda's elite after the 
	 	 	 genocide.
UPC	 	 	 Union of  Congolese Patriots
	 	 	 Organisation formed by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and active in Ituri 
	 	 	 after Lubanga's split from the RCD-ML in July 2001. Said to be largely 
	 	 	 backed by ethnic Hema interest groups.
·  193·
A PARTIAL CONGO CHRONOLOGY
Date	 	 	 Event
1971 	 	 	 Congo renamed Zaire.
1 October 1990	 Rwanda Patriotic Front attacks Rwanda from Uganda.
6 April 1994	 	 Juvenal Habyarimana's plane shot down over Rwanda.
July 1994	 	 Rwandan genocide.
October 1996	 Rwandan forces invade Zaire under cover of  'homegrown' rebellion, 
	 	 	 beginning the First Congo.
May 1997	 	 Mobutu toppled, ending the First Congo War. Zaire becomes the DRC.
1997-1998	 	 Mai-Mai militias begin to form in the Kivus in resistance to the foreign 
	 	 	 connections of  rebel forces.
August 1998  The Second Congo War begins, with Rwandan-backed RCD forces and 
   Uganda-backed MLC forces seeking to overthrow Laurent-Désiré 
   Kabila, who was supported by other African states, including 
   Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola and Namibia. Sometimes referred to as 
   'Africa's World War'
2 August 1998 10th Brigade of  the Armée Nationale Congolaise deserts along with the 
   12th Brigade, forming the military wing of  the anti-Kabila rebellion and 
   beginning the Second Congo War
4 August 1998	 James Kabarebe commands Kitona Airlift.
20 August 1998 Political wing of  the anti-Kabila Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
   Démocratie (RCD) formed in Goma.
26 August 1998	 Zimbabwe dispatches forces to Kinshasa to defend Kabila.
May 1999  Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de 
   Libération (RCD-ML), also known as RCD-Kisangani, splits from RCD 
   with the support of  Uganda. Rwanda supports the other major faction, 
   RCD-Goma, which has a more militarist agenda.
November 1999	 First MONUC observers deployed, but limited to rebel territory.
January 2001	 Laurent-Desire Kabila assassinated. Joseph Kabila takes power.
April 2002	 	 Agreement arising from the Inter-Congolese Dialogue signed by DRC 
	 	 	 government and MLC at Sun City, South Africa.
December 2002	 Inter-Congolese Dialogue participants sign the Global and All-Inclusive 
	 	 	 Agreement.
May 2003	 	 Last regional army leaves the DRC.
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February 2006 International Criminal Court (ICC) issues arrest warrant for Thomas 
   Lubanga Dyilo on charges of  child conscription on behalf  of  the Forces 
   Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC)
July 2006  Laurent Nkunda creates the Congrès National pour la Défense du 
   Peuple (CNDP).
August 2006	 	 ICC issues arrest warrant for Bosco Ntaganda on charges of  forcible 
	 	 	 conscription, rape, sexual slavery and other war crimes and crimes 
	 	 	 against humanity carried out on behalf  of  the FPLC.
January 2008	 Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the Kivus 
	 	 	 launched in Goma, beginning the Amani Peace Process.
May 2008	 	 ICC issues arrest warrant for Jean-Pierre Bemba on charges of  war 
	 	 	 crimes and crimes against humanity carried out by the MLC in the 
	 	 	 Central African Republic. Bemba arrested the next day.
November 2008	 DRC-Rwanda Nairobi agreement on joint military action against 
	 	 	 FDLR.
January 2009	 4,000 Rwandan troops re-enter eastern DRC in Operation 'Umoja 
	 	 	 Wetu' ('Our Unity').
22 January 2009	 Laurent Nkunda arrested in Rwanda.
March 2009	 	 'Kimia II' ('Calm') operations begin with FARDC supported by 
	 	 	 MONUC forces.
23 March 2009	 CNDP Integration Agreement specifying that CNDP troops will 
	 	 	 become part of  DRC army and police and that the CNDP will become 
	 	 	 a political party. Date referenced in name of  M23 rebellion launched in 
	 	 	 March 2012.
December 2009-	 'Kimia II' operations end and are replaced by a new FARDC-MONUC
January 2010	 mission named 'Amani Leo' ('Peace Today')
September 2010 ICC issues arrest warrant for Callixte Mbarushimana on charges of  war 
   crimes and crimes against humanity (including torture and rape) carried 
   out by Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). 
   Mbarushimama is arrested in October 2010.
	
December 2011	 ICC drops charges against Mbarushimana.
March 2012	 	 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo convicted of  war crimes.
April 2012	 	 M23 rebellion begins in Eastern DRC.
May 2012	 	 ICC issues second arrest warrant for Bosco Ntaganda on charges of 
	 	 	 war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out on behalf of the 
	 	 	 FPLC/UPC in 2002-2003.
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Chapter Seven
SEX AND DEATH IN THE EASTERN 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Atrocity cannot be its own explanation. Violence cannot be allowed to 
speak for itself, for violence is not its own meaning. To be made thinkable, it 
needs to be historicized.
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers 1
Kasika
In August 1998, troops from the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) passed through the 
village of Kasika with Rwandan soldiers on their way to overthrow Laurent-Désiré Kabila.2 
After a formal welcome from the traditional Nyindu tribal leader, they went on their way. 
But when they passed back through Kasika the soldiers came under attack from a Mai-Mai 
militia led by a dissident chief from a nearby village.3  The ambushers managed to kill the 
RCD commander,  and the surviving soldiers spent the remainder of the day hunting for 
them, to no avail. The next day, RCD troops returned to Kasika at dawn. Entering the 
church during Mass,  the soldiers tied up the worshippers, separated out the nuns – who were 
raped and then killed – and the priest – who was forced to hand over money and then made 
to kneel in prayer before being shot in the head. They then turned on the village 
inhabitants: “[t]he soldiers began by using their hatchets to bludgeon the worshippers to 
death – so as not to alert the village, some of the villagers I interviewed said. Others said it 
was to save bullets”.4
Those who had fled and survived returned to further horror. The chief's heart had been 
removed and his pregnant wife's genitals cut out (her foetus cast by her side). Inside the 
church a grim tableau had been arranged for them:
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1! Mamdani 2002:228–229.
2! These paragraphs draw heavily on Stearns 2012a:251–257.
3! 'Mai-Mai' literally means 'Water-Water' and is a blanket term for local militias organised in the Kivus in the 
late 1990s in resistance to various 'foreign' occupiers.
4! Stearns 2012a:256.
They disembowelled one woman by cutting her open between her anus and 
vagina, then propped up the dead body on all fours and left her with her 
buttocks facing upwards. Another corpse was given two slits on either side 
of his belly, where his hands were inserted. “Anavaa koti – they made him 
look like he was wearing a suit”,  the villagers told me. Another man had his 
mouth slit open to his ears, was put in a chair and had a cigarette dangling 
from his lips when he was found.5
Perhaps Kasika was a rare kind of atrocity exhibit. In the most comprehensive catalogue of 
violence in the Congo – the so-called Mapping  Report – it features as just one more passing 
example of retaliatory violence in South Kivu. Mentioned with contemporaneous attacks 
nearby, there is  none of the intimate terror conveyed by Jason Stearn's informants,  although 
we do learn of “[b]rutal rapes, disembowelling and rape with sticks of wood...suffered by an 
unknown number of  victims”.6 One incident among 600.7 
In Congo itself Kasika has apparently attained a mythical and special status. Its residents 
took to calling it 'Kosovo', reaching for a parallel that could perhaps express what they had 
suffered to an international audience.8  But, excepting the origami of corpses, Kasika is  in 
many ways stereotypical of atrocities in the Congo wars.9  The targeting of a civilian 
population; looting at gunpoint; the desecration of symbolically important spaces; rape; 
summary execution; evisceration; anger; a confusion of identities (the RCD soldiers assumed 
that the Kasika villagers supported the Mai-Mai); a simultaneous reliance on powerful 
collective labels (the villagers and Mai-Mai are 'Nyindu'; the RCD soldiers and Rwandans 
are identified by villagers as 'the Tutsi');  claims of violence as 'retaliation'; and a level of care 
and detail in the carrying out of  atrocities, all congealed together. 
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5! Stearns 2012a:257.
6! United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:304.
7! The Mapping Report's comprehensiveness comes from its insistence on at least two independent sources for 
each incident. The material amassed across its 545 pages builds on the testimony of some 1,280 witnesses. See 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:6.
8! Stearns 2012a:251.
9! 'Origami of corpses' is paraphrased from Stearns 2012a:257.
In this event alone we can detect the possible traces of instrumentality (a signal to military 
enemies, an opportunistic seizure of small cash sums), unreason (the transgression of the 
corpse arrangement, the spontaneous rape of the nuns), and mythology (the salience of 
putatively ethnic identities; the forum of the church). Here are the calling cards of the 
geopolitical commander and the obedient footsoldier, massacring because strategic logic and 
chains of command require it. There is the communal enforcer,  writing his identity on the 
bodies of those others from an alien place. And in the church, the work of the frustrated 
power-seeker and his brothers in arms,  exorcising their failure to track down the Mai Mai by 
contorting eviscerated flesh.
The Rape Capital of  the World
From such admixtures of horrorism, manifested again and again in the warzone dispatch, 
comes the foregrounding of a particular kind of atrocity: the commonplace of Eastern DRC 
as the 'rape capital of the world'.10  Journalists, analysts, intervening agencies and human 
rights activists operate within this conflict frame, at once documenting its reality and 
reproducing it as a one-stop designation. Like 'genocide' for Darfur or 'sectarian war'  for 
Iraq, the idea of Congo as rape capital animates activity. Within the benevolence industry 
itself, opinions have a more cynical tone; sometimes even sour.11 Sensitive to the duplication 
of humanitarian effort,  to the short-sightedness of donors, and to the complex social 
embeddedness of gender, officials complain about the sluggish progress of MONUC and 
MONUSCO and express doubt that anything can really be done.12  There is resentment, 
and exhaustion, and distaste at some of the techniques of international advocacy (a flavour 
of  which can be found in Figure 13). 
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10! See, for example, BBC 2010; Lloyd-Davies 2011; Wairagu 2012; Kahorha 2011; Gettleman 2009. 'Horrorism' is 
Adriana Cavarero's term (see the opening quote of the introduction).
11! The term 'benevolence industry' is borrowed from Poplak 2012.
12! This is an impressionistic gloss from interviews carried out in Goma and Bukavu in May-June 2010. See the 
Appendix for further details.
Figure 13: Imagining Congo, Consuming Congo: 'Love and Theft (Rosario Dawson)' (2011), Richard 
Mosse's Aerochrome Infrared of  actress Rosario Dawson using an iPhone to photograph herself  with a 
security guard near Bukavu at the inauguration of  the City of  Joy.13
Several informants complained of the swathes of agencies descending on the region, lured 
by the promise of funds associated with projects on war rape, regardless of objective needs 
or their qualifications to deliver.14  For one prominent activist, rape had “become a huge 
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13! In Mosse 2012:97. Mosse's rational is worth reproducing: “Like Marlow on the steamer, I was pursuing 
something essentially ineﬀable, something so trenchantly real that it verges on the abstract, at the very limits 
of description. I needed to find an appropriate form to better describe this sinister resonance. In December 
2009, Kodak oﬃcially discontinued their color infrared film, Aerochrome. The film was developed during the 
Cold War, in collaboration with the US military... [A] unique window through which to survey the battlefield 
of eastern Congo. Realism described in infrared becomes shrouded by the exotic, shifting the gears of 
Orientalism” (Mosse 2012:130).
14! In one case, two local implementing partners of the same UN agency were working in Lubero delivering the 
same services for a year. The agency itself had not spotted the duplication. It was also reported that NGOs 
were taken an insuﬃciently nuanced view of training members of the Congolese armed forces. By restricting 
training to those under a certain age and insisting on literacy and fitness requirements, they missed many of 
the soldiers who required sensitisation most. It has become common for senior soldiers to receive the same 
training several times, training which takes place at expensive resorts, but which is often delivered in English 
or French, languages in which those being trained are often not fluent or even basically competent. Interview 
with UN oﬃcial, Goma, 1 June 2010, and EU Gender Oﬃcer, Goma, 3 June 2010. 
business for people... [survivors] become like merchandise”.15  The link between sexual 
violence and exploitation has become solidified in another way too,  one that risks re-
inscribing a space called 'Congo' in the perpetual shadow of violence. Not just a geopolitical 
repetition, but a geosocial and geocultural one. A savage recycling. It can be found in the 
phraseology of the benevolent as much as in the colonial imagination: Rape of a Nation,  Rape 
of the Congo,  'Stop Raping Our Greatest Resource',  'Peace Violated' (see Figures 14, 15 and 
16).16 
Figure 14: 'Rape of a Nation' (2008): The cover photo for Marcus Bleasdale's extended photo essay  on 
the connections between violence and resource extraction in the DRC.17
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15! Interview with Christine Schuler-Deschryver of V-Day, Bukavu, 8 June 2010.
16! Bleasdale 2009; Hochschild 2009. 'Stop Raping Our Greatest Resource' is the slogan of V-Day's campaign in 
the DRC (http://drc.vday.org/home.html). 'Peace Violated' is the title given to a France 24 iPad report on the 
DRC, the first such interactive documentary produced especially by for iPad (see http://www.france24.com/en/
20100802-france-24-launches-worlds-first-ipad-documentary-democratic-republic-congo-kivu-rape).
17! See http://mediastorm.com/publication/rape-of-a-nation.
Figure 15: 'Blood and Treasure' (2010): Another Marcus Bleasdale shot, this time for an article in 
Mother Jones written by Adam Hochschild.18
There is no doubt that rape is a major aspect of conflict in Eastern DRC. Victims have been 
recorded as young as 3 and as old as 80.19  Yet rape is only one feature of a generalised 
terror. Civilians fear travelling to markets, fields or nearby towns, especially in North Kivu. 
And for good reason. On average, residents of North Kivu have been displaced 3.7 times 
each, 3.3 times in South Kivu, and 2.5 times each in Ituri during since the early 1990s. 81% 
of people in one survey of Eastern DRC reported having been displaced at least once since 
1993.20  As Table 3 indicates, sexual violence has in some senses been less of a consequence 
of  conflict that has forced labour, physical beatings and general persecution.
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18! Hochschild 2010. The shot is from Bleasdale 2009, the first 24 pages of which are dedicated to similar scenes 
of mining.
19! Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International 2010:9.
20! Vinck et al. 2008:26, 29.
Have you experienced any of  the following as a consequence of  the conflicts in Eastern Congo since 1993?
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 North Kivu	 South Kivu	 Ituri	 Total
Interrogation/persecution by armed group	 54.6	 	 60.2	 	 50.7	 55.3
Forced to work	 	 	 	 	 50.8	 	 58.1	 	 50.3	 52.9
Forced to carry loads	 	 	 	 50.8	 	 57.7	 	 50.4	 52.8
Beaten	 	 	 	 	 	 46.6	 	 50.7	 	 40.5	 46.2
Tortured      34.0  38.8  34.8 35.7
Abducted for at least a week   30.8  39.8  31.2 33.7
Being sexually violated	 	 	 	 13.4	 	 22.4	 	 11.6	 15.7
Being sexually violated multiple times	 	 8.5	 	 18.4	 	 8.7	 11.6
Table 3: Varieties of  Human Rights Violations Experienced in Eastern Congo, 1993-200721
How are we to make sense of sexual violence, and its place alongside war and suffering in 
the region? To begin with, we must understand the scale and character of sexual violence in 
the Congo Wars. Yet,  for all the attention to the sheer quantity of rape, comprehensive 
estimates are rare. One report suggested a total of 40,000 rapes between 1998 and early 
2004 in South Kivu, Maniema, Goma and Kalémie alone.22  Subsequent specific regional 
reporting suggests that the overall figure must be much higher and that rape has continued 
on much the same, if not a greater scale, since the formal end of the war in 2003. For 
example,  MONUC recorded 13,000 rapes just in South Kivu during 2006, although other 
UN estimates appear to have placed the number closer to 27,000.23  Médecins Sans 
Frontières admitted 7,482 rape victims to its health centres in Ituri alone between 2003 and 
2007 and treated 6,700 victims in DRC during 2008.24 The UN recorded 7,703 new cases of 
sexual violence in North and South Kivu during the same period and one recent UN 
document claimed that some 1,100 rapes are documented every month, mainly 
concentrated in the Kivus.25 
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21! Vinck et al. 2008:33–35. The survey was of 2,620 individuals between September and December 2007.
22! Human Rights Watch 2005a:7. The study was carried out by the Joint Initiative on the Fight Against Sexual 
Violence Towards Women and Children, made up of NGO, UN and Congolese Government representatives 
and also including input from the World Health Organisation. 
23! United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:7; Wakabi 2008:16.
24! Médecins Sans Frontières 2009:9.
25! Human Rights Watch 2009b:6, and United Nations Security Council 2009b:14.
Figure 16: 'Rape in Congo: Peace Violated' (2010): the lead image for a France24 report on sexual 
violence in the DRC, specifically for iPad.
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These rough estimates have recently been replaced by a more serious statistical accounting, 
now suggesting levels of sexual violence up to 26 times higher than previously suggested.26 
Working from household survey data, rather than rapes reported directly to authorities, 
Peterman, Palermo and Bredenkamp infer a total of 1.69 to 1.8 million women who would 
have reported rape during their lifetime (and over 400,000 in the preceding twelve months), 
allowing for “translat[ion] into approximately 1,150 women raped every day, 48 women 
raped every hour, and 4 women raped every 5 minutes”.27
Without large-scale systematic studies like this, tracing changes in levels of sexual violence 
over time becomes extremely challenging. The most commonly-cited difficulty is that of 
stigma. A study by MONUC of South Kivu province showed that between 2005 and 2007, 
less than 1% of the cases identified by health facilities were reported to the justice system.28 
Other estimates suggest that less than 50% of those who are raped are actually able to 
access health centres, a figure which would suggest an immediate doubling of the figures 
compiled from sources like Panzi Hospital.29  Impunity, often cited as a reason for the 
perpetration of sexual violence, also limits resources for investigation. At least until 2004, 
there was only one gynaecologist available part-time for the whole of Maniema province, an 
area in which nearly 58,000 women are estimated to have experienced sexual violence in 
their lives.30 In one case, many military justice officials simply refused to travel to Kabare to 
investigate the alleged crimes of the Congolese Army's 14th Brigade, citing the collapse of 
internal military control over the brigade and consequent risk to life.31  And of 287 cases of 
rape reported to authorities  in South Kivu between 2005 and 2007, only 64 cases had 
actually been tried and 58 convictions secured by 2008, with more than half the cases still 
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26! Peterman, Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011; Palermo and Peterman 2011.
27! Peterman et al. 2011:1064–1065. See also the coverage of this research in Gettleman 2009; Pflanz 2011; 
Adentunji 2011.
28! MONUC Human Rights Division and Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2007a:18.
29! Human Rights Watch 2009b:14. Panzi Hospital near Bukavu in South Kivu is the major site for sexual violence 
treatment in the Eastern DRC, and its founder, gynaecologist Dr Denis Mukwege, has been a major advocate 
on behalf of survivors and is prominent in many news stories about rape in Congo. He has been awarded the 
UN Human Rights Prize (2008), the Olof Palme Prize (2009) and has been spoken of as a potential Nobel 
Laureate. Many organisations thus draw on Panzi for information and statistics. See, for example, the method 
adopted in Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International 2010.
30! Pratt and Werchick 2004:15; Peterman et al. 2011:1064.
31! Human Rights Watch 2009b:51.
under investigation.32  Those cases reported made up less than 1% of the number recorded 
in hospitals in the period.33 Put otherwise, less than 0.002% of recorded rape cases resulted 
in a conviction in South Kivu.
Our statistical picture may even be the inverse of reality. As one UN official explained it,  the 
data collected by any study is directly related to the geographical coverage of the research 
team. In times of high insecurity, when rape is assumed to be extensive,  the coverage of 
teams is restricted to the safest areas. Their estimates are therefore based on samples which 
will be unusually secure from sexual violence, resulting in a headline figure that indicates 
that rape is going down precisely when violence and insecurity are at their highest levels.34 
By contrast, research teams are able to conduct their most comprehensive assessments when 
violence has receded, meaning that the higher levels of rape reported will reflect periods of 
past atrocity, or reporting which is ‘batched’ together (for example, individuals reporting all 
the sexual violence experienced over the last years in one statistical push). When UN and 
other agencies bring figures together to give officially-sanctioned estimates of rape, these 
coverage issues, as well as sometimes significant differences in research method, are elided.35 
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32! United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:16.
33! United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:294.
34! Interview with UNOCHA oﬃcial, Goma, 15 June 2010. Something along these lines was held by some to have 
occurred in 2009, and, for them, the idea that there had been a drop in sexual violence during that year was 
“impossible”
35! Interviews with UNOCHA oﬃcial, Goma, 15 June 2010; UNFPA oﬃcial, Goma, 17 June 2010; UNICEF 
oﬃcial, Goma, 1 June 2010; Alpha Ujuvi oﬃcial, Goma, 3 June 2010; and Adèle Safi Kagarabi, COFAS/CPLVS, 
Bukavu, 8 June 2010. Several interviewees explained that measurements of the extent of sexual violence were 
carried by a large number of organisations, from local charities to international agencies. These agencies often 
had diﬀering methods, but 'final' statistics bearing the UN stamp were arrived at merely by aggregating the 
figures received from associated agencies. Rigorous statistical analysis is not carried out on these figures 
because of resource pressures on UN organisations. Following the implementation of the DRC Government-
led National Strategy, diﬀerent agencies are now responsible for diﬀerent Clusters at the National and 
Provincial levels. Each cluster has adopted its own set of indicators for its issue area, generally based on a range 
of reporting forms for psycho-social, medical and legal aspects of SGBV (Sexual and Gender-Based Violence) 
created by UNFPA under previous coordinating arrangements. However, the use of these forms varies 
considerably in practice, creating significant problems with the primary data. For example, some 
implementing partners interpret a 'new' incident to be one in which an attack took place that week and the 
victim received services while, for others, a 'new' incident would be one that took place that month. Others 
recorded all cases where the victim as already in the system as 'old', even if the incident itself had not 
previously been reported. Some local NGOs had created their own exceptionally detailed systems for 
recording SGBV incidents, but also reported that international actors had ignored their data in collating global 
figures. Moreover, the tendency of some major actors, particularly MSF, to only provide their data occasionally 
was also held responsible for confusing the data, in one case creating the impression that there had been a 
major spike in the incidence of SGBV during two months in 2008, when this had simply been the result of 
MSF providing its data for the months in question. 
One humanitarian official who had been involved with the creation of the original case 
forms was particularly scathing about the way in which locally-collected data was compiled 
for the Eastern DRC as a whole: “I was responsible for psychosocial data and I would cringe 
when I saw these presented as nationally-validated statistics”.36  The empirical picture that 
emerges in the face of these difficulties is complex, but nonetheless provides some grounds 
for analysis. Four large sample studies in particular give strong indications of the distribution 
and form of sexual violence in Eastern DRC for a range of territories at multiple points in 
the Congo Wars. 
International Alert and partners' study of sexual violence in South Kivu from 1996 to 2003 
drew on 492 informants who had suffered rape during that period (Figure 17).37  Victims 
reported that the majority of rapes were both 'isolated' and 'planned', meaning that they had 
been conceived by perpetrators in advance and took place some distance from public spaces. 
At the same time, a significant proportion (almost 40%) of rapes took place in public. The 
overwhelming majority of rapes were carried out by multiple assailants – were, in common 
parlance, gang rapes – and most were accompanied by some torture or additional brutality. 
Around 10% involved sexual slavery,  and more than 12% were accompanied by the 
insertion of objections into genitals. Médecins Sans Frontières' (MSF) study of violence in 
Ituri during the shorter period of August 2004 to January 2005 arrived at very similar 
conclusions. 807 patients at MSF clinics reported on acts accompanying sexual violence they 
had suffered (Figure 18).38 The vast majority of rape was coerced by armed fighters and was 
usually gang rape. A similar sub-group of victims experienced either additional violence or 
sexual slavery. A similar follow-up study published recently arrived at similar conclusions.39
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36! Anonymised respondent, Goma, June 2010.
37! Réseau des Femmes pour un Développement Associatif, Réseau des Femmes pour la Défense des Droits et la 
Paix, and International Alert 2005.
38! Médecins Sans Frontières 2005. See footnote 40 above on Panzi.
39! Duroch, McRae, and Grais 2011.
Figure 17: Types of  Attack in Rape Incidents, South Kivu, 1996-2003 (492 respondents)40
Figure 18: Types of  Attack in Rape Incidents, Bunia, Ituri, August 2004-January 2005 (807 patients)41
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40!Data from Réseau des Femmes pour un Développement Associatif et al. 2005:33–36, 62.
41! Data from Médecins Sans Frontières 2005:10.
Figure 19: Types of  Attack in Rape Incidents Reported at Panzi Hospital, 2004-2008 (4,311 patient 
records)42
Figure 20: Types of Attack in Sexual Violence Incidents Over Lifetime for Male (m) and Female (f) Victims, 
Kivus, Maniema and Ituri (998 respondents)43
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42! Data from Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International 2010:13, 16.
43! Data from Johnson et al. 2010:557. The red sections of the bars indicate percentages of all sexual violence while 
the extended blue bars indicate percentages within cases of rape. So more than 30% of all cases of sexual 
violence where the victim was female involved multiple assailants, and more than 60% of all cases of rape 
where the victim was female involved multiple assailants.
An analysis of all records of sexual violence at Panzi Hospital by Oxfam and the Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative (hereafter Oxfam-HHI) drew conclusions on the basis of 4,311 
patient records covering medical examinations and after-care between 2004-2008 (i.e. after 
the formal conclusion of the Congo wars) (Figure 19).44  Again,  rape was most usually 
carried out armed groups (52% of rapes attributed to either a specified or unspecified 
armed group compared to only 6% by civilians, with the remainder of cases without 
perpetrator attributions, but likely also military)  and was overwhelmingly gang rape. A 
similar proportion of victims (around 12%) experienced associated sexual slavery.45  On 
release, this study was widely reported as showing an increase in rape by civilians.46  But, 
despite the emphasis on this issue in the report (principally in terms of very large 
proportional increases in civilian perpetrators,  rather than their role on an absolute scale) 
the researchers actually concluded that sexual violence in South Kivu is “largely 
militarized”, and that the vast majority of  perpetrators do belong to armed groups.47
More challenging to the conventional understanding of rape in Eastern DRC is a fourth 
study by Kirsten Johnson and colleagues,  who interviewed 998 people in a representational 
cross-sectional study of the Kivus, Maniema and Ituri.48 Because clinic-level data is likely to 
privilege war-related atrocity, the research team's method of random interviews was able to 
reveal a much greater extent of civilian and intimate-partner rape than previously explored. 
Intimate-partner violence stood at around 31% for women and 17% for men, with conflict 
related sexual violence at 74% and 65% respectively. Peterman et al. have also shown the 
existence of significant levels of civilian rape, with 35% of women in some parts of Congo 
reporting intimate partner sexual violence (compared to rates of 12-15% in neighbouring 
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44!Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International 2010.
45! The conclusion that unattributed rapes were also likely carried out by armed groups comes from an analysis of 
the other known characteristics they shared with military-perpetrated rapes. See Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative and Oxfam International 2010:14.
46! See Al Jazeera 2010; Ross 2010; Pflanz 2010a; Fallon 2010.
47! Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International 2010:2, 33. What the study tracked was an increase 
in civilian rape on these measures from 1% of reported rapes in 2004 to 38% in 2008: Ibid., 19. This perhaps 
reflects a decline in armed group activity or a greater willingness to report civilian rape, as well as the 'spread' 
of rape to the civilian population usually cited. Several respondents raised concerns about the report by Oxfam 
and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, launched just before the interviews took place, and most concluded 
that civilians accounted for an important part of the data, but that the majority perpetrators were still armed 
groups. 
48! Johnson et al. 2010.
countries).49 Amongst those reporting sexual violence in the Johnson et al. study, gang rape 
was again common (although significantly less  so for men), and sexual slavery a more 
significant factor than suggested in other studies for both sexes (Figure 20). The surprising 
figures for levels of male rape were matched by evidence of female violence, with women 
reporting carrying out wartime sexual violence against other women in 41% of cases, and 
against men in 10% of cases.50  For sexual violence carried out by both men and women, 
perpetrators were again overwhelmingly combatants rather than civilians.
As with all analyses, there are potential problems with this data, as the authors themselves 
note in each case. It is possible that there is some double-counting across the studies,  for 
example because the Johnson et al,  International Alert and Oxfam-HHI studies all draw on 
data from South Kivu (although the International Alert and Oxfam-HHI studies examined 
different time periods). There are also some issues around direct comparison of the 
categories in the different studies.51  Nevertheless,  when taken together these detailed 
accounts provide information on some 5,900 victims of sexual violence, which is itself a very 
large corpus of data, even if the results  cannot be generalised more widely beyond these 
samples.52
Bodies As Battlegrounds
Qualitative, summative, impressionistic and activist accounts generally reinforce these 
findings. A number of the distinctive forms of sexualised brutality discussed in Chapter 1 
are again present. For example,  the deliberate destruction of victims' genitals appears to be 
common. The Provincial Synergy to Combat Sexual Violence in South Kivu estimating that 
20% of all rape victims suffered irreparable damage to their genital organs, that fistulas are 
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49! Peterman et al. 2011:1065.
50! Men carried out the remainder of the wartime sexual violence in both categories, with small numbers of 
attacks (less than 1%) being carried out by men and women together (Johnson et al. 2010:557).
51! The overall Johnson et al. figures are not strictly comparative, since 'sexual violence' included more than rape 
in their study. Of 202 women and 88 men reporting sexual violence, 105 and 18 respectively had been raped (so 
approximately 52% of sexual violence against women and 20% of sexual violence against men was rape). For 
Johnson et al., only about half of sexual violence was coded as rape, whereas for Oxfam-HHI 'rape' and 'sexual 
violence' were treated as interchangeable.
52! Here I count only the respondents from the Johnson et al. study who reported sexual violence (conflict-related 
or not) and not the entire sample of interviewees.
widespread, and that 22% of rape victims in the province were HIV-positive.53 The clitorises 
and vaginas of victims have been cut with razor blades and 'Banyamulenge' troops are 
alleged to have shot suspected 'Mai-Mai wives' in the vagina.54 In at least two similar cases in 
Kabumbe, RCD soldiers shot women they had raped in the genitals, killing them.55 Reports 
of additional violence towards victims' bodies beyond rape itself are common in the 
documentary literature.56 
Rapes are often public and accompanied by deliberate humiliation. Women have been raped in front 
of their husbands and children, and fathers have been forced to rape their own daughters at 
gunpoint.57  The practice of forcing family participation is reported as widespread by aid 
workers.58  A doctor at Panzi related that soldiers would often surround villages and then 
rape women publicly and collectively, including children and the elderly.59 Coerced dancing 
and obscene singing are also common features in these charades.60  As would be expected, 
these rapes often involve multiple perpetrators.61 
Another consistent theme concerns gendered and sexual slavery. Women have been forcibly 
recruited to act as porters or cooks,  and many of these sexually exploited or raped. Women 
have been abducted for months at a time to provide services traditionally thought of as 
'women's work'.62  Of 101,000 fighters demobilised by the National Commission for 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (CONADER), 2,600 were women, 
indicating the extent to which chronic slavery 'integrates' brutalised women into fighting 
forces.63  
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53  United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:14
54! Human Rights Watch 2002:54–55.
55  Human Rights Watch 2002: 55.
56! See Amnesty International 2008:11; Human Rights Watch 2009b; Réseau des Femmes pour un 
Développement Associatif et al. 2005:34–35; Wakabi 2008:15.
57! Human Rights Watch 2005a:10; United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:12.
58! Wakabi 2008:15.
59! Pratt and Werchick 2004:7.
60!United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:319–320.
61! Human Rights Watch 2005a:10–12, 2009b:30; Réseau des Femmes pour un Développement Associatif et al. 
2005:33.
62! Amnesty International 2008:9; Human Rights Watch 2005a:9, 17, 2009b; Rodriguez 2007:45.
63! United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:15. On the wider phenomenon of forced female labour in DRC, 
see Dzhambazova and Bashengezi 2012.
It also appears that many of the victims are children. Depending on the area of violence, 
between 35% and 50% of all reported rape cases concern children between the ages of 10 
and 17 years old, and more than 10% of all rape cases concern children under the age of 
10.64  13% of victims documented by the Provincial Synergy to Combat Sexual Violence in 
South Kivu in 2007 were girls under the age of 18 and in one case in Ituri in the early 
2000s, a victim of four months was recorded.65   A Canadian-funded programme in Ituri 
and the Kivus had assisted 4,222 child survivors of  sexual violence by 2007.66 
As well as being victims, children are also often combatants. This is  especially so with some groups, 
such as the Lord's Resistance Army, that actively seek young recruits through campaigns of 
kidnapping.67 CNDP forces have also been held responsible for large-scale child recruitment 
in North Kivu.68  One local organisation recorded 236 recruitments from schools in 
September 2007 alone and there was also testimony that the CNDP had recruited from 
inside IDP camps in areas it controlled.69 An adult forcibly recruited into the CNDP training 
centre at Bwiza,  Rutshuru in August 2007, estimated that there were 170 children (mainly 
between 15 and 17 and only boys) and 250 adults in the camp.70 A UNICEF study reported 
8-10,000 child soldiers in the Ituri alone in 2003 and groups like the UPC and the Hema 
militias used children as young as 7 and 8 for both soldiering and domestic work.71  The 
RCD-National and RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération groups apparently included 
up to 25% children in their ranks.72 
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64! United Nations Security Council 2009b:14.
65! United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:7; Pratt and Werchick 2004:7.
66! Human Rights Watch 2007:26.
67! Human Rights Watch 2009c.
68! The CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) are an armed group particularly active after 2006 in 
Eastern DRC. Led by Laurent Nkunda and then Bosco Ntaganda, they were considered the main security 
threat from that time to the present. Now formally a political party, their elements were integrated to various 
extents into the FARDC, but have recently been heavily involved in the so-called M23 rebellion. These 
developments are partly addressed in the next two chapters, but see Stearns 2008.
69! Amnesty International 2008:15.
70! Amnesty International 2008:20.
71! Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004:13.
72! Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004:14.
Figure 21: The Brutalised Innocent: 'Rebel Rebel' (2011), Richard Mosse's Aerochrome Infrared image of 
a young APCLS rebel in North Kivu, wearing a Sponge Bob Squarepants t-shirt and the photographer's 
glasses.73
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73! From Mosse 2012:61.
Figure 22: The Monstrous Masculine: 'Congo, November 2008', Alvaro Ybarra Zavala's image of  a 
soldier posing with a severed penis and a severed hand.74
The two dimensions of child involvement in the war seem fundamentally related, in that 
children can be brutalised when kidnapped by being forced to kill and rape, which often means that 
they cannot return to their communities once demobilised for fear of the local people who 
observed their acts.75 As Chapter 5 briefly suggested, this situation proves deeply unsettling, 
since it brings into disturbing proximity the figures of the brutalised innocent – who we want 
to shield from war and return to the innocence of youth – and the monstrous masculine – 
the nauseating representative of total degradation, and the one to blame for the horrors of 
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74! As he later recalled “I saw three soldiers smoking, playing with their guns, and felt safe – I don't know why. 
Then I saw a man with a knife in his mouth, coming out of the bush – he was holding up a hand like a trophy. 
The soldiers started laughing and firing in the air. I didn't think about it and began shooting. He walked 
directly at me. People surrounded us, celebrating. I thought, 'Don't do anything crazy, just act like you're part 
of this crazy party'”. See The Guardian 2011.
75! Amnesty International 2008:20–21.
rape (Figures 21 and 22).
Although a generally neglected topic, men and boys have also been targeted for rape, often 
specifically for 'forced incest', where they are compelled to rape family members,  but also 
through sexual abuse in custody, where rape establishes hierarchy and where some men 
report being raped publicly by female guards.76  At one legal clinic in Goma, men were the 
victims in 10% of the sexual violence cases in June 2009, and aid workers reported large 
increases in the months since.77 Former combatants admit inserting sticks and hot knifes into 
male penises as forms of torture.78 And the Mapping Report includes details of male victims 
in 5% of the 1,660 cases of rape recorded in Fizi from 1998 to 2003.79  Leaving aside the 
Johnson et al. estimate it is  hard to quantify the scale of such violence. Even in that case,  the 
sample of  men reporting rape amounted to only 18 individuals.80
It was particularly difficult to discover what extent of sexual violence incidents may involve 
male survivors, or what form such violence might take in the context of ongoing conflict. 
Some suggested that reports of male rape and male survivors were increasing, and even that 
male survivors may have accounted for as much as 9% of registered sexual and gender-
based violence cases reported in 2009.81  UNFPA itself stated that the number of men 
accessing rape-related services was very small – only 10 men did so in the Kivus in 2007, 
rising to 124 in 2008 and 178 in 2009. This compared to 12,755 women accessing services 
in 2008 and 15,108 in 2009.82  Others reported that they had never encountered male 
victims of rape in any of their programmes.83  Heal Africa, a Goma-based hospital and 
ecumenical organisation dedicated to treating survivors of sexual violence, reported that 
only some 2% of cases they had dealt with in 2010 had involved male survivors, slightly 
lower than for 2009, when 84 out of  3,086 cases (or 2.7%) had featured male rape.84
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81! Interviews with Hilary Margolis, International Rescue Committee, Goma, 28 May 2010; Sage Mulinda, Alpha 
Ujuvi NGO, Goma, 3 June 2010; and COOPI oﬃcial, Bukavu, 8 June 2010.
82! Figures provided by UNFPA oﬃcial, Goma, 17 June 2010.
83! Interview with Save the Children oﬃcial, Goma, 3 June 2010.
84! Interview with Joseph Ciza, Heal Africa, Goma, 10 June 2010.
While some organisations emphasised that there programmes were open to all, most 
reported that they had no programmes designed specifically to address the impact of rape 
on men.85  It was reported that Women for Women were running a programme with men 
specifically on the issue of taking leadership on sexual violence issues. In addition, V-Day 
have been planning a campaign centred around men to be launched as 'V-Man' when they 
open their 'City of Joy', to function both as a tool for sensitisation and a way to train male 
activists.86  It was also suggested that the UK Foreign Office may be piloting a scheme with 
men as positive role models in the DRC. However, there was little sense of established 
programmes currently addressing these issues. As one interviewee put it, “Gender here is 
women, mostly”.87
These forms of sexual violence summon familiar questions over which kind of analysis 
could account for this variety. Certainly the use of children as soldiers would seem to 
mitigate against any straight-forward description of their actions as the behaviour of freely-
choosing market-rational actors (although there is a persuasive military logic to kidnapping 
children as soldiers in the first place). Again, the frequency of mutilation stands out as 
complicating appeals to instrumentality, while the significant extent of slavery suggests that 
there are uses to which victims are put (although the balance between labour and sexual 
abuse within that category is not explored by any study in depth).88  In part this requires a 
more fine-grained analysis of combatants and perpetrators, which will be undertaken in the 
remainder of this thesis, but three consistently-reported aspects of sexual violence stand in 
particular need of explanation: the use of gang rape in the majority of cases; the migration 
of rape into sexualised slavery in a significant and persistent minority of incidents; and the 
varying use of additional brutality from object insertion to mutilation and torture in a 
significant minority of  attacks.
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85! None of the organisations interviewed reported running any programmes dealing specifically with men either 
as survivors or as perpetrators.
86! Interview with Christine Schuler-Deschryver, V-Day, Bukavu, 8 June 2010.. See http://drc.vday.org/ for details 
on the 'City of Joy'.
87! Interview with UNOCHA oﬃcial, Goma, 15 June 2010.
88! One study distinguished between victims who had been forced to work and those that had been forced to 
become 'wives'. The percentage was roughly equivalent in each case (3.7% of victims forced to work and 4% 
forced to marry). See Duroch et al. 2011:6.
Who Rapes? 
We have seen that perpetrators include female combatants and also that, even where 
violence by civilians appears to be on the rise, armed groups are the majority agents of 
sexualised violence. And yet identifying which groups are responsible for which kinds of sexual 
violence has proved extremely challenging for analysts. Even where victims can be identified 
and interviewed, it is hard to determine who was involved in a particular attack. Perhaps the 
most widely-quoted report on sexual violence in the DRC, Human Rights Watch's The War 
Within The War, illustrates the limitations of research under such complex and difficult 
conditions. A relatively small sample of 50 women and girls who had been subjected to 
sexual or gender-based violence, as well as some witnesses and relatives, were interviewed in 
the Kivus.89 Those who had been raped were generally unable to identify the perpetrators, 
since they came from outside their communities or hid their faces with masks or blinding 
light. There was no indication of what percentage of attackers might be strangers and what 
percentage might be known to victims but concealed by masks or disguises.90
The victims were to some degree able to place attackers by their statements, so that those 
who accused them of links with the RCD or the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) during the 
rapes could be identified as Mai-Mai, or because of the timing of attacks, such as when 
RCD and RPA soldiers raped them in reprisals against locally-based armed groups that had 
first attacked their positions. Victims also relied on ethnic appearance and the language of 
the perpetrators where possible.91  But attackers often deliberately obfuscate their identity, as 
in one case where a girl victim was actually instructed by  the perpetrators to report that her 
attackers were 'Interahamwe' and not RCD, a claim which is apparently reasonably 
common during rape attacks.92 Some groups seems to be differentiated by their patterns, so 
that Mai-Mai would abduct women for very long periods of time, such as a year or more, 
and seemed to require women to perform sexual acts for a number of combatants in the 
group, while other groups were more likely to 'allocate' abducted individuals to individual 
soldiers.93
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92 Human Rights Watch 2002:26–27; Pratt and Werchick 2004:9–10.
93!  Human Rights Watch 2002:25
There have been some efforts to track the changing incidence of human rights abuses and 
sexual violence attributable to different groups over time. For a period, MONUC released 
human rights reports at six month intervals providing a breakdown of identified 
perpetrators of abuses into the FARDC (the Congolese army), the PNC (Congolese 
National Police),  ANC (L'Agence Nationale de Renseignements) and other state-run 
Intelligence Services, and assorted militia groups (see Table 4). The patterns are clear. State 
forces, whether army, police or intelligence services, were overwhelmingly responsible for 
abuses and were implicated in up to 92% of all cases. On average, the combined rebel 
groups were held responsible for only 11.5% of  abuses.94
Period	 	 Incidents	 FARDC	 PNC	 	 ANC/Intel	 Militia	
1 April-31 Dec ‘05 1,866  46%  23%  5%   10% 
1 Jan-30 June ’06 905  53%  24%  7%   18% 
1 July-31 Dec ‘06 Unknown 40%  38%  9%   12% 
1 Jan-30 June ‘07 Unknown 43%  43%  8%   6% 
Table 4: Human Rights Incidents By Alleged Perpetrator, DRC, April 2005-June 200795
The figures indeed appear to show an increase in abuses by state forces and a decrease in 
militia abuses in the relevant period. The detailed figures for sexual violence are even more 
stark. MONUC concluded that the FARDC and PNC were responsible for 97% of all 
human rights violations in the DRC during the first six months of 2007, an increase on the 
63% of all cases attributed to them during July-December 2006.96 Armed groups were held 
responsible for only 3% of all such violations.97  MONUC analysts indeed concluded that 
“[t]he FARDC remains generally incapable of carrying out military operations in 
accordance with the law because of the ill discipline of the members of most units as well as 
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the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007b, 2007a. There is an apparent calculation 
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96 MONUC Human Rights Division and Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2007a:17-19.
97!  MONUC Human Rights Division and Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2007a:18.
their inadequate renumeration and logistical support”.98  Analysis by the UN Group of 
Experts in North Kivu held the FARDC responsible for around 35% of all human rights 
violations there in the first half of 2010 compared to 19% attributed to the FDLR (the 
Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, composed in part of  ex-genocidaires).99 
The sheer size of the FARDC is sometimes considered sufficient to account for its role in 
perpetrating violence.100  The national army's size is now estimated at 60,000 in eastern 
Congo.101 By comparison, in March 2009, total FDLR forces in the DRC were estimated to 
number 5,000-6,000 combatants.102 Increases in sexual violence are also attributed to rebel 
groups during military operations, although the balance still appears to tip towards atrocities 
by state forces.103  Many report being raped during or soon after military engagements, 
which would seem to indicate a link to military policy, although it could also be explained by 
an increase in the absolute number of troops and hence in opportunities for opportunistic 
sexual assaults.104 
Even where the FDLR to appear to be responsible for most of the sexual violence, it 
remains unclear how much this reflects an overall strategy, and how much the violent 
entrepreneurship of a particular faction, such as the notorious 'Rasta' held responsible for 
many of the rapes treated at Panzi.105  Similar problems plague the analysis of rape as a 
systematic tool used by other groups, especially where there are renegade elements, as in the 
case of the Congolese army's 14th Brigade, where perpetrators may be newly integrated 
elements rather than 'core' troops, as in the series of integrations of armed groups into the 
FARDC, or where groups initially characterised by a particular pattern have changed over 
time.106  For example, there is some evidence that Mai-Mai forces originally constituted 
something of a 'popular resistance' movement, but were later infiltrated by other elements 
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99 United Nations Group of Experts 2010:13.
100 Human Rights Watch 2009b:5.
101 Human Rights Watch 2009b:20.
102 United Nations Security Council 2009b:10.
103!  United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:9.
104  On abuses after military engagements, see for example Human Rights Watch 2002:46.
105! United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:7.
106 On the 14th Brigade in particular see Human Rights Watch 2009b. On integration see Thakur 2008.
with more of an interest in exploitative practices. Indeed, it had even been said that until the 
arrival of  “Kabila with the Tutsis”, the Mai-Mai did not rape at all.107 
There certainly appears to be a strong relationship between the deployment of government 
troops in combat and increases in sexual violence, as during Kimia II operations against the 
FDLR, in which FARDC elements in the Kivus have been held responsible for coercing 
village chiefs into organising labour, pillaging villages,  and for “substantial increases” in 
sexual violence wherever they have been deployed.108 Successive operations by the FARDC 
with MONUC support have generally only worsened the general security situation and 
proliferated instances of rape and atrocity.109  Nor is sexual violence restricted to armed 
groups operating in the DRC. Although the numbers are too low to warrant a substantive 
investigation here, peacekeepers have been found to trade food or small sums of money for 
'sexual contact'  with women and girls often under the age of 18, and some as young as 13, 
indicating “a pattern of  sexual exploitation”.110 
In addition to the generic distinctions employed in some studies surveyed above (specified 
armed group, unspecified armed group, and civilian perpetrators),  the International Alert 
and Johnson et al. Studies provide a more fine-grained breakdown. In stark contrast to 
MONUC reports, neither identifies the FARDC as perpetrators of sexual violence at all. 
Instead both rank 'Interahamwe' as the majority perpetrators, at 27% and 22% respectively, 
followed by the FDD, RCD, Mai Mai and FDLR. Since 'Interahamwe' is a blanket term for 
purportedly Rwandaphone militias,  this leaves little sense of any one major actor. In both 
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109 International Crisis Group 2010:i, 9.
110 United Nations Human Rights Council 2008:12. In one case in December 2001 a Congolese women allegedly 
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rape. But allegations have also been substantiated against all categories and all levels of UN staﬀ, with civilians 
found to be guilty more often than military personnel. See Human Rights Watch 2002:95; Dahrendorf 
2009:10–
studies the Mai Mai appear to constitute some 15% of attacks.111  On these figures, then, 
sexual violence has a highly distributed character, being practiced by many groups and often 
indeterminate in source. The absence of FARDC attributions is very striking, and illustrates 
a running confusion over perpetrators. For example, on the very  same page that one MONUC 
study concluded that more than 90% of abuses were by state agencies, it was also stated that 
the major perpetrators of rape in South Kivu specifically were members of foreign armed 
groups such as the FDLR.112 In a similar vein, the UN's Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women has noted both MONUC's figures for sexual violence in the DRC as a 
whole and the Provincial Synergy's analysis of sexual violence in South Kivu in 2007, which 
indicated that 70% of all rape was carried out by non-State groups, 16% by the FARDC or 
PNC, and a further 14% by civilians.113  In neither case was any attempt made to explain 
this discrepancy between overall sexual violence and that carried out in South Kivu. 
Each piece of research is detailed and consistent over time with other analyses of the same 
sort. But the gulf in estimations is more than an anomaly. Even if we assume some 
important sample differences in time, place or circumstance, it simply cannot be that the 
FARDC are both the majority perpetrators of sexual violence and do not commit rapes on 
any measurable scale. MONUC human rights violations reports cover the whole country 
and so many of the reported incidents may have taken place in Kinshasa or other areas 
from the Eastern conflagrations.114  Yet this does not account for the absence of FARDC 
attributions in other reports, especially given clear indications that army operations in the 
Kivus and adjacent areas often result in rights violations. The only plausible explanation is 
that the International Alert and Johnson et al. research teams asked only about rebel groups 
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Rights 2007a:6.
or excluded government forces from the results in an equivalent way.115  For the MONUC 
figures, it is possible that victims were only able to report sexual violence in areas which were 
under joint MONUC-FARDC control, paradoxically meaning that the FARDC appeared to 
be perpetrators to a much greater extent than other armed groups that they had successfully 
expelled or neutralised.
Whatever the truth, this analysis of perpetrators indicates a similarly fragmented pattern to 
those from victim reports. Given that the FARDC has, at least since 2003, integrated other 
armed groups,  it may well be that atrocities attributed to it were actually carried out by units 
which would otherwise have been considered part of rebel group. Thus, even if the most 
vivid of MONUC statistics was to believed, it is not clear that the FARDC commit rape on 
state orders (an issue that will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 9). However, the 
consistent lack of clear information on perpetrator identity, combined with the frequently 
isolated nature of rapes, is  itself suggestive. It indicates that rapes are not often part of the 
conduct of battle itself (as might be expected in a straight-forwardly geopolitical version of 
instrumentality) and that soldiers are not actively trying to impress their identity on victims 
(as might be expected in understandings of mythology stressing genocidal rape or ethnic 
identity. Victims often refer to perpetrators in vague terms such as 'Interahamwe' or 'Mai 
Mai',  which suggest little more than the men came from outside the community. Do these 
attempts by perpetrators to hide their identity point to shame (and therefore a moral code); 
opportunism (as criminals absent from their units without permission); a military strategy of 
confusion (sent by commanders to intimidate the local population); or a kind of 
contemptuous play (the psychopathological result of their own brutalisation)? After all,  the 
extent of  impunity hardly suggests a fear of  criminal prosecution. 
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115!This may reflect what Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers see as an excessive focus on rebels at the expense of 
critical perspectives on the DRC Government as itself a violent actor, political manipulator and process 
spoiler. See Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009:476.
An Un-Unified Theory Of  The Congo Wars116
These analytical problems reflect the underlying structure of violence in Eastern Congo. 
Armed groups coalesce, ally, split and shift in response to perceived threats and opportunities 
of politics,  economics and autonomy.117  Small groupings emerge and then dissipate, but 
cause great suffering nonetheless.118 For example,  in 2007 a militia called the Front Pour la 
Libération du Nord Kivu based on Mai-Mai and FDLR elements announced itself, 
ostensibly to help in containing the CNDP forces of Laurent Nkunda. Conflicts involving 
the FLNK, the FARDC, MONUC forces and Nkunda's troops internally displaced some 
370,000 civilians in October.119 Since then they seem to have dissappeared, and there is no 
discussion of  them in the recent major works on conflict in Congo.
Statistical consistency in patterns of rape (group rape by armed men, accompanied to a 
significant degree by further brutality and sexual slavery) are matched by divergence and 
confusion over the identities and motives of perpetrators. In contrast to situations where one 
military in particular was the major source of sexual violence (for example, the US army in 
Vietnam) or where a distinct gender cosmology informed the tactics of enemies (as in 
Bosnia's ethnic conflagration), war in the DRC is instead characterised primarily by 
fragmentation: of actors, motives, identities,  and lethal contestations. Wars themselves are 
shifting, ambiguous, hard to identify and locate in a given time-frame or place. 
In spite of attempts to project agendas onto it, this iterated conflict has been characterised as 
defying simple diagnosis, as a 'conceptual mess' and as ideologically inchoate.120 In the case 
of sexual violence, this has incubated a general condition of permissiveness, one usually 
defined in terms of impunity from the law, but also indicating an entire way of being a 
soldier and of  conducting a war:
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Wherever they went, the soldiers and officers of the RCD-Goma, whether 
stationed or on patrol, used the backdrop of war to abuse their power and 
rape women and young girls. This violence was accompanied by the 
breaking and entering of  victims' houses, theft and looting.121
Moreover, violence does not seem to have been restricted to moments of necessity (whether 
military, economic or symbolic):
The successive and concurrent wars in the DRC contributed to widespread 
sexual violence during the fighting, during the withdrawal of combatants, 
after the fighting,  in areas where troops were stationed, in occupied areas, 
during patrols, during reprisals against the civilian population and during 
raids conducted by isolated and sometimes unidentified armed groups.122
These descriptions conjure again the stereotypes of the sexual predator and the frustrated 
power-seeker, and perhaps too of the disorientated victim and liminal subject. The zones 
where unreason and mythological explanation join. But the economic survivor is present 
too. At the level of ordinary soldiers, there would certainly appear to be serious material 
pressures. Overspends on the military are notorious in DRC where 'ghost soldiers' allow 
commanders to expropriate the pay of non-existent combatants, for example in setting up 
payment systems for 240,000 FARDC soldiers when there were probably less that 
120,000.123  But privates are paid only $10 per month: a 'clear incentive' to loot.124  The 
question is how this deprivation might be linked to sexual violence.
One discernible strategy of several armed groups is to resist demobilisation and brassage in 
order to maintain a strong bargaining position with the government over resources.125 
Violence is one way of achieving that, since it may encourage the government to concede 
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more, and sooner.126 Autonomy can also enable other strategies of personal enrichment and 
community protection.127  But attempts to achieve autonomy can just as soon invite the 
attentions of the FARDC, backed by MONUC and more recently working in collaboration 
with the Rwandan army. This has indeed been the case, and has not worked out well for 
many armed groups (as will be explored in greater detail in the coming chapter). Sexual 
violence may fit as part of  such an independence strategy.
Finally, the Eastern DRC is itself part of the dilemma. Why has sexual violence been so 
clustered there, when the Congo Wars initially took in large swathes of the country (see Map 
2)?  For several analysts, the history of the Kivus is a necessary element in any viable 
explanation for war there. As a site of conflict and revolt, it is a node in a regional network 
of political identities and a 'recycling point'  for armed groups,  a role that goes hand in hand 
with the lack of central state authority.128  As we will see, this is not merely a matter of 
natural resources, but encompasses land, identity (ethnic and otherwise),  demography, 
regional geopolitics and post-genocide conflict dynamics.
“Well, What Is The Feminist Perspective On Congo?”129
In short, a more fine-grained analysis is needed to reveal the dynamics of historical conflict, 
patterns of economic and political power, and the differing (and converging) characters of 
armed groups perpetrating sexual violence in Congo. What this will reveal is a relative 
disconnect between war and war rape in the region. Perhaps against expectations, 
understanding how armed groups sustain themselves and what motivates them to fight does 
not reveal why they rape, nor why rape takes certain forms. The analysis of forms of sexual 
violence and armed groups provided in this chapter has indicated fragmentation rather than 
ideological or economic coherence, and further inquiry will reinforce that conclusion.
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Map 2: Approximate Deployment of  Armed Groups During the Second Congo War130
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Since feminists are concerned with how putatively private acts of sexual violence are 
integral to the public politics of war, this analytical move may seem suspicious. But it is not 
an argument that suggests that rape has nothing to do with war. It remains a practice of 
collective violence, and one ridden with politics. The dynamics of war as understood here – 
the allegiances made by armed groups, the ends sought, patterns of exploitation and 
funding, ideological beliefs and communal support – are articulated together with wartime 
sexual violence, but also operate with some degree of freedom from it. In the same way that 
the content of the Congo Wars is not exhausted by the motives of group leaders or resource 
accumulation, so too wartime sexual violence cannot merely be reduced to the functional 
expression of those 'higher' agendas. Revealing how gender power circulates in ways that do 
not align with geopolitics indeed resonates strongly with feminist curiosities. 
Existing feminist analyses of the Congo Wars have advanced a broad diagnosis, seeing rape 
as, for example, a combination of “social constructs of masculinity and the politics of 
exploitation” but also endorsing view of it as “functional” and “a systematic and brutal 
weapon”.131  As with other accounts examined in Part Two, there is  an unremarked 
combination here of distinct processes and logics: both individual motivation and discursive 
identity, both political economy and affective violence, both discipline and indiscipline, and 
so on. This is a way of observing that armed groups are involved in economic exploitation 
and that they are also the principle perpetrators of sexual violence, and therefore drawing 
the conclusion that the latter facilitates the former, all the while acknowledging a social 
constructionist dimension to gender attitudes. But there are other ways of understanding 
war and rape together apart from through this reduction. In particular,  how do we reconcile 
accounts of the Congo Wars (which pay little specific attention to the question of war rape) 
with feminist concerns over gendered suffering (which tend to say very little about other 
histories of violence?). The next three chapters turn to claims about identity, power and 
resources and try to uncover how they might be related to sexual violence in an attempt to 
progress just this question. 
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Chapter Eight
COCKROACHES AND AUTOCHTHONES IN 
THE GREAT LAKES WAR COMPLEX
For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in sum) doing to 
others as we would be done to,) of themselves, without the terror of some power, 
to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that 
carry us to partiality, pride, revenge and the like. And covenants, without 
the sword, are but words, and of  no strength to secure a man at all.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Or The Matter, 
Forme, and Power of  a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civill 1
And all the peripheral conflicts started to roll down the Congo basin like so 
many overripe toxic fruits. 
Gérard Prunier, Africa's World War 2
Strategic Ethnocentrism3
Congo has been a place not only for fantasies of Africa but also for many of its crucial 
historical events. But it is the 1994 Rwandan genocide that casts the longest shadow over 
atrocity in the DRC. The Banyarwandan diaspora (spanning the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi)  and the main Hutu-Tutsi dynamics attributed to it are so invested with 
responsibility for violence that the Second Congo War is often known simply as “the war of 
the Banyamulenge” in reference to those of purportedly Rwandan Tutsi ancestry.4 It is not 
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Kivu population in the 1970s. See in particular Mamdani 2002:239–241; 249–250; Pottier 2002:9–53; Prunier 
2009:51–53.
unusual to hear that it was the Rwandans who brought sexual violence to the DRC. Nor is 
this view of a pre-genocidal sexual peace restricted to non-Kinyarwanda Congolese citizens. 
A UN official who had been in Kigali at the time of the genocide similarly claimed that 
patterns of atrocity today could be traced back to that seminal event: “I really believe that 
the intensity of violence that we see today was imported from violence in 1994...they've 
developed a culture where they think they can do anything”.5
The Rwandan genocide is better understood as a catalyst for, rather than as the cause of,  the 
Congo wars.6  It was an event embedded in the regional politics of autochthony – of 
organicist territorial identity.7 Those politics have a close bearing not only on the question of 
sexual violence, but on the general dynamics of violence in Eastern Congo. For example, 
Tutsis had infamously been portrayed as inyenzi (cockroaches) in the genocide, and the same 
cosmological imagination could be seen at work when genocidaires who had fled to Congo 
organised attacks against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from Goma in July 1994, a 
counter-operation they christened 'Operation Insecticide'.8  And many more contemporary 
exchanges of brutality occur within similar appeals to origins, identities,  and the threat of 
extermination.
This chapter explores some of these themes by stepping back from the close analysis of 
sexual violence developed in the last chapter. It explores patterns of war and belonging, 
examines the differing character of some armed groups, and advances an argument about 
retaliatory atrocity that stresses its mythological character (group identity, the precarity of 
performative identities) and resonance with themes of bonding, rage and abjection from 
unreason. This line of analysis begins to reveal how we might make better sense of atrocities 
like those of Kasika, and unravel the gender politics of the “imaginative encounter” in 
· 229·
5! Interview with MONUC Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration oﬃcer, Goma, 11 June 2010.
6! Prunier 2009:xxxi; Stearns 2012a:8.
7! 'Autochthony' literally specifying “of the soil itself ” (Geschiere and Jackson 2006:2). As Jackson comments, 
there is a “rather conventional irony” here, since the language of autochthony is ultimately traceable to French 
policy in the Sudan in the late 1900s, where it was put to use in the colonial ordering of local populations 
(Jackson 2006:97–98).
8! Stearns 2012a:27. See also Mamdani 2002:129; Fujii 2004; Jackson 2006:109–110. However, Straus provides 
some grounds for doubting the prevalence of dehumanising metaphors amongst perpetrators. See Straus 
2006:158–160.
Eastern Congo.9 
A Place Of  Negations10
In some senses, the impact of the Rwanda genocide and civil war is hard to over-state. It 
contaminated the worlds of those those who lived through it.11  But the effects of the 
genocide on Eastern Congo are less often discussed. After the killings, so many Rwandans 
had fled into Congo or had been herded into IDP camps in the South that only some 45% 
of the prewar population (or 3.6 million people)  remained to live 'normally'  in Rwanda.12 
Between July and August of 1994, no fewer than 850,000 refugees arrived in North Kivu, 
320,000 in South Kivu, and 62,000 in Uvira, where they joined 225,000 Burundian refugees 
who had themselves fled in 1993 (see also Map 3 and 4).13
The impact on economic, social and environmental life was huge: “The refugees behaved as 
if in a conquered country,  cutting firewood without authorization, stealing cattle, plundering 
crops, setting up illegal roadblocks, and, this not in an anarchic,  disorganized way, but, on 
the contrary, clearly responding to the directives of a sinister and powerful leadership”.14 
These movements exacerbated the set of pressures on land already present, pressures which, 
as we shall see, are hard to distinguish from ideas about identity.15 
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10! Achebe 1978:2.
11! “To understand the complexity of the postgenocide situation in Rwanda, one should imagine a world in which 
many of the German SS would have had Jewish relatives and in which the postwar State of Israel would have 
been created in Bavaria instead of the Middle East” (Prunier 2009:1)
12! Prunier 2009:5.
13! Prunier 2009:53.
14! Prunier 2009:545–55.
15! Autesserre 2010:141. Land pressures have themselves been blamed to varying degrees for the patterns of the 
Rwandan genocide themselves. See André and Platteau 1998; Verpoorten 2012.
Map 3: Rwanda: Refugees and Displaced Populations, 31 March 199516
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16! Reproduced from Pottier 2002:xvii.
Map 4: Hutu refugee flows into DRC in the aftermath of  the Rwanda genocide17
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17! Reproduced from Prunier 2009:xxv.
The link, real or imagined, between suffering today and those events continues to animate 
political passions. As Paul Kagame, Rwanda's post-genocide leader and driving force behind 
shifts in regional geopolitics,  has put it: “When a Tutsi is killed in Bukavu [in Eastern DRC], 
it is not one death, but a million and one”.18  Correspondingly, for the FDLR the conflict is 
partly the result of an unacknowledged 'double genocide',  one in which Hutus are the 
victims as much as Tutsis.19  Common Cause, a group of Congolese women activists in 
London, have expressed the situation thus:
...for over a decade, the Congolese populations in Ituri,  North and South 
Kivu have been suffering the consequence of the fratricidal conflict 
between ethnic Rwandans – Hutu and Tutsi – who were exported onto 
Congolese soil by mandate of Operation Turquoise by the UNSC in 
1994.20
About a million people crossed over to Eastern Congo after the genocide.21  The camps set 
up in the wake of this influx hosted both refugees and former genocidaires, and so became the 
locus of a vast renegade power structure within Eastern DRC. Fleeing Rwandan forces loyal 
to the Hutu regime amounted to some 22,000 soldiers stationed around Lake Kivu.22  The 
crisis was such that the international community poured money into the Eastern DRC, but 
with unintended violent consequences. Humanitarian aid to the refugee camps totalled 
more than $2 billion between 1994 and 1996, while aid to Rwanda itself came to only $897 
million in the same period, although there were two million refugees and five million people 
in Rwanda recovering from genocide and political collapse: a comparison giving $1.40 per 
capita per day in the camps compared to $0.49 per capita per day in Rwanda.23  These 
funds substantially benefitted the genocidaire leadership, allowing them to lay the foundations 
for the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) insurgency that continues 
to this day. 
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21! Stearns 2012a:15.
22! Stearns 2012a:26–27.
23! Prunier 2009:30.
But the situation in the camps had also set the scene for involvement by the new Rwandan 
leadership in the DRC. From the start the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were less 
interested in saving Tutsi civilians than preventing the formation of any viable counter-elite, 
regardless of the brutality required or the identity of victims.24 This required attacks against 
not only the remnants of the old regime who had fled to Congo, but on the mass of 
predominantly Hutu refugees that had gone with them. At Kibeho refugee camp in April 
1995, Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) forces began a massacre that would last hours, with 
UN peacekeepers watching on. A proper accounting was prevented by the RPA, but it 
seems that over 5,000 refugees were killed over the two days.25  The explanation for these 
atrocities must lie also partly in the character of the Rwandan genocide,  which was achieved 
through popular participation on a mass scale, and so stimulated fears of whole 
communities.26 
Major protagonists in war and sexual violence in Eastern Congo are closely linked to these 
dynamics. Laurent Nkunda, for one, volunteered for the RPF in the Rwandan civil war, was 
a top RCD-Goma commander, and remains insistent that he fights to protect Banyamulenge 
from any further genocide (being himself a Tutsi from Rutshuru in North Kivu).27  Making 
sense of agendas for war, and possible of repertories of sexual violence themselves, thus 
cannot escape a tracing of the impact of pre- and post-genocidal dynamics on the Kivus, an 
area in many ways more contiguous with Rwanda than with the rest of  the vast DRC.
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25! Prunier 2009:40–41.
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27! Prunier 2009:297–298; Stearns 2008.
A War Of  The Ordinary Person28 
The forces accelerated by the post-genocide situation had longer lineages within Eastern 
DRC, histories which they worked to polarise and inflame. Identities had not always been so 
rigid. In Rwanda itself, Hutu were able to become Tutsi through cattle acquisition at least 
until the middle of the 19th century.29  Rwandan populations have frequently been forced 
into migration by persistent drought as well as by political crisis, and that movement has 
usually been into Eastern Congo (or what is now Eastern Congo). There were major post-
famine migrations in 1928-29 (leaving some 7% of Rwanda's population dead) and 1943, 
and a politically-charged exodus in 1959-1961 of 150,000 Rwandan Tutsi in the lead-up to 
national independence. Moreover, the Belgian colonial powers had encouraged 'assisted 
migration' from 1937-1955.30  These population movements put considerable stress on the 
land, steadily increasing populations densities even before the arrival of refugees in 1994.31 
The waves of immigration from Rwanda to Congo in the 20th century were such that some 
500,000 descendants of Rwandan immigrants are estimated to have been living in North 
Kivu by 1990.32 And yet these pressures did not flower into mass brutality: 
Up until the middle of 1996, the question of Banyamulenge citizenship and 
civil rights had been fought mostly through memoranda and verbal 
provocations. This changed dramatically the moment Banyamulenge/RPA 
[Rwanda Patriotic Army] soldiers crossed into Zaire from Rwanda. While 
effectively on a mission of self-defence, the campaign was understood to be 
an invasion because of the massive logistical support received from both 
Rwanda and Uganda. Anti-Banyamulenge sentiment in South Kivu quickly 
turned from ugly to insane.33 
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out to be, and that it ended not with colonial rule, but with the reign of King Rwabugiri. See also Stearns 
2012a:14.
30! Pottier 2002:11, cf. Jackson 2007:484–485.
31! For example, the number of humans per square kilometre increased from 59 to 286 in Goma, from 26 to 91 in 
Rutshuru and from 39 to 101 in Masisi between 1957 and 1984 (cited in Prunier 2009:48). See also Vlassenroot 
and Huggins 2005:139–143.
32! Stearns 2012a:72.
33! Pottier 2002:42.
However, although both 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' are designations deployed in Eastern Congo, and 
although both often carry the prejudice and fear that they might connote elsewhere, their 
histories (pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial) are also importantly different. They are 
linked, for example, to memories of Banyamulenge assistance to Mobutu in putting down 
Eastern rebellions during the 1960s.34 Mobutu had used Banyarwanda, and especially Tutsi, 
in these decades precisely because of their vulnerable local position: he could be confident 
that they would not build a strong enough movement in the east to resist his plans.35  The 
exact overlap between identity and economic power varies by area and changes over time. 
For instance, North Kivu mines tend to be owned by Tutsi Kinyarwanda-speakers because 
of the citizenship rights policies pursued under Mobutu,  and so ethnic Hundes historically 
take issue with Tutsi land control in particular. In addition to this mix, North Kivu's most 
populous group is Congolese Hutu, who Hundes can view as immigrants, giving rise to three 
way tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, Hunde and Tutsi and Hunde and Hutu. The 
situation in South Kivu is more varied still, but in both both regions ethnicity can act as a 
uniting factor or as a source of tension (as in relations between Congolese Tutsi, Congolese 
Hutu, Rwandan Hutu rebels and the Rwandan army, all of whom are classified as 
Kinyarwanda-speaking).36
Eastern Congolese Hutu and Tutsi were largely in alliance, designated jointly as 
Banyarwanda, after 1960. Their unity was generated in significant part through subjection 
to Mobutu's strategies of bait-and-switch. The 1964 Constitution specified that citizens had 
to be able to trace ancestors from within Congolese territory to before 18 October 1908, 
excluding many who had migrated in the preceding decades but who otherwise considered 
themselves Congolese.37  For example, in Masisi,  Hunde autochtones quickly replaced Hutu 
officials, with consequent effects on the development of ethnic consciousness.38  Then, in 
1972, the position shifted again, allowing all those of Burundian or Rwandan heritage to 
call themselves Congolese so long as they had ancestry from before January 1950. 
Banyarwanda were able to accumulate power again, and some estimates suggest that an elite 
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37! Pottier 2002:26.
38! Pottier 2002:26–27.
of them gained up to 90% of the plantations in some areas.39  In Masisi a 1991 study 
apparently showed that 58% of the available land was controlled by only 512 families, 502 
of which were Banyarwanda.40  The resentment against this growing influence was a cause 
of yet another politico-judicial shift, this time to an inconsistently applied 1981 law requiring 
citizenship traceable to 1885.41 
It was not until 2004 that a new nationality law designated Hutu Banyarwanda in North 
Kivu as Congolese citizens (although even this retained some ambiguity and remnants of 
the native/foreign motifs past).42  Feeling more secure, and doubtless  influenced by the 
conflicts deepened in the genocidal aftermath,  these Hutu communities moved away from 
Tutsi Banyarwanda,  seeking an alliance with the Nande who had won provincial elections in 
2006.43  But this citizenship crisis was specific to North Kivu, and even here there are 
divisions, with Hutu living in Rutshuru being allowed a Native Authority on grounds that 
they were present before the 1880s, while Masisi Hutu are not considered indigenous in the 
same way.44  Similarly, whilst conflicts in Ituri have been characterised by intense violence, 
the situation in Masisi up until 2004 was more stable.45  But changes in the short-term 
politics and in the details of law still had to figure with an underlying atmosphere of fear 
and prejudice. In 2002, only 26% of respondents to one survey agreed that the 
Banyamulenge were Congolese.46 
In other words, the geographies of identification in Eastern Congo are highly complex, 
frequently fractured, and shift over time. In spite of the major role played by the genocide, 
there is no simple alignment of identities across the border. On Gérard Prunier's account,  it 
is thus misleading to understand violence in DRC either as a systematic attempt to 
annihilate Banyamulenge and North Kivu Tutsi on the part of genocidaires or as a case of 
'Banyarwanda predators' exploiting innocent indigenous Congolese. The Kivus are 
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41! Mamdani 2002:244.
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44!Mamdani 2002:235–239.
45! Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005:160–162, 151–156.
46! Stearns 2012a:265.
intimately connected to, but not merely an extension of, Rwanda.47 Rather, they form part 
of the Banyarwanda diaspora, which can be understood as “the most volatile of all diasporic 
networks in the region”, with the result that it was the Banyarwandan communities in North 
and South Kivu which were “dissolved”, in the wake of genocide, “into the by-now volcanic 
crucible of Rwandan politics”.48  And it is this diasporic fault-line that sits within a zone of 
civil warfare arcing from the Horn of  Africa to the two Congos.49 
Mulele Mai!50 
So the alliance between Rwandan Hutu refugees and militias expelled by war and massacre 
and Congolese Hutus was a result of the 1994 genocide, not a stable identification preceding 
it.51  Both Hutu and Tutsi in the Kivus had been targeted as a single Banyarwanda 
community over these decades. Despite the validity of Pottier's general claim about the 
post-1996 explosion in anti-Banyamulenge sentiment,  conflicts had taken place in the 1960s 
and the early 1990s over the threat of 'allochthons' to Hunde, Nyanga and Nande 
'autochthons'.52 Hutu-Tutsi dynamics, whatever their substance,  are only one element in the 
clash of identities. The language of autochthony could be mobilised in Hunde and Nyanga 
disputes as well as in distinctions with Kinyarwanda speakers, or in attempts to discredit 
candidates in one province as being from somewhere else.53  The major argument of 
Séverine Autesserre's The Trouble With The Congo develops precisely this dimension: 
peacekeeping has failed because it has been treated as a top-down mission, rather than as 
bottom-up peacebuilding working through the multiple local dynamics that are in fact 
driving violence.54  Despite disagreements over whether the explanation for all this is top-
down or bottom-up, Jason Stearns similarly sees not one or two Congo wars, but “at least 
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Banyamulenge allying themselves with Joseph Kabila against Rwanda and Rwandan-backed rebels, and richer 
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48! Mamdani 2002:38.
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51! Pottier 2002:29–30.
52! Vlassenroot and Huggins 2005:145–148; Jackson 2006:101.
53! Jackson 2006:101–102.
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forty or fifty different, interlocking wars”.55 
These micro-conflicts between communities revolve often around the control of land. 
Conflicts between groups like the Hema and the Lendu can be traced to before colonisation 
and to the different needs of herders (predominantly Hema) and farmers (predominantly 
Lendu).56  Here, as elsewhere, apparently 'ethnic' divisions are legacies of class distinctions. 
For Autesserre, then, rape appears as something of a side-effect of local conflicts and 
antagonisms, wrapped together with other forms of brutality.57 Occasionally she follows the 
instrumentalist path and suggests a strategic link, but when this is mentioned it is is said to 
actually increase the antipathy of civilians towards attackers.58  This is a view of conflict as 
resulting from “manipulation along the broader Great Lakes Rwandaphone ethnic 
configuration, and the debate on autochthony (in other words,  the conflict between originaires 
and non-originaires, locals and strangers)”.59 
And yet, against Autesserre's argument, the UN Group of Experts view from a few years ago 
was that “land and cattle ownership are not lucrative enough at the moment to constitute a 
central cause of the conflict” and that they played a more symbolic role.60  There are other 
reasons too why a land-conflict explanation cannot be so easily subsumed within 
instrumentality. For one, clashes were also founded on fears that each group was secretly 
working on a plan for the eradication of the other.61  Although clearly stoked by a degree of 
paranoia, such fears could not be considered fantastical given the history of pogroms and 
ethnic cleansing in the region. The ambiguity of these discourses means that apparent 
'necessity' is subject to considerable rhetorical influence. An economic relation could thus be 
transformed into a racial-cultural one. So whenever there were significant numbers of 
immigrants, “competition for land was easily manipulated...into ethnically motivated 
conflicts”.62
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The explanation for these dynamics is reminiscent of instrumentalised mythology, but 
ambiguously so. For many, the explanation for ethnic division is simple: that Mobutu – that 
exemplary 'ethnic entrepreneur' – created them, building on the legacy of colonialism.63 But 
identities clearly have a salience beyond this. The two prominent themes in the discussion of 
Eastern DRC – that ethnic divisions there are the product of centralised geopolitical plot, and 
that the Kivus are a space where the state does not have meaningful control – cannot easily 
co-exist.64  Mobutu and his heirs worked with the constellations of identity and interest they 
were given, and changed them in important ways,  but the reduction leaves a stubborn 
residue. It is harder still to take the extra step and say not only that violent expressions of 
identity are directed by the state and its geopolitical enemies in the region, but also that the 
dynamics of sexual violence in turn reflect their purposes (the failure of these stories to 
explain the spread of  violence in Congo will be themes returned to in the coming chapters). 
So the politics of this complexity is itself revealing for modes of critical explanation. What, 
after all, is autochthony? A cynical tool of control,  a gloss on desires to maim or a 
meaningful collective identity? As in other contemporary framings of the threatening 
stranger, there is something importantly slippery about authenticity discourse.65  It is, in 
Stephen Jackson's apt phrase, “dangerously flexible in its politics”.66  Since origins are 
relative, autochthony can always be flipped, and its advocates can find themselves on the 
wrong side of  a given historical construction.67  As discourse, it is
endemically nervous because many of those deploying it suffer the nagging 
fear that they could suddenly find themselves its objects. At some level, no 
one in the DRC seems to be sufficiently authochthonous to escape at some 
point becoming the target for accusations of  foreignness.68 
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Identities of this kind are thus ridden with affect, contingency and the spectre of 
contamination. The language of belonging can be microscopic, say in distinguishing 
different communities within a single ethnic group inside a single province in the last 
decades, as well as megascopic and physionomic, as in the 'Hamitic Hypothesis'  that posits a 
a thousand-year war of the 'Bantu' against the 'Nilotes', with the former characterised as 
variously as Nande, Nyanga, Hunde, and Hutu, agriculturalist, hardworking, gullible, 
shorter, darker-skinned, and with flattened noses and the latter as Rwandan, Burundian and 
Congolese Tutsi, Congolese Hema, Ugandan Hima and others, invaders from the Horn of 
Africa, regal, lazy, cunning, taller, lighter-skinned, and with more aquiline noses.69 
Thus saturated with tropes of purity,  infiltration, race history, and pathogens, the co-
implication of contests over land and identity, and their connection to acts of brutality, 
cannot be rendered as purely instrumental. Nor, given the shifts  in identifications in response 
to land and migration pressures, can they be taken as 'merely’ cultural. If we are to see 
sexual violence in Eastern DRC as linked to communal identities (whether for an 
instrumentalist explanation of deliberate mass intimidation, unreason's view of the 
breakdown of sense of self, or a mythological account of cultural violence), then we must 
understand those identities historically. But the history is riddled with paradoxes, 
disjunctures and reversals of collective fortune. Practically any atrocity, no matter by who or 
on who, could retroactively be explained by previous tensions between the groups in 
question. The layering of judicial categories on traditional socio-economic ones, as 
described above, poses the question as not simply one of 'ethnicity', but of a political 
identity.70  This layering is not restricted to the mixing of ethnic and political ideas, but 
becomes invested within land and property relations as well, at least when colonialism also 
bequeathed dual property systems mixing 'modern' rights with customary systems, as was 
the case in the Belgian Congo.71 Since the post-colonial situation was one in which differing, 
overlapping rights coexisted, ethnic identity became institutionalised, and groups sought 
autonomy by acquiring land along 'ethnic' lines.72 
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Recognising these legacies makes it easier to understand the otherwise perplexing practices 
of Mai Mai groups, amongst others. Initially considered as expressing a kind of egalitarian 
quality, and as genuinely representing the interests of local communities, Mai Mai militias 
have more recently come to be seen as a major source for sexual violence (recall from the 
last chapter the attribution of some 15% of sexual assaults in the east to Mai Mai forces).73 
Early estimates suggested that there were some 20-30,000 active Mai Mai, although 
individual groups tend to be much smaller, ranging from 50 to 1,000 combatants.74  As will 
become clearer in Chapter 10, there does appear to be a specific set of ritualised actions 
amongst some Mai Mai groups that would constitute strong evidence for the mythological 
mode. Mai Mai have been reported as raping in the belief that the act will make them 
invincible, and have been known to use body parts from victims for magical charms, 
including cutting off and drying the genitalia of both sexes and foetuses to make into 
amulets.75  Instances of sexual slavery – slavery for rape alone, without evidence of forced 
labour – have also been documented, with hundreds of captives held for days or months in 
different camps.76  And although Mai Mai groups vary greatly, these mythological 
characteristics appear to be a binding element: “the only commonalities between the 
different Mai Mai groups were their reliance on magic-based rituals and their pretense of 
being destined to defend their villages”.77 
Responding to a seemingly constant shifting of social relations in Eastern DRC, subjected to 
not only refugee influxes and the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, but also to regional 
major wars,  and drawing on a set of myths inherited from rebellions in the 1960s, Mai Mai 
groups emerged as true believers in the need for autochthonous violence.78 Like others, the 
Mai Mai have mythologised migratory histories to set a legitimate origin for themselves.79 This 
is the symbolic work of a precarious belonging, not the acts of instrumentally deploying a 
violent rhetoric,  even if such identities can be turned to instrumental purposes. The 
situation is not much different for the CNDP, although the communities in question, and the 
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direct tactics used, are distinct. The rise of the CNDP was not merely a military or 
mercenary phenomenon based on extraction or a 'spoiler'  agenda, but was instead related to 
fears of persecution amongst Banyarwanda communities stemming from changes in local 
power balances between 2003 and 2006.80  And, although the CNDP was (and is) linked to 
Rwanda, and although its formation in part reflected fears that local Kivu dynamics were 
favouring the FDLR, both Hutu and Tutsi could be found in its communal base, in 
Nkunda's brigades and in the group's senior ranks.81 
This explains how the dynamics of ethnic cleansing could remain even after the power of 
the genocidaires has ebbed. The influx of refugees in 1994 destabilised the east and heralded a 
new geopolitical balance in the region, one which would in turn end the reign of Mobutu, 
and twist against Kabila. At each point the originary upheaval has been layered with new 
politics and allegiances, to the point where figures from opposite sides of the Rwandan war-
genocide now collaborate. Since 2002 close rapprochement between elements of the RPF 
and some former genocidaires has taken place, as FDLR generals dealt in coltan with high-
ranking Rwandan military officers.82  More crucially, successive waves of militarisation have 
constricted the space of the FDLR. There is something of a paradox here. Defeating the 
FDLR is the rhetorical lynchpin of all state violence and international intervention in 
Eastern DRC, and yet they have often been neglected in favour of easier targets.83 
Organisational skill and tenacity has allowed them to survive, but not to flourish. FDLR 
numbers have been falling, and from 2009 to October 2010, MONUC estimated a decline 
from 6,500 soldiers to as few as 4,000.84  A UN demobilisation official in Goma concurred 
with that assessment and suggested that there were no more than 200 or 300 former 
genocidaires left in the FDLR.85  If the genocide did infect Eastern Congo with a particular 
repertoire of practices, including the patterns of sexual violence that studies have identified, 
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these forms of  brutalisation have long since diffused out from their progenitors.86 
What Is Retaliatory Atrocity?
Given this understanding of dynamics of power and belonging, we can return to the bloody 
scene presented by atrocities like that of Kasika. Just as the RCD troops there saw 
themselves as engaged in a retaliation, so too are many massacres in Eastern DRC described 
as responses, replies and reactions to some perceived harm.87  Jason Stearns explains the 
Kasika massacre in straight-forward terms: “The killers wanted to show the villagers that 
this could be the consequence of any resistance”.88 Yet Kasika's residents did not quite take 
the hint. Rather than changing their behaviour to respond to the RCD's signals, they 
became more angry,  the memories melding with a directionless resentment. As one resident 
explained to Stearns himself: “I hate the Tutsi. If I see a Tutsi face, I feel fear”. Another, 
asked if he could ever forgive, responded: “Forgive whom? We don't even know who did 
it”.89  If anything, the RCD's delivery of death and propaganda had “merely fuelled local 
resistance, and the region descended into vicious, cyclical violence”.90
In other cases, we again encounter the use of increasingly vicious brutality going far beyond 
penetrative rape: acts like placing hot peppers in the genitals of victims before burying them 
alive.91 Given the proportions of victims who described such additional violence (between 10 
and 12%, see Chapter 7, pgs. 207-208), these practices of  revenge demand some attention:
In many cases, the soldiers attempted to outdo each other in terms of the 
cruelty of the sexual violence to which they subjected their victims, by 
introducing objects into the genitals. Sticks, bottles, green bananas, wooden 
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batons coated in pepper or chilli and the barrels of  guns were all inserted.92
Is this instrumental, somehow rational?  As discussed in Chapter 4, explanations in the war 
studies literature frequently fall into circularities when faced with these kinds of examples. 
They say that the acts were rationally logical because otherwise troops would not engage in 
them, or that they seemed rational at the time, even if after the fact we can diagnose them in 
terms of signalling error or game-theoretic sub-optimality. Thus excluding affect, 
symbolism, rage,  irrationality and associated factors by definition. Especially where 
observers are so often killed immediately after the spectacle itself, any strategic ‘benefits’ of 
sexual violence would seem to be immediately squandered. The plausibility of these forms 
of instrumentalist explanation recedes even further when repeated atrocities only increase 
the determination of enemies. For example, the atrocities of Nanking do not seem to have 
been militarily successful but instead galvanized Chinese patriotism and animated 
worldwide anti-Japanese propaganda.93
Indeed, atrocity retaliations in Congo against civilians also appear to increased local 
community hatred of whoever committed them. Already considered not properly 
Congolese, Rwandan-backed armed groups do not appear to have profited from massacres 
such as Kasika. For their part, increasing abuses by Mai Mai forces earned them a 
reputation at odds with their initial profile as “prewar animosities turned into deadly 
grudges”.94  The long-term effect of iterated massacres thus appears not so much to be 
military or economic success, but increasing polarisation and hostility towards armed groups 
themselves. Repeated reference to 'settling accounts' are more reminiscent of the blood feud, 
mimetic exchange, and the violence of  symbolic equivalence than of  cool calculation.95 
This is not to say that soldiers are not agents of atrocity, nor that they might not be 
attributed responsibility for their acts. It is not the acts that are in question, but the meaning 
conferred on them, and the selection of some elements in the scene (say,  the looting of food) 
to act as the ends which rape and massacre are said retrospectively to have been aimed at. 
· 245·
92! United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2010:319.
93! Brownmiller 1975:41; Goldstein 2003:367.
94! Autesserre 2010:150.
95! See Jackson 2006:97.
Contradictions develop where analysts attempt to maintain both a symbolic and a rationalist 
dimension, as when Prunier describes the RPF both as a brutal military culture and as 
calculating users of terror for very clear political goals.96  The conceptual issues here are 
likely interminable, and cannot be settled decisively by appeals to evidence. They reflect in 
part the general hybridity of war with more extreme practices of ethnic cleansing and 
genocide: the seepage of doctrines of instrumental violence (merely overwhelming the 
enemy through judicious force) into those of purification (blurring into the civilian basis of 
the enemy's political power).97 
Nevertheless, on the reading provided here,  these patterns of violence must be recognised as 
significantly non-instrumental. Instead, they represent the most coherently mythological 
moments of violence in Congo, as soldiers bond in the performance of retaliation. The 
political complexities are such that few appear to endorse a fully exterminationist 
programme, responding instead to particular communities at given times for sometimes 
elusive betrayals. The perpetrators of atrocity may well be indoctrinated in a particular 
military culture, although alliances seem too shifting for that to be the general condition. 
More plausibly, they find themselves as liminal subjects and temporarily empowered 
communal enforcers,  reacting to whatever group has been smeared with the status of 
inauthenticity and allochthony in that episode of war. Retaliatory atrocities may also yield 
short-term material benefits, although we will see in the next chapter that they seem to have 
a different quality to the acts that secure profitable resources. They more closely border the 
expressions of fragmented sexual aggression characteristic of unreason,  expressions 
discussed with surprising openness by the combatants to be encountered in Chapter 10.
More Like 17th Century Europe Than Nazi Germany98
The immediate aftermath of the Rwandan genocide was only one moment in which the fate 
of Eastern Congo became intwined in the Great Lakes war complex. And in some senses 
the Rwandan and Congolese situations are in fact opposites. The Rwandan genocide was 
highly organised,  built on a long-gestating plan, clearly patterned in the forms of its 
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slaughter and targeted particular communities in an explicit way (if not only them). FDLR 
organisation reflected this heritage: soldiers were clustered in standardised units, subject to 
clear military hierarchy and a range of benefits, including leave, despite the nominally 
disorganised labels of rebels and insurgents. By contrast,  violence in the DRC is fragmented, 
widely distributed, subject to horizontal organisation (or that of minor hierarchies), 
communal but often not ethnic (at least not in any simple way) and combines periods of 
directed brutality with a general condition best understood not as 'impunity' in the sense of 
the mere absence of  judicial power, but as a familiar and general way of  conducting war.
Map 5: Countries intervening in the Second Congo War, 1998-200399
· 247·
99!  Reproduced from Prunier 2009:xxiv.
It is partly this contrast that has led several analysts to converge on a Hobbesian metaphor 
for understanding the fragmented nature of war in Congo. So Séverine Autesserre defines 
the problem as 'the missing leviathan'; Jason Stearns as a Thirty Years'  War without an 
emergent Commonwealth; and Gérard Prunier as a “pattern of the conflict was much older 
and prenationalistic: it was more like the Thirty Years' War that had ravaged Europe 
between 1618 and 1648”.100  These scripts are misleading, or at least ambiguous beyond 
repair. They pose the Eastern Congolese quagmire as a deficiency of effective state power 
and see in the European model the promise of settlement. They jointly mobilise that 
pernicious trope of putative difference (national,  cultural, geopolitical) as just a delayed re-
enactment of a primary history.101 And yet the Leviathan trope has another relevance in the 
Great Lakes, one tied to the centrality of state power and organisation – to ordered networks 
of killing – that made possible the Rwandan genocide.102 In Congo, land tensions themselves 
are properly read as the instantiation of a particular kind of state settlement. As parallels 
with 17th century Europe intimate, this  is in part a question of clashing warrants of 
legitimacy and overlapping political authority, but it is one that emerged from a deliberate 
colonial project to construct an ethnic-political-property tapestry of  this kind.103
Hobbesian motifs  are a shorthand for the involvement of regional powers in the Congo 
Wars, an involvement that has indeed been extensive (see Map 5). This is the subject of the 
next chapter, which intertwines the Kivus with international flows and interests. It will 
return us to an old dilemma: of whether resources are the purpose of conflict or are merely 
used to fund it for other purposes.104  Examining the 'resource curse' argument,  and its 
difficulties in accounting for sexual violence, will provide a focused counterpart to this 
chapter's discussion of  long-standing conflict dynamics. 
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Chapter Nine
WAR/RAPE/ECONOMY: THE RESOURCE 
CURSE AND WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE
The truth of what we heard from survivors is rooted in simple economics. 
Profits made from this illicit minerals trade arise from market demand for 
such minerals. If consumers demand conflict-free products, then companies 
will eventually meet that demand, in turn cratering the market for minerals 
mined through violence.
Ryan Gosling and John Prendergast,
'Congo’s Conflict Minerals: The Next Blood Diamonds'1
The regions with most rape are the regions with mines of gold and 
coltan...so long as the international community doesn't understand that this 
is an economic war, nothing will change.
Christine Schuler-Deschryver, V-Day, Bukavu, DRC, June 20102
#bloodminerals3
Over the last decades, a certain consensus has emerged amongst activists, journalists and 
government officials regarding the connection between resources and sexual violence in 
Eastern DRC. In short, armed groups use sexual violence to acquire vital minerals,  which 
they then smuggle and trade for extraordinary profits, profits which are then re-invested to 
secure their militarised hold in the region. The process is importantly internationalised, not 
only because neighbouring countries are closely involved in a convoluted geopolitical web, 
but also because the demand for the 'blood minerals' in the first place is driven by 
production in the East and consumption in the West.4 Clashes between armed groups are, 
then, best viewed not as motivated by long-standing grievances, ethnic ideologies or political 
projects against the Congolese state, but instead as competition between predatory and 
vicious military-corporate entities primarily concerned with raping civilians the better to 
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'rape'  the wealth of the Congo.5 As one political tract from the late 1990s put it, the United 
States was guilty of:
helping the international bandits from Rwanda,  Uganda and some sons of 
the D.R.Congo to rape the country and loot Tantalum and Niobium 
minerals from Eastern D.R.Congo to be used in the US computer industry.6
This view of conflict in DRC has been most prominent in the work of John Prendergast and 
the Enough Project, an advocacy group campaigning on genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Testifying before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Prendergast 
cast “competition over the extraordinary natural resource base” as “one of the biggest 
drivers of the conflict” and also as the “root cause” of rape and sexual violence enabled by 
“the chain of command that either encourages or allows rape to be utilized as a war 
strategy”.7  Among Enough's proposed ways to end rape and sexual violence was further 
military collaboration between UN forces and the DRC government: “[p]roperly integrated 
Congolese security forces, supported by U.N. peacekeepers, should secure these sites and 
transit routes”.8  In 2010, Enough's advocacy resulted in a DRC-focused episode of the 
American crime drama Law and Order: Special Victim's Unit, intended to bring into ordinary 
homes the reality of violence used by armed groups. Writing with the show's star Mariska 
Hargitay, Prendergast explained:
Rape becomes their principal means of terrorizing local populations into 
passive compliance, so they can steal the mineral wealth without opposition. 
These crimes destroy families, decimate communities, and lethally spread 
HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. There are few other 
conflicts in the world where the link between our consumer appetites and 
massive human suffering is so direct.9
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Enough also created a number of videos drawing explicit connections between the minerals 
they identified as the '3Ts' (tin,  tantalum and tungsten) and the high rates of sexual violence 
in the DRC.10  For feminist campaigners like Eve Ensler too there is  a “direct link” between 
the mining of natural resources and sexual violence in DRC: “we all create those atrocities 
through our consumption”.11  Alongside others drawing attention to the economic 
dimensions of the Congo wars,  Enough succeeded in generating House Resolution 4128, 
known as the Conflict Minerals Trade Act, which in July 2010 fed into Section 1502 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, requiring publicly-traded 
companies to 'report and audit'  their involvement with conflict minerals with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).12 
The analysis that lies behind these advocacy programmes is familiar from the modes of 
feminist explanation and the logics of wartime sexual violence explored in Chapter 4. These 
are strong claims of instrumentality, identifying a conscious desire for economic or 
geopolitical aims as the motivating force behind acts of extreme violence. Whether for 
instrumentality, unreason or mythology, evidence to support the modes should ideally be 
comprehensive and compelling. This chapter assesses available evidence of a particular kind, 
that largely found in intergovernmental, NGO and academic studies of the economic 
dimensions of the Congo Wars, to assess claims of a strong link between mineral resource 
exploitation and sexual violence. The following analysis thus deals with two different 
research problems behind such an argument: first, that mineral resource exploitation is 
closely connected to the dynamics of collective violence in eastern DRC in a war economy; 
and second, that sexual violence in eastern DRC reflects, and is driven by, the needs of such 
a war economy to the extent that we can speak of  a war-rape economy.
The chapter begins with a survey of existing analyses of the war economy  proposition. 
Drawing on detailed UN reports and other studies, it confirms that armed groups have 
indeed been heavily integrated into mineral resource and other natural resource profit streams for 
more than a decade, and that the claim for a war economy in eastern DRC is thus 
convincing in many details. It then turns to some criticisms of this characterisation, focusing 
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on countervailing evidence. This section qualifies the war economy thesis by embedding it 
more carefully in wider social and political dimensions of violence. In particular, the reliance 
of armed groups on mineral resources is  somewhat overstated, and strong claims for a kind 
of rampant instrumentalism do not seem to capture the full dynamics at play. However, 
these qualifications are not sufficient to dismiss the war economy claim, only to modify it. 
The chapter then turns to the question of whether the war economy can be best viewed as a 
war-rape economy. An assessment of some incidents examined by UN reports suggests a 
marked variation in the forms of violence used to secure natural resources, with a general 
sense that sexual violence is not a major tool compared to other kinds of human rights 
abuses. A comparison of levels of sexual violence and mineral wealth at the national level 
further destabilises the correlation between the two factors. These issues are explored 
through the detailed case of the mass rapes at Walikale in July and August 2010, which 
provide evidence of instrumentalist rape, but also further complicate the relationship 
between those rapes and economic objectives. The chapter concludes by clarifying the 
complex of issues at stake and suggesting that no clear pattern is discernible without further 
information, but that strong versions of the instrumentality thesis do not appear to be 
supported by current evidence.
Africa Has The Shape Of  A Pistol, And Congo Is Its Trigger13
Since before the formal conclusion of the Second Congo War in 2003, detailed reports 
commissioned by the United Nations Security Council have investigated the connections 
between armed groups and the 'illegal' exploitation of natural resources.14  The cumulative 
analysis of these reports reveals a deeply embedded and widespread war economy in the 
east. An early estimate suggested that just one of three elite networks invested in the Kivus 
and elsewhere (the DRC/Zimbabwe political-military-commercial network) had managed to 
extract no less than $5 billion over a 3 year period, largely in mineral wealth, transferring 
state assets to private companies which fronted for its interests and jointly ensuring that none 
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of that wealth was realised by the formal institutions of the DRC government.15  The first 
UN Panel of Experts report identified five strategies of exploitation used by elite networks: 
asset-stripping; control of procurement and accounting (with front groups declaring huge 
losses despite their access to major concessions for very low prices); organised theft from 
production at source via internal theft rings run by police, soldiers and managers (sometimes 
accounting for drops in total revenue of up to 25%); corporate facades as cover for criminal 
activities such as arms trafficking, smuggling and money-laundering; and the provision of 
equipment and services to militaries,  for example in using diamond revenues to pay for FAC 
(the then DRC army) arms purchases.16 
In one particularly prominent case coltan – one of the '3Ts' identified by Enough as driving 
the conflict – played a major role17. Ranking officers of the Rwandan army themselves 
purchased coltan during the last years of the Second Congo War, and used it to directly 
finance the army. The Panel of Experts estimated that this exploitation of resources was the 
major source of army revenues at the time, accounting for a full 80% of the RPA (Rwandan 
army) budget in 1999, so that the actual level of Rwanda military spending for that year is 
estimated at $400 million despite the official budget provided by the Rwandan government 
standing at only $80 million.18  Two years later, the real budget was estimated to be $135 
million,  another huge increase on official figures.19  In the 1997-2000 period Rwanda and 
Uganda also saw their official diamond exports multiplied to 12 times their previous levels, 
while DRC exports collapsed. Rwanda's profiteering peaked with a 2000 diamond export 
level 90 times higher than what it had managed in 1998.20  As well as these wild official 
increases, a further $13.5 million worth of diamonds went missing in 2000, likely laundered 
to the benefit of traders and armed groups.21  In all cases, minerals originating in the DRC 
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had been extracted and circulated by elite networks working in alliance with elements of the 
DRC army and other armed groups.
These elite networks persisted after the formal peace, with local leaders linked to 
transnational networks of trade and exploitation and so able to hold considerable power in 
mini-fiefdoms beyond the control of the central government.22  Uganda and Rwanda both 
strongly maintained their interests for a number of years,  interests which persist today, 
especially in the case of Rwanda.23 Whilst the formal alliances, and many of the names, had 
changed, the 2007 Group of  Experts Report continued to link resources and violence:
In Ituri and the Kivus there has been a close geographical correlation 
between the activities of illicit armed actors and areas of natural resource 
exploitation. Control over territory has proved to be the key factor enabling armed 
groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo to profit from the exploitation 
of  natural resources.24 
 
These dynamics of exploitation and conflict are characteristic of all armed groups operating 
in the region, and cross the full spectrum of minerals. The principal funding for the FDLR, 
for example, has for the last decade been the illegal mineral trade, with profits in the millions 
of dollars generated every year from cassiterite, coltan, gold and wolframite.25  FDLR units 
“tax and control the trade of minerals in a system they call 'non-conventional logistics'” and 
were until recently in control of the majority of artisanal mining in South Kivu, as well as 
'many' gold mines in North Kivu.26 The exact minerals focused on varies depending on the 
exact situation, so that by 2009 the FDLR came to trade most heavily in cassiterite because 
it delivered the highest revenues at several million dollars a year.27  Others, like the ADF (the 
Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan-based Islamist group) rely more heavily on the timber 
trade, and there is even evidence of the FDLR attempting to sell on canisters of uranium 
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discovered in Walikale.28  The DRC government's own estimates are that illegal gold exports 
alone total more than $1.24 billion a year while the Enough Project estimates that all armed 
groups together made $11.8 million from coltan in 2008.29 
The scale of extraction can be seen even in official statistics. For example, local government 
records for May to August 2011 showed 947 tons of iron ore arriving in Goma by air and 
land but only 361 tons officially exported in the same period, leaving as much as 586 tons 
(some 58% of the total) likely smuggled out through Rwanda.30 Corporate actors are clearly 
implicated in these hidden profits and criminal networks, as when Tremalt Ltd. paid the 
DRC government just $400,000 for cobalt and copper concessions actually worth in excess 
of $1 billion.31  The Panel of Experts was similarly able to chart extraordinary shifts  in 
international diamond trades based on shadow mining in the DRC, with diamonds from 
Mbuji Mayi apparently accounting for the increase of exports from the United Arab 
Emirates to Antwerp from only $4.2 million in 1998 to $149.5 million in 2001.32
The over-riding indication given by UN studies is thus that military-commercial-political 
elite networks have consistently exercised a high level of control in multiple social spheres in 
the eastern DRC: using front companies, maintaining the 'facade' of rebel administrations, 
coordinating logistics through transnational criminal networks, and controlling military and 
security forces “that they use to intimidate, threaten violence or carry out selected acts of 
violence”.33  The international aspect of this extraction was particularly evident in the final 
stages of the Second Congo War, but the value illicitly realised from mining secured by force 
by armed groups has persisted to the present day, and remains significant in both scale and 
variety, as indicated by Tables 5 and 6 below. Yet, that armed groups require funding, and 
that they use violence as a means to secure that funding, does not alone settle the question. 
The sheer scale and complexity of resource exploitation in the DRC is clear, but the 
interaction between this dimension of economic extraction and wider social patterns of 
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wartime existence requires a further stage of inquiry before we can turn to the question of 
just how 'selected' these acts of violence are, and what relationship they bear to gendered 
suffering and to repertoires of  sexual violence.
Armed Group Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Diamonds Copper Cobalt
Pro-Government Forces
DRC Army * * *
Zimbabwean Army *
Angolan Army *
Mai Mai * * * *
Anti-Government Forces
Rwandan Army * * * * *
Ugandan Army * * * * *
RCD-Goma * * * * *
RCD-ML * * * * *
MLC * * *
Table 5: Major Armed Groups and Sources of  Mineral Revenue, 1998-2003 34
Armed Group Coltan Gold Tin Tungsten Manganese Diamonds Copper Cobalt
DRC Army * * * * * * * *
Mai Mai * * * *
PARECO * * *
FDLR * * * *
CNDP * * * *
Table 6: Major Armed Groups and Sources of  Mineral Revenue, 2006-2008 35
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The War Economy, Qualified
So all armed groups, during both the Second Congo War and after,  have been involved in 
the extraction of a wide range of minerals. Yet the association of armed groups, illicit 
mining and extreme violence is  complicated by a number of factors, principally founded in a 
wider analysis of the social and political dimensions of natural resource exploitation in 
DRC. Michael Nest, for one, has suggested that coltan, which has been so central to activist 
campaigns against illegal exploitation and sexual violence, is much less important than 
conventionally supposed. The profits generated by Rwanda at the turn of the century in 
particular were exceptional, and based on a short-lived bubble of  coltan prices.36 
Moreover, the overall contribution of DRC-origin coltan to the global economy is frequently 
over-stated in journalist and activist accounts. The most common myth is that the DRC 
holds 80% of the world's tantalum reserves. The actual figure is closer to 8% or 9%.37 
Although the figures are not as clear as they could be, a reasonable estimate for the DRC's 
share of total world production is around 21%, putting it between world leader Australia 
(30% of world production) and third place producer Brazil (with 14%).38  The comparable 
value of coltan for armed groups is also small. Official records, which massively 
underestimate true levels but can nonetheless be used as a proportional measure, show that 
coltan exports from South Kivu were valued at only a few million dollars in 2005, moving 
up to $7 million by 2008, in comparison with the value of gold ($8 million in 2005, $28 
million by 2008) and tin ($6 million in 2005, $18 million by 2008).39 Yet groups like Global 
Witness make much in their analysis of the claim that 64% of the world's known Coltan 
reserves are in the DRC.40 
Paradoxically,  the very dominance of a mineral economy in areas of conflict generates the 
misleading appearance of an association between violence and mineral wealth. Up to 80% 
of exports and 30% of GDP in the DRC depends on mining, and these levels are 
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particularly pronounced in mineral-rich areas like the Kivus.41  Estimates suggest that 
750,000 to 2 million Congolese artisanal miners work in the 'illegal' war economies of the 
DRC.42  Their dependents in turn may total 10 million people, or 16% of DRC's 
population.43  In other words, almost all social life in eastern DRC is strongly integrated into 
mining economies. Peaceful actors are as reliant on mining as violent ones, which 
destabilises the apparent correlation between resources and armed groups. Possible 
implications of a strong instrumentalist thesis, for example that non-violent actors are not 
associated with mining, or that rape is lower in areas where there is no mining-related 
economy, thus become difficult, although not quite impossible, to examine.
It is also not clear to what extent armed groups are the main beneficiaries of mineral 
resources.  Data from 2000 suggests that armed groups received only around 11% of the 
total profits from coltan within the DRC, which in turn accounted for only 1% of the 
globally-realised profits. Within the DRC, similar shares went to the chief of mine, various 
middle men, taxes, with creuseurs (miners who sometimes act as combatants)  and licence and 
fee collectors benefiting most. Globally, only 12% of profits were realised in the DRC, with 
brokers, processors and manufacturers taking by far the majority of the profit.44 Drawing on 
the only available comprehensive mapping data of mines and who controls them, produced 
by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) for 2009, Nest suggests that the FDLR 
fully control six coltan mines in South Kivu; the FLDR and Mai Mai control one mine in 
North Kivu; the FARDC fully control two mines; and former CNDP forces now 'integrated' 
into the FARDC control ten mines. Four further mines in the Kivus are controlled by no 
armed group.45  The case of the CNDP is particularly instructive since they have been the 
major source of conflict in Kivus in the last decade, but did not control any major mining as 
late as 2008. They had links to traders, but appear to have received most funding from the 
Tutsi community and parallel taxation systems.46 
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Of course, coltan is far from the only important mineral, and we have seen that armed 
groups are predominantly reliant on other minerals,  but the overall IPIS data shows that 
armed groups maintained 'positions' at just over half the mines in the two Kivus.47  The 
association of armed groups with mines is thus very significant, but not overwhelming. As 
Laura Seay indicates in her critique of Enough advocacy for the Dodd-Frank Act, many 
mines, even in the Kivus, are free of violence: “not all violence in the eastern D.R.Congo is 
related to the mineral trade, and not all mines are controlled by violent actors”.48 
Two qualifications of the war economy thesis thus arise. First,  mining may only be one, 
albeit important, revenue stream among many for armed groups. An assessment of FDLR 
economic activities across Walikale since the late 1990s lists  not only artisanal mining, but 
also quarrying, woodworking, transport, cattle trading, fish farming, local market taxation 
and even school and health post provisions in Bakanjo.49  Second, in an economy so 
dominated by mining, it is almost impossible for armed groups not to benefit in some way 
from activities that could be plausibly be related to mines and mineral wealth.50  Soldiers can 
still receive revenues from mines they don't control, either through systems of taxation and 
transport, or simply because they control trade around an area where miners and their 
dependents live.51  An analytical jump is required to move from this embeddedness in a 
mineral economy to a claim that this economy causes violence or that sexual violence would 
decrease if  armed groups were not integrated into them. 
The Rwandan state unquestionably benefitted from its involvement in the Second Congo 
War. But even here the money seems to be have been more means than end for a foreign 
policy elite raised in exile and engaged in a post-genocide project of state consolidation and 
moral-political vision: “For many Rwandans, from the presidency down to the school 
teacher, the war in Congo was an ideological project, not just an opportunity for plunder”.52 
· 259·
47! Spittaels and Hilgert 2009:11.
48! Seay 2012:17, 7.
49! Rudahigwa 2010:37.
50! Similarly, it can be observed that rule in the DRC has always been related to its massive wealth and to a 
political economy of controlling distribution of gains, from Belgian rule through to Mobutu. In other words, 
the role of natural resources in the social sphere is a constant. See Nest 2006:17–30.
51! Spittaels and Hilgert 2009:11.
52! Stearns 2012a:301.
And for less prominent parters in accumulatory atrocity may not have benefitted much at 
all. Zimbabwe's involvement, for one, had been predicated on the lure of easily-accessible 
seams of copper and cobalt which proved far more challenging to access than planned. 
Smaller concessions could not make up for the outlay in arms and loans never to be 
repaid.53
On this account, what matters is not so much whether armed groups are motivated by the 
acquisition of mineral wealth or whether they access wealth directly or indirectly. What 
matters is that armed groups require funding,  and respond actively to changing military, 
economic and political situations to ensure that funding.54  On the one hand, this may spur 
efforts to regulate mining in an effort to narrow the range of opportunities for armed 
groups. But it may also lead to increases in violence against civilian populations. Rather than 
paying merely for arms, mineral extraction is mainly used to cover soldiers' subsistence,  for 
FARDC troops as much as for Mai Mai or other rebel forces.55  Under conditions where 
civilians already suffer from extreme 'taxation',  this may mean that mining bans will increase 
direct suffering, including levels of  sexual violence.
Necropolitics and Necroeconomics56
Consider the relationship between violence, minerals and arms suggested by the UN Panel 
of Experts. As Seay suggests, armed groups do not need to rely on income streams to 
purchase arms directly,  usually acquiring them through easy raids on badly kept FARDC 
stockpiles.57 In moves familiar from the 'sell-games' discussed by David Keen (see Chapter 4), 
the nominally opposed FDLR and FARDC have been known to collaborate at the local level 
in the sharing of arms and in disrupting the demobilisation efforts of MONUC forces.58 In 
other cases vicious attacks, including decapitations,  are inflicted on other armed groups in 
contests over control of resources like timber.59  These interactions begin to suggest a more 
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complex relationship between military forces and civilian victims,  one reinforced by some of 
the details on human rights violations offered by the UN studies.
The dominant form of violence recorded in the UN studies is not sexual violence, but 
targeted brutality towards miners as part of a protection racket guarantee both of direct 
mineral wealth and associated 'taxes'. In the case of the CNDP, this has involved “allowing” 
mine owners to retain their concessions in return for cuts of the product, and of them 
helping “resolve” business disputes in return.60  Similar arrangements apply elsewhere, as at 
Kamituga in South Kivu where the 321st FARDC brigade under Colonel Rugo Heshima 
runs the Itabi goldmine, taking a cut of roughly 40% of all production.61  The Group of 
Experts summary of another particular egregious example illustrates several themes 
common to these situations:
Government officials  particularly denounced Major Dudu’s 1,112th 
battalion, which on 17 March was deployed to the mineral-rich area of 
Manguredjipa. According to the same sources, Dudu’s soldiers have 
consolidated a monopoly on gold purchases through a barter system at 
Mbunia and Kisenge mines. The soldiers organize all transport of beer, 
food and supplies to the mines, in exchange for gold at favourable rates. 
When production is  limited, according to mining officials, the soldiers have 
allegedly beaten numerous diggers whom they believe to be lying to or 
cheating them...The Group also received documents reporting on a meeting 
that mining authorities organized with diggers, traders, government officials 
and representatives of Dudu’s battalion at Manguredjipa. In the meeting 
notes, participants accused the military of imposing “security” taxes on 
diggers and forcing them to carry merchandise to be sold in the mine. In 
addition, soldiers were accused of collaborating with groups of deserters 
who harass and loot mineral traders. Participants also denounced the 
unequal market competition between civilian and military mineral traders.62
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Such limited and goal-orientated harassment is  indicative of closely controlled shadow and 
war economies. Taken together with the variety and complexity of military-civilian relations 
in eastern DRC, the instrumentalist case for mineral-driven sexual violence stands in need of 
more cautious evaluation, and of a more variegated depiction of how armed groups operate 
and why. As well as expressing both conflictual and collaborative relations, armed groups 
have developed their strategies for survival and profit over time. In Stephen Jackson's 
terminology, the Congo wars have been progressively economised as initially political 
objectives became more and more dependent both on economic means and economic 
ends.63  Most armed groups are thus not best characterised as simplistically motivated by 
minerals: “instead, their violent behaviour stems from anger over inequality, ideological 
issues, and/or because there are no constraints on such activities in the eastern 
D.R.Congo”.64  A similar diagnosis was recently made by the UN Group of Experts: “the 
exploitation of natural resources merely enables armed movements to sustain their efforts 
towards political objectives. However,  the Group has noted that economic motivations are 
increasingly driving a significant portion of armed actors, including criminal networks of 
FARDC”.65  Moreover, as the same Group put matters a decade ago, “[w]hile some hide 
behind a political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic activities as a matter of  survival”.66 
That capturing valuable minerals may make wars 'self-financing' (in Paul Kagame's boastful 
phrase67) helps us establish how wars persist, but not what causes them. Nor does it help 
characterise the repertoires of violence used by combatants to secure profits or to pursue 
other agendas and desires. All wars require funding, which means that maintaing an 
economic base will likely be part of armed groups strategies, and that personnel will be 
dedicated to that task. This in itself is no more reason to see conflict in the eastern DRC as 
specially  economic than would the total war economies of the Allied and Axis powers require us 
to see World War II as primarily driven by the desire for resources. The emergent picture is, 
then, one of collusion, private enrichment, overlaps with criminal network, conflicting 
incentives in which profit motives trump security duties, a mix of greed and grievance and a 
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general context of  impunity. 
However, these qualifications to the war economy thesis have their own limitations. The 
attention to transnational resource flows, and to the mutual implication of violence in 
Congo and consumption in California in an international political economy, has the 
analytical value of marginalising simplistic notions of African barbarism and primitivism.68 
Rival explanations around the role of land pressures and ethnic conflict can have the effect 
of opposing 'land' and 'resources'  as well as ignoring the co-implication of economic 
networks, ethnic identities and political projects. Moreover, the expansion of economic 
control by the FARDC in the war against rebels has important implications, not least at the 
level of state-building practice.69 The sharpest critiques against activism challenge particular 
narratives, but do not disrupt the overall claim of a connection between collective violence 
and economic agendas. There is no evidence that coltan in particular is  more frequently 
associated with violence relative to other economic activities70, but this is not the same as saying 
that economic activities are not strongly associated with violence. Finally, in understanding 
the unfolding dynamics of violence (including sexual violence), what starts or drives a war 
might not be as important a question as what makes it persist and what determines the form 
that it takes. That struggles over resources may be an effect rather than a cause helps 
unsettle simplistic narratives71, but does not dispel the political economy of  war. 
The War-Rape Economy 
Even if armed groups dominated mines, and received the vast majority of their wealth from 
them, this would not show that sexual violence is driven by the need to acquire such 
resources. A more detailed investigation is needed to establish the character of sexual 
violence as enacted in the DRC. Unfortunately, the UN reports surveyed here did not 
explore sexual violence in any great detail. Across the 169 pages of the five reports from 
2002 to 2007, the phrases 'rape', 'sexual violence' and 'violence against women' occurred a 
combined total of only 5 times. Later documents faired better, but the four reports from 
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2008-2011 still only used those phrases 79 times in 998 pages of material. The reports give a 
general sense that violence is important to armed groups, and that concretely this does mean 
violence against civilians, but it is unclear just how much violence is civilian-directed, and 
how much of that violence in turn is sexualised in character. Do conflicts over resources 
happen in traditional military encounters between armed groups? Or as a way of capturing 
areas and using the local labour supply (coercive violence perhaps involved to secure a 
territory or exploit workers)? Or as part of a wider terrorising of civilians and cleansing to 
consolidate control? Or is sexual violence concentrated and distributed in ways much closer 
to the logics suggested by mythology and unreason?
As elsewhere, the quality of data is a major issue. As the Group of Expert explained in their 
short study of 300 cases of sexual violence in North Kivu in the 2008 Final Report, “[o]n 
the basis of the data collected, all armed groups and FARDC are responsible for committing 
such violations” but the data “did not however provide sufficient information about the 
authors or the chain of command”.72  Amazingly, the Group was not able to analyse a 
MONUC database of incidents of sexual violence apparently in existence at the time and 
seems to have had difficulty getting sufficient cooperation from MONUC at all.73 The next 
year the Group again reported that “...despite the prevalence of sexual violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, obtaining accurate and reliable information regarding the 
number of victims and the identity of perpetrators remains a severe challenge”, although 
the Group was also confident enough to repeat the UNFPA estimate that 90% of all rape 
cases are perpetrated by “men with arms”.74 
It is therefore necessary to find other ways of uncovering the relevant dynamics of sexual 
violence. The detailed cases explored by the UN reports appear to bear differing relations to 
economic or instrumentalist pressures and encompass general harassment of the population, 
including looting, rape carried out by retreating military groups, and summary executions 
and reprisal killings carried out on suspected 'sympathisers'.75 Sexual violence does appear to 
be a major dimension of some such reprisals,  which we might include in the category of 
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retaliatory atrocity elaborated in the last chapter. For example, documentation of FDLR 
attacks between February and October 2009 put the cases of sexual violence at 135, 
amongst a total of 384 deaths, 521 abductions,  38 cases of torture and 5 cases of 
mutilation.76  Evidence from several villages in Bunyakiri in South Kivu suggest that all of 
these attacks had been deliberately planned by Major Willy Guillaume Simba, the FDLR 
commander of the Romo Battalion stationed in that area. Some villagers had in fact 
received documents signed by Major Simba threatening retaliations if Kimia II (the military 
operation against the FDLR) was launched, a threat he followed through with in mid-June 
2009.77  Those attacks alone led to the burning of 1,000 houses,  70 abductions and more 
than 20 cases of  sexual violence.78 
However, in other cases, reprisal attacks appear to take place without sexual violence,  whilst 
in others sexual violence seems unconnected to any agenda. For example,  in April 2009 the 
FARDC attacked FDLR dependents in Masisi, killing of at least 143 Rwandan refugees, 
primarily women and children,  as part of Kimia II operations.79  However, the UN Report 
presented no evidence of sexual violence, apparently in accordance with the plan of 
FARDC Colonel Ngaruye who is said to have ordered that “[a]ny young men found should 
be killed, while all children,  women and elders should be captured and sent back to 
Rwanda”, in effect meaning that the the latter groups were often being killed en route.80  A 
practice familiar from other contexts, and certainly deeply implicated in gender norms, but 
not one that fits the conventional narrative of  rape as a tool of  resource accumulation.
In still other cases rape appears to be part of a deliberate geopolitical strategy,  although not 
one aimed at capturing mineral resources but as part of the overlap of ethnic conflicts with 
land disputes.81  In early 2010, for example, former-CNDP elements attacked villages in 
Lukweti, raping 40 women, killing 30 people and burning down 150 houses: “The 
unequivocal explanation that the villagers gave the Group was that all the attacks were 
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meant to drive the local Bahunde population out so that former CNDP officers could take 
over the lush pasturage of the Lukweti zone”.82 The 2011 Final Report further documented 
a number of separate cases of widespread rape, generally either without reference to any 
particular agenda, or as acts accompanying a melange of activities such as purported 
weapons searches by FARDC, evictions of people from 'illegal'  settlements, direct 
retaliations for perceived support for FDLR, FDLR retreats accompanied by attacks on 
villages, or merely as acts associated with general looting.83 
These overlapping and contradictory accounts provide no clear image of how sexual 
violence is linked to particular instrumentalist projects, or whether such a link exists at all. 
Some evidence is available for direct commands to rape being passed down a military 
hierarchy and implemented for the purposes of securing mineral wealth. Other accounts 
point to more opportunistic conjunctures or show that definitive agendas like 'resource 
exploitation' or 'land dispute' cannot be so easily separated. Where rape is mentioned, it is 
often alongside other acts of atrocity, and without sufficient clarity about what drives it,  as 
summed up in an early assessment of  the spread of  armed conflict through society:
Widespread armed activity is characterized by opportunistic and chaotic 
encounters. Children are killed, adult victims are eviscerated, women are 
raped, property stolen, houses burned, churches demolished and whatever 
infrastructure exists is laid to waste.84 
A more general level of analysis  only reinforces the sense that the war-rape economy thesis is 
insufficient. Table 7 sets out the Peterman et al. figures on sexual violence in the DRC. 
Unlike most studies, they used data for the DRC as a whole to separate out the experience of 
female survivors in different provinces and, importantly, to calculate the rate of sexual 
violence As would be expected from the history of conflict in eastern DRC and the 
discussion in Chapter 7, the provinces most involved in the Congo Wars (North Kivu, South 
Kivu, Maniema and Oriental) all reported extremely high rates of sexual violence. Areas 
usually thought of  as more removed from the conflict registered lower rates. 
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Map 6: Mineral Deposits in the Democratic Republic of  Congo 85
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Province Absolute No. of  
Occurrences of  Rape in 
Preceding 12 Months
Rates per 1,000 Women 
of  Reproductive Age in 
Preceding 12 Months
North Kivu 73,387 67
Equateur 94,604 65
Maniema 19,050 50
South Kivu 41,811 44
Oriental 59,779 38
Kinshasa 43,619 26
Katanga 28,784 14
Bandundu 22,691 14
Kasai-Oriental 9,418 8
Kasai-Occidental 7,749 8
Bas Congo 6,504 7
Total 407,397 29
Table 7: Calculations of Levels and Rates of Sexual Violence Among Women 15-49 Years by Province, 
Democratic Republic of  Congo, 2007 86
Since the Kivus are mineral-rich, these figures may seem to indicate a correlation between 
areas of high mineral wealth and areas of high sexual violence. While this correlation in 
itself could not show that minerals are meaningfully the cause of sexual violence, it would 
add plausibility to some, perhaps quite convoluted,  link between these factors. However, the 
Kivus are far from the only resource-rich area of the DRC, and an analysis of other areas of 
mineral wealth suggest that the assumed correlation may not hold at all (see Map 6). Nor 
can the difference be explained by different historical resources for rebellion. Katanga was 
the site of the most serious challenge to the integrity of the Congolese state after 
independence but shows a comparatively low level of sexual violence. The kind of historical 
attention to Kivus developed in the last chapter does clarify matters somewhat, but this is 
still very much a war economy located in ways that may be differently instrumental-rational-
material, but also mythological-cultural-historical and unreason-contingent-emotional. And 
since studies predominantly focus on gendered brutality and the Great Lakes legacies of 
profit and conflict, they have tended to neglect cases where sexual violence was low or war 
· 268·
86! Adapted from Peterman, Palermo, and Bredenkamp 2011:1064.
relatively absent. In other words, the analysis underling much advocacy around sexual 
violence in the DRC selects on the dependent variable. 
Province Total Granted Mineral Rights 
(Research Permits, 
Exploration Permits, etc.)
Katanga 1,282
Kasai-Occidental 518
Kasai-Oriental 461
Oriental 308
Bas-Congo 221
Bandudu 209
North Kivu 82
Maniema 77
South Kivu 71
Equateur 36
Kinshasa 10
Total 3,275
Table 8: Mineral Rights Issued by CAMI (Mining Title Registry and Cadastre Service) to 10 July 2007 87 
The World Bank data on mineral rights in Table 8 suggests a very different ordering of 
provincial wealth than we might expect from the view that sexual violence is high in places 
where there is most economically to be gained from violence. The strong contrast between 
the tables is particularly suggestive for any war-rape economy hypothesis. Of the top five 
provinces granted most mineral rights (Katanga, Kasai-Occidental,  Kasai-Oriental, 
Orientale and Bas-Congo), only Orientale had a rate of sexual violence above the DRC 
average of 29 per 1,000 women of reproductive age. The Kasais and Bas-Congo were in 
fact the provinces with the lowest estimates of rates of sexual violence and Katanga's  rate 
was similarly below the national average. 
Excepting the capital Kinshasa, the top four provinces for sexual violence were also the 
bottom four provinces for mineral rights granted. Other figures buttress the position of 
Katanga as the major provincial wealth source in the DRC. World Bank estimates put 
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anticipated mining receipts from Katanga at an annual average of between $127 million to 
$170 million between 2008 and 2012, compared to between $43 and $55 million for the two 
Kasai provinces put together in the same period, and only $15 to $21 million for Ituri on the 
same measure.88  Indeed, the Katanga Copper Belt is the world's largest known cobalt 
resource, bringing the DRC total to second in the global rankings, behind Chile and ahead 
of the USA.89 The gap between this clear wealth and the relative absence of sexual violence 
is striking, especially since Katanga shares a long border with Angola, and is close to 
Burundi and Rwanda, all countries closely involved in the Second Congo War. It is also the 
province which has come closest to permanently seceding from the DRC since 
independence (it declared independence in 1960 but was re-incorporated in 1963). Yet this 
history and wealth has not led to levels of wartime sexual violence comparable to those 
found in the Kivus.
Yet this table can only be taken as indicative. Since it lists only rights granted, it may miss 
much activity undertaken illegally in Eastern provinces, and it may also reflect more about 
prospective sources of wealth than areas currently being exploited at their full capacity. 
Serious mining companies are likely to be reluctant to invest heavily in the east, where most 
mining continues to be undertaken at at artisanal level. On the other hand, mining 
controlled by armed groups does also take place under officially granted concessions which 
are obtained corruptly. Mining in all of Congo remains artisanal, which is one reason why it 
has been traditionally so hard to quantify. Moreover,  the data anticipates our estimates of 
sexual violence by two years, and so may be taken as reflecting the resource situation before 
those attacks were taken out. 
So interpretive caution is in order on several fronts. As we have seen previously data 
problems in eastern DRC can be sufficiently disabling as to make any authoritative claims 
shaky beyond generic identifications of sexual violence as a serious and widespread problem. 
Sexual violence statistics can suffer from cross-cutting issue both of over-counting and 
under-counting in conflict areas.90  Similar problems plausibly affect official mining statistics. 
An instrumentalist account may counter some of the criticisms above with relative ease, for 
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example by combining the short-term war-rape economy claim with an acknowledgement 
of certain broader regional dynamics that would tend to concentrate conflicts in the Kivus. 
Other possible connections between war economies and sexual violence, such as encounters 
between combatants, miners and prostitutes in areas of mineral wealth, have not been 
touched on.91 Although further research may yet validate some of these options,  the current 
discussion has at least illustrated that claims for resource wealth as the driving force for 
sexual violence are hard to sustain in the face of complex details from existing investigations 
and contradictory national indicators. One way to clarify these points yet further is to take a 
particularly well-documented case of sexual violence and assess its relation to claims of 
instrumentality, unreason and mythology.
Walikale
Walikale is a territory of North Kivu province in eastern DRC, and the location of the Bisie 
mine (see Map 7), which is “the epicentre of cassiterite production in North Kivu since 
2003”, accounting for two thirds of total recorded production exported from the province in 
first half of 2010.92  Between 30 July and 2 August 2010 it was also the site of some of the 
most infamous incidents of sexual violence in recent years. A UN investigation concluded 
that at least 387 civilians (300 women, 23 men, 55 girls and 9 boys)  had been raped across 
13 villages by a coalition of Mai Mai, FDLR and dissident FARDC forces.93  The attacks 
drew international scandal because they happened less than 20 miles from a MONUSCO 
(formerly MONUC) troop contingent.94
Some 13,000 people lived in Walikale before late 2010, of which around 3,000 were miners 
were men between 19 and 35 years (women traditionally not being allowed on the mining 
sites).95 Bisie is the main mine in the Walikale area, alongside Omate, Obaye and Binakwa 
to the south, and its population is predominantly male (65% to 30% female and 5% 
children).96  For a number of years prior to 2009, Bisie had been controlled by Colonel 
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Sammy Matumo and the 85th Brigade of the FARDC. Matumo was repeatedly named by 
advocacy NGOs as a controlling force in the area, and held responsible for a number of 
human rights violations around Bisie, although not apparently any allegations of rape.97 
Following the apparent reconciliation between Rwanda and the DRC in early 2009 and the 
nominal 'integration' of former CNDP soldiers into the national army, the former CNDP 
212th Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Yusuf Mboneza were stationed to Bisie in February 
2009, replacing Matumo's 85th Brigade. Having been rotated away from the area around 
Bisie in a standard manoeuvre with the 211th FARDC Brigade, Mboneza the refused the 
order to move back to the axis near Walikale, leaving the area without FARDC soldiers.98
Map 7: Mines, Transport Routes and Areas of  Armed Group Influence in Walikale, North Kivu99
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This background provided an opportunity for three armed groups to come together to 
launch an attack: a Mai Mai Sheka group under the command of Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, 
formerly aligned with the 85th Brigade that had been ordered away from Bisie;  an FDLR 
unit under Sérafin Lionso; and a break-away FPLC (Forces patriotiques pour la libération 
du Congo) unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, said to be the 
cousin of Mboneza, who had allowed the power vacuum to occur in the first place.100 
Attacks on all 13 villages followed identifiable patterns,  carried out in groups of between two 
and six combatants:
the assailants arrived by surprise and stated that they had come to provide 
local people with security. Some chiefs and notables then instructed women 
to prepare food for the rebels. At that point, the assailants suddenly moved 
towards houses and began raping and looting. While one group raped and 
looted, another set up ambushes in the outskirts of the forest to intercept 
fugitives, and raped or abducted them. Some of the attacks took place by 
day, but most of  them took place during the night.101
The small combatant groups would almost always gang-rape the victims, taking turns and 
using sticks or fists to further brutalise genital areas, often going on to “wipe their hands on 
the faces of their victims, insulting them and humiliating them verbally,  with expressions 
such as 'you betray us, so you don't deserve to be left alive'”.102 The looting was accompanied by the 
abduction and forced labour of at least 116 people who were forced to carry heavy packages 
of stolen goods for up to two days on the way to their assailants'  camp.103 Survivor testimony 
provided a strong narrative of the rationale for the attacks, one that matches the dynamics of 
retaliatory atrocity already examined:
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According to local sources, the attacks were a punitive strike intended to 
subjugate local communities living along the Kibua-Mpofi axis, considered 
as “traitors” for reportedly sympathizing with Government forces,  and 
aimed at equipping the coalition of  armed groups.104
In a brutal irony, the FARDC deployment launched at short notice to repel the attacks itself 
involved sexual violence, the systematic burning of houses,  the widespread arrest of 
suspected 'collaborators', and abductions of  civilians to serve as guides.105
The detailed investigation into the Walikale attack provides the clearest indication of an 
instrumentalist rationale for sexual violence as a tool for material acquisition, although even 
here the attacks focused on looting and 'signalling' punishment to suspect communities in 
the style of retaliatory atrocity, rather than to a full attempt to recapture the mines 
themselves. Debriefings undertaken by the UN Group of Experts revealed a clear pattern to 
the Walikale attacks: a)  choice of targets and looting operations jointly decided, with 
commanders then passing instructions down to their separate groups; b)  overall tactical 
agreement still allowing for variation according to different group's agendas; c)  loot equally 
divided up between groups. Rape, abduction,  looting and forced labour tactics were used by 
the same coalition of groups in other attacks, with officers (including Sadoke Kidunda 
Mayele, Sheka's  Chief of Staff) reported as present during mass rapes from 30 July and 2 
August 2010.106 The UN Joint Human Rights Office considers the information gathered in 
its study as sufficient to establish the command responsibility of the named commanders for 
human rights violations under the Rome Statute.107
In spite of the relative clarity of this case, the situation both before and after the high profile 
rapes again suggests a complexity. Writing about the 85th FARDC Brigade in 2009, Nicholas 
Garrett, Sylvia Sergiou and Koen Vlassenroot pointed to the interconnection of the war, 
shadow and coping economies around Bisie. As the only 'non-integrated' FARDC Brigade in 
North Kivu, the 85th was thus particularly close to its former incarnation as a local Mai Mai 
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106 United Nations Group of Experts 2010:40–41.
107 United Nations Joint Human Rights Oﬃce 2011:4.
force.108  The system implemented under Matumo was indeed exploitative, but in a 
particular way. Miners worked at Bisie as part of 'Salongo', an indentured labour system that 
'taxed' them of their product three days a week, while the coordinated use of impromptu 
checkpoints around Bisie brought in several thousand dollars a month.109 The 85th was also 
well established enough to sign 'protection' agreements with the formal Administrator of 
Walikale.110 On the account given by Garrett, Sergiou and Vlassenroot, this not only made 
the area “relatively stable” but also meant that “the 85th brigade has a better record with 
respect to human rights abuses”.111 Their assessment is worth quoting at length:
[T]here is a certain code of conduct deployed, enforced centrally by 
Colonel Samy [Matumo]. In the territory under their control, they have 
established a rules system, within which they also undertake police functions 
in security provision. The 85th brigade cooperates with the police and 
sometimes takes over their functions, while being the last instance of 
decision. In the Bisie mine, the 85th brigade fully takes over the police 
functions. There are soldiers permanently deployed in the mine, collecting 
taxes and enforcing the rules system and acting also as a mediator in cases of 
disputes between the artisanal miners. The highly centralized leadership 
structures and sanction mechanisms allow the development of such a 
security governance structure (coercive governance) that leads to a 
respectively secure environment. Offences committed by soldiers of the 85th 
brigade are largely punished, mostly by arrest and detention. Nevertheless, 
the 85th brigade regularly extorts ‘‘rations’’, and violent incidences like rape 
and harassment happen, albeit irregularly. The population has learnt to 
adapt to a certain level of insecurity and they have arranged themselves 
with the armed groups and the negative consequences of their presence in 
the form of extortion. It should be considered that security situation analysis 
in a country that has recently undergone civil war has to incorporate the 
population’s adaptation to insecurity,  depending on their experience of 
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111!  Garrett et al. 2009:11, emphasis added.
violence, and the corresponding shift in their perception of what is 
considered as secure and insecure. Given that the overall situation in North 
Kivu is – put at its best – a post-war situation and is still marked by its 
transitional character, Walikale territory seems relatively stable and 
secure.112
Nor does the situation since 2010 seem to fit the model proposed by a war-rape economy 
thesis, at least in its advocate variant. Following Kabila's mining ban of September 2010 to 
March 2011, and pre-emptive corporate reactions to the Dodd-Franks Bill, it should be 
expected that armed group involvement at Bisie would decrease, with a corresponding fall in 
sexual violence following. On the one hand, the UN Group of Experts reported that by 
August 2011, production levels around Walikale were at 10% of 2010 levels, with prices 
halved, and the Mai Mai Sheka had moved from direct exploitation of the mine to more 
heavy taxation of local communities and placing of agents within mineral supply chains.113 
The Group mooted the possibility that this official picture was itself part of a collaborative 
deception requiring FARDC forces to be redeployed more heavily to the area, at which 
point militarised exploitation could resume.114  It certainly seems that ex-CNDP elements 
within the FARDC have actually increased their control in the wake of the ban, now 
occupying 75% of the command posts in Walikale, and so being better placed to fully 
exploit mineral resources there.115  In addition to marked increases in workers arriving at 
nearby trading towns,  satellite images show beyond doubt that the biggest of the work sites 
at the Bisie mine “increased considerably” in size between the imposition of the Kabila ban 
and its lifting.116  Huge drops in production have thus gone hand-in-hand with the 
consolidation of  certain kinds of  control.
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The Sexual Security Dilemma
The links between armed force and the war economy in eastern DRC are thus complicated 
but real. While bold statements that violence is caused or motivated by mineral wealth do not 
bear close scrutiny, there is  clearly a relation of dependency on these sources for armed 
groups, and constant plays of conflict and collaboration over who can control it. The 
interpretation of violence in the DRC as progressively economis-ing  in response to these 
pressures is convincing, although it does not reduce conflict to its economic dimension alone, 
and must be situated within a wider social analysis of conflict, as well as of coping and 
shadow economies. The connection of mineral wealth to sexual violence is not so solid, and 
is much more suggestive than substantial. There is evidence of sexual violence, including 
instrumentally commanded sexual violence, associated with mines and mineral resources, but 
there is  more to suggest either the micro-level instrumentality of rape as an accompaniment 
to looting or the vengeful brutality inflected by unreason and mythology. A close reading of 
war economies reinforces the sense of a relative disconnect between dynamics and patterns 
of sexual violence and the requirements of the war economy itself. Although linked at 
points, and condensing into particularly vicious enactments in cases like that of Walikale, the 
sheer scale of both resource exploitation and sexual violence demands a more 
comprehensive overlap between social fields. Understanding this disconnect will require a 
closer look at the gendered discourses deployed by combatants and perpetrators themselves, 
which is the subject of  the final chapter.
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Chapter Ten
ATROCITY DISCOURSE: PERPETRATORS,
COMBATANTS, EXCUSES AND JUSTIFICATIONS
The assault is suffused with malevolence, with hatred, and with loathing so 
extreme, so palpable that it seems pointless, almost dishonouring, to attempt 
to make sense of  it.
 -Lisa S. Price, 'Finding the Man in the Soldier-Rapist'1
Narrating Rape
Perpetrators are the absent presence in many accounts of rape in DRC. They are in one 
sense the centre of the conflict, since it is they who have created the 'rape capital of the 
world'. And yet there is generally little discussion of them. Agency and NGO interviewees in 
Eastern DRC often said that programmes with perpetrators and ex-combatants were much 
needed,  but that it would be practically impossible to get donor support for them. This 
chapter surveys the existing picture of discourses of sexual violence adopted by combatants 
and ex-combatants in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Drawing on testimonies, 
video interviews and reports,  it seeks to assess the forms taken by a range of statements 
regarding the causes and character of sexual violence, and to interpret that within the 
framework developed over the last chapters. Where previous case study chapters have 
considered the general relationship between war,  conflict and sexual violence in the DRC 
and assessed our current understanding of who carries out rape, how and where, this 
discussion focuses on the reasons and rationales given by soldiers themselves.
This chapter draws on a range of sources to reveal common themes in combatant and ex-
combatant testimony about war rape, as well as the areas in which respondents diverged, 
and concludes with an assessment of these themes and what they tell us about the character 
of war rape in Eastern DRC over the last decades. This is not a wholly straightforward task.2 
As one examination of discourse analysis in the aftermath of genocide puts it,  “interviewing 
is also interrogation, and many subjects will not allow it to penetrate beyond a certain level 
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of generality”.3  More so than with convicted rapists or general populations, testimony in 
times of war provokes questions of accountability and justification.4  Researchers therefore 
have to pay attention to what Fujii calls  the 'meta-data'  of fieldwork, the rumours, 
inventions, denials, evasions and silences that exist in addition to directly spoken accounts.5 
Testimonies are invested in a moment of telling, and so are shaped not only by memory, but 
by the current political landscape,  the perceived agenda of interviewers, and the social 
meaning of speaking out. General discourses may affect the perceptions of both 
interviewers and interviewees, for example in reproducing notions of pathology and 
barbarity.6  And, in the context of the DRC, prominent stories about mutilation and even 
cannibalism can reinforce a tendency for “men to appear as beast-like perpetrators, while 
women appear as passive and helpless victims”.7 
These difficulties are further heightened by a reliance on second-hand interviews. I have had 
no access to the original transcripts or interviews which provided the testimony presented 
here (the sources of which are set out in Table 9). Although the sources chosen are quite 
detailed in their citation of exact phrases and the contexts in which discussions occurred, it 
is not possible to fully verify their accuracy. Moreover, a detailed examination of the 
distribution of these statements within an overall corpus of speech is not possible, since 
academic, documentary and journalistic sources present a necessarily edited version of the 
sum total of topics discussed and phrases used by combatants and perpetrators. This 
prevents any coded analysis of the frequency of given phrases, or any comparison of the 
occurrence of  rape confessions or discussions within the overall 'text' of  conversation. 
But an analysis of combatant and ex-combatant discourses can cast light on the character 
and dynamics of rape in Eastern DRC, specially when considered alongside the range of 
other data already examined in the preceding chapters. Perhaps testimonies are subject to 
error and concealment, but can nevertheless provide information on the actual pattern of 
events. A stronger view of the constitutive power of discourse suggests that the question of 
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4! Price 2001:212.
5! Fujii 2010:232.
6! Cameron and Frazer 1987; Price 2001.
7! Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008:59. See also the important discussion of the spectre of cannibalism in Pottier 
2007.
veracity is unimportant, since testimonies are not for confirming empirical details, but for 
revealing the imagination and identity of the speaker.8  They are, in other words, the 
narrative scripts of  the soldiers themselves. 
Since one frequent suggestion is that the extent and character of sexual violence in the DRC 
varies by armed groups, each with their own repertoires of violence, this chapter analyses 
general discourses of war rape by affiliation – the FARDC, the FDLR and Mai Mai groups – 
alongside more fine-grained individual confessions of rape collected by documentary film 
makers.9 This is complicated somewhat by the large-scale integration of former militias and 
rebel groups into the FARDC since 2003 and the difficult of linking specific abuses to given 
units, but testimonies frequently specify which period and group is being discussed, which 
makes the relevant dynamics clearer.10 
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are I. van Velzen and F. van Velzen 2009; L. F. Jackson 2007.
10! Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010:11; Kelly 2010:4–5.
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Poverty/Suffering; Or, The FARDC
The most thorough examination of attitudes to rape in the FARDC has been conducted 
over the last 6 years by Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, whose results have been 
presented in a series of publications.11  They found little evidence of either explicit 
nationalist discourse or ethnic identifications in soldiers' views of rape, instead suggesting 
that sexual violence is a generalised phenomenon making all women vulnerable.12  Their 
research design also directly broached one central instrumentalist proposition. Every one of 
the 226 soldiers and officers surveyed in their full study was asked whether or not they had 
ever received orders to rape. Not a single one reported receiving such orders.13
The dominant themes emerging from an examination of the FARDC are those of poverty, 
suffering, need and lust as the driving forces explaining sexual violence. Again and again, 
soldiers cite the hardships of army life,  periods spent away from women, and poor pay and 
conditions as understandable pressures for rape. These comments can have an 
instrumentalist tone, especially where it is suggested that better pay may alleviate rape, but a 
closer reading suggests that these sentiments are much closer to the forms of frustration, 
anger and confusion characteristic of  unreason.
Consider this exchange between Maria Eriksson Baaz and two male corporals in the 
FARDC:
{Corporal A} “We soldiers commit rape, why do we commit rapes? Poverty/
suffering. When we are not paid, or not paid at all. We are hungry. And I 
have a gun. In my house my wife does not love me anymore. I also have a 
wish to have a good life like you.”
{Maria} “But that is a different thing, no? I asked about rape, not stealing.”
{Corporal A} “I understand...I am getting to it. I am not finished yet. Rape, 
what is that? It is connected to all that – stealing, killing, it is all in that.”
{Maria} “So, is it anger then or what?”
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{Corporal A} “Yes, it is anger, it is creating, the suffering is creating...You feel 
you have to do something  bad, you mix it all: sabotage, women, stealing, rip the clothes off, 
killing.”
{Corporal B} “You have sex and then you kill her, if  the anger is too strong.”
{Corporal A} “It is suffering  that makes us rape. Suffering. If I wake up in the morning 
and I am fine, I have something  to eat, my wife loves me, will I then do things like that? 
No. But now, today  we are hungry, yesterday  I was hungry, tomorrow I will be hungry. 
They, the leaders/superiors are cheating us. We don't have anything.” 14
Although Eriksson Baaz and Stern concur that competition for resources is an important 
dynamic of violence in Eastern DRC, the testimony they collected does not suggest a 
specific link between sexual violence and this accumulation.15  Instead,  most interviewed 
soldiers identified a link between poverty and violence of all kinds: as an obstacle to buying 
sex, forcing a resort to force, and as causing frustration and anger which is then expressed 
through violence.16
Direct confessions of  rape by FARDC soldiers support this interpretation:
{Soldier A} “I've slept with some women...If she says no I must take her by 
force. If she is strong, I'll call some friend to help me. All this is happening 
because of  the war. We would live a normal life and treat women naturally.”
{Lisa} “Is it about power or sex?”
{Translator} “These are complicated questions that he can't understand.”
{Soldier A} “...Yes, she is a human being but when I feel I want a woman 
and she is there, and my wife is not there, I must do it.”17
{Soldier B} “I've raped women in the forest” 
{Lisa} “Does it make him feel more like a man when he rapes”
{Soldier B} “I rape because of  the need. After that I feel I am a man”
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to filmed testimony, refer to the minutes where quoted sections begin and end.
{Lisa} “If there was a law that would put him in jail for raping a woman, 
would he stop raping?”
{Soldier B} “Yes. But we have been suffering in the forest, that is why we rape women.”
{Lisa} “So he has to make the women suffer because he is suffering?”
{Soldier B} “Ah [yes], that's the problem. I have no time to negotiate, I have 
no time to love her. I am in need. If I ask and she says no, I will take her by 
force. They were afraid and when they resisted, I told them I would use my 
gun to get what I want and most of  the time they ended up accepting.”18
Eriksson Baaz and Stern interpret these rationales via a distinction between normalised and 
understandable 'lust' rapes, contrasted to 'evil'  rapes, with significant numbers of informants 
explaining high levels of  sexual violence in terms of  the former:
[T]here are different types of rape. They are all forbidden. There is the rape 
when a soldier is away, when he has not seen his women for a while and has 
needs and no money. This is the lust/need rape. But there are also the bad 
rapes, as a result of the spirit of war...to humiliate the dignity of people. This is 
an evil rape.19
{Soldier A} “There are different kinds of rape. Some rapes are about lust. 
But some are criminal. Well all are forbidden. It is bad. You cannot be with 
a women without her consent. Even in the house. Also in the house, if your 
woman does not want to, you cannot force her. But in the sense that I am 
talking about now, that rape is in two sorts, what do I mean? Because if it is 
only lust, then why  do you sometimes kill her? Also if it is about lust, you will use 
the organ that you have. Why  would you put a stick in her?  We see that a 
lot...That is  not about lust. It is not about the physical needs. That is from a 
need to destroy,  to destroy the dignity,  the human dignity of a person...rape is 
committed at both these levels. It is also about lust – it is like if you are hungry 
– it is the same with the body/sexual needs. And if you have the possibility – 
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you are also stronger than women, it can happen. But it is bad.”
{Soldier B} “The way that some rape, the women...They rape them, that is not 
lust, that is to sully them, it is not lust.”20
[I]t is a problem of suffering/poverty. A soldier, if he has no possibilities, no 
money so that he can go the normal way...if he has nothing in his pocket,  he 
cannot eat or drink his coke, he has nothing to give to a woman – he will 
take her by force. He will take a woman by force. Physically, men have needs. 
He cannot go a lot time without being with a woman. It is very difficult to 
stop him... So a soldier needs a bit of money in his pocket, and he needs to 
have leave. If  that would happen, it would reduce the rapes a lot.21
The soldiers who are participating in the rape would stand and cheer, 
enjoying witnessing such an act. This normally encouraged more and more 
soldiers to rape women. Sometimes it starts with one soldier raping a 
women and then it ends up with a gang rape. And that's why I say it's like evil 
spirits that are making us treat women in this way. I now believe that this training 
will prevent these things from ever happening again.22 
These testimonies suggest a conflict in rationales. Soldiers emphasise both the powerless of 
men in the face of circumstances,  with rapes resulting from a breakdown in the normal 
order of things, and the power of men to take what they need even in extreme 
circumstances. This combination of frustration and control was paralleled in talk of why 
soldiers joined the army in the first place:
{Maria} “What brought you into the army?”
{Corporal} “Anger,  anger for all the bad things we have seen since we were 
children. We had little money. But when the soldiers came to our little 
boutique...Everything a soldier wants to do they do. Soldiers do what they  want. 
All that made us angry. We just thought, I should become a soldier.23
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As well as providing a reason for joining the army, frustration and shame also appears to 
accompany military existence, with several respondents complaining about the general 
attitude to soldiers in the DRC. One 29 year-old sergeant explained:
You know, [the civilians] do not understand. They no longer respect us. 
They see us as useless people. Because, these days we have nothing. We are 
the ones who have to come to them to beg for food. They laugh and refuse 
us a seat on the bus...It used not to be like that. Before... Of course they also 
fear us because of some of the bad things people in uniforms do. It is  bad. 
So they fear us. But also, they don't understand what we are doing.24
A corporal agreed:
The civilians don't respect us...Yesterday when I was out, somebody spat on 
me. Sometimes they even attack us...They are thickheaded. They don't 
understand things. So sometimes they need some punishment...That is also 
sometimes, sometimes, an explanation for rape. If they respected us, it 
would be different. Then you would not see so much of all that, rape, 
killings and stealing. It is also that. Their disrespect. They don't 
understand.25
This strong sense of humiliation concurs with a psychological analysis in terms of the 
sources of aggression in shame.26 The confessions of soldiers in a discussion group similarly 
cast sexual violence as a result of  trauma, as well as a cause of  it: 
I have nightmares about murdering people...Sometimes I see a woman 
walking and I grab her and rape her. If I dream that, I wake up 
screaming.27
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It hurts me to see my comrades get paid well and not me. I fought for my 
country and now that there's a sort of peace I don't get what I deserve. 
They sent me out to rape and steal. Now I'm here, my Captain, but I don't 
know if  I'll make it through the evening.28
Soldiers also reported that alcohol and drug use was widespread, and attributed sexual 
violence to this in combination with general frustration at the 'craziness of war'.29  This 
reinforces an analysis of discourses of sexual violence as drawing strongly on narratives of 
confusion, chaos and abjection. In some testimonies, the disorientation and madness of 
violence was particularly pronounced:
War is crazy,  it destroys the minds of people. Some people just go crazy. Rape is a 
result of that too, especially the bad rapes. It gets too much...Also, a lot is 
because of drugs. If you take drugs, drink, or other things – it is not good. 
And many, many...most take drugs.30
Despite this emphasis on hardship and disorder, the general attitude of soldiers seemed to be 
to strongly value and identify with standards of  discipline:
The difference between a civilian and a soldier is that we follow orders/
rules. I get up at 5 in the morning, put on my uniform and go to work. I do 
not go to work because they will give 1,000 FC [US$2] at  the end of the 
day. I go with both my joys and my sorrows and I will sit on guard...until the 
superiors tell me it is enough.31
This was supplemented by a clear sense that rape was forbidden and, moreover, a practice of 
the enemy other:
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Rape, [the commanders] tell us, belongs to rebel fighting. It does not belong in 
the army. Here it is punishable. In the army it is  punishable, really long 
sentences. But of course some do it anyway. It depends on person to person. 
Every person has his way of  doing things.32
Rape is  forbidden. It is forbidden for us soldiers. In the centres they tell us 
that, we can not take other people's things and we can not take other 
people's women...it says [in the military code] that if you have needs, if you 
have note been with a woman for a long time and there is no woman, you 
should use the soap [masturbate]. We are not supposed to take other 
people's women. That is bad.33
FARDC officers frequently complained that rape was hard to stop, suggesting to Eriksson 
Baaz and Stern that rape was better conceptualised as a weapon of war in terms of “an 
implicit authorisation followed by a lack of specific orders not to rape,  and coupled with an 
attitude that rape is unavoidable”.34
Eriksson Baaz and Stern have tended to theorise this data in two ways. First, via the 'lust 
rape'/'evil rape' distinction drawn by informants and, second, by stressing that the 
background cause to these rapes is in fact the “idea and ideal of militarised male 
sexuality”.35 They suggest that feelings of frustration are more likely to be the cause of rape 
than any shortfalls in pay, and even link expressions of sexual anger to a kind of resistance to 
the authority of the military and to the 'normalisation' of rape.36  Yet they also stress that 
'successful' masculinity for many of those they interviewed meant playing the archetypical 
role of provider and having the material means to pay for sex.37 As they say: “In the soldier's 
testimonies, the man who rapes was, rather, an emasculated man, who, deprived of the 
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resources needed to perform hegemonic masculinity, is 'forced'  to rape”.38  The stress is 
therefore on the performance of  a particular masculinity, but also on its failure.39
Although Eriksson Baaz and Stern acknowledge the high level of ambiguity in soldiers' 
responses concerning military masculinity40, they resolve this theoretically into a case for 
understanding sexual violence in terms of military masculinity. Yet the accumulated sense of 
trauma and confusion from these testimonies suggests a more subtle interplay between 
normality and deviance. Rather than acting out clearly authorised practices of celebrated 
masculinity, as suggested by a mythological analysis, soldiers instead seem deeply conflicted 
about the ethics of rape, as well as by the temporal and spatial distinctions that may 
authorise it under certain conditions (a long time in the forest). Although 'deviant'  behaviour can 
implicitly reinforce sexual norms41, the characterisation of rape as undisciplined, mad, evil, 
motivated by spirits or the snapping of control, as abnormal and driven by feelings that 
come from without all suggest a profound dimension of unreason in experiences of wartime 
sexual violence by FARDC troops.
But The Rape, That Was Not Policy; Or, The FDLR And Interahamwe
Analysis of FDLR rebel discourse accords in many ways with the impression given by the 
FARDC interviews. A study of discourse among ex-FDLR combatants in Rwandan 
demobilisation camps (gathering testimony from 101 ex-combatants) found the difficulty and 
unpleasantness of life as a soldier to be a recurrent theme.42  In attributing motives for rape, 
ex-combatants primarily cited impunity, military indiscipline, the proliferation of armed 
groups and the combination of Congolese customs and alcohol and drugs.43  One former 
FDLR combatant stressed the absence of  structured command:
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We were never paid in the FDLR, we got nothing, only money from car-
jacking. To get money and food we would approach civilians, take their 
crops, rob their villages. We would attack the civilians too, it's true. But the 
rape, that was not policy, that was not organised like the stealing  was. The rape and 
killing was down to individuals.44
Group discussions foregrounded similar causes of  war rape:
{Soldier A} “Congolese armies are undisciplined, they are not punished when 
the commit crimes, this is why they’ll do anything. The women are also not 
protected by the laws.”
{Soldier B} “Actually, in Congo, there are many armed groups which are out 
of  control.”
{Soldier A} “Congolese armies are not paid, they don’t have money to pay 
women, this is why they are violent.”45
{Corporal} “Congolese armies are not paid, so they can do anything.”
{Soldier} “There are also many militaries belonging to different groups and 
this is the cause of  sexual violence.”
{Corporal} “Congolese armies don’t have money to pay for the favours 
[faveurs] of  a woman.”46
The words of a 26-year old private and two corporals emphasise both the role of drugs and 
the practices of  other armies:
Congolese armies are heavy consumers of drugs and of strong alcohol that 
is made locally, and it is after drunkenness that the armies attack women. 
When there is war, there are no laws: it is the law of  the strong that rules.47
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{Corporal A} “The source of sexual violence is nothing  other than war. There 
are Congolese armies who, after having recaptured a zone previously 
occupied by the FDLR, rape all the women in the zone as a way of 
punishing them.”
{Corporal B} “The women are raped by Congolese armies because the latter 
are vicious and undisciplined.”48
These references to 'Congolese armies' and ill discipline are characterisations of the FARDC 
and associated groups and not accounts of combatants' own behaviour. Similarly, 
respondents would commonly attribute practices of mutilation and brutality to other groups 
that were said to want to specifically punish Hutu women.49 
Given their reputation for rape, FDLR rebels surprisingly also stressed the forbidden nature 
of rape and emphasised that groups had punished its occurrence severely, especially before 
2001:
{Soldier A} “There was the case of a Captain who was found guilty of 
raping a woman: he was killed at once. This happened at Gasiza during the 
war of  infiltration.”
{Soldier B} “I know someone who received 300 blows.”
{Soldier C} “I knew someone who received 300 blows….There are many 
more examples in many more units.”
{Soldier D} “There are definitely cases which we don’t know about. Those 
who commit rape are like those without honour,  they do not receive more 
missions. The people who commit these acts go on to enrol with the Mai-
Mai or the Mongols [a militia] because they are cursed in the FDLR.”
{Soldier C} “After the blows, the guilty cannot do anything because they 
have become like a handicap.”50 
{Soldier A} “I saw myself  an FDLR combatant: he raped a woman and he 
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was punished with capital punishment.”
{Soldier B} “For me, I know one [FDLR soldier] who was killed for raping a 
Rwandan woman.”
{Soldier A} “There are definitely those who commit rapes and who are not 
caught and who boast of  having raped women during operations.”
{Soldier C} “Those who rape discuss it with their friends and not publicly.”
{Soldier B} “We think of  these rapists like idiots.”
{Soldier C} “Later, from 2001, when rape became like a simple game, there 
were no explicit orders to rape, but at the same time rapists were not severely punished.”51
{Soldier A} “Within the FDLR, a combatant found guilty of rape would be 
sentenced to death. But now he is given a punishment of  300 blows.” 
{Soldier B} “After these blows, the person is cared for and is ashamed of 
what he has done. People stress the standards of society, and more often 
than not he is ashamed of  being with others.”52
{Soldier A} “In 2000, when [General] Rwarakabije was found again in 
Congo, I knew of a case of an FDLR soldier who raped a woman and 
received the death penalty.”
{Soldier B} “I also know of two cases of rape in the FDLR: one of the guilty 
received 300 blows and the other 200 blows.”
{Soldier C} “In 1999, I knew of a case of an FDLR combatant who had 
raped a woman and he was killed immediately after being found guilty.”
{Soldier B} “In Congo, you can easily find a woman who will consent to 
sexual relations, so he who rapes is  indicted by the standards of the 
community; he is taken to be like those who are not normal.”53
In discussions of genital mutilation ex-FDLR fighters appeared to see such acts primarily as 
the side-effect of gang rape, and the physical damage that it does. Individual soldiers were 
held to be particularly barbaric,  accounting for some intentional damage, but not in any 
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organised sense. Similarly, combatants revealed that there were deliberate attempts to inflict 
harm via genital mutilation as a punishment of civilian populations. This was held to occur 
for one of two reasons: either because of the ethnic identity of the target population, with 
some role for ritualised behaviour by perpetrators, or because the local population had 
‘collaborated’ with enemy groups. 
Yet these were again acts attributed to the FARDC and others, rather than admitted as part 
of rebel practice. As was the case with Eriksson Baaz and Stern’s informants, the discourse 
around genital mutilation amongst ex-FDLR combatants stresses that acts are a 
consequence of ‘war culture’ – extreme practices brought about by the ‘craziness’ and 
associated stresses of combat, often related to the consumption of drugs and alcohol.54 
Some ex-combatants did suggest that some rapes were part of military strategy (an 
interesting observation given the record of informalised punishment for sexual violence 
within the FDLR), but the more widespread narrative was that fighting provided the context 
of chaos and opportunity in which sexual violence could occur, rather than sexual violence 
being an intended goal in a military strategy.
Interestingly, these soldiers, interviewed in Rwanda as ex-members of a group with 
significant sources in Rwanda, attributed the low position of women specifically to 
Congolese culture. They reported that “men are like kings” in Congo and noted in 
discussions that the role of women in Congo was far more subordinate than in Rwanda, 
even citing the low levels of female political participation in contrast to the Rwandan 
context. Congolese women were also held to be “easy” and “like prostitutes”.55 These kinds 
of distinctions do appear to have arisen out of stark contrasts in FDLR discourse between 
them and the Congolese forces they were fighting:
The other thing too is that the ideology is very, very strong. It is the ideology 
of 1993-94, the ideology of the genocide, the Interhamwe. It continues now 
at the FDLR and is strongly promoted at the highest level, at the command, 
with the politicians, and to their subordinates.56
· 294·
54! La Benevolencija Rwanda 2010:16.
55! La Benevolencija Rwanda 2010:27.
56! Leonce 2009.
These clear indications of mythological narrative operate in a telling tension with discourses 
around sexual violence. Collective identities seem very important to FDLR cohesion as a 
fighting force. But this does not seem related to rapes that they may have committed, but is 
instead to posit enemy forces as particularly brutal agents of gendered violence. Accounting 
for FDLR sexual violence relies,  as did FARDC narratives, on themes derived from the 
space of  unreason, and the stresses placed on soldiers in the context of  war.
The Devil Fools You; Or, The Mai Mai 
In several respects, Mai Mai discourse shares the same emphasis on the hardship of war and 
the special impacts of space and time on the ethics of rape that were evident in FARDC and 
FDLR discussions:
{Soldier D} “We know it's not a good thing but what do you expect? We 
spend a long time in the bush and when we meet a woman and she will not 
accept us then we must take her by force.57
To rape? Well, rape for a Mai Mai, it is Satan's work, because as people 
walk, Satan follows behind them... This means [raping] may happen to you 
when you are not prepared, but all of  a sudden, the Devil fools you.58
{Soldier E} “It's all about control. Before raping them, I made sure that the 
women were in good health. Just by looking at her, I could tell if she was 
sick or not...Well, those women [that he raped] were not taken by force. The 
thing is they were in a combat zone where most of the fighters relied on 
magic power. That magic potion worked in such a way that you've got to 
rape women in order to overcome the enemies who've invaded our country, 
the Congo. That is why all those things have happened.” 
[Lisa asks how many women he has raped]
{Soldier E} “It's hard to keep record of the number of women that I've 
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raped. The thing to keep in mind is the fact that we stayed too long in the bush 
and that induced us to rape. You know how things are in combat zones. We 
raped as we advanced village to village.”59  
Soldier E's mention of magic potions brings to the force the much clearer stress on ritualised 
collective identities of  a form suggested by mythological readings:
[Magic beliefs] are the rule, and it is our foundation. Our biggest support is 
that witchcraft. Because when we started fighting we didn't have any money 
for firearms, so, after you got the scarifications, they would provide you with 
a machete or a knife, and you'd go to war...We really believe in the 
witchcraft, so if  you don't go through the rituals, you don't go anywhere.60 
As one Mai Mai was reported as having declared during a rape:
You are our medicine and we are going to come and rape you whenever we 
want.61 
Victims and survivors reported that Mai Mai attacks often involved careful ritualisation. On 
one occasion in which 17 young girls were abducted and raped to break their virginity, the 
Mai Mai apparently collected vaginal fluids in bowls and handkerchiefs for their magical 
properties.62  Testimony gathered by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative suggests that 
initiation rituals for new soldiers were similarly coercive. The study also found that the use of 
marijuana was common to overcome fear in preparation for combat.63 
Mai Mai responses also posited instrumentalist themes suggesting that rape was sometimes 
the result of direct orders to rape, both as a kind of tithe to senior commanders and as an 
instruction that they themselves rape:
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[The commander] will have his [girl] brought first before he can ask me to 
bring mine...That is exactly what I must do. You say: 'Great chief, here is 
the girl you asked me to bring to you'.64 
We are always sent by our chiefs who tell us: 'Do this!'. Despite your refusal, 
they oblige you to do it; otherwise you will be beaten seriously. As a result, 
you will do it unwillingly. And you can even rape because of  that.65 
This second confession is particularly interesting for the way it combines a military order, 
apparently with the feel of a strategic objective,  with the absence of reflection and control 
on the part of individual soldiers who are coerced, either by direct force or social pressure, 
to rape. Alain Kasharu, an ex-Mai Mai rebel interviewed in Weapon of War,  similarly 
explains that the withdrawal of food rations by the local population led him to commit a 
series of rapes - “Looting and raping was our usual strategy”66 - yet these acts were always 
conducted with the same three friends in a gang, targeting women washing by the river. As 
such they fit a pattern in which attacks do have an economic dimension, but one which is 
frequently conceived of as a cause of frustration leading to opportunistic violence,  rather 
than as the return on an investment in gendered brutalisation. Where orders are given, they 
appear to be for sexual tributes to be given, rather than for particular resources to be 
targeted. Later Alain reflects:
When I go to sleep, I think about the bad things I did. I confess and I'm 
really sorry because I acted like an animal. My  brains didn't work like normal 
people's do. I was like a wild beast. I had no conscience,  couldn't separate good 
from bad.67
These passages certainly provide evidence of command responsibility for rapes, but the 
purpose of such rapes remain within a broad framework of unreason (the trauma and 
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suffering of war) and mythology (the need to carry out rapes for certain magical purposes to 
triumph over invading ethnic others). Instrumentalist themes of accumulation and the 
resource curse were also a way for Mai Mai combatants to characterise the behaviour of 
enemies:
The goal of  this group is to protect natural resources that are in this part of  
the country. We know already that natural resources are what motivate the 
enemy to come here.68
But,  unlike FDLR rape talk,  the framing of an enemy other in Mai Mai discourse is much 
more clearly linked to an injunction for the Mai Mai themselves to rape:
 
{Soldier F} “Well the worst acts were done by foreigners living in this area. For 
instance, when the Hutus go into a village, they'll take some women up the 
mountains, and rape them multiple times. Sometimes one woman would be 
raped by at least twenty men.” 
{Lisa} “But how is it different what he does?”
{Soldier F} “The difference between the Hutus and us?”
{Translator} “Do they enjoy gang rape more than you?”
{Soldier F} “Well, those guys have been living in the bush for too long 
without women. They've just been living like that for so long that it's very 
pitiful when they encounter a woman...Well, we were just abiding  by  the 
conditions of our magic potion. We had to rape women in order to make it work, and beat 
the enemy...Well, we were following our own rules. And they had to abide by 
our rules. They knew that having sexual relations with us would help us be 
successful in battle.
{Lisa} “So it's like patriotic to get raped?”
{Soldier F} “We raped them because of  our belief  in the magic potion.”69
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Jackson interprets this last comment as proof that soldiers are 'often' ordered to rape, 
although the rules here appear to be those imposed on sex and rape by the magic rituals of 
the Mai Mai, rather than the direct commands of a military superior for clearly defined 
objectives. This sometimes gave rise to a strange combination of hierarchical deference and 
justifications on the basis of  magic:
It was our war strategy to tattoo ourselves with magic. We cut off her 
breasts and her genitals. We laid them out to dry. Our magician used the 
ashes for the tattoos. The bullets didn't kill us. But our bullets did hit the 
enemy. Because they didn't have the magic. These are the scars from the 
tattoos. We don't give a damn, that's how it goes in the army. I could murder 
my own father. Even my mother. The army is about orders. There's no mercy.70
Other Mai Mai combatants denied that they were responsible for rape at all, citing their 
putative role as honest defenders of local communities.71  Some Mai Mai combatants 
appeared particularly aware that rape could cost them the support of those communities, 
and hence held that it was strategically irrational to commit it. They also stressed that there 
were consequences for rape (“If you commit rape and you are caught, you must be 
punished”72), although this study lacked the detail on the form and extent of punishment 
suggested by analysis of FDLR practices. This may reflect differences between militia 
groups, since Mai Mai Shikito were more likely to deny that rape happened at all,  while Mai 
Mai Kifuafua members spoke more often about women as trophies and objects of sexual 
violence.73
As with evidence from the FARDC and FDLR, Mai Mai combatants appear to differentiate 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of gendered violence, situating abduction and 
opportunistic rape as common and acceptable, but genital mutilation and the use of foreign 
objects in rape as not only unacceptable, but also horrific and criminal.74  Their narratives 
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invoke more than any others the space and time of mythology, and the special licence and 
requirements that go with a practice of fighting. As with mythological accounts more 
generally, this discourse abstracts from individual rationality and trauma to speak of 
requirements imposed by a certain collective cosmology. Marked by a political imaginary of 
vicious and threatening others, rape becomes framed as necessary to protecting themselves 
and their resources from attack. Elements of instrumentality are present in accounts of 
internal hierarchy, but the general tone is one in which the traumas and hardships of 
unreason are organised and rationalised within the rules of  a wider collective.
In Their Country, Violence Is A National Sport
The picture of attitudes to sexual violence among other armed groups does not differ 
substantially from the above analysis. A single filmed interview from Weapon of War with 
Commander Taylor of  the CNDP provides the starkest instrumentalist account:
I can state that sexual violence was our big  weapon. The leaders of our group 
organised secret meetings among colonels,  the generals and majors. They 
discussed it. We thought up strategies that ordinary militia wouldn't 
understand. We did it as a way of provoking  the Congolese government. We didn't give 
the orders, but if they  went out raping, we were proud of them...I can tell you that 
sexual violence has led to the government wanting to negotiate with us to 
reach a ceasefire, and getting us out of the jungle and into Goma. Because they  say 
we wouldn't stop raping otherwise.75 
This is a clear statement of rational purpose,  although the ends themselves are somewhat 
more complicated. There is no mention of resources as the objective, but instead a sense of 
victimisation and hardship as something to be escaped (“out of the jungle and into Goma”) 
using sexual violence as a signal to other powerful actors, including the government, that the 
CNDP are a serious security risk and therefore need to be negotiated with. By contrast, 
Laurent Nkunda himself claims that CNDP soldiers who raped were punished with death, 
killed by fellow officers of  the same rank:
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We have a military code of conduct... Rape will be punished by firing 
squad, death penalty. And it's known. And two weeks ago, two officers were 
killed for that... Officers, not soldiers... They did rape in their 
drunk[enness]. Then we called the military court, and we said now in our 
code of conduct if you rape now [slaps hands]... And we killed them there. 
Before soldiers... That's the way. It was a punishment.76
Other accounts make mention of some instrumentalist themes, but again in a particularly 
complicated way. The complexities of command are illustrated by a series of interviews with 
Captain Basima, an army chaplain in the FARDC who promotes gender awareness during 
the integration of troops into the army. In one clip he recalls the context of war rape as it 
was when he fought with the RCD:
When I fought with the RCD we didn't get any  clear orders during operations. 
But that actually stimulated soldiers to rape. We were told: when you arrive 
in a village and conquer it, everything you find is yours. The women, the 
goods, everything is yours. In fact,  it was sort of an order, like: Go, fetch and 
party.77 
As with testimony from FDLR rebels, this narrative combines an injunction to celebrate, 
dependent on gendered conception of ownership and licence, with a sense of a permissive 
atmosphere that allowed rape to take place. But it lacks the articulated instruction of 
superiors seeking to attain a given material goal by using sexual violence. Instead, rape 
appears as a release and an excessive pleasure in the context of war. We later learn that 
Basima is indeed one of  the rapists, and that one of  his victims is now his wife.78 
The 2005 joint report between two feminist networks in DRC and International Alert also 
drew on discourses of rape relating to the period around the Second Congo War.79 Two of 
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the RCD combatants interviewed repeated the combination of lust and poverty 
explanations found in other testimonies:
Militias rape and pillage because many of them are not properly organised. 
The fighters wait four months to get paid. They've got nothing to eat, they 
have to cope as best they can.80
Our combatants don't get paid. Therefore they can't use prostitutes. If we 
politely ask women to come with us, they are not going to accept. So, we 
have to frighten them to make them obey us so we can get what we want.81
RCD soldiers also engaged in familiar attributions of mythological/ideological motives to 
enemy others to explain sexual violence, locating rape as something foreign and particularly 
barbaric in the practices of  other armed groups:
The foreign militias, such as the FDD, FNL and Interahamwe are like 
mercenaries in a far-off land, where they have neither father not aunt nor 
brother and they  act without scruple. They also have to demonstrate that they 
control the area.82 
The rapes took place because the Mai Mai wanted to terrorise our soldiers. By 
raping and torturing the women, cutting off their breasts or their 
heads...they could terrorise our soldiers who might be passing that way or 
hear about these atrocities.83
It's ideological – they want to know what's happening in our ranks by making 
the women speak.84
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The same research indicated a similar discourse of war rape amongst victims themselves. 
83% of the 492 female rape survivors interviewed spoke about the causes of rape in terms 
of disorganisation and indiscipline in armed groups and 41% also stressed sexual needs on 
the part of the fighters.85  Women abducted and kept in armed group camps reported an 
interesting dynamic between accumulation and sexual violence,  one which reinforces the 
impression of  sexual violence as a reward rather than a means:
Often we saw the soldiers turning up with stolen goods and their boss, to 
reward them, allowed them two hours in which to go back to the village to 
rape, so as to satisfy their sexual needs.86
In other words, although sexual violence in this case is intimately linked to accumulation and 
war economies, it is not the sexual violence that facilitates the capture in an instrumentalist 
form, but sexual violence which allows a release and reward in unreason's terms after 
resource capture. The discourse of foreignness was common among survivors too, with 
more than 57% suggesting that rape was part of an overall plan to destroy the Congolese 
people:
They come to kill and destroy, because if it was only to satisfy their sexual 
urges, they would not set about raping 86-year-old women or children less 
than 11 years old. It means they are trying to harm and destroy.87 
They use torture to overcome and destroy us, because they are jealous of us. 
Ours is  a big country with great wealth. They were chased out of their own 
country and now they're living off the bush. They've brought a culture of 
violence with them – in their country, violence is a national sport.88 
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Compare this view with the testimony of ex-FDLR fighters, who attributed gender 
domination to Congolese culture, and saw themselves as corrupted by time in foreign lands. 
In both cases the narrative location of sexual violence in other times and spaces is repeated. 
For perpetrators, at least, this fits the justifications and excuses found by Hearn in his 
analysis of rape discourse: justifications (high responsibility/low blame) where circumstances 
are held to have forced combatants to act and to rape and excuses (high blame/low 
responsibility) where they narrate their own experiences as losing control.89
Interpreting Soldier-Rapist Testimony
This collected testimony reveals the complexity of narratives around wartime sexual 
violence, but also makes clear some prominent themes in soldier-rapist discourse. There is 
evidence in informants'  rape talk to match each of the modes. However, the discourse 
analysed also reveals clear patterning. Throughout, there was a heavy stress on themes of 
unreason. Participants and observers of wartime sexual violence in the DRC, from all 
groups and across contexts, clearly experience rape as the result of suffering and hardship,  but 
also as something that emerged from an alien space, either within themselves or from the 
chaos of the war itself. Rape was repeatedly described in terms of disgust and brutality and 
in terms of sexual lust and group bonding. The contradictory expressions captured in the 
'lust'/'evil'  rape distinction were found across groups and contexts, and appears to be 
reinforced throughout with a dependence on stimulants and drugs to remove fighting selves 
from the realities of sexual violence. Informants returned again and again to the idea that 
rape was a behaviour that escaped their control and reason, and that this was part of the 
horror of  their experiences.
Previous discussion pointed out that much existing literature conflates civilian victimisation, 
torture and sexual violence and tends to see them as closely linked to the identity and 
strategies of the armed groups that carry them out. This testimony instead illustrates the 
relative separation of practices of violence from each other and from the overall context of 
conflict. Although instrumentality and mythology are fairly commonly found in descriptions 
of the war itself and reasons for joining (protection of Congolese wealth, ethnic differences 
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with rebels or armies,  personal quests for a better life), accounts of rape focus instead on the 
loss of control, emotional needs and confusions, and the ambiguous or opposed relation 
between rape and military order.
This was in places supplemented with acknowledgement of collective imperatives and 
settings. Testimony touched on instrumentality to the extent that need was sometimes 
expressed in economic terms, although this largely lacked evidence of instructions to rape. 
Indeed, there was significantly greater discursive framing of rape as forbidden and 
punishable by extreme measures, and testimony suggested that such punishments were real, 
at least in certain phases of the war. Mythological frames were common to the extent that 
each group saw rape, and brutal rape in particular, as the province of enemy others who 
were to be resisted. The prevalence of group bonding discourse also suggests a role for 
mythology,  although one which reflects the fratriarchal enjoyment of rape rather than a 
patriarchal demand for it.
Moreover, the salient distinctions between forms of discourse appear to map the different 
institutional cultures of the different armed groups. The Mai Mai in particular appear to 
conform to mythological propositions, adopting strong senses of group cohesion and a 
developed repertoire of rituals and symbols through which they enact and make sense of 
sexual violence. They expressed clearly that they saw acts of gendered violence as necessary 
and as demanded by an external magical force. These narratives also had the flavour of 
hetero-nationalism, with both Mai Mai and FDLR forces constructing coherent accounts of 
the sexual deviance of enemy others, deviance which entitled particular actions, whether 
retributive rape for the Mai Mai or a sense that Congolese culture itself approved of rape in 
the case of  FDLR rebels.
The distinctions drawn by combatants of all allegiances clearly shows that moral codes are in 
operation. This need not rule out instrumentality in principle, although it does indicate that 
beliefs about appropriate and inappropriate gender violence are important to participants 
and perpetrators. Yet,  given the detail of responses, there is  little supporting evidence for 
instrumentalist conclusions. The persuasiveness of this  testimony thus in many ways 
supports evidence gathered from other sources and other measures. Discourses of sexual 
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violence among combatants and ex-combatants further suggest a need to rethink strongly 
instrumentalist and materialist 'weapon of war'  theses. Against the claims of activists and 
policy advisers like John Prendergast,  war rape in the DRC is, then,  much more than 
“simple economics”. The knot of economic, social and political issues is  clearly dense, but 
the accounts offered by combatants themselves are perhaps surprisingly close to the picture 
established through attention to research into rape, historical legacies of violence and 
dynamics of  accumulation in the region.
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Conclusion
WEAPONS AND MOTIVES, 
BLOODY FINGERPRINTS
It's all about strikes now
So here's what's striking me
That some punk could argue
Some moral ABCs
When people are catching
What bombers release
Well I'm on a mission to never agree
Here comes the argument
Fugazi, 'Argument'1
What, in the wake of this long analysis, are we to make of wartime sexual violence, and of 
feminist ways of accounting for it?  This thesis has made a contribution at three levels of 
inquiry. First, in terms of meta-theory and the philosophy of social science, it has offered a 
critique of the standard conceptions of feminism in IR, as either empiricist, standpoint or 
postmodern, or as an option alongside gender theory; explored alternative frameworks and 
found them unable to cover the variety of feminist claims; instead advanced a view of 
feminism as an assemblage of explanatory, political and ethical claims irreducible to any of 
those elements;  turned to a view of feminism as deploying different forms of critical 
explanation; and further specified the content of feminist modes of critical explanation for 
wartime sexual violence in terms of differing analytical wagers, narrative scripts and 
normative orientations.
Second, in terms of feminist modes of critical explanation for wartime sexual violence, the 
thesis has distinguished three (instrumentality, unreason and mythology) and proceeded to 
outline each implicit mode and its logic; to relate the modes to parallel debates and 
problems in war studies; to develop a richer understanding of the modes through their 
resonance with wider debates in feminist, gender and social theory; to identify 
discontinuities and ambiguities in each mode and across them; and to set out the variety of 
propositional forms modes may take.
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Third, the analytical framework applied to the ongoing conflict and associated sexual 
violence in the DRC has done more than offer an account of its complexity. It has shown 
how the dynamics of war and the dynamics of war rape can be separated; shown the very 
real limits of narrowly instrumental and economistic arguments about the causal role of 
natural resources in sexual violence; and provided a close working through of how the 
conjunction of modes of unreason and mythology play out in practice. Although economic 
motives are important in sustaining (and to some degree causing) violence,  rape does not 
appear to be a systematic tool aimed at accessing those resources. Victim and survivor 
reports do not indicate that rape is particularly 'ethnic' or otherwise communal in nature, 
although there are exceptions. On the contrary, many reports stress the distributed and 
fragmented character of violence carried out by combatants and civilians (although there is 
ambiguity about the exact balance). 
There are important aspects of the conflict as a whole requiring a historical and micro-level 
perspective (focusing on the fall-out from the Rwandan genocide and local land disputes) but 
these indicate a mythological and instrumental reading only in some sense. They do not, for 
example,  justify a view of rape in the DRC as a process of one-way cleansing,  or of land 
conflicts as the generative force for atrocity. Combatants' own accounts stress trauma, 
confusion and, to some degree, codes of moral behaviour that they see as breaking down in 
the pressure chamber of prolonged war. In the specific case of the Mai Mai a more 
ritualised understanding of gender is evident, and this translates into relatively clear 
repertoires of violence that indicate a pocket of mythological intensity in the midst of a 
fractured war. Compared to what is known of other cases, the DRC case thus appears to 
combine both very high levels of rape overall with a rather distributed and unclear pattern 
in the character and perpetrators of rape. Examining these dynamics in the DRC has been 
an important activity in its own right: the conclusions generated matter because they refer to 
a real case of mass human suffering, and not merely because they advance a theoretical 
agenda.
This approach has added a clarity and precision not otherwise available. By thinking of 
feminism as explanatory-political-ethical, we have been able to go beyond making rape in 
Congo visible to adjudicating, however precariously, between rival understandings of what 
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drives violence there. Via modes of critical explanation, it has been possible to distinguish 
the multiple implicit understandings of how war rape works, to trace them against a varied 
and dense empirical record, and to show where contradictory explanations rub up against 
each other. And by considering rape and war in the DRC together, both have been exposed 
as co-implicated and as importantly different: as articulated layers in a running drama of 
overlapping brutalities. In each part, the thesis has thus sought to address one of Marysia 
Zalewski's questions from Chapter 1: 'what work is gender doing?'. What work in our ideas 
of method and truth;  what work in our narratives of how rape occurs;  and what work within 
the field of  situated conflict in the Great Lakes?
The result of this three-part inquiry has been to forcefully illustrate that feminism in IR is 
not one, but many things. In this sense, a simple instrumentalist account of rape as a 
weapon of war has been jettisoned. Jettisoned only to be replaced by alternative, and more 
consistently critical, views of economic, military and material forces. Much the same can be 
said of unreason and mythology. The refusal to promote one modal truth is quite conscious. 
Each represents a sophisticated strand of feminist social thought, and cannot be disproved 
by single cases, or by refutations of one-dimensional theoretical instantiations. This may, of 
course, show that modes are too ambiguous and cumbersome constructions to be of any 
use, but my own sense is that, while the view of them promoted here may be far from 
perfect, they reflect very real challenges for explanation, ethics and politics. 
It has also become clear that feminism and critical war studies have more in common than 
has previously been supposed. Many of the key questions raised for one find parallels in the 
other. A productive conversation (and, in part, synthesis) is therefore possible. There are 
convincing feminist accounts of wartime sexual violence available for instrumentalist, 
unreason and mythological readings (and, by implication, for critical war studies), but 
matters are clarified by setting them out in detail. Given the complexity of the theoretical 
and empirical discussion, modes and logics are best understood as analytical frameworks, 
rather than as mutually incompatible theses (although in specific instantiations they can be 
contradictory). In other words, it is possible (and likely) that different conflicts will fit 
different modes and combinations of  modes. 
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Accepting this analysis nevertheless leaves some questions unanswered. It may be objected 
that the case-specific conclusions are rather straight-forward and mundane in light of the 
philosophical discussion in Part One and the convoluted resonances developed in Part Two. 
This is so especially because the inquiry into war rape in the DRC is thin on both ethics and 
politics: it represents no definitive party (beyond a blanket desire for less rape and less war) 
and advances no programme of action. This is particularly damning in light of the scale of 
intervention in the DRC, which has been examined only tangentially. There is certainly 
scope to say much more here: on the beliefs and actions of interveners, on how the 
internationalised history of the conflict has impacted on practices of sexual violence, on how 
global dynamics are implicated in dimensions of war beyond rape,  and on what should be 
done by citizens who are not of  the Congo to reconsider their roles in thought and deed.
It might be volunteered that the political intervention of the thesis is in its critique and 
extension of feminist accounts of war, and therefore in its spur to new action. But then 
academics always say that. The truth is that the kinds of politics practiced in academia – 
whilst certainly necessarily, and integral to the feminist insurgency – cannot accomplish the 
task of world transformation alone. Where they do,  it is always because they are part of a 
praxis, and maybe even then they do not play a great role. Ending rape requires a different 
kind of  political action.2
There is also much more to be said about the potential for revisiting and revising existent 
accounts of wartime sexual violence. We are only now beginning to think seriously about the 
large variation in the extent and character of rape in war. Perhaps the differences in modes 
arise as a particular consequence of the case-by-case approach, with those working on 
Bosnia or Darfur stressing military commands and strategy, while students of the Rwandan 
genocide are more alive to mythological aspects, and accounts of wartime sexual violence in 
Vietnam quicker to identify the frustration and pleasures taken by individual men as the 
running theme. If so, this may lead us to abandon any hope of a general account of 
wartime sexual violence in favour of more specific, historically located claims, or it might 
encourage us to trace connective elements across space and time. 
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Moreover, further attention to the explanatory-political-ethical character of feminist analysis 
might illuminate how this tension works in practice. The desire that arose out of Chapters 2 
and 3 was to hold on to this hybrid character,  and to make it the central argument for what 
designated feminism as such. Since this is a constitutive tension, revisiting it does not mean 
abolishing it, but better understanding how the different elements of an approach are linked 
and the impact they have on each other. In some cases, this may be grounds for re-
evaluation some assumptions and ditching others. Although the task was not undertaken in 
this thesis, it is possible that elements of feminist modes of explanation will be revealed to be 
irrelevant in practice, or misconceived in theory. 
That further work is both theoretical and empirical. The focus on a single case in this thesis 
was both defensible and productive. It would not have been possible to examine either 
differing modes or the contexts of violence in Eastern Congo whilst also addressing other 
situations of war/rape. Those cases have, of course, seeped into analysis: as the episodic 
detail at the beginning of the chapters in Part Two, as ad hoc illustrations of conceptual 
points, and as the implicit background to the discussion of the DRC as a coherent and 
bounded case. Try, for example, to think of any instance of war rape without rendering it in 
comparison to a different situation taken to be either normal or desirable. This comparative 
dimension, thus far muted, is not only desirable for comprehensiveness, but increasingly 
seems necessary to a fuller accounting of gendered violence. As Elisabeth Jean Wood's 
ongoing project suggests,  attending only to the extreme and to the horrific blinds us 
analytically to human variance and politically to the opportunities for social transformation. 
Although there are works which make use of many examples, as this thesis  has also done, 
there are none existing which seriously apply a theoretical framework to multiple cases of 
wartime sexual violence. Such works exist for revolution, for democracy, for the initiation, 
duration and cessation of war, for the dynamics of genocide and ethnic cleansing, and for 
the literary analysis of  feminist theory. But not for war rape.
A further project thus takes shape. Feminist scholarship on wartime sexual violence was 
shaped to a significant extent by the war/genocides of Bosnia and Rwanda. This 
unsurprisingly foregrounded the purposeful of sexual violence in those cases,  and its 
saturation with notions of righteous ethnic community (in the terms offered by this thesis, 
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aspects of instrumentality and mythology). We have seen that the DRC does not match this 
model,  and it is not clear that similar dynamics would be found in cases such as the 
American war in Vietnam or in the conduct of the armies that wrestled across Europe 
between 1939 and 1945. Even within the supposed 'new wars' of globalised extraction and 
communal hatred in the last decades, revealing differences may emerge. How similar is 
sexual violence in DRC and Sierra Leone? Do conditions of state terror (such as those found 
in Darfur or Zimbabwe) reflect the patterns of more conventional wars or is violence used 
principally within the confines of state torture chambers? Can we determine a greater 
malice aforethought where levels of rape are actually lower, as elites target prominent 
enemies of state, or do practices of war rape escalate in the contest of forces? Such an 
account would also allow for a comparative sociology of military cultures, and so help clarify 
whether the rape-proneness of military masculinities  constitute a kind of baseline 
explanation for wartime sexual violence, a foundation on which other factors work to either 
heighten or suppress levels of  gendered suffering.
The focus of this thesis has been on what it means to inquire into war rape as a feminist. But 
the questions raised clearly go beyond both the phenomenon and the political-intellectual 
tradition. On the one hand, the perspective developed in Part One can be applied to other 
areas within (and without)  the discipline: to the study of gender mainstreaming or 
representations in global culture or the feminisation of labour in the world economy. 
Recognising explanation as a vital part of what feminism does, and being clear about the 
terms of those explanations, engages a conversation about the direction and content of the 
disciplinary feminist insurgency itself. On the other hand, aspects of critical explanation, 
and insights from the modes and the relative disjuncture between war and rape in the DRC, 
have relevance beyond feminism. Post-colonialism too might be read as critical explanation, 
and perhaps self-consciously critical approaches of all stripes might be said to share the non-
exclusive balance of explanation, ethics and politics. Similarly, the 'synthesis' suggested with 
critical war studies above might proceed on the basis of shared meta-theoretical 
commitments or contingent interests in addressing an unfolding case of  concrete violence.
Like all theses (like all inquiry),  what is offered here is thus both a progression and an 
opening. It may become many things or nothing, a lineage that cannot be settled in advance. 
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A revealing,  to use language recalled from Chapter 1, of many different 'whys', and a 
stimulating of some new ones. A small refusal of the identity that birthright can bestow, a 
mimetic re-enactment of a political and intellectual identity,  and an attempted intervention 
in world-knowing and world-making.3
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3! The reference is to 'Refusing To Be A Man', in Propagandhi 1996. The relevant lines are: “I’m a hetero-sexist 
tragedy / And potential rapists all are we / But don’t tell me this is natural / This is nurturing / And there’s a 
diﬀerence between sexism and sexuality / I had diﬀerent desires prior to my role-remodelling / And at six years 
of age you don’t challenge their claims / You become the same / (Or withdraw from the game and hang your 
head in shame) / I think that’s exactly what I did / I tried to sever the connections between me and them / I 
fought against their further attempts to convince a kid / That birthright can bestow / The power to yield the 
subordination of women ... And I refuse to be a 'man'.”
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS
List of interviewees in Eastern DRC by date. Each respondent was asked how they would 
like to be identified in any resulting publication. Some opted for vague designations (such as 
'international official'). Others preferred more specific labels which nonetheless preserved 
their anonymity (such as 'UNICEF official'). A few, particularly Congolese respondents who 
had the most to fear from publication of their sometimes critical views, opted to be named 
in full. The below reflects those preferences.
1. Hilary Margolis,  Gender-Based Violence Program Coordinator for North Kivu, 
International Rescue Committee, Goma, 28 May 2010
2. Official, UNICEF, Goma, 1 June 2010
3. Official, UNHCR, Goma, 2 June 2010
4. Dr Muteho Kasongo, Education Rights Coordinator, ActionAid, Goma, 2 June 2010
5. Human Rights Officer, MONUC, Goma, 2 June 2010
6. Sage Mulinda, Alpha Ujuvi, NGO, Goma, 3 June 2010
7. Official, Save The Children, Goma, 3 June 2010
8. EU Gender Officer, Goma, 3 June 2010
9. Police Advisers, EUPOL, Goma, 4 June 2010
10. Adèle Safi Kagarabi, Executive Secretary of COFAS (Conseil des Organisations des 
Femmes Agissant en Synergie) and Provincial President of CPLVS (Commission 
Provinciale de Lutte Contre les Violences Sexuelles Sud-Kivu), Bukavu, 8 June 2010
11. Official, COOPI, Bukavu, 8 June 2010
12. Christine Schuler-Deschryver, V-Day, Bukavu, 8 June 2010
13. Joseph Ciza,  Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Coordinator, Heal Africa, Goma, 10 
June 2010
14. Activist, Femme Plus, Goma, 10 June 2010
15. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Officer, MONUC, Goma, 11 June 
2010
16. Official, International Alert, Goma, 11 June 2010
17. Official, UNOCHA, Goma, 15 June 2010
18. British official, Goma, 17 June 2010
19. Official, UNFPA, Goma, 17 June 2010
20. Official, War Child, Goma, 17 June 2010
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